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This study represents an attempt at analyzing the economic
forces underlying home mortgage lending in the Boston market. In
contrast to a great many related studies conducted on a nationwide
basis, the present analysis is largely confined to a restricted
geographic area. Relevant data have-been gathered from a wide
variety of sources, but an inherent lack of comparability limits
the validity of any conclusions drawn from these data alone. To
supplement these sources, valuable insights into market behavior
have been acquired through a series of fifty interviews with the
managements of local mortgage lending institutions and other in-
formed parties.
The earlier chapters of the study consider some of the primary
factors underlying tke demand for and the supply of home mortgage
credit. In each case, specific reference to the Boston situation
are preceded by a brief theoretical analysis. The role of the vari-
ous thrift institutions in the local savings market is summarized,
followed by an analysis of dividend returns on different types of
savings accounts.
Home financing has frequently been the focus of extensive
interventionary efforts on the part of state and federal govern-
ments. Part IV considers 'the salient features of some of these
programs as well as the underlying institutional background.
Primary emphasis is placed upon the activities of the Home Loan
Bank System and the Federal Housing Administration.
Home mortgage lending in the Boston area is analyzed in some
detail in Part V, concentrated primarily on the postwar situation
but with brief reference io the interwar period as well. Among
the most striking features of local market behavior are the.rapid
rise of federal savings and loan associations during the prewar
recovery years and a resurgence of mutual savings banks into domi-
nance after 1946. The methods employed in realizing these signifi-
cant gains are analyzed, considering both price and non-price com-
petitive tactics. Some insights have been gained in regard to the
lending areas of various mortgagee types, as well as the reasons ac-
counting for the continuing co-existence of adjacent institutions
with vastly differing interest rate schedules. The growth patterns
and mortgage lending policies of the five largest savings banks and
cooperative banks are compared with those of all such thrift insti-
tutions in the Boston area.
In Part VI attention is directed to the utilization of the home
loan programs of the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Ad-
ministration. Whereas both programs have enjoyed wide acceptance
throughout the nation, only the latter has played a prominent role
in the local postwar mortgage expansion. Several reasons are advanced
to account for this striking difference, chief among which concerns
the inherent capital surplus characteristics of the Boston market.
Part VII considers the development of an effective secondary
mortgage market and the strategic role assumed by the federal gov-
ernment up to this point. Local life insurance companies, savings
banks, and commercial banks have invested vast amounts of long-term
capital in insured and guaranteed mortgages throughout the nation.
The concluding Part VIII deals first with the adequacy of the
existing mortgage interest rate structure to properly compensate for
the various implicit cost components. In most cases, local lending
institutions have been able- to accumulate generous surplus reserves
and appear to be well fortified against a possible downturn in eco-
nomic activity and an attendant rise in mortgage foreclosure. The
final section analyzes the favorable influence of federal interven-
tionary efforts upon the competitive structure of the Boston mort-
gage market, particularly with reference to the activities of the
Federal Housing Administration and Home Loan Bank System.
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PART I. CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The home ortgage market performs a vital function in any economy
where individual home ownership .predominates. By providing long-term
financing, mortgage lenders have facilitated home purchase among fami-
lies lacking the financial resources to pay cash in full. Inasmuch as
the various contract provisions offered by mortgage lenders affect
overall opportunities for home ownership, the mortgage network is
intimately connected with the socio-economic welfare of the community
and nation. Largely because of this close inter-relationship, home
financing has frequently been the focus of extensive intervention on
the part of state and federal governments.
Not only has the mortgage network made home ownership possible
for millions of families otherwise destined to be tenants, but it has
also provided institutional investors a highly desirable investment
outlet. For many thrift institutions savings capital has always been
directed primarily into mortgage channels, regardless of minor develop-
ments in other financial markets. By making such investments, local
savings institutions not only discharge an essential community obliga-
tion but realize net yields which on the average compare quite favorably
with those on alternative investments. Unlike mortgage operations in
Europe, however, a specialized type of mortgage lending institution has
not emerged as such in this country, with the result that a wide variety
of lending agencies supply home financing needs.
The home mortage market, as the largest sector in urban real estate
financing, represents a major factor in the aggregate long-term capital
market. De spite its continuing significance, however, home mortgage
lending has displayed a wide variation through the years, following to
some extent the violent fluctuations in new home construction as well
as general real estate activity. Largely because of the essentially
long-term nature of home financing as well as the low level of repay-
ment during depression periods, the outstanding debt has been somewhat
more stable. Nevertheless, from a peak of $19.6 billion in 1930, the
nationwide mortgage debt on 1- to 4-family dwellings fell to $16.7
billion by 1933, thereafter rose but slightly through the subsequent
war years. During the postwar expansionary period, the home mortgage
network has been called upon to finance a housing boom of unprecedented
proportions, with the outstanding debt rising abruptly from $19.2
2billion in 1945 to $43.3 billion by 1951.
The structural composition of the urban mortgage debt is heavily
influenced by the type of dwelling unit dominating new construction.
Since the mid-1920s, there has been a pronounced shift away from large
rental units in favor of small 1- to 4-family homes. As a result,
the home mortgage segment of the aggregate urban mortgage debt has
steadily mounted in importance, rising from a low of 50.3 per cent in
1932 to 63.9 per cent by 1948.3 This pronounced shift is not wholly
the result of free market activity, however, for especially since the
lIn 1949, the $1l:3 billion private long-tem debt was distributed
into these broad categories: corporate debt, $54.4 billion; farm
mortgages, $5.4 billion; nonfarm mortgages, $51.5 billion. Economic
Almanac, 1951-2, National Industrial Conference Board, p. 216.
2Survey of Current Business, Department of Commerce. For years up to
1949, see issue for October 1950.
3 Ibid.
depression years the rise in owner-occupancy has been heavily influenced
by federal interventionary measures.
Undoubtedly the most widely known instrument used in urban real
estate finance is the mortgage contract. The popular conception of
the mortgage as a debt is misleading and technically incorrect, as it
is simply a pledge of collateral to secure the accompanying note. Since
both are essential in any mortgage transaction, however, the term mort-
gage will frequently be used throughout the study as a convenient ab-
breviation for the technically correct "mortgage loan."
The legal and institutional framework surrounding mortgage fi-
nancing has undergone substantial modifications through the years,
generally benefiting the rights and privileges of the debtor. This
development has been far from uniform across the country, however,
with the result that foreclosure and title laws vary widely among the
states. Furthermore, land contracts and trust deeds are common in some
regions, while in others conventional mortgage. lending constitutes the
primary method of financing real estate transfers. In the latter case,
the mortgage contracts written may be classified according to the pri-
ority attached to their claims. Where the borrower is able to secure
the necessary funds from a single source, only a first mortgage loan
is involved. Frequently, however, the proceeds of a single loan are
inadequate to supplement the limited savings of the mortgagor, with
the result that second and even third mortgage loans are sought for
See M. L. Colean, The Impact of Government On Real Estate Finance in
he United States,National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1950.
2See E. M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets and Their Financing Needs,
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York~ 1951, Chapter II.
additional funds.
Most home mortgage contracts written in recent years have been
of two basic varieties in regard to principal repayment. A straight-
term mortgage provides for full repayment only after a fixed term has
elapsed, while interest is payable on a monthly or quarterly basis.
Although such contracts are seldom written for terms exceeding 3 to 5
years, the essentially long-term character of home financing has neces-
sitated successive loan renewals if foreclosure is to be averted. The
obvious dangers involved in making straight-term mortgages have prompted
a universal preference among borrower and lender alike for fully amor-
tized loans. As a popular variant of this second loan type, direct-
reduction mortgages specify level monthly payments for a stated number
of years, by which time the debt is fully retired. By making small
monthly payments, the home buyer accumulates an increasing equity in
the property without being liable for large lump-sum payments. At the
same time, the lender is able to base his lending operations upon a
more predictable rate of repayment inflows, and is effectively spared
from extensive holdings of frozen assets on which large due payments
cannot be collected. When level monthly mortgage payments are made
over the entire loan term, the interest component generally absorbs
most of the earlier payments but the principal component becomes in-
creasingly significant as repayment proceeds. For example, on a 4 per
cent, 20-year mortgage, a level monthly payment of $6.06 per $1,000
1Junior financing was especially widespread before the recent depres-
sion, when lenders restricted loan-value ratios to 50 or 60 per cent.
of original loan amount is required. The interest component on the
first such payment is $3.33, but declines continuously with succeeding
payments.
An examination of the various contract provisions included in
direct-reduction loans demonstrates the degree of complexity as well as
flexibility in the mortgage price structure. Although contract inter-
est rates are generally regarded as the basic cost element in mortgage
lending, other elements are equally determining at least so far as
demand functions are concerned. With debt repayment arranged on a
convenient monthly basis, home buyers are frequently more concerned
with the amount of this monthly payment than with the specific interest
rate or loan term. In many cases the maximum loan amount granted on
a given property is the all-determining factor in a prospective home
purchase, especially where secondary financing is unavailable or un-
wanted. In view of their widespread acceptance in recent years,
direct-reduction mortgages have been tabbed as the innovation which has
made home building the "biggest new industry since World War II."l
The rapid growth in mortgage operations during the postwar period,
as well as increasing evidence of major structural changes in the mort-
gage network itself, renders an analysis of home financing particularly
relevant at this time. The outstanding mortgage debt is at an unpre-
cedented pea4 level, and portfolios of institutional lenders are filled
with unseasoned, high-percentage loans based on highly inflated market
valuations. At the same time, however, mortgage investors are increas-
Address of P. I. Prentice, editor and publisher of Magazine of Building,
at 1951 Convention of Mortgage Bankers Association of America, re-
printed in Boston Sunday Herald, September 23, 1951.
ingly interested in the development of an effective secondary market,
whereby long-term home credit may flow freely from areas of surplus
to those of want.
Inasmuch as the home mortgage market constitutes a principal sector
in the economy, considerable attention has been focused upon these
developments throughout the nation. So that all parties concerned may
acquire a more thorough understanding of mortgage lending, its methods,
achievements, and shortcomings, various private and public groups have
conducted extensive research studies during recent years. In addition
to regular staff analyses by affiliated housing agencies, the central
Housing and Home Finance Agency has sponsored a series of local and
national studies to be conducted by numerous colleges and universities. 1
Various private foundations have also undertaken serious analyses of
home mortgage lending, frequently with an eye toward a better under-
standing of the fundamental causes of the disasterous loss experience
of the 1930s. Through a realization of past errors in mortgage policy,
lending institutions as well as governmental planners may become better
fortified against a repetition of this experience.
As might be expected, many such studies have been nationwide in
scope, analyzing the overall impact of various private and public
institutional forces upon the structure and behavior of the mortgage
market. At the present time the National Bureau of Economic Research
is conducting a series of individual studies under a special Urban
Two such mortgage studies have been reviewed in Housing Research,
HHFA, Fall, 1951, dealing with both a small (Hagerstown, Md.) and
a metropolitan mortgage market (San Francisco.)
Real Estate Finance Project. Some of these studies consider the overall
nature of the mortgage market, while others consist of statistical sur-
veys of lending operations of certain institutions since 1920. At least
three of these investigations have already been published, while several
1
others are still in preparation. In the prewar period, two studies of
a more regional nature were published, one dealing with cooperative
banking in Massachusetts and the other, savings banking in New York
State.2 During the early postwar years, Professor Lintner conducted
a thorough study of the savings and mortgage activities of mutual savings
banks, concentrating on the Massachusetts situation but having direct
application to the nationwide market. 3
While aggregative analyses are admittedly essential in acquiring
an understanding of overall mortgage lending activity, the merits
of a restricted market study should not be overlooked. In the former,
lThose completed include Colean, The Impact of Government on Real Estate
Finance in the United States; Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life
Insurance Companies; Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets and Their Finan-
cing Needs. Studies yet to be published include analyses of Economic
Fluctuations and Urban Real Estate Finance, Commercial Bank Activities
in this field, HOLC operations, and Comparative Markets and Risk Exper-
ience of Mortgage Lenders.
2D. H. Davenport, The Cooperative Banks of Massachusetts, Business
Research Studies No. 20, Graduate Schoolof Business Administration,
Harvard University, Boston, 1938; W. Welfling, Savings Banking in New
York State, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1939.
3John lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings and Mortgage Markets,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston,
1948. This study was financed by the Savings Banks Association of
Massachusetts.
many significant differentials among the areas included are concealed
or largely offset by counterbalancing forces elsewhere. When a small
area is concerned, prevailing relationships are heavily influenced by
institutional and legal factors peculiar to that area, and hence are
not readily applicable to all markets alike. Nevertheless, due allow-
ance can often be made for such factors, and some significant behavior
patterns may be revealed from a local analysis of this nature.
The present study represents an attempt at shedding some light on
mortgage lending activity within the Boston area. In contrast to the
statistical nature of the various National Bureau surveys, this study
has depended upon personal interviews as a primary source of material.
Relevant data have been gathered from a wide variety of sources, but
their lack of comparability severely limits the validity of any con-
clusions drawn therefrom. Such difficulties undoubtedly arise in most
empirical studies of this nature, but, by a careful and discriminating
examination of the available data, reasonably valid insights into
market behavior can often be gained. Where relevant data are completely
lacking, however, heavy reliance must be placed upon the informed
judgment of interviewed parties.
Since the sources cited in the text have compiled their data
for widely different purposes, the bases for inclusion and classifi-
cation are far from uniform. Some deal only with institutional holdings
of the outstanding mortgage debt as a whole, while others are concerned
solely with mortgages on small 1- to 4-family properties. The Bureau
of the Census generally provides separate treatment for single-family
homes, but in 1940 its home mortgage surveys were restricted to owner-
occupied dwellings.
Perhaps an even more limiting factor concerns the non-uniformity
in geographic coverage among the various sources. Although most data
refer to mortgage lending activity in the Boston area alone, some are
available only for Massachusetts or even for all of New England. Within
the more restricted area, the Federal Reserve Board breaks down their
findings only on a county-wide basis, whereas the Bureau of the Census
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics use the standard Boston Metropolitan
Area as the covered territory. The Metropolitan Area as defined by the
Census is almost wholly included within four counties surrounding Boston
proper, and constitutes slightly over four-fifths of the combined popu-
lation of these counties* Even when dealing in Census data alone,
however, full comparability is lacking because the "Metropolitan Area"
as defined in 1950 was slightly less extensive than the "Metropolitan
District" of 1940, largely because of the elevation of the Brockton
vicinity to the status of metropolitan area in-the most recent survey.1
1 )uDring the decade of the 1940s, population increased roughly 9 per- cent
(presumably for the same coverage), with the 1950 figure for the Boston
Standard Metropolitan Area being 2.37 million. At the present time
there are 65 cities and towns included in this Area, distributed in 5
counties thus (1950 figures in thousands):
County Population within Met. Boston % of County Pop. within
Met. Bosto
Suffolk 896.6 100.0
Middlesex 852.3 80.0
Norfolk 339.0 86.5
Essex 268.2 51.4
Plymouth 14.0 7.4
Since such a small proportion of the Metropolitan Area is within
Plymouth County, only the first h counties are included in this study.
The total population of the h counties was 2.88 million in 1950, -with
2.34 million being within the Metropolitan Area. 1950 Census of
Housing, Preliminary Reports.
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In view of the limited resources available for this project, more
concentrated analysis has been confined to mortgage operations in those
communities located wholly or in part thereof within a 10-mile radius
of Boston City Hall. This restricted area includes 32 cities and towns,
and contains over 85 per cent of the total population of the Metropolitan
Boston Area. (See Chart I.) Most of the lenders interviewed are lo-
cated within this 10-mile region, and all data compiled from annual
reports of state- and federally-chartered thrift institutions are
similarly chosen. Unless the Standard Metropolitan Area or the four-
county region are mentioned by name, data presented in the text refer
to mortgage lending activity within the 10-mile area exclusively. This
latter geographic area is alternately termed "Boston area," "immediate
Boston vicinity, " "metropolitan Boston," etc.
For the most part, location of the lending institution rather
than pledged property is used as the basis for classification in this
study. In other words, unless stated otherwise, data on mortgage lend-
ing activity within the "immediate Boston vicinity" refer to mortgage
operations of lenders with headquarters in this restricted area. While
it will be shown that most thrift institutions concentrate lending
operations on properties within their immediate community, property
location is not coincident with lender location in all cases. On the
contrary, several locally organized institutions, notably life insurance
companies, are relatively. active in the nationwide mortgage market but
are of minor importance in the local area. Because of the capital
surplus characteristics of the Boston market, most inter-regional flows
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of mortgage credit represent exported funds, with the reverse movement
being of negligible significance. In some cases, however, data are
classified according to property location in which event valuable
insights can be gained into policies regarding geographic lending areas
among local thrift institutions.
This study is concerned primarily with home mortgage lending
operations in the Boston area during the postwar period. The material
in the study is presented in 8 parts and 15 chapters, the first of
which is this introductory discussion. In Parts II and III the major
demand and supply forces underlying home mortgage lending are analyzed,
first on a quasi-theoretical plane, and then with specific reference
to the Boston market. Part IV summarizes some characteristic weaknesses
in the pre-depression mortgage market, followed by a description of
the principal methods by which the government has attempted to eliminate
or largely overcome these weaknesses. Part V- presents specific data on
mortgage operations of local lending institutions, as well as an analysis
of relative contract terms and lending practices. The utilization of
the FHA and VA home loan programs is analyzed in Part VI, including the
primary reasons accounting for the low seald of insured lending on the
local level.- The development of an effective secondary mortgage market
is considered in Part VII, with special emphasis given to the contri-
bution of insured and guaranteed loans in this development. The con-
cluding Part VIII analyzes the soundness of the existing mortgage struc-
ture as well as the influence of federal interventionary efforts upon
the competitive structure of the local market.
PART II. DEMAND FORCES: THE MORTGAGOR
CHAPTER 2. SOME THEEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The demand for home mortgage credit is closely related to the
demand for real.housing assets. Unless the refinance of an existing
obligation is involved, mortgage credit is sought primarily in con-
nection with the purchase of a new or standing house. The demand for
mortgage credit is commonly referred to as being "derived" from the
outside housing market. In view of the indispensability of appropriate
financing in most home purchases, however, a "joint" demand relation-
ship may be a bit more realistic. 1 Because of the interdependence be-
tween the mortgage and real estate markets, this chapter will consider
some of the principal forces underlying the demand for housing assets
before analyzing mortgage demand directly.
THE HOUSING MARKET
Fundamentally, the demand for mortgage credit as well as for housing
assets largely depends upon the demand for and supply of real housing
services. These housing services constitute an essential item in every
family budget, although the precise services sought by a particular
household must be determined in the Walrasian general equilibrium system,
given-incomes, tastes, technology, etc. The composite demand for these
1For the implications of this observation, see "Mortgage Demands of
Owner-Occupants" below.
services is translated into dollar rentals, and interacts with the
existing supply in determining the market rental structure. For our
immediate purposes, the distribution of the ownership of housing assets
is unimportant, as all family units are treated as if they were tenants.
If an individual were an owner-occupant, his behavior as a consumer of
housing services is analytically distinct from that as an investor in
this particular form of asset.
The "supply of housing services" of course refers to the utiliza-
tion of housing inventory, whether it be newly-constructed or older
property. In theory, the present value of this stock is found by ap-
plying the relevant discount factor to anticipated future net revenues.1
As .a result of competition among buyers and sellers of housing assets,
market price tends to gravitate toward this value. These capitalized
values thence tend to rise and fall with fluctuations in dollar rentals.
The latter, in turn, depend on shifts in the demand and/or supply sche-
dules for housing services. Hence, real estate valuations, in theory
at least,, are a function of the forces determining the basic demand for
and supply of housing services.
This observation is not at all surprising, for the same elementary
principles apply equally well to pricing in all commodity markets.
Nevertheless, the extreme durability of housing inventories gives rise
The determination of the "appropriate" discount factor is a subject
for analytical study, whether it relates to lending rates, borrowing
rates, short or long rates, or some other economic variable. See the
discussion of FHA capitalization methods in Chapter 8.
to certain distinguishing market characteristics. Real estate markets
are largely dominated by the behavior of a vast standing stock, and
annual additions or diminutions to this inventory appear relatively
insignificant. This observation is easily verified by considering the
ratio of annual nonfarm housing starts to existing stocks. Even in 1950,
when an all-time high of 1.4 million units were started in the nation,
new construction represented but 3.5 per cent of the standing inventory
of 39.4 million dwelling units. 1
Not only is the total stock of housing relatively inflexible in
number but it is also fixed as to location. Automobiles, furniture and
other consumer durables are relatively mobile as families move about,
while a house can be moved only at great expense, if at all. Prefab-
ricated housing has facilitated a more responsive adjustment of production
2to changes in location of demand concentration,, but under existing
1 Compare data on housing starts presented in Chart I with the total
stock of 29.7 million units in 1940 and 39.4 million in 1950. The
durability of housing assets is demonstrated by the following age
distribution of over 28 million urban dwelling units, as of 1950:
Year Built Per cent of Drelling Units Reporting
All years 100.0%
1945 or later 11.8
1940 to 1944 7.7
1930 to 1939 11.8
1920 to 1929 22.2
1919 or earlier 46.4
Source: Bureau of the Census, presented in Economic Almanac 1951-1952,
National Industrial Conference Board, p. 410.
2Some folding houses are designed to permit repeated moving even after
the unit has once been assembled, e.g., Acorn Houses.
technology, factory-built homes have enjoyed only limited public
acceptance.
As a result of this extreme stock-flow relationship, supply
schedules of housing services change but slowly over a period of time.
As a consequence, dollar rentals in a free market are largely demand
determined, and may display erratic behavior at times. In the very
short run, the physical stock of housing is absolutely fixed and the only
adjustment in market offering to various prices involves doubling-up
or vacancies among the standing units.
The Rate of Utilization of Housing Facilities
In a theoretical equilibrium situation, the existing stock of
housing facilities would be used to best advantage, with rents and
home prices tending to remain unchanged. Under such circumstances, the
"rate of utilization" of the standing stock -would be at an optimal
level, and instances of involuntary doubling-up or property vacancy
would be only transitory and of minor significance in the aggregate.
On the other hand, it is entirely probable that a certain amount of
doubling-up would persist even under equilibrium conditions, for some
members of the economy may be unable or ill-advised to seek their owri
2housing accommodations for long periods of time.
'The concept "rate of utilization," which might be defined as the
degree to which the existing stock of housing is being occupied or
used up, was used by Professor Ernest Fisher in an address before the
1951 Convention of Massachusetts Savings Bankers. Reprinted in U.S.
Investor, September 29, 1951, pp. 1861-4.
21f general equilibrium were obtained throughout the economy, relative
prices would be established so as to stimulate sufficient new construc-
tion to offset the real depreciation of the hitherto standing stock.
In a growth economy, because of pressures of population growth, rising
incomes, etc., new construction would exceed this depreciation; and
conversely in a declininge-economy.
If the supply of housing services were to become excessive relative
to the equilibrium level (or alternatively if the demand were to become
ddficient), the "rate of utilization" of existing facilities would fall
below the theoretical optimal level. In this event, vacancies would mount
and dollar rentals as well as current market valuations on housing as-
sets would display a downward tendency. Such an"unemployment" situa-
tion may persist for long periods of time, as the housing stock has a
long average life and is seldom diminished by an appreciable extent
during any one year. Natural catastrophes, such as fires, floods, and
storms, destroy some units, while others are intentionally demolished
in connection with changes in land use or urban redevelopment. During
the decade of the twenties, however, the total number of dwelling units
withdrawn from use for all reasons probably represented less than 10
2per cent of the number of new units put in place.
In the past, the economy seldom had to wait upon full physical
depreciation of standing stock before the rate of utilization would
rise again. Ordinarily rising incomes and population pressures would
induce a secular increase in overall demand for housing services.
This outward shift in demand would intersect the relatively stationary
1 By 1940, the net vacancy ratio in the U. S. had declined to 4.8 per
cent, and by 1950, only 1.77 per cent of all nonfarm dwelling units
were involuntarily vacant. The corresponding ratios for Massachusetts
and Metropolitan Boston in 1950 were 2.4 and 2.0 per 'cent, respectively.
1950 Census of Housing, Preliminary Reports, Series, HC-1, No. 28.
2L. J. Chawner, "Economic Factors Related to Residential Building,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
March 1937, pp. 27-2b.
supply schedule at a higher price and at a point of more complete
utilization of the standing stock. Hence, dollar rentals would once
again rise to the equilibrium level, and asset valuations would begin
to turn up.
If, on the other hand, the demand for housing services were to be-
come excessive relative to the equilibrium level (or if supply were to
become deficient), the rate of utilization would rise above the theore-
tical optimum level. Under such circumstances, rentals would mount
significantly, a "housing shortage" would develop, and doubling-up
would become widespread in the areas concerned. Once again, a dis-
equilibrium situation may prevail for several years, despite the fact
that new production would take place as soon as rental prospectsl rise
sufficiently to push capitalized values of housing assets above current
costs of construction. As has been true of the postwar housing boom,
builders continue to put up new dwelling units as long as anticipated
market conditions permit their sale at a profit. This situation obtains
notwithstanding the restraints of Regulation X and other governmental
2credit regulations. Construction activity is not confined to new
dwelling units alone, for during such boom periods existing properties
undergo extensive repair, modernization and conversion.
Although new construction is undertaken and maintained only so
long as anticipated market valuations exceed total production costs,
the latter hardly functions as an upper limit to the former. As data
It is to be remembered that rentals in this connection refer to
compensation for housing services, whether the occupants are tenants
or owners.
2If direct controls over prices, wages, materials allocations, etc.,
were assumed, this statement would require modification.
on new construction indicate, construction activity even in peak years
adds but a small amount to the aggregate housing inventory. Hence, it
may take several years before the rate of utilization and dollar rentals
fall sufficiently so that selling prices drop to a level approximating
current costs of production. The fact that market valuations may exceed
production costs for long periods of time reflects not only the length
of the planning and construction period, but also imperfect knowledge,
financing difficulties, heavy risk, etc. Furthermore, the return to
equilibrium may be indefinitely extended if active building operations
are accompanied by outward demand shifts, which in turn tend to increase
the rate of utilization. This type of inflationary race has charac-
terized much of the postwar housing boom. As late as 1950, nearly 2
million families across the nation were still doubled up, despite an
unprecedented volume of new home building. Indeed, only after market
valuations drop below the level of current costs of construction mould
new production be curtailed or eliminated.
It is precisely this derivative nature of new construction, as
well as its undisciplined, localized operations, that subjects the
industry to such a feast and famine existence. The severity of the
Sample surveys of doubling-up have revealed these statistics for
selected years:
Date Estimated Number of Families
Doubled Up (C06)
April 1, 1940 1,846
April 15, 1947 2,712
April 15, 1949 2,0o
March 15, 1950 (preliminary) 1, 880
Source: Savings Bank Trust Company, Mortgage Statistics Bulletin,
1951, p. 14.
swings in private home construction is vividly illustrated by Chart I
on private home building in the country. Costs of production perform
the same function in housing just as in all other commodity markets.
In the case of most consumer items, however, market price fluctuates
quite closely about reproduction costs. Inventories undergo fairly
rapid turnover as consumers purchase these non-durables frequently,
and consumption accordingly follows production and distribution very
closely.
In the construction industry, however, a relative surplus of
standing inventories distributed throughout the economy may render
new production unprofitable for long periods of time. Construction
costs tend to remain fairly stable in the short run, while capitalized
values fluctuate widely, as a result of shifts in prospective net
rentals or in the rate of discount applied to these revenues. In de-
pressed periods, costs seldom decline as rapidly as do real estate
values, and similarly cost advances rarely keep pace with boom price
movements. Indeed, current wage rates and material costs are deter-
mined by forces operating without as well as within the home building
industry, and hence tend to follow overall economic developments rather
2
than home construction activity alone. As new construction is revived
Or within certain regions.
2 The rigidity of wage rates is also heavily influenced by labor union
efforts, imperfect knowledge, etc.
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Source: National Industrial Conference Board, Road Map of Industry,
No. 834 and Housing Statistics, HHFA, January 1952, p. 2.
following a period of inactivity, factor resources are initially
absorbed from unemployed pools at existing prices. But as operations
expand, these factors of production must be bid away from alternate uses
by offering higher factor prices. Hence in the later stages of a boom,
costs of construction gradually approach and in practice may surpass
capitalized values of housing assets.
There is undoubtedly a considerable lag between the point of
stimulus and the time when newly-constructed units are available for
occupancy. This period of gestation has frequently been analyzed by
students to determine its role in aggravating economic fluctuations.
Inadequate market knowledge coupled with other imperfections may give
rise to overinvestment and an ensuing painful period of readjustment.
A careful examination of cyclical behavior in the housing industry
cannot be included in this study, but several empirical investigations
have been conducted in this field.
Anticipating Price Changes
Professor Ernest Fisher has formulated a series of tables demon-
strating the influence of anticipated price changes on current market
valuations.2 If an individual home buyer expected real estate prices
to remain constant for several years, he would feel justified in
lSee W. H. Newman, The Building Industry and Building Cycles, University
of Chicago Press, 1939; C. I). Long, Building Cycles and the Theory of
Investment, Princeton University Press, 1940; J. R. RiggTlean, "Build-
ing Cycles in the United States," 1875-1932, Journal of the American
Statistical Association, June 1933; and others.
2E. M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets and Their Financing Needs,
0k. cit., Chapter I.
paying no more than the prevailing price. If he believed a subsequent
resale of the property would bring in a sizeable capital gain he may be
willing to pay a little more. If he believed market price would advance
at a rate of 5 per cent per year for 5 successive years and then remain
steady, a house costing $10,000 could be sold for $12,760 at the end
of the 5-year period. If this inflationary expectation were shared
by buyer and seller alike, the prospective capital gain would be re-
flected in the current price. Assuming a 4 per cent discount rate, the
price would approach $12,271, the exact amount depending upon the rela-
tive bargaining strength of the two parties as well as the firmness of
their convictions. Largely because of an acute lack of knowledge in
the real estate market, this process tends to accelerate rates of price
change, whether in expanding or declining periods. Once such a price
rise is underway, buyers and sellers may alter their convictions in the
direction of a more rapid or of a more enduring inflationary spiral.
Although he may not always calculate the precise discounted value
of these prospective increments, the actual home buyer certainly con-
siders resale value as a vital factor in arriving at a maximum offering
One of two tables presented in Fisher's study will be reproduced in
part here, from which the above example has been drawn:
Index of Price in Period Index of Pres
Period N (Assuming 5% Rise per Period) Price (where disco
0 100.0 100.00
105.00 lo4.81
2 110.25 109.48
3 115.76 114.0l
4 121.55 118.42
5 127.63 122-71
Source: Ibid. The index is found directly by this formula:
.2.= /If o [f/ "/, where
r expected rate of change in price, and
i= rate of discount.
ent
int rateh%)
1
price. Furthermore, the market interaction of buyers and sellers in
making due allowance for price changes would result in a schedule
similar to that described above. On the other hand, under a theoretical
perfect capital market situation, one might say that the problem of
flanticipating" price changes does not exist as such, but rather reflects
more fundamental developments in the market. Investors in housing as-
sets base their offering price upon the present discounted value of
all expected future net revenues, consisting mainly of rental incomes.
Hence, from a purely economic point of view, the only items that might
change present values of such assets are changes in expected net rentals
or in the rate of discount, and, at any moment of time, competition
among buyers and sellers would insure that market valuations approach
these present values. If, for instance, net rentals were expected to
increase, a buyer would feel justified in paying more for a property
than if he expected them to remain constant or decrease. In other words.,
if he firmly believes his housing asset could be resold at a higher
price five years after its purchase, he implicitly assumes rising rent-
als or declining interest rates for discounting purposes. To summarize,
elementary economic theory describes the market value of any good as
the present worth of a series of flows. Nevertheless, in the real
housing market, prospective buyers and sellers follow a behavior pat-
tern quite similar to that as described by Professor Fisher in allowing
for anticipated price movements.
Rental- vs. Owner-Occupancy
The previous discussion has not been concerned whatever with the
distribution of home ownership throughout society. Under the
restrictive assumptions postulated, it is really trivial to consider who
selects this type of earning asset as an investment outlet. By and large,
however, private demanders for assets in housing fall into these four
categories: (1) owner-occupiers, who purchase a home for direct amenity-
income purposes; (2) true investors, who purchase such assets solely for
their money-income earning capacity; (3) combinations of the above,
especially where the owner occupies one unit of a 2- to 4-family property;
(4) speculative builderw, who may lease newly-constructed units for a
short period, perhaps speculating on a price advance before selling. In
the case of an owner-occupier, it would be theoretically correct to fol-
low the suggestion of the nineteenth-century French economist, Walras:
. . . (A) man who buys a home to live in may be disassociated into
two individuals, one of whom makes an investment and the other consumes
1directly the service of his capital." Under these circumstances, a
competitive rent would be imputed to the home owner by himself as if
he were a tenant, and payment for the undepreciated portion of the
Leon Walras, Elements, p. 242, quoted in G. J. Stigler, Production
and Distribution Theories, Macmillan, New York, 1941, p. 26.
property would be met out of savings. Certainly either type of home
purchaser must bear the many risks of physical depreciation, obsolescence,
adverse price movements, etc., associated with any capital investment.
Hence, in theory at least, a home purchase is considered in the light
of the relative attractiveness of alternative investment outlets, such
as government bonds, private securities, savings and loan shares, and
other real investments.
Realistically, the first two categories of property owners deserve
individual examination, since vastly different forces may underlie their
investment decisions. Even if the capitalization process were faith-
fully employed by both types -of purchasers, owner-occupiers may evaluate
certain "services" by a weighting system far different from that applied
by professional investors. Individualistic features may hold great
esteem for the former, but business investors must analyze the general
acceptability and marketability of a property in considering its pur-
chase. The latter may be relatively mobile and objective in placing
their funds to secure an optimum yield. The typical home purchaser, on
the other hand, is confined to a restricted geographic area, is inex-
perienced and poorly informed concerning market developments, and may be
1 For national income purposes, the 'Department of Commerce includes in
the item "rental income of persons" the imputed net rental return to
owner-occupants of non-farm residences. The number, type and size of
such houses are obtained from census data. Estimates of the gross rental
value of these houses are made on the basis of current rents paid for
comparable tenant-occupied units. Net imputed rent is then determined by
deducting depreciation, maintenance and other expenses from gross esti-
mates. R.- Ruggles, An Introduction to National Income and Income Analysis,
McGraw-Hill, New Yor7 1949, p. 121.
unduly influenced by the many intangibles associated with home ownership.
In addition to the above inherent distinguishing characteristics,
governmental intervention has further withdrawn this decision-making
from a relatively free market. Rent control has undoubtedly had a
bearing on new rental construction and, in turn, on the relative avail-
ability of rental units.2 Ceilings on rentals coupled with outright
federal encouragement of individual home ownership hare introduced a strong
bias in favor of the latter. The personal income tax structure through
allowing interest payments as a deductible item, in addition to the
FHA and GI home loan programs, grants special concessions to the owner-
occupant. Undoubtedly many families in the postwar period have been
virtually compelled to purchase their own homes simply because rental
units were not obtainable at a reasonable price.3
1See Abrams, The Future of Housing, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1946.
2 Compare Lloyd Rodwin, "Rent Control and Housing," Social Research,
September, 1950, pp. 302-319, and G. J. Stigler and M. Friedman, -Roofd
vs. Ceilings, Foundation for Economic Education, New York, 1947.
3The shift that has taken place is clearly indicated by the following
percentage breakdown on the types of structures constructed in selected
years in the United States.
Percentage of total units in -
Year 1-family structures Rental-type structures
2-family Multifamily
1927 56.1 12.2 31.7
1936 76.5 4.h 19.1
1940 80.6 6.2 13.2
1946 88.0 3.6 8.h
1948 82.3 5.0 12.7
1950 preliminary 83.0 3.0 14.0
Source: Housing Statistics, HHFA, January 1951, p. 4.
In the present study of the Boston home mortgage market, only the
owner-occupant type of home purchaser will be examined in detail. Wherever
possible, data will be broken down so as to refer directly to this impor-
tant branch of the overall mortgage market.
MORTGAGE IEMANDS OF 0YNER-OCCUPANTS
The purchase of a new or existing home requires an outlay much
1larger than the typical family's accumulated savings. To channel the
flow of credit from those individuals or institutions with an abundance
of liquid holdings to those with a deficiency, the home mortgage system
has been established. The classical economist's "effectual" demand
postulated both willingness and ability to pay-when applied to home
2purchase, "ability" usually entails the use of mortgage financing.
Since financing plays such a prominent role in the housing market,
it might be argued that mortgage costs should be an element in the cost
of the asset itself. Pare theory would dictate, however, that methods
1 The Federal Reserve estima es that 31 per cent of all spending units
in the nation held no liquid assets in .1950; 27 per cent held between
$1 and $499; and 9 per cent held $5,000 or more in this form. Economic
Almanac, 1951-1952, p. 149. These data may be compared with $85 the
estimated construction cost for the average single-family dwellings in
the same year. Housing Statistics, January 1951, p. 6.
2Land contracts, widely used in the Middle West, are rare in the loc al
area as an alternative method of financing. In the Metropolitan Boston
Area, 94 per cent of all new single family homes purchased during late
1949 and early 1950 involved mortgage financing. (From an unpublished
sample survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.) When mort-
gage financing is not used, perhaps the buyer frequently pays for the
new property with the proceeds of a previous home sale.
of finance have nothing to do with basic economic values, and that mort-
gage loans merely involve a reapportionment of the economy's liquid
holdings. On the other hand, the universality of mortgage lending has
undoubtedly influenced the operations of the housing market itself.
The fact that families with modest liquid resources are afforded extensive
purchasing power through low equity down payments has undoubtedly af-
fected current home prices. Especially in a seller's market, a liber-
alizing of credit terms may merely result in a higher price level without
any appreciable improvement in the quality of homes purchased. The price
charged for a house is adjusted in accordance with the new liberal terms
so that the monthly debt service remains unchanged.2
As a compromise solution to the problem of value and indebtedness,
one writer has suggested a classification of home sales according to
debt status. The great variety of possible mortgage arrangements makes
systematic classification extremely cumbersome, if not impossible, if
all variables are to be considered. However, that writer would regard
sales where over 50 per cent of the price is borrowed as not being true
sales at all but merely a peculiar type of tenancy. The remaining sales
iThe interdependence of home purchase and credit availability is aptly
demonstrated by the advertising efforts of builders in stressing con-
venient debt service without even mentioning actual home prices. See
Chapter 12.
2See Fisher, Op. cit., Chapter IV.
would be classified into 3 value groups: where debt-price ratios are zero,
1 - 25 per cent, and 26 - 50 per cent, respectively.
On a theoretical plane, mortgage interest payments should perhaps
not be regarded as a part of current costs of house maintenance. The
relevant income flow for yield comparison purposes on various properties
is net rentals before deducting mortgage interest payments, and should
not be influenced by individual loan arrangements.2 In practice, how-
ever, the mortgage interest rate is of vital importance to the prospec-
tive housing investor,who has the option of purchasing government or
private securities, or making any of a great many other investments.
The owner-occupant seeks home mortgage credit for at least two
different purposes. The most significant motive involves the purchase
of a newly-constructed or an older property, whereby the buyer must
resort to borrowing in order to supplement his limited equity savings.
In other cases the existing home owner may look to the mortgage market
for the refinance of an outstanding obligation. He may need additional
funds either to repair, modernize or enlarge his mortgaged property,
or even to finance s ome other consumption expenditure, such as a vacation
k. M. Kingsbury, The Economics of Housing, King's Crown Press, New York,
1946, pp. 139-1~17
2Similarly, mortgage fees should not be included in the costs of recon-
struction, at least when the investment is considered from the social
point of view. Atthe same time, interest payments on construction loans
must be counted as a true cost, as they represent a necessary expense in
house construction. Ibid. pp. 141-2.
trip, automobile purchase or stock market speculation. The refinance
may merely entail an extension of the repayment term or a reduction in
interest charges without altering the principal amount of the loan itself.
PRICE OF MORTGAGE CREDIT
Demand functions in any industrial market are extremely difficult
to analyze. The list or quoted price may be merely a fictitious figure
from which discounts and rebates are to be deducted before a net price
is determined. In the mortgage market, however, "price" is an even
more elusive concept. Mortgage price has a great many significant
dimensions, any or all of which may vary widely. The contract rate of
interest is perhaps the commonly accepted variable but its influence in
the demand for mortgage funds is not always the major element.
A reduction in mortgage interest rates, ceteris paribus, would tend
to stimulate an increased volume of home mortgage applications, both in
number and dollar amount. Families hitherto lacking sufficient income
prospects to carry the necessary debt burden would enter the housing
market as eligible home purchasers. This observation is especially
relevant when debt service is put on a monthly payment basis. Other
families with more adequate income prospects may be inducied to pur-
chase more expensive homes, as the lower interest rate may permit a
lIt is only fair to add these latter transactions are being increasingly
scrutinized by lenders and government examiners. Federal credit regu-
lations generally restrict such credit terms.
larger purchase without an increased monthly debt service. Still
another possible consequence of a differential reduction in mortgage
rates as against the general interest rate structure might involve the
purchaser's preference to increase initial debt-value ratios. The re-
leased equity payments would then be directed into the relatively more
profitable investment channels.
Monthly Debt Service
When the mortgage contract calls for level monthly payment over
the loan term, debt carrying charges depend upon three major elements:
(1) the original loan amount; (2) the term of the loan; and (3) the
rate of interest. Although the latter represents the price paid for
the use of borrowed funds, liberalizing the remaining two components
has played a major role in promoting home purchase among families of
modest means.
The loan-value ratio is frequently the most crucial variable in the
prospective mortgage loan. If the hopeful home. purchaser has $2,000 in
liquid holdings and seeks a house selling for $10,000, his primary con-
cern is securing an $8,000 loan. Perhaps he is quite insensitive to a
slight upward revision in interest rates so long as the loan is large
enough and monthly debt service manageable. Consequently, lenders can
effectively influence the level of home mortgage demands by varying
permissible loan-value ratios. As higher debt-value ratios are sanc-
tioned by mortgage lenders, the purchasing power of a constant down
This consequence requires that the rate reductions apply to the larger
loan as well as to the initial amount. Frequently lenders follow a
definite policy of raising interest rates as loan-value ratios increase.
See Chapter 12.
payment increases rapidly. This expanding buying capacity may attract
new buyers into the market, or it may induct other buyers to purchase
better, more expensive homes. On the.other hand, it may simply invite
1
an automatic price advance on existing homes. At any rate, varying
maximum debt-value ratios has a direct bearing on the number of active
buyers in' the housing market.. The potency of this lever has been
recognized by the federal government in the provisions of Regulation X,
where maximum loan-value ratios are established'for various price classes.
The effectiveness of any such regulation, however, depends to a great
extent upon the appraisal criteria used by the lender in establishing
"value."
Varying allowable loan-value maximums directly affects the minimum
down payment required and the implicit rate of interest associated with
this payment. Especially where this initial outlay depletes his liquid
holdings, the home buyer runs the risk of meeting any subsequent emer-
gencies only with the aid of costly personal loans. When the mortgagor
is thus inadequately fortified against adverse contingencies, overall
borrower risk is heightened, and so also is lender risk.2 It is true,
however, that resort to personal loans might be necessary only during
the early years -of the term, for as repayment proceeds the mortgagor
may be able to s ecure supplemental funds by refinancing the existing
lSee Chapter 8, where FHA encouragement of 90 per cent loans is discussed.
2 This may theoretically tend to produce higher interest rates on mortgages
with higher loan-value ratios, which in practice is generally quite true.
See Chapters 11 and 12.
mortgage at relatively low interest costs.
The remaining dimension of the mortgage contract, the loan term,
has entered into popular discussion largely since direct-reduction type
loans became widespread. More liberal loan-value provisions signify
low cash down payment, but do entail larger debt carrying charges.
Lengthening the loan term, however, reduces these periodic payments.
Hence, a combination of a high loan-value ratio and a long-term mortgage
facilitates home purchase with both a minimum initial equity and modest
monthly debt service.
Another price component which should not be overlooked in comparing
alternative financing plans concerns the imposition of various fees and
bonuses in the granting and servicing of mortgage loans. Although
these items appear insignificant when compared to the price of the
house, their total cost may easily add up to a full 1 per cent to the
effective rate of interest paid. At various times and on various types
of loans, mortgage borrowers have been obliged to pay special fees for
loan application, property inspection, credit examination, loan servi-
cing, loan renewal and for many other purposes.
The net effect of a combination -of such charges on financing costs
may be demonstrated with reference to the following table:
TABLE I. COST COMPARISONS ON 20-YEAR AMORTIZED IDANS OF $1000 AT VARIOUS
RATES OF INTEREST
Monthly Payment Excess over
Contract Rate (Principal and Payment where Present Value
of Interest Interest) .5W Rate Of Excess*
4.5% $6.33
5.0 6.60 $0.27 $37.65
5.5 6.88 0.55 76.65
6.0 7.17 0.84 117.25
Source: Adapted from R. S. Smith, "A Method of Comparing Home Mortgage
Financing," Journal of Marketing, April 1945, pp. 386-8.
*Discounted at a 6 per cent nominal rate, converted monthly.
From these calculations, it is apparent that a 4.5 per cent contract
rate of interest would be preferable to a 5 per cent rate only if the
additional fees charged the borrower in the former case alone were less
than $37.65 per $1,0o of loan. If the 4.5 per cent loan required dif-
ferential extras totaling over $117.25 per $1,000 of original loan, the
mortgagor would seek a 6 per cent loan without such fees. These compari-
sons are based upon a nominal discount rate of 6 per cent, which is
perhaps unrealistically high under current conditions. A lower rate of
discount would serve to increase the effective savings from the lower
contract interest rates. For example, if a 4.5 per cent discount rate
were applied, the present value of the interest savings from a 4 5: pere ant
as compared with a .t per cent mortgage rate would be $42.67.
Before leaving this theoretical discussion of mortgage demand, it
may be useful to present in concrete fonm the influence of varying
loan amounts, terms and interest rates on debt service. The amortized
monthly repayment scheme is now so universally accepted that a full
understanding of current mortgage operations requires some, knowledge of
these inter-relationships.
Of the three determinants of debt service, only loan amount bears
a one-to-one relationship with tarrying charges. Regardless of term
or interest rate, so long as these two items remain unchanged, a doubling
of the loan principal will entail a 100 per cent increase in monthly
debt service. The influence of varying term and rate of interest on
lProfessor Fisher has prepared a series of tables showing various
mortgage loan plans. Op. cit.., Chapter IV.
monthly debt payment is a bit more complicated. As mortgage repayment is
spread over a larger number of level monthly payments, aggregate interest
charges also increase, with the result that the reduction in monthly
payment is less than proportionate to the extension in term. Such ex-
tensions have their greatest influence in moderating carrying charges
while the proportion of amortization payments to total debt service re-
mains quite large. 1
Reductions in rates of interest do reduce debt service, but not in
direct proportion to the rate change. Unless the term is also extended,
full principal amortization must be crowded into the same number of
monthly payments, regardless of any change in interest rate. The ratio
of total interest to total principal payments, however, does decline
more than proportionately with the interest rate reduction, since larger
dollar amounts are applied to principal retirement in the smaller
monthly payment.2
10r, in other words, when slight increases in aggregate interest payments
have relatively little influence on total monthly payment amounts . Since
successive extensions do increase total interest payments, reductions in
monthly carrying charges are progressively less significant at longer
terms. See Table II.
2For example, consider the allocation of the first month's payment as
between interest and principal, on a $10,000 loan, for a 20-year term,
at various rates of interest.
Contract Rate Total Monthly Interest Component Principal Component
of Interest Payment Amount Per cent Amount Per cent
$60.60 $33.33 55.0% $27.27 45.0%
5 66.00 41.67 63.2 2h.33 36.8
6 71.65 50.00 69.8 21.65 30.2
Computed from Extended Payment Table for Monthly Mortgage Loans, Finan-
cial Publishing Company.
On a 20-year loan, a 50 per cent increase in interest rates from 4 to 6
per cent has the effect of increasing the ratio of total interest to
total principal payments by 59 per cent. On a $10,00 loan at 4 per cent,
aggregate interest payments (over 20 years) are $4,544; at a 6 per cent
rate, the corresponding total is $7,196.
TABLE II. MONTHLY PAYMENT RBQUIRED TO AMORTIZE A $1000 MORTGAGE AT
VARIOUS RATES OF INTEREST AND FOR VARIOUS TERMS
Rate of Interest Term in Years
5 0 15 20 25 40
3.5 $ 18.20 $ 9.89 $ 7.15 $ 5.80 $ 5.01 $ 3.88
4.0 18.42 10.13 7.40 6.06 5.28 4.18
4.5 18.65 10.36 7.65 6.33 5.56 4.50
5.0 18.88 10.61 7.91 6.60 5.85 4.83
5.5 . 19.11 10.85 8.17 6.88 6.14 5.16
6.0 19.34 11.10 8.44 7.16 6.44 5.52
Source: Computed from Extended Payment Table for Monthly Mortgage Loans,
Financial Publishing Uompany, Boston, 1940.
The effect on monthly debt service of changes in term and interest
rate, both individually and in combination, is indicated in the Table II.
From this table the relationships discussed above are clearly demon-
strated. For example, a 5-year, 6 per cent loan calls for a monthly
payment fully 5 times as large as a similar loan at 3.5 per cent over a
40 year 'term. Extension of loan term is much more effective in reducing
debt service at lower rates; at 3.5 per cent, lengthening the term from
5 to 40 years reduces each monthly payment by nearly 80 per cent, whereas
at 6 per cent, the reduction is slightly over 70 per cent. On the other
hand, interest rate changes are most influential in connection with long-
term loans; for a 5-year term, increasing rates from 3.5 to 6 per cent
raises monthly payment only 6 per cent, while a similar rate increase on
a 40-year loan entails a 42 per cent advance.
These relationships may also be indicated by referring to a con-
ventional indifference curve representation of alternative level monthly
payment patterns. (See Chart II.)
Especially when the level monthly payment plan is used, lenders
give careful consideration to the relation between debt service and
anticipated borrower income. In the past when unamortized loans were
written for nominal 3-year terms, the only mortgage obligations to be
met regularly out of current income were interest payments. Now., how-
ever, the entire principal as well as interest is paid out of income in
the form of monthly installments. Hence, it is particularly relevant
to consider how varying interest rates and loan terms affect the princi-
pal amount that can be amortized by a constant monthly payment. For
instance, assume the borrower's income can reasonably warrant an outlay
of $50 per month toward debt service. The following table indicates the
maximum loan amounts this fixed payment will service, to the nearest $5.
TABLE III. LOAN AMOUNT AMORTIZED H CONSTANT MONTHLY PAYMTS OF $50,
AT VARIOUS RATES OF INTEREST AND FOR VARIOUS TERMS
Rate of Interest Term in Years
5 10 15 20 25 4o
3.5% $2750 $5055 $6995 $8620 $9990 $12,905
4.0 2715 4940 6760 8250 9475 11,965
4.5 2680 4825 6535 7905 8995 11,120
5.0 2650 4715 6325 7575 8555 10,370
5.5 2615 4605 6120 7270 8140 9,696
6:.o 2585 4505 5925 6979 7760 9,085
Source: Same as Table II.
Analogous observations may be drawn from this table as from the
previous one. At the extremes, the level monthly payment will amortize
5 times as large a loan on a 3.5 per cent, ho-year basis as on a 6 per
cent, 5-year basis. Lengthening the term of the loan permits the amorti-
zation of a larger amount, but not in direct proportion to the extension.
At a 3.5 per cent rate, the amortized amount increases 4.7 times as the
term is lengthened from 5 to 40 years; at a 6 per cent rate, the multi-
plier is only 3.5. Where the term is as short as 5 years, total debt
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service consists mainly of principal payments and, consequently, is less
affected by interest rate changes than when payment extends over a longer
period. The amount amortized over 5 years is but 6 per cent greater for
a 3.5 per cent than for a 6 per cent loan; the corresponding difference on
a 40-year loan is 42 per cent.
From this table, the potency of more liberal credit terms can be
readily demonstrated. As interest rates fall and repayment periods
lengthen, the prospective home buyer is in a position to carry a larger
mortgage debt without absorbing a greater share of his expected monthly
income. This relaxation of cre dit availability might result in the
purchase of more expensive homes, or in larger debt-value ratios for
the same properties if such is permitted by the mortgagee. If down
payment requirements are not reduced as well, however, some households
would still be unable to take advantage of these opportunities because
of insufficient liquid holdings.2
The importance of the interest component in total debt service has
been alladed to- in the previous discussion. Extending the period of loan
repayment is a real convenience for the borrower, but obviously this
privilege requires d much larger interest payment. Interest is computed
on the declining unpaid principal, so the shorter the term the smaller
is the total interest cost. The influence of varying rates and loan
lIt must be remembered, however, that as the term is extended aggregate
debt service absorbs an increasing proportion of aggregate "life" income.
2Hence the effectiveness of Regulation X.
terms on the interest component is indicated by the following table.
For example, if the mortgagor were granted a $10,000 loan at 4 per cent
running for 0 years, total interest payments would exactly match this
$10,000 sum.
TABLE IV. INTEREST COMPONENT AS A PER CEN T OF TOTAL DEBT PAYMENT FOR
CONSTANT MONTHLY PAYMENT MORTGAGES. AT VARIOUS RATES OF
Rate of Interest
3.5%
4.5'
5.0
5.5
6.0
Source: Same as Tab
INTEREST AND F OR VARIOUS TERMS
Term in Years
5 10 15 20
8 16 22 28
10 18 25 31
11 20 27 34
12 22 30 37
13 23 32 39
14 25 34 42
le II.
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50
54
57
60
62
INTERNAL RATE CF DISCOUNT
The variety of loan combinations possible under the level monthly
payment type mortgage makes comparison of alternative plans difficult.
If the home purchaser is offered a choice of several mortgage contracts,
with varying rates of interest, loan terms, or loan amounts, what cri-
teria would he employ in making his decision? This problem will be
briefly analyzed here.
The influence of varying maximum loan-value ratios in affecting
the dollar volume of home purchases has been considered above. 1  The
mortgagor, however, rarely has a real choice in specifying the loan
amount, for he ordinarily requires all that the lender will grant to
supplement his limited equity accumulation in purchasing a particular
1See pp. 32-33.
house, If the lender refuses to approve his request, the borrower may
either try another lender, consider a less expensive house, seek a
second mortgage, or continue renting. Frequently he could perhaps se-
cure the desired larger loan only at a higher rate of interest, which
may or may not render the monthly debt service too burdensome.
Even if a larger loan could be gotten only at a higher interest
rate, the home buyer may be wise to retain a small emergency cash reserve
and seek the maximum possible loan. The inherent dangers involved in
completely draining his liquid resources to meet a larger down payment
are hardly worth the oossible saving in interest payments. In the
event he finds this emergency reserve to be unnecessarily large or if
his income rises materially, the mortgagor may subsequently reduce his
mortgage obligation through prepayment.
The home purchaser who has a substantial liquid accumulation may
rationally select the optimum loan amount. The magnitude of his down
payment would depend upon the relation between mortgage interest rates
and the expected net returns on outside investments. If the former
were much lower, the mortgagor would request a larger loan than if the
relative yields were more nearly equal.2
When the alternative mortgage plans specify varying interest rates
and loan terms, the problem becomes more complicated. Under these cir-
cumstances, the mortgagor ts selection may depend upon an implicit
"intra-personal" rate of discount. This concept will be clearly iden-
tified in the following analysis.
lSee p. 33.
2 1n the continuous case, he would increase the requested loan amount
until, at the margin, the two rates are equalized. Cf. below.
First of all, consider the case where interest rates remain constant
over a wide range of alternative loan terms. For example, assume mortgage
lenders charge a h per cent rate of interest on all acceptable loans,
whether the term be 10 or 2D years. Therefore, provided his credit
rating is satisfactory, the mortgage applicant may select one of two
level payment plans. One calls for monthly debt service of $10.13 per
$1,000 of loan amount over a 10-year term; and the other, a $6.06 monthly
payment for 20 years. In theory, the plan selected by the mortgagor
would depend upon the implicit discount rate applied to these future
outlays.
If this intra-personal discount rate were equal to the market rate
of interest, the borrower would be indifferent as to his choice of loan
plans. Obviously, by definition, the present worth of either stream
of future disbursements would equal $1000 when a h per cent discount
factor is assumed.1  in this hypothetical case, however, the home buyer
would actually be indifferent as to whether or not he borrows at all,
for he would seek a loan only if the market rate were less than his own
discount rate. The fact that the home buyer applies for mortgage credit
implies the existence of a surplus analogous to a "consumer 's surplus"
in Marshallian terminology.
1For the balance of the present analysis, all calculations will refer
to a $1,000 loan amount.
21n theory, he might become a lender if the market yield ever exceeded
this discount rate. In the continuous case, the individual would bor-
row or lend until the two rates are equal at the margin.
So long as the internal discount rate exceeds the market rate of
4 per cent, the 20-year loan term would be rpreferred to the shorter
term loan. This fact may be demonstrated by referring to the standard
present value formula,
7 a 7d =where
A present value of a series of n monthly payments of
R dollars, discounted at a yearly nominal rate of
d per cent, converted monthly. 1
As stated above, when the internal rate d is 4 per cent, the present
value of both payment schedules is equal to the original loan amount,
$3,000. As d increases, A continually falls below this anount, but,
the relative decline is not identical for the two loan options. If
d 5 per cent, the present value of $10.13 per month for 10 years is
$955; while for monthly payments of $6.06 over a 20-year term, A = $918.
Corresponding present values for a 6 per cent discount rate are $912 and
$845, respectively. Hence, it appears that the preference for the
longer-term mortgage becomes more pronounced as a higher discount rate
is postulated.
This conclusion is hardly surprising, for mortgagors might be
expected to prefer extending the repayment period so long as interest
rates are not increased. It might be more realistic, however, to as-
sume that lenders ascribe a high degree of risk to granting long-term
1For a discussion of simple annuities refer to any standard text on the
business mathematics, e.g., Hummel and Seebeck, Mathematics of Finance,
Ch. IV-
mortgages, and, as a result, do adjust rates of interest according to
length of term. To simplify the analysis, consider the case where the
mortgage market menu consists of only two loan plans: one involving
a 4 per cent, 10-year loan; and the other, a 5 per cent, 20-year loan.
The corresponding monthly payments per $1,000 of original loan for
these two options are $10.13 and $6.60, respectively. Once again,
the "intra-personal" discount rate will implicitly influence the home
purchaser's selection of loan plan, although this time the decision is
a bit more complicated.
As an aid in analyzing this problem, the following table has been
prepared using the present value formula:
TAELE V. PRESENT VALUE OF A SERIES OF n MONTHLY PAYMETS OF R DOLLARS,
DISCOUNTED AT A YEARLY NOMINAL RATE OF d PER CENT,
CONVERTED MONTHLY
Discount Rate Present Value (A)
(d)T R $10.13, n 120 R~$6.60, n: 240
4.0% $1000 $1089
5.0 955 1000
6.0 912 921
6.5 892 884
7.0 872 851
If d= 4 per cent, neither plan would be attractive to the home buyer.
Certainly he would not borrow $1,000 if the present value of the monthly
outlays were $2089. Furthermore, he would be indifferent as between a
10-year loan or no loan at all, for reasons described above.
At a 5 per cent discount rate, the borrower would definitely prefer
the shorter-term mortgage, as the present value computations indicate.
Similar observations are applicable to the situation where d = 6 per cent,
although the margin of preference has narrowed considerably. If d = 6.5
per cent, the 20-year mortgage is actually chosen in favor of the shorter-
term loan. By interpolation, the point of indifference is estimated to
be in the region of d = 6.25 per cent. At this critical discount rate,
present values are identical and the two loan plans appear equally
favorable to the mortgagor. At lower rates, the 4 per cent, 10-year
plan is preferred; and, conversely, at values of d above 6.25 per cent,
the 5 per cent, 20-year plan is chosen.
This point of indifference was estimated by a process of trial
and error. Unfortunately, an exact solution to the relevant equation
cannot be found by elementary mathematical methods. This equation
may be expressed in the following way:
As stated at the outset of the present discussion, the concept of
"intra-personal discount rate" is of limited practical value in analyzing
mortgage market behavior. It may merely provide a partial ex post ration-
alization of an existing interest rate structure. This concept combines
into a single rate a great many seemingly incommensurate variables, such
as future income prospects, psychological time preference, expectations
as to future interest rate changes, psychological desirability for a
debt-free home, etc. Even in the absence of positive time preference,
in the terminology of Irving Fisher, the home buyer may choose a rela-
tively long repayment period despite the slightly higher interest rate
imposed. Theoretically, an individual would consider it economic to pay
cash for a home only if he possessed an unusually large sum- of liquid
funds not investible in ordinary higher income-yielding assets. In a
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realistic sense, however, this statement demands serious qualification,
for decided benefits, material as well as subjective accrue to the owner
of a debt-free home.
Certainly the home buyer does not consider his own particular dis-
count rate in choosing one loan plan in favor of another. 1  Perhaps the
most common, as well as the most important, criterion in making the
selection consists of relating debt service to expected incomes. A
h per cent, 10-year mortgage might entail a monthly payment schedule
that is too burdensome for the mortgagor to carry safely, -while the
same loan may be easily handled if recast on a 5 per cent, 20-year
basis.2
lIndeed, a single discount rate may be applicable to the individual's
loan preference function only at a particular moment of time and over
severely restricted range of loan amounts and terms. The rate may be
different for each year up to a certain point and then may approach
infinity, etc.
2Carrying this theoretical analysis one step further, it is possible to
solve these loan selection problems by means of a conventional indiffer-
ence curve representation. Consider the example used in the text where
the home buyer had the option of choosing either a 4 per cent, 10-year
loan, or a 5 per cent, 20-year loan. To demonstrate this diagrammatic
technique, assume a discount rate of 5 per cent. The continuous contours
connect points representing monthly payment schedules to which the mort-
gagor is indifferent (i.e., where A is constant.)
~/0 / 5 20 . 5z- -7o
7ei- r-- I ; a x5-
S.! _ 4-0
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2 (Continued)First locate the two monthly payment plans on the coordinate
axis, which are $10.13 - 10 years, and $6,66 - 20 years in this example.
Then sketch the relevant indifference curve through one of these two
points. Now if the second point lies within the arms of this contour,
the former indicates the preferred loan plan. Conversely, if it lies
outside the contour, the second is preferable. Alternatively, indiffer-
ence curves could be drawn through each point, and the curve bearing the
lower present value (A) indicates the preferred plan. Accordingly, the
10-year repayment period is selected when d = 5 per cent.
CHAPTER 3. HOME MORTGAGE DEMAND IN METROPOLITAN BOSTON
Before concluding Part it, some additional characteristics of the
Boston housing market will be reviewed. The implications of certain
demand relationships will be developed in later chapters insofar as
they influence mortgage lending operations.
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BOSTON AREA
Boston, while one of the oldest and largest cities in colonial
America, has gradually waned in national prominence since that time.
Although it is still the largest population center in New England, the
Metropolitan Boston Area has declined in national ranking from fourth
to sixth since 1920. Of the 32 largest metropolitan areas in the
country, only Pittsburgh has shown a slower rate of growth during this
period, the.Boston Area having increased 28.5 per cent. Typical of
most urban growth patterns, the City of Boston has grown much less
rapidly than have the outlying suburban communities. The population
of the City of Boston has advanced little over 10 per cent since 1920,
with only Providence showing a smaller percentage gain among the 32
areas.
Growth patterns for the 6 largest metropolitan areas are indicated
by the following table prepared by the National Industrial Conference
Board:
1Road Maps of Industry, No. 826, National Industrial Conference Board,
October 26, ~~1971
TABLE VI. POPULATION TRENDS
CITY VS. SUBURBS, 1920 - 1950
Number of Persons (000)
1950 1920Central City Inside -Outside Inside Outside
Central Ciy Central City Central City Central City
New York- North-.
ern New Jersey 8,625.7 4,277.8 6,332.7 2,158.0
Chicago 3,621.1 1,873.5 2,701.7 820.1
Los Angeles 1,970.3 2,397.6 576.7 421.2
Philadelphia 2,064.8 1,595.9 1,823.8 890-5
Detroit 1,849.9 1,166.3 993.7 312.1
Boston 800.6 1,569.9 748.1 1,096.2
Source: Road Maps of Industry, No. 826, National Industrial Conference
Board, October26~ 1951.
The gradual increase in total population in the Boston area is
further suggested by observing comparative data on birth and death rates.
In 1947, the birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants stood at 23.3 in Massa-
chusetts against a national average of 25.8. Corresponding statistics
on death rates were 11.2 and 10.1 per 1,000 inhabitants, respectively.
These significant differences suggest the existence of an older age dis-
tribution in the local area, perhaps characteristic of a relatively mature
economy.
The composition of the Boston labor force and of business activity
in general also reflects a mature, established economy. In accordance
with its slower population growth, the local increase in number of workers
has not matched that of the nation. Daring the decade of the 1940s, the
total labor force in the Metropolitan Boston Area advanced only 8 per
cent to 993.2. thousands, compared with a 13 per cent increase in the
1 Economic Almanac, 1950, p. 4.
United States. 1 Another major source of labor for the industrial expansion
during the past decade has come from vast unemployed pools, which had
declined from 168 thousand in 1940 to 56 thousand by 1950.2
The proportion of the population in the labor force is slightly
higher in the Boston area than throughout the nation, largely because
of women workers. Especially during the early 19h0s a large number of
women were attracted into full-time employment, so that by 1950 nearly
a third of all women in the Boston area were actively in the labor force.
In addition to the stimulus of wartime labor needs, the proportionately
more significant role played by women in the local area is due in part
to the urban concentration of population and the location of many firms
offering extensive employment to women, such as insurance, finance, soft
goods production and jewelry.3
Manufacturing continues to be the largest single source of employ-
ment both locally as well as nationally. These activities in the Met-
ropolitan Area are widely diffused among the various major industrial
categories, with nearly 275 thousand persons in 1947 employed in over
1 Business Record, National Industrial Conference Board, February 1952.
2The 19h0 data refer to the Metropolitan "District." 19h0 Census of, Popu-
lation, Vol. II, Part 3, Table A-50. Data from 1950 Census are presented
in Business Record, February 1952, p. 70, and refer to the Metropolitan
"Area." See Chapter 1.
3
"The New England Labor Force," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, March 1952.
5400 manufacturing establishments.1 At that time, 11 per cent of this
working force was Employed in the electrical machinery industry, followed
closely by' the following, in order: food and kindred products, leather
and leather products; other machinery, apparel, and printing and pub-
lishing industries. 'While the textile industry continues to represent
a primary activity throughout New England, fewer than 11 thousand
workers in Metropolitan Boston were employed in "textile mill products"
in 1947. Heavy industries are relatively insignificant in the local
area, as 3.9 thousand were employed in primary metals at that time.
Just as the Boston economy has approached a rather mature stage
in its development, so also is a large proportion of its labor force in
the older age brackets. 2  This consequence follows directly from the
age distribution of a relatively stable population, but it is also in-
fluenced by the industrial structure. For example, a larger proportion
of the gainfully employed persons are included in professional and tech-
nical groups in the Boston area than throughout the United States. The
corresponding ratios for these groups in 1950 were 12 and 8.8 per cent,
locally and nationally, respectively. The -continuing shortage of such
trained personnel has perhaps caused many individuals to remain on the
job beyond the usual retirement age. Furthermore, the more mature New
England industries may not offer the same ample opportunities for un-
skilled young workers as do the more rapidly growing industries concen-
trated in newer sections. 3
11947 Census of Manufactures, Bureau of the Census, Volume III, Table 1.
2See Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, September 1951.
See also p. 50 above for data on birth and death rates.
3
"The New England Labor Force," op. cit., p. 2.
With a high proportion of its labor force employed in the skilled,
technical and professional occupations, it is not surprising that Massa-
chusetts ranks above the average in per capita income payments. In 199J
per capita incomes in the Commonwealth were $1,600, compared with a
United States average of $1,436. In accordance with its relative de-
cline in population and economic prominance, the margin of local over
national per capita income payments has steadily narrowed in recent
years. In 1929, the corresponding average incomes were $897 and $680,
and in 1940, $764 and $575, respectively.
THE BDSTON HOUSING MARKET
Inasmuch as most of the above demand factors reflect a mature
economy, one might expect the local demand for new housing to be
2
relatively stable and predictable. Over the past three decades,
however, the volume of new home construction has fluctuated widely in
the Boston area, and the postwar era has witnessed a building boom of
unprecedented proportions. Although population increased only 9 per
cent between 1940 and 1950, the total number of households and occupied
dwelling units in the Metropolitan Boston Area advanced 19 per cent.
Over the same decade, the average number of persons per occupied dwelling
unit fell significantly from 3.90 to 3.56. This disproportionate increase
in occupied units reflects not only rising incomes but also an unusually
1R. E. Graham, "State Income Payments in 1950," Survey of Current Business;
August 1951, pp. 11-21. In 1949 the median family income in the Metro-
politan Boston District was $3,514. Business 'Record, February 1952, p. 70..
2Data on the age of housing are not available for various communities, but
a casual observation of local standing homes indicates an abundance of
century-old properties.
high rate of net family formation.
Fluctuations in local home building activity are indicated in
Table VII, but unfortunately these data are not directly camparable with
the national statistics presented earlier. 2  Local data refer to build-
ing permit applications in representative Massachusetts cities and towns,
but the number of communities chosen for the tabulation has gradually
been extended from 39 to 146. Since adjusted data for prior years are
not always included when the coverage is expanded, it is impossible to
measure the amplitude of cycles in local home building over the past
30 years. A further limitation on comparability arises from the fact
that the permit data refer to the number of buildings constructed but
give no indication as to the number of individual dwelling units in-
cluded. Nevertheless, the severity of cyclical fluctuations in local
home building may be deduced from data.in Table VII. For example,
nearly 12,000 new building permits were filed in 39 cities during the
peak year 1925, -while 9 years later the number of applications was but
31,314 for 55 cities and towns.
1 In 1950, the marriage rate per 1,000 inhabitants in Massachusetts was
12.0, compared with a United States average of 11.2. Economic Almanac,
1951-2, p. 16.
2 Chart I.
3Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries. The fluctuations in
number of dwelling units involved in these applications were even more
pronounced. This belief is based on the fact that only 57.9 per cent
of the applications referred to single family dwellings in 1925, while
the share rose sharply to 98.0 per cent by 1934.
TAELE VII. BUILDING PERMIT APPLICATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES IN
SELECTED MUNICIPALITIES IN MASSACHUSETTS, SELECTED YEARS,
1925-1950
Year Number of Number of Estimated Cost
Municipalities Buildings ( )
1925 39 11,795 - $ 117,366
1927 55 11,418 101,959
1934 55 1,314 9,513
1936 55 2,935 18,020
1940 55 4,896 32,720
1946 68 6,947 52,368
1947 68 9,0h9 73, 346
1948 68 10,560 103,795
1949 68 11,718 137,609
1950 68 15,910 163,612
Source: Annual Summary Reports by the Massachusetts Department of Labor
and Industries.
Periods of extensive home building activity are generally accom-
panied by a heavy trading in existing properties, as an increased demand
for housing services manifests itself in the purchase of both types of
dwelling units. Sellers of existing homes may prefer more expensive
accommodations, may be moving out of the community, or may merely be
willing to part with their asset at the prevailing high price level.
Since approximately 90 per cent of all home purchases involve mortgage
financing, a rough measure of transfer activity among both new and
existing properties is supplied by data on mortgage recordings. In
Table VIII, total mortgage recordings on 1- to 3-family properties are
compared with postwar home construction activity in 5 communities in
the Boston area. As would be expected, total mortgage recordings far
exceed the volume of new home construction, although in relative terms this
margin varies considerably. The mortgage index rose smoothly during the
5-year period under consideration, while the index of home construction
followed a highly irregular path. Moreover, the latter index increased
TABLE VIII. RELATION BETWEEN NEW HOME CONSTRUCTION AND TOTAL MORTGAGE
RECORDINGS ON 1- To 3-FAMILY PROPERTIES IN FIVE* METROPO-
LITAN BOSTON COMMNITIES, 19h6-1950
No. of Homes Index No. of 1 - 3 Fanily Index
Year Buil 19I6 ::100 Properties Mortgaged 191b-1
1946 693 100 5551 100
1947 764 110 5859 io6
1948 1574, 227 6133 no
1949 1179 170 6389 115
1950 181h 262 7441 134
Source: Home construction data from Massachusetts Department of Labor
and Industries; Mortgage data computed from tabulations of the
Metropolitan Mortgage Bureau of Boston.
* Includes: Arlington, Belmont, Lexington, Newton, Quincy.
162 per cent between 1945 and 1950, while the former advanced but 34
per cent. This significant difference in relative movements suggests
that the purchase of existing homes is not only quantitatively more
important but also far more stable than the purchase of newly-constructed
units, at least in prosperity periods. Another factor which perhaps
stabilized data on mortgage recordings refers to the unknown but sub-
stantial volume of refinance activity included in these data. It is
likely that mortgage borrowing for purposes of home improvement or
modernization is relatively unaffected by minor changes in economic
conditions. 2
Characteristics of Housing Stock in Metropolitan Boston
Boston is typical of most metropolitan areas in that single-family
dwellings comprise a relatively small proportion of all residential
l1n depression periods, the index on new home building would drop to a
fraction of the corresponding prosperity level, while the path charted
by the index on property transfers would be less predictable. Although
transfer of ownership of existing properties is undoubtedly less common
in depression than in prosperity periods, many home owners are compelled
to dispose of their holdings because of mortgage delinquency and fore-
closure, inadequate income to maintain the property, etc.
2Such refinance activity bears an important influence on these data on
mortgage recordings as number rather than dollar volume is the basis
for the tabulation.
properties. In the local housing market, 2- to h-family dwellings have
traditionally been a favorite investment, accounting for slightly over
one-half of all 'residential properties in 1950. At the s ame time, 'single-
family units represented about one-third and large rental units about one-
tenth of this total stock. (See Table IX.)
TABLE IX. -MELLING UNITS IN METROPOLITAN BOSTON BY TYPE OF STRUCTURE,
1940, 1950.
(Number in Thousands)
1940 1950
Type of
Structure Number Per cent Number Per cent
All dwelling units 596.9 100 680.7 100
1-4 family 507.4 85 559.5 82
1 family detached 196.9 33 20.1 30
1 family attached n.a. n.a. 7.0 1
other 1-h family n.a. n.a. 348.4 51
5-9 family 43.9 7 62.6 9
10 or more 45.6 8 58.6 9
Source: 1950 Census of Housing, Preliminary Reports, Series HC-3, no. 7.
n.a. not available.
Although these data indicate a predominance of multi-family proper-
ties in the Boston housing inventory, the pattern of-new construction has
varied widely over the past 30 years. A complete breakdown on type of
structure is not available, but the share of total residential construc-
tion represented by single-family homes is known for the Massachusetts
communities referred to in Table VII. The building boom of the 1920s
was concentrated in large part on multi-family units, and in 1925 such
properties constituted 42.1 per cent of the number and 66.9 per cent of
1
the estimated cost of total residential construction. With the onset
of the depression, investment in new rental housing appeared most un-
attractive, and by 1934 single-family units represented 98.0 per cent of
the number and 97.8 per cent of the value of the severely curtailed
lIn this connection, multi-family properties refer to all but single-
family units, i.e., they 4.nclude all 2- or more-f amily properties.
production.
In the postwar, period, there has been a renewed interest in multi-
family construction, although the extent of this activity is far below
previous peaks. In 1949 these efforts reached their highest postwar
level when multi-family properties accounted for 15.3 per cent of the
number and 47.9 per cent of the value of all newly-constructed residential
properties in the Commonwealth. By 1950, however, the corresponding
percentage shares had fallen to 8.4 and 24.1 per cent, respectively.1
In a relatively free housing market these wide shifts in the com-
position of new construction would result from fundamental changes in
the relative investment attractiveness of single- and multi-family
properties. Since the early 1930s, however, a significant but uncal-
culable portion of these movements merely reflects modifications in
federal housing policies. In postwar years, for example, the VA home
loan program has stimulated an active demand for small owner-occupied
homes, while changing FHA rental housing regulations2 and extensive
public housing activity have produced a fluctuating volume of multi-
family construction. Public housing has never contributed as much as
5 per cent of new single-family construction, while in multi-family
construction it has been far more significant, though highly variable.
The ratio of public to private starts in 2- or more-family structures
ranged from 0 in 1946 to a high of 6.20 in 1950. The peak year for
public housing, however, was 1949 when 4,740 dwelling units were financed
with public funds, all but 870 of which involved structures with 5 or
1Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries. These data corres-
pond closely with BLS data on construction in the Metropolitan Boston
area, the latter finding single-families to account for 58 and 77 per
cent of all new dwelling units in 1949 and 1950, respectively. Con-
struction, U. S. Department of Labor, May 1951, pp. 12-14.
2Especially regarding emergency provisions of Title VI of the FHA
program. (Section 608.)
more units. In the same year private capital accounted for 8,170 new
dwelling units, with 5- or more-family structures accounting for only
620 units.
By affecting the type of residential construction, federal efforts
have directly influenced overall tenure status in the loc al housing
market. Obviously owner-occupancy is far more prevalent in areas where
single-family properties predominate than in large metropolitan areas
where multi-family properties are most common. For example, ii'1950
owner-occupied homes accounted for 31 and hh per cent of all occupied
dwelling units in the Metropolitan Areas of New York and Boston, respec-
tively, while the corresponding ratio in the smaller Youngstown Area was
70 per cent.. largely because of the postwar interest in single-family
construction, however, the number of owner-occupied units in the Metro-
,politan Boston Area increased 50 per cent during the 1940s, while the
number of rental units remained relatively unchanged. (See Table X.)
In addition to positive federal encouragement of owner-occupancy, perhaps
this behavior is due in part to negative effects of rent controls in
curbing the construction of new rental structures.
TABLE X. TENURE STATUS OF IWELLING UNITS IN THE BOSTON STANDARD METROPOLITAN
AREA 1940, 1950
1940 1950 Change
Tenure Number Per cent Number Per cent 190-1950
(000) - -000) Per cent
All occupied
dwelling units 558.2 100 665.6 100 19
Owner-occupied 195.0 35 291.1 44 49
Renter-occupied 363.2 65 374.5 56 3
Source: 1950 Census of Housing, Preliminary Reports, Series HC - 3, No. 7.
1 Construction, U. S. bepartment of Labor, May 1951, pp. 12-14.
2 Business Record, February 1952, p. 71. These ratios are perhaps even
higher in smaller non-metropolitan areas.
Mortgage Indebtedness
The significance of mortgage indebtedness in any given housing market
depends upon several factors. Since most new mortgages arise in connec-
tion with home purchase, the volume of recent purchases whether the pro-
perties be new or old is a primary determinant of overall mortgage status.
Sample surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal that
mortgage financing is involved in over 90 per cent of all new home pur-
chases. Undoubtedly mortgage financing is equally common in the trading
of older properties, but in this case the buyer may, in effect, assume
full liability for the partially amortized mortgage of the seller as part
payment therefor, with the proportion of mortgaged among all properties
2
remaining unchanged. Where resort to mortgage borrowing is not required,
the home buyer often applies the proceeds of a previous property sale to
the present purchase. The degree to which the recentness of a home pur-
chase influences overall mortgage status obviously depends upon the aver-
age life of the mortgage contract.
There appears to be a positive correlation between the significance
of mortgage indebtedness and the population size of the housing market
concerned. (See Table XI.) In early 1951 mortgaged properties as a
proportion of total occupied units throughout the nation ranged from 33
per cent in "open country" to 57 per cent in metropolitan areas. Recent
data are not available for the Boston area alone, but findings of the
1940 Census of Housing may reveal a reason for the apparent connection
1 Unpublished studies by the New England Office of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor.
2Under current mortgage lending practice, the seller is generally
relieved of all existing mortgage obligations after the sale is con-
summated and after the lender has drawn up a completely new contract
for the buyer. In the past, however, the existing note was often
simply endorsed by the latter, but the original mortgagor was still
technically liable in the event of delinquency or default.
TABLE XI. MORTGAGE STATUS OF OWNER-OCCUPIED NONFARM DHlMLING UNITS, BY
LOCATION OF PROPERTY, EARLY 1951
Location of All Cases Mortgaged Not Mortgaged
Property Number Per cent Per cet cent
Metropolitan Area 495 loo 57 43
City, 50,000 or more 238 100 58 42
City, 2,500-49,999 357 100 43 57
Towns, up to 2,500 269 100 4o 60
Open Country 141 100 33 67
Source: "1951 Survey of Consumer Finances," Part V, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, 'December 1951, pp. 1516-26, Table 3.
between mortgage status and population size. While 66.1 per cent of all
local 1- to 4-family properties were mortgaged in 1940, the corresponding
ratios for single-family and for 2- to h-family units taken separately
1
were 63.1 and 72.7 per cent, respectively. From these data, it appears
as if purchasers of 2- to 4-family properties must resort to mortgage
financing more frequently or for longer periods of time than do single-
family buyers. Since the former properties tend to predominate in large
urban centers, it may be expected that mortgaged properties are most
widespread in such centers.
Prices of Homes in Metropolitan Boston
Except for partial coverage during the postwar period, data on
average home prices are almost totally lacking for the local area. Per-
mit data presented in Table VII are of limited assistance, as they refer
only to the total number of buildings constructed and their estimated
cost, but give no indication of cost per family dwelling unit. More
detailed information for the years 1946-50 has been obtained in regard
to permit applications among 18 communities in the Boston area. In these
cities and towns, average construction cost per unit shows a consistent
upward trend, rising from $4.49 thousand in 1946 to $8.92 and $9.57
11940 Census of Housing, Volume IV, Part 2, Table E-1.
thousand in 1949 and 1950, respectively. 1 Sample surveys conducted by
the Bureau of Labor Statis tics reveal similar average construction
costs for late 1949 and mid-1950 of $8.3 and $9.6 thousand, respectively.
These latter data refer to actual costs on single-family homes started2
while the former are cost estimates filed with permit applications.
These data relate only to costs of construction, and, as analyzed
in the theoretical section, may not follow trends in actual market valua-
tions very closely. Although production costs had fallen somewhat be-
tween the mid-1920s and the early 1930s, informed judgment of interviewed
parties points to a much sharper decline in current real estate prices
during that period.- By 1940, the "averare value" of single-family
properties as used in census tabulations had reached $5,642 in the
Metropolitan Boston District.3  During the postwar period the local hous-
ing market has enjoyed boom conditions, and, except for 1949, new con-
struction and home prices'Trose steadily through 1950. The brief economic
reversal in 1949 was accompanied by a 25 per cent drop in new home con-
struction in the 5 communities of brisk housing activity. 4 In addition,
the upward drift in home prices was temporarily checked, as the 'average
purchase price in10 local communities fell pearly 4 per cent from the
1 Massachusetts Department of Labor end Industries.
2Construction costs as defined by the BLS include all labor, materials,
subcontracted work, and contractor's profit chargeable directly to the
project. Land development costs and sales profits are excluded from
this coverage.
1940 Census of Housing, Vol. IV, Table E-3. The reliability of "average
value" usually depends upon the accuracy of the home owner's estimate of
what his property is "worth"'- hardly a scientific appraisal in most
cases.
See Table VIII.
1948 level. (Table XII.)
TABLE XII. AVERAGE SALES PRICE OF ALL HOMES PURCHASED IN TEN MUNICIPALITIES*
IN METROPOLITAN BOSTON, 1948-1951.
Period Average Purchase Price Period Average Purchase Price
1948- First Quarter $12,366 1950 $11,975
1949 11,889 1951 13,304
Source: Computed from tabulations of the Metropolitan Mortgage Bureat,
Boston
*Including Belmont, Arlington, 'Dorchester, Quincy, Lexington, Medford,
Newton, Somerville, Winchester and Roxbury.
Another, perhaps more exact, method of measuring movements in real
estate valuations involves a comparison of resale and original prices
for the same properties. Of course, this technique is of real utility
only when the resale follows the initial purchase rather closely, lest
the price comparison might take account of property depreciation or ob-
solescence as well as overall market trends. To minimize this possibility,
the following data refer to resale activity only if the property had been
initially purchased within the preceding year.
TABLE XIII. RESALE ACTIVITIY IN MIDDLESEX AND NORFOLK COUNTIES, MASSACHUSETI'S,
1946-1951
(Resale of same parcel within a one-year period)
Year of Middlesex Couny Norfolk County
Secon~ Number % of F % of Sales Number % of $2$Tf Sales
Sale of Sales Increase at same or ofSaes Increase at same or
in Total lower price in Total lower price
NIles Sales
Revenues Revenues
1947 799 17 16 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1948 366 11 15 129 13 16
1949 389 6 33 142 3 39
1950 351 10 17 133 8 25
1951 354 14 9 132 14 10
Source: Metropolitan Mortgage Bureau
n.a. - not available.
'While prices fell slightly, average construction costs as indicated by
permit data continued to increase nearly 12 per cent between 1948 and
1949. Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries.
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The temporary setback in 1949 is most pronounced in these data. Total
sales revenues showed very little change, and one-third of all property
resale activity was made without any advance in price. The subsequent
recovery was prompt and certain, however, and by 1951 an upward drift
in prices was once again well in evidence.
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PART III. SUPPLY FORCES: THE MORTGAGEE
CHAPTER 4. SOME INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The mortgage market is closely tied to external developments in the
industrial and financial sectors of the economy. The inherent connection
between the demand for home mortgage credit and the overall housing market
- has been anaLyzed in the preceding chapters. On the supply side, the
availability of, loanable funds for home financing is closely related
to the outside capital market. It will be shown that certain types
of institutional lenders are obliged by law or custom to invest in home
mortgages regardless of minor developments in other loanable funds markets.
By and large, however, mortgage loans compete with alternate investment
opportunities in attracting the funds of credit suppliers. Specifically,
they must compare favorably with securities or other investment outlets
in regard to these generally accepted criteria: safety, liquidity,
shiftability, and yield. Whether or not mortgage loans have succeeded
in providing these desired investment characteristics will be considered
in some detail throughout this study.
At the present time, the availability of home mortgage credit is
largely influenced by the efforts of three major lender types operating
in the market. The conglomerate of private individual investors con-
stitutes the oldest and still a substantial source of mortgage funds.
The second, and perhaps most significant, type of mortgagee includes
the various private institutions seeking mortgage loans as an investment
outlet. Mortgage lending serves a variety of functions for these in-
stitutions. Conventional thrift associations act as middlemen in chan-
neling the flow of community savings into the capital funds market, and
as such originate and hold mortgage loans to maturity. Other specialized
institutions, frequently called mortgage companies, operate in the market
primarily to initiate mortgage loans for the purpose of reselling them
to others at a profit. These brokers, ordinarily with limited capital
resources, may or may not maintain a standing inventory of mortgage
investments from which sales are made to other financial institutions.
The latter select mortgages for investment purposes just as they might
purchase any public or private security, and may include the identical
thrift institutions referred to above. Quantitatively more significant
within this category, however, are life insurance companies, which
purchase huge amounts of sound mortgage loans on distant properties.
In either case, the original mortgagee or broker is ordinarily engaged
to service the mortgage after it has been assigned to a permanent holder.
The third dominant power in the home mortgage market, the federal
government, has so far played a minor role as a direct source of mort-
gage credit. Only in emergency periods has this function been author-
ized, such as during the depression when the HOIC program was in full
swing. In the postwar. period this activity has been reinstituted in
another form, that of granting direct loans to veterans where comparable
liberal credit accommodations are unavailable through private channels.
Nevertheless, the bulk of federal intervention in the home mortgage to
date has been less direct but fully as positive in its impact. The
institutional nature of this intervention will be considered in Part IV,
with specific reference to the Boston area being taken up in the suc-
ceeding Parts V and VI. The balance of the present section will be
concerned with the development of the first two types of mortgage
lenders.
lActually this "direct" lending program differs only slightly in degree
from the inflationary advance commitment procedure followed by FNMA,
especially in the years 19h8-50. See Chapter 14.
DECLINE OF INDIVIDUALS AS MORTGAGEES
Inasmuch as individual home ownership has long been promoted in this
country, one might anticipate an early development of a well-coordinated
system for financing home purchase. Actually, however, for many years
home credit needs were supplied in large part by individual lenders,
whose operations have been generally undisciplined and unrestricted down
to the present day. Even with the emergence of more specialized insti-
tutional lenders, positive steps toward coordination and uniformity are
of relatively recent origin, with the result that mortgage lending prac-
tices have traditionally varied widely from city to city, and within
communities as well.
So long as the United States was, predominantly an agricultural
economy, most families were housed on farms and did not seek home mort-
gage credit as such. At that time, financing land settlement and im-
provement was generally supplied by individuals and by various state
and private banks, During the early nineteenth century, however, the
movement to urban centers gathered momentum and families acquired property
solely for home occupancy as distinct from any agricultural or commercial
venture. Various types of lending institutions emerged to meet these
new home financing needs, especially in the more industrialized eastern
regions of the nation, and the shortcomings of individuals as lenders
became increasingly evident. The geographic area served by an individual
was severely restricted, as he could invest his limited savings only in
mortgage loans where the pledged property was nearby and fimiliar to him.
Moreover, the scope of his lending operations were ordinarily too small
to permit a well-diversified portfolio and an efficient servicing proce-
dure. Lastly, he rarely was an expert at rating mortgage risk functions,
and ordinarily relied upon the time-honored debt-value technique exclu-
sively. Hence, institutional investors appeared far better adapted for
efficient home mortgage operations, and the decline of the individual
as a mortgagee was inevitable.
Despite these shortcomings, the individual continues to perform
a vital function in localities where specialized institutions are
either absent, unable, or unwilling to supply mortgage credit needs.
The first condition applies more generally to newer sections of the
country where thrift institutions have never achieved the prominence
typical of the Northeast. The "unable" circumstance frequently arises
when limited cash savings compel a home buyer to seek an aggregate 16an
exceeding that obtainable from a savings institution. Under these cir-
cumstances, the buyer may request a supplemental second mortgage loan from
an individual lender. The "unwilling" situation may be a corollary of
the preceding one, where institutions refuse to approve certain loan re-
quests because of inferior mortgagor credit, poor property construction,
or undesirable location. The individual may originate the mortgage him-
self, or he may purchase it through a broker or mortgage company that
perhaps has been unable to sell the paper to a c onventional thrift
institution. Where the individual lender is concerned, purchase-money
mortgages are quite common under which he, as seller of the property,
accepts a mortgage in part payment therefor. Purchase-money mortgages
are generally sought to supplement other borrowed funds, although they
may also represent a first lien.
1 The individual also played an important role in the large-scale bond
financing during the 1920s. To finance the purchase of hotels and
expensive apartments, individuals invested heavily in this salable
paper issued in small, convenient denominations. Wickens, "Develop-
ments in Home Financing," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, March 193,p~~757'
The individual has largely retreated from direct mortgage lending
in many sections of the Boston market. Except under conditions outlined
above, the private person has preferred to invest his modest savings in
government and corporate securities, or else increase his savings account
in a local thrift institution. By entrusting his funds with the latter,
he indirectly invests in home mortgages but at the same time is spared
the problems of servicing and maintaining a sound investment portfolio.
In return for this convenience, the individual seeks safety above all,
but does expect a modest interest yield consistent with this safety. He
generally accumulates a savings account to meet some future expenditure,
to provide for old age, or merely to establish an emergency reserve.
Since he does not expect to use either principal or interest payments for
current expenditures, the savings depositor is willing to give the insti-
tution a 30-day withdrawal notice, if necessary.
CIRCULAR FLOW ANALYSIS
As indicated in the preceding demand analysis, individuals ordinarily
seek home mortgage credit either to finance the purchase of a new or
existing property or, to refinance an existing obligation. Although
there is no analytical distinction on the demand side as to whether a
new or an older property is purchased, supply implications may be quite
different. Indeed, when a newly-constructed home is purchased, the
buyer, ordinarily with the aid of borrowed funds, injects purchasing
power directly into the industrial sector through his payment to the
builder. Such a purchase constitutes a real transaction in the national
income sense, and is accordingly included in the accounts of real economic
In addition, an existing owner of unmortgaged property may need additional
funds for any of a variety of reasons and may pledge his property as col-
lateral. Such credit, however, is frequently sought in connection with
propertyimprovement and modernization, and hence is drawn up on a short-
term basis.
activity. The inflationary aspects of such purchases during expansionary
periods have been recognized by the federal government, and efforts to
curb these dangers are manifest in the credit regulations of Regulation X.
The purchase of an existing property, on the other hand, does not
constitute a real transaction in the national income sense, and expan-
sionary potentialities are perhaps less direct and clear-cut. Indeed,
when the ownership of an existing stock of housing is redistributed
throughout society, there is no necessary inflationary or deflationary
bias involved. The seller of the property shifts the form of his asset
holdings from a relatively illiquid house to cash or perhaps to a highly
liquid thrift account. The buyer, on the other hand, acquires the owner-
ship of a durable good in exchange for parting with some liquidity hold-
ings as well as assuming a substantial mortgage obligation. 2
If a mortgage is still attached to the property at the time of
its resale, the lending institution ordinarily draws up a new mortgage
contract, with the previous owner receiving the loan proceeds. Thus
the latter is enabled to withdraw his equity from the mortgaged property
as a result of the willingness of the lending institution to inject new
funds into the mortgage market. During the immediate postwar period
before extensive home building was underway, many existing home owners
realized substantial capital gains through disposing. of their property,
whether mortgaged or not, in a brisk real estate market. Such gains
1 f, for example, the thrift institution financing the transaction were
loaned up at the time and required added savings inflows, the loan
proceeds would be supplied indirectly by new savings of depositors.
On the other hand, depositors may merely be transferring some of their
cash holdings into savings accounts which are but slightly less liquid.
2It is theoretically possible, though highly unlikely, that if the thrift
institution were virtually loaned up when the buyer sought the mortgage
credit, the seller could in effect supply the loan proceeds himself
through making an immediate deposit of the full loan amount.
were made possible in large part by virtue of liberal mortgage credit
availability, and such trading of existing properties undoubtedly had
a definite inflationary influence.
As indicated earlier, a home seller is often obliged to take back
a substantial purchase-money mortgage in order to complete the sale.
In this 'event, however, there is no necessary flow of funds in the
mortgage market, and the seller realizes liquidity from the transaction
only as the attendant mortgage loan is repaid. Purchase-money mortgages,
perhaps more than any other type of mortgage, are sorely lacking in
marketability, and can be cnverted into cash only at substantial dis-
counts if at all. The history of speculative builders in particular
in accepting and discounting such second mortgages in selling excessively
over-priced properties has been most unfortunate.
The refinance of' an existing mortgage without change in ownership
may require additional long-term credit only if the new contract in-
creases the outstanding loan balance. Frequently the rewritten con-
tract merely consolidates previous first, second, and even third
mortgages into a single instrument. On the other hand, it may offer
the mortgagor' a more favorable repayment schedule, such as a' term ex-
tension, interest rate reduction, more convenient periodic payments,
etc.' Especially in periods of vigorous competition among mortgage
lenders, the home owner may find it advantageous to refinance his
mortgage at the institution offering the most substantial tprice"t con-
cessions4 Provided he possessed reasonably complete knowledge of al-
ternate loan plans, the mortgagor may employ a technique similar to
that described in Chapter 2 in selecting the optimum combination of
contract provisions.
lSee Chapter 6.
Straight-term and Fully Amortized Loans
The principal difference between straight-term and fully amortized
loans upon the new lending operations of thrift institutions can be
conveniently described by using a simple application of the Austrian
"Period of Production" analysis. The straight-term loan contract is
analogous to the "point input-point output" case, whereby full repay-
ment follows the granting of the loan by a specific time interval.
Fully amortized loans, on the other hand, may be represented as a vari-
ant of the "point input-continuous output" case, whereby principal
repayment is gradual rather than in a lump-sum amount.
Consider the c ase where a lending institution writes all mortgages
on a fixed 3-year basis, and where all such loans are held until maturity
at which time they are fully retired. When the contract specifies no
amortization payments, the outstanding loan balance remains at the
original level, say $300, until repaid in full at the end of the tem.
If the annual volume of all straight-term mortgages made by a lending
institution were valued at $300, its outstanding portfolio could be
represented as in Table I. Assuming no mortgage holdings at the outset,
the thrift institution increases its total mortgage investment only
until the earliest mortgages are retired, during which interval loans
may be made either out of newly-deposited funds or out of idle investible
resources. After 3 years, repayment revenues are sufficient to meet all
new mortgage demands under the restrictive assumptions made, and the
2
outstanding balance remains at $900 indefinitely in the continuous case.
In this simple case, the "period of production" is 3 years, and the lender
has a virtual turnover of c apital within this period.
lSee, for example, E. Bghm-Bawerk' A Positive Theory of Capital, 1889,
(Smartts Translation).
2In this simple model, interest payments are disregarded; perhaps it could
be assumed that interest revenues exactly cover all administrative costs,
dividend payments, and necessary reserve allocation.
this long-term obligation with a short-term instrument.
As the term of the loan is extended, the thrift institution must
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A-$300 $300 A-$300 $2,0 A-$2,O
B- 300 600 B- 300 400 B- 2,0
A- 300 A- 1,0
c- 300 900 c- 300 4,0 C- 2,0
E- 300 B- 1,0
A- 300 A- ,0
D- 300 900 1)- 300 4,0 D- 2,0
c- 300 C- 1,0
B- 300 B- ,0
for level monthly p~r.ments over the entire loan term, thereby producing
The most popular variant of the fully amortized loan type calls
repay his mortga~e in less than 20 years, it is unrealistic to write
an accelerated amortization schedule as maturity is approached. Early
3
1
2
payments consist of interest charges for the most part, ~ile as the
TABLE I. COMPARATDlE FDaTFOLIO COlviFOSITION UNDER STRAIGHT-TERM AND FULLY~~ORTIZED MORTGAGE LENDING
Straight-term Amortized*Year New Loans End of Year Composition End of Year Compositionl3alance- Balance-
{*'Assuming "straight-line" amortization, with continuous new lending at an
annual r ate of ~~300.
4
if the average home buyer is unable to accumulate sufficient equity to
consequence is reflected in a leading argument for 20-year mortgage loans:
entails a much more concentrated saving schedule on hi.s own part. This
to the individual mortgagor, however, for the shorter repayment period
the community of savers) must wait to realize full liquidity on a parti-
affects the period over which the lending institution (and indirectly,
cular mortga.ge investment. The specific term is of utmost significance
the period of production would be doubled. Var:rinQ' the loan term thus
period of time. For example, if the term were extended to 6 years, new
savings or idle capital would be required for the initial 6 years, and
continue injecting new funds into the active mortgage market for a longer
term progresses this share declines steadily. To simplify the analogy
of such contracts to the "point input-continuous output" case, assume
that the unpaid principal balance diminishes continuously through
"straight-line" amortization. In other words, for each 3-year loan made,
the lending institution realizes a continuous inflow of amortization sums
equivalent to one-third of the original loan amount within every 12-month
period.
The right-hand side of Table I has been drawn up under the same
basic assumptions as the left-hand side, except that loan contracts
specify full amortization rather than lump-sum payment at the end of
the 3-year term. In either case, a type of equilibrium is reached at
the end of 3 years, after which time repayment sums are sufficient to
maintain the hypothetical circular flow. When fully amortized loans
are considered, however, the "period of production" is halved, and even
though complete retirement requires 3 years, a lending institution with
a balanced portfolio has a turnover of loan capital every 115 years.
In the latter case, amortization revenues supply an increasing share of
new loan requirements during the initial 3 years, with the amount rising
from $50 in the ,first year to $250 in the third.
Certainly the assumption of continuous lending precludes a literal
application of this analysis to the real world. Nevertheless, the be-
havior of a large mortgage lending institution with a well-balanced loan
portfolio may approximate this theoretical situation. For example, if
2)-year amortized loans had been made regularly and held to maturity,
the mortgagee would have to place new loans each year valued at 10 per
i.e., the outstanding balance of $450 'divided by the new loan amount of
$300.
cent of its outstanding portfolio in order to maintain this balance.~
Hence, as will be shown later, a $100 million thrift institution faces
continuing re-investment problems as substantial amortization payments
are received every business day.
MORTGAGES AS AN INVESTMENT FOR THRIFT INSTITUTIONS
A mortgage lending institution is analogous to a water reservoir,
in that it receives an inflow of savings from the community at large and
directs these funds into worthy long-term investment channels. In so
doing, it continually, faces the conflict of seeking optimum profitability
on these investments while preserving the safety of the funds entrusted
to it. Individual depositors regard the safekeeping of their funds as
the most essential function of the depositary, but the universal adoption
of public and private insurance programs has lessened the competitive
2
advantage of an established safety record. This consequence certainly
does not imply that the safekeeping function has been relegated to a
subordinate role, but rather that the discriminating depositor can now
afford to expect additional benefits from the thrift institution. He
has become more sensitive to convenience, both as regards location and
ease of doing business, andmay shop around among competing depositaries
in quest of maximum interest returns, consistent with safety. The rela-
tive achievements of competing institutions in the Boston area in meeting
these changing demands of community savers will be discussed later in the
lThis is necessarily true when "straight-line" amortization is required,
as shown in the above hypothetical illustration. Under the popular
direct-reduction type of contract, there is a curvature in the amorti-
zation schedule, but the 10 per cent re-investment requirement would
still be approximated in a large well-balanced portfolio.
2See Part IV.
section.
Although thrift institutions solicit only savings funds of a
relatively long-term character, they must be prepared to meet most with-
drawal requests on demand. Local savings and cooperative banks may re-
quire a 30-day notice from depositors and shareholders before withdrawals
are paid, but, in practice, rarely exercise this privilege except in times
of extreme financial stress.
If an institution wished to maintain absolute liquidity to prepare
for the possibility of complete withdrawal, it would have to retain all
deposited funds in cash. Any other possible use of the funds would im-
pair their immediate convertibility. Certain investments, such as U. S.
Treasury Bills and Certificates, permit a prompt recovery of cash with
a minimum risk of loss. Such highly liquid assets, however, necessarily
involve a'sacrifice in the form of reduced interest income. At the
opposite end. of the spectrum--are opportunities which offer the investor
a less certain repayment of cash only after a long period of time. The
chance of loss on such an investment is particularly high if the holder
attempts to secure a cash recovery by selling the paper before maturity.
As compensation for tying up funds in this manner, the investor ordinarily
receives a generous interest return. Hence, the conflict between-safety
and profitability resolves itself in part into the conflict between li-
quidity and interest yields.
Established thrift institutions can utilize their past experience
with depositors' funds in shaping an investment policy about a fairly
predictable rate of withdrawal. To meet immediate liquidity requirements, a
lAlthough total savings inflow may be relatively inelastic to interest
rate changes, there- is evidence of a considerable degree of "consumer"
sensitivity to alternate dividend rates among competing institutions.
See "Dividend Returns on Savings Accounts" in Chapter 5.
certain portion of these funds are retained as cash, deposited in
correspondent banks, and invested in short-term government paper.
The balance may be prudently placed in various longer-term investment
outlets, notably mortgage loans. By an appropriate combination of
maturities and amortization schedules, the mortgage portfolio may produce
a flow of repayments that will assist in meeting anticipated withdrawal
demands.
Mortgage loans have characteristically lacked any significant degree
of liquidity or shiftability. Straight mortgages are highly illiquid,
for the lender must await maturity before he has any contractual right
to receive any principal repayment. Furthermore, the short-term nature
of such loans has made it difficult for the mortgagor to retire his
obligation even at maturity. As a result, the latter would frequently
seek repeated loan renewals, aggravating the inferior liquidity of this
investment. Amortized mortgages, on the other hand, are liquid to the
extent that principal repayment is spread out over the entire loan term.
For example, a level monthly payment type mortgage is amortized accord-
ing to the following schedule:
TABLE II. AMORTIZATION OF PRINCIPAL ON A IDAN OF $10,000 FOR 25-YEAR
TERM AT 5 PER CENT INTEREST RATE
End of Year Amount Amortized End of Year Amount Amortized
1 $ 210 15 $ 4500
3 650 17 5400
1140 20 6920
7 1690 22 8070
10 2610 25 10,000
12 3310
Source: Insured Mortgage Portfolio, Federal Housing Administration,
October 1938, pp. 14-15.
The equity component of the constant monthly payment rises rapidly as
maturity is reached, especially during the latter half of the term.
Approximately a third of the debt is amortized during the first half of
the term, while the last third is retired during the final 6 years of the
repayment period. The preceding analysis on circular flows has indicated
the effect of amortization in producing a continuous stream of repayments.
Shiftability generally refers to that quality of an investment which
permits its conversion into cash via sale or rediscount. Liquidity and
shiftability serve complementary functions in an individual investment
portfolio, for the institution may need to carry only minimum cash re-
serves so long as its long-term paper can be readily turned into cash
without heavy loss. Of course, for the whole system of institutional
investors, the effectiveness of shiftability depends upon the existence
of active buyers as well as sellers in the market, lest substantial
capital losses be incurred. In the past, mortgage loans have not been
shiftable to any significant degree. The potential resale market was
severely localized at best, and even then few investors or institutions
sought this unstandardized paper. Recent legislation, coupled with the
growing popularity of amortized loans, has greatly strengthened and widened
the secondary mortgage market.
The preceding discussion indicates how mortgages represent an in-
creasingly desirable investment outlet for thrift institutions, at least
so far as liquidity and shiftability are concerned. Before an overall
evaluation of mortgage lending can be made, however, its safety and
profitability characteristics must be analyzed.
A comparison of net yields on mortgage loans as against alternate
investment yields can be made only after the various rates of return are
reduced to a common base. The gross return on any investment includes
1 This legislation is summarized in Part IV and its influence is analyzed
in Part VII.
compensation for three distinct elements. In the first place, all
administrative costs of originating and servicing the investment must
be covered. Expense rates in mortgage lending vary widely among in-
stitutions, according to type and size, as well as according to the
type of loans made. For example,. monthly amortized loans covering small
homes are much more expensive to service, relatively speaking, than are
straight-term loans or single loans on large income properties.
The second major component in gross investment yield consists of
pure interest. This interest'rate is the theoretical return which
accrues to a riskless investment involving no service costs whatever.
For practical purposes, the yield on government securities is taken as
an approximate measure of this rate. Under equilibrium conditions in
a perfect capital market, the pure interest component would be equal
in all alternative investments.
The third major component implicit in gross interest rates consists
of compensation for the risk assumed in making the investment. This
element is not an absolute phenomenon, for every investment involves a
risk of loss to a certain degree. The degree, however, varies widely
among different classes of investments and within each class as well.
Mortgage lending, for instance, may involve substantial risk, though
highly variable, and the lender is accordingly justified in charging
an additional return as due compensation for its assumption.
When a thrift institution finances a home purchase through making
a mortgage loan, it converts into cash the present value of a series of
payments promised by the mortgagor. The seller of the property may be
either unable or unwilling to extend credit to the home buyer. Hence,
the institution monetizes the mortgagor's obligation, and makes a cash
1See pp. 87-88.
payment to the seller for his illiquid asset. The latter shifts the
risk of full repayment on to the lending institution, which must then
assess the home buyer the necessary premium for bearing this risk.
The fundamental risk in home mortgage lending concerns the pos-
sibility that the borrower may be unable or unwilling to fulfill the
stipulated mortgage obligations, thereby necessitating foreclosure
or some other loss adjustment. This failure may stem from a wide
variety of causes. The mortgagor may find the monthly debt service too
burdensome for his impaired income stream at some point during the re-
payment period, because of illness, accident, unemployment, severe de-
flation, etc. Other factors which might increase mortgage delinquency
and default result from the breaking up of the family, on account of
premature death, divorce, etc. Even if the repayment schedule is not
oppressive, the mortgagor may simply lack the proper motivation to
maintain payments over the loan term. He may have lost his enthusiasm
for home ownership in general. On the other hand, the value of the
mortgaged property, because of obsolescence, neighborhood blighting,
or severe physical depreciation may have fallen more rapidly thaa the
outstanding debt balance. Accordingly, the mortgagor may have little
incentive to continue accumulating a worthless equity in the property.
In the event of such a default, the mortgagee may call upon his
second line of defense, that of foreclosure. This contingent claim
on the pledged property affords the lender an opportunity to recover
some or all of the unpaid principal balance when the mortgagor does
default. Until the recent depression, mortgage lenders had placed an
lEspecially when mortgage delinquency is due to external economic condi-
tions, the lender may prefer not to foreclose but rather to permit the
existing owner to retain the property with the former recognizing his
loss through reducing interest charges, reducing the outstanding loan
balance, etc.
almost limitless confidence in the dependability of this hedge against
loss. The disasterous loss experience of the 1930s, however, demon-
strated beyond a doubt that proper risk arialysis must consist of more
than merely prescribing a reasonable debt-value ratio. History has
shown that periods of economic crisis tend to be accompanied by waves
of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure. The acquisition of mortgaged
property has not guaranteed solvency in the loan portfolio, for the vol-
ume of foreclosures tends to vary inversely with general real estate
1
activity and market valuations. Hence, in a period of severe deflation,
the sale of a property inortgaged during a period of prosperity would-
probably provide insufficient revenues to cover the unpaid debt balance
2.
and the expense incident to foreclosure.
The effectiveness of the foreclosure option in minimizing mortgage
risk is further diminished by the costly, time-consuming, and often
unnecessary procedures required in many states. Statutory rules and
regulations surrounding foreclosure proceedings and title acquisition
vary widely across the nation. During the recent depression, redemption
periods ran as high as 24 months in Alabama, whereas most states on the
'This tendency is indicated by the following table, showing indexes of
real estate activity in Boston and non-farm real estate foreclosures in
Massachusetts, for selected years:
Year Real Estate Activity Foreclosures in
in BosTon Massachusetts
1931 109.7 n.a.
1934 73.6 124.6
1935 74.3 143.1
1936 80.9 106.2
1937 85.5 98.5
1938 78.8 75.6
1939 89.2 76.8
1940 100.3 66.2
1943 103.0 15.0
1945 134.4 6.8
Source: Reprinted from Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks, op. cit.,
Appendix Table X-2, p. 503.
2Especially if the mortgage were of the straight-term variety, or, if
fully amortized, if it were relatively unseasoned.
Atlantic seaboard, including Massachusetts, had no such restriction. In
connection with its operations, the HOLC found average costs of foreclo-
sure to range from $5.18 in Texas to $354.30 in Illinois, with the cor-
responding figure for Massachusetts being $29.08.
It should be repeated that the mortgagor's note constitutes the
primary credit instrument, and the mortgage itself is merely a security
device to protect the lender. If, however, the mortgagor defaults and
also if subsequent disposition of the foreclosed property fails to cover
the unpaid debt balance, the mortgagee may resort to the third line of
defense. In this event, the creditor may issue a deficiency judgment
against the other assets of the borrower, measured by the difference
between the sale price and the amount of the debt. Its issuance is
justifiable only if the judicial sale is conducted in a reasonably normal
market. Otherwise, as has characterized depression foreclosure experi-
ence, the original mortgagee is the only active bidder at the auction sale,
and hence may purchase property "worth" thousands of dollars for a mere
$100. This eventuality operates both as a windfall gain to the mort-
gagee and as a double loss to the mortgagor when deficiency judgments
are readily enforceable.2 To protect the mortgagor from such oppressive
conditions a series of legislative measures and court decisions have
progressively limited the overall effectiveness of deficiency judgments.
Rather than abolish the right of issuance altogether, however, most states
have sought an equitable compromise through setting up the "fair value"
device as a guide in foreclosure sales.
1D. A. Bridewell, "The Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home
Financing," Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1938, pp. 545-563.
DJ.  Popeat, "State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor During
the Depression," Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1938, pp. 529-936.
3 1bid., pp. 531-536.
MORTGAGE RISK AND PROBABILITT THEORY
It may be helpful to digress a moment and apply some elementary
probability theory to the mortgage risk problem. Each mortgage loan
gives rise to a-risk function which could be represented by a proba-
bility distribution showing the relative likelihood of its being repaid
fully or in any part thereof. To restrict our analysis to a simple
example, consider the case of 10-year mortgage loans, where no principal
or interest payment is made until the end of the term.1  The probability
distribution furnishes the lender with an "expected value," perhaps best
identified as the mean of the distribution, which should be at least
equal to the repayment sum on similar risk-free investments plus any
differential administrative expense. In order to realize a given rate
of return, the mortgagee would specify a repayment sum (P) larger than
the corresponding expected value (X ).p
This repayment function undoubtedly resembles a highly skewed dis-
tribution, with the specified repayment as a maximum but with no deter-
minate lower limit short of zero. The expected repayment is a function
of the parameter P, where the probability of any given repayment X is
found from the implicit function f (XP) 0.
X= P
K~ givenPrepayment I i
It is quite realistic to regard the modal repayment as coinciding with
the required sum, while the expected value is necessarily less than or
1This is, in effect, a straight discount type contract, which is still
widely used by private home construction lenders, where the term rarely
exceeds 6 months.
equal to this sum.
This hypothetical risk function would require some modification when
the second and third lines of defense are taken into consideration. Ef-
fective losses on defaulted mortgage loans are substantially lessened
when due allowance is made for subsequent revenues arising out of fore-
closure sale and a possible deficiency judgment. The extent of the
resulting adjustment in net returns may be indicated by the relation of
net losses charged off at the time of sale to the total book value of the
foreclosed properties sold by all Massachusetts savings banks.
TAELE III. NET LOSSES CHARGED OFF ON FORECLOSED REAL ESTATE AT TIEE OF
SALE, IN DOLLAR VOLUME, AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL BOOK
VALUE OF ESTATES SOLD BY ALL MASSACHUSETTS SAVINGS BANKS,
SELECTED YEARS, 1926-1945.
Year Total Net Losses Charged Net Losses as Percentage of
Off at Time of Sale Total Book Value of
-COOU) ~Estates Sold
1926 .13 1.13%
1929 212 3.30
1933 1,525 3.68
1936 2,584 7.61
1940 10,831 20.00
1943 13,471 31.60
1945 6,0h9 26.29
Source: Lintner, op. cit., Table 35, p. 279.
The .f act that the dollar volume of these recognized losses increased
steadily each year from 1926 through 1943 reflects the particular
2
foreclosure policies followed by these lending institutions. Professor
Saulnier has conducted a sample survey of the foreclosure experience of
24 life insurance companies during the period 1920-46. During these
lIn discussions of uncertainty,economists have used the mode as well as
the mean in referring to expected value, although the preference for the
latter seems clear-cut here. See F. Lutz, The Theory of Investment in
the Firm, Princeton University Press, 1951.,~9. 179-180.
2See Lintner, op. cit., Chapter X.
years the loss on the disposal of foreclosed 1- to 4-family dwellings
averaged 8.8 per cent of the lender's investment at foreclosure.
On individual transactions, disperson (e.g., standard deviation) of
the repayment probability distribution may be so high that loan terms are
materially affected. Where a single loan is considered, there is a sig-
nificant likelihood that the mortgagor's repayment may fall far short of
(or, alternately, may well exceed) the mean value (x). In this event,
the assignment of P or, in effect, the contract rate of interest, de-
pends largely upon the speculative characteristics of mortgage lenders.
An individual lender may be regarded as balancing the "expected" return
against some measure of the dispersjon. Most lenders perhaps have a
strong aversion to this latter risk, and would assume a wider disperson
only if the mean value were correspondingly increased. 2 For example,
second mortgage loans have been made only at high rates of interest,
partly because of a low X/p ratio, but also because of the lender's
fear of a total loss of principal.3  The behavior of first mortgage
lenders may be analyzed in a similar manner. Except in boom periods
when orthodox risk rating is often forgotten in the inflationary spiral,
conservative lenders may refuse loan applications even at premium rates,
because certain mortgagor credit or property elements entail extraordinary
risk. Instead of adjusting repayment sums (or interest rates) to reflect
varying X/p ratios and z- many lenders have adopted a policy of strict
1Saulnier, op. cit., Chapter VI, Table 28.
2Professor Lutz suggests that this "risk preference function"t for an
individual entrepreneur may be represented by conventional indifference
curves, with the mean and standard deviation as the two parameters.
Lutz, op, cit., pp. 189-190.
3 Their fears were not unfounded, as demonstrated by the widespread failure
of second mortgage lenders during the early 1930s.,
credit rationing, and thereby offer essentially identical terms to all
qualified applicants.
When ,any lender is able to pool together many individual mortgage
loans, he may benefit from the operation of. the ."law of large numbers."
Actual repayment sums may show a wide variation from the true expected
value, but, as the number of trials is increased, this variation de-
creases monotonically. The probable variation from the mean increases
only with the increase in the square root of the number of cases observed
(e.g.,'W-g=' -7 ). Hence, the actual approaches the expected experience as
the lender expands his operations, and the element of uncertainty is cor-
respondingly lessened.
To take a concrete example, consider a population of mortgage loans
where the lender will either receive full payment (100 per cent) or
nothing whatever (0 per cent). Provided each type were equally repre-
sented in the population, both as to number and loan amount, the ex-
pected value is 50 per cent of the specified repayment amount. If his
"risk preference function" were ignored.for the moment, the mortgagee
would assign P so that i = } P would at least correspond to returns on
alternative investments. Actually, however, dispersion is unusually
high, and on a single loan, the lender would receive either 0 or 100 per
cent of what he specified. If two loans were made, the probability of
receiving exactly 50 per cent of the total P is 2, and of receiving all
or nothing, * each. As the number of loans is increased, the range of
probable repayment will concentrate more closely about the theoretical
expected value of 50 per cent.' This simplified illustration is admittedly
unrealistic, for, in the real world the lender may receive virtually any
amount between nothing and full repayment from an individual mortgage loan.
As in any sampling process, it is important that the mortgagee strive
to eliminate any undesirable bias in selecting his loan portfolio. For
example, if a sample of loans with similar risk characteristics were
isolated, the actual repayment may vary widely from the expected value as
determined by the past experience of the entire group containing a wide
diversity of risk elements. Hence, unless the lender is purposely as-
signing his interest rates according to a special segment of the popula-
tion, he should seek a random distribution of risk characteristics in his
portfolio,1
AWANTAGES OF INSTITUTIONS AS MORTGAGE LENDERS
Institutional lenders, by including in their respective portfolios
mortgages with differing types of risk elements, are generally the only
type of mortgagee that are large enough to effectively utilize the law
of large numbers. Although the success of many types of mortgage loans
may depend upon similar variables, the relative influence of each variable
may differ considerably. For example, a severe slump in a major industry
may increase the likelihood -of mortgage default throughout the economy,
but it would spell almost certain loss in the localities immediately
concerned. To limit the total amount loaned on any single-risk element,
the mortgagee often strives to distribute his loans over a reasonably
wide geographic area, and avoids a heavy concentration in communities
dependent upon the prosperity of a single company or industry. He may
also seek to place mortgage loans on various types of property according
to price range, neighborhood, architectural design, number of family
accommodations, etc. To achieve a proper balance between mortgages and
1Assuming, of course, that the lender has reasonably complete knowledge
of the expected net yield for the entire population of loans, but not
the various discriminant functions for particular segments, etc.
2The feast and famine plight of New England textiles and the many single
industry communities serve as an apt illustration in this regard.
investments in the external capital market, a thrift institution may
supplement mortgage lending with purchases of government and private
corporate securities.
As a business enterprise, the thrift institution may enjoy de-
creasing average costs over a wide range of output. Average adminis-
trative costs of initiating and servicing mortgage loans, consisting
largely of salary payments, appear to decline continuously as more
'loans are handled.. Rental expense per $1,000 of assets also appears
to decline slightly as the size of institutions is increased. Among
the major cost items, only advertising budgets increase more than pro-
portionately with the increase in asset size. (See Table IV.) The
role of advertising in securing and maintaining mortgage portfolios
will be considered in some detail later in the study.
TABLE IV. AVERAGE EXPENSE RATES PER $1,000 OF ASSETS FOR ALL MASSACHUSETTS
SAVINGS BANKS AND COOPERATIVE BANKS IN MASSACHUSETTS, BY SIZE
GROUPS, 1950
Size Group
ssets per Bank
(millonsroT
Under 2
2 -5
5 - 10
10- 20
20- 35
over 35
All Banks
Under 1
1 -2
2 -3
3 -4
4 -5
5 -7
Over 7
All Banks'
N6. of
Tinkis i
Group
6
26
47
56
26
28
189
19
54
28
22
18
17
17.
175-
SAVINGS BANKS
Year ending October 1950
Expenses
n Total Salaries
$7.56 $4.97
5.76 3.52,
5.88 3.45
4.93 2.93
5.15 2.86
4.69 2.60
4.92 2.76
COOPERATIVE BANKS
Year ending April 1950
9.86 5.45
8.97 5.29
9.09 5.16
8.97 4.92
8.51 4.80
8.51 4.41
8.24 4.38
8.68 4.73
per $1,000 of Assets
liint Advertising Other
$.53
.36
.43
.37
.40
.37
.39
1.20
.93
1.00
1.44
.86
.85
.85
$.10
.18
.23
.19
.26
.23
.22
.35
.31
.44
.39
.45
.66
.62
.97 .52
$1.96
1.70
1.77
1.44
1.63
1.49
1.55
2.88
2.44
2.49
2.22
2.40
2.59
2.39
2.46
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts
lSee Chapter 12.
Commissioner of Banks, 1950.
These ddta indicate that overall average costs of operation as a
percentage of total assets tend'to vary inversely with the asset size of
the thrift institution. Among cooperative banks, average costs per $1,000
of assets in 1950 were 16 per cent less in the highest than in the lowest
size bracket. The corresponding range in average costs among savings
banks was a significantly wider 38 per cent and was heavily influenced by
the relatively high cost operations of the smallest institutions. This
observbition, however, does not necessarily apply to costs of mortgage
lending or to profitability ratios. Moreover, no deductions can be drawn
from these data alone as to the relative efficiency of the two types of
local thrift institutions. As succeeding discussions will indicate,
cooperative banks have traditionally invested mtch more heavily in mort-
gage loans than have savings banks. Inasmuch as mortgage loans, while
high yielding, are among the most expensive to service in an investment
portfolio, the higher expense ratios among cooperative banks are not
surprising.
Within each institutional type, the appearance of "decreasing costs"
probably indicates some real economies in handling larger mortgage port-
folios.' The inference follows directly, however, only if overall mort-
gage investment policy is relatively independent of the asset size of
tie institution. For instance, if the larger savings banks invest most
of their deposits in government bonds while the smaller banks concentrate
on mortgage loans, the hypothesis of decreasing costs in mortgage lending
would be seriously questioned. Actually, size appears to have a minor
influence on the ratio of mortgage loans to total assets; in 1950 this
ratio was 35.8 per cent for the 5 largest and 34.9 per cent for all 56
savings banks in Metropolitan Boston.
1Comuted from Annual Report, 1950. See "Additional Comments on the
Largest Institutions" in Chapter 12.
Furthermore, even if the mortgage-to-assets ratio appears to be
independent of asset size, it does not necessarily follow from the above
data that thrift institutions enjoy real economies in mortgage origina-
ting and servicing. These apparent economies may result largely from the
type and size of loan made rather than from any inherent advantage accru-
ing to the operation of a large portfolio. Even these "apparent" econo-
mies are an indirect consequence of size, however, for only the larger in-
stitutions are able and justified to make large individual loans on which
administrative costs are admittedly minimized.
Specialized lending institutions become experts in the mortgage
field, and real economies may result from spreading this "fixed factor"
over many individual transactions. As specialists, they may directly
minimize mortgage risk by scientifically anply'ing the economic soundness
of the proposed home purchase. After a careful investigation of the
mortgagor and his capacity to assume the attendant financial obligations,
as well as of the long-run value of the property, these experts may pres-
cribe the appropriate mortgage plan, if any. Perhaps certain thrift
institutions, obligated by law or custom to regard mortgages as their
primary investment outlet, may readily compensate for this lack of diver-
sification by thoroughly exploiting their role as mortgage specialists.
This suggests a practical limitation to extreme diversification. As
explained earlier, the law of large numbers is utilized to the best
advantage when the various loans are spread over as many different risks
as possible. Nevertheless, the small institutional lender may be wise
to run the theoretical risks of geographic concentration of mortgage
loans in order to operate in a locality where he is thoroughly acquainted
with the borrower as well as the mortgaged property. Until mortgage
lending practices become more scientific and standardized and until the
operation of the secondary home mortgage market approaches that of the
organized stock exchange, small thrift institutions at least will continue
to operate only in local markets where they possess an unusual insight or
familiarity.
An objective analysis of a proposed home purchase certainly provides
a real service for the mortgagor as well as for the mortgagee. The buyer
is guarded against an unwise investment, with reference to the housing
asset itself as well as to his capacity to carry the debt burden over the
loan term. Undoubtedly such expert counsel may be highly desirable when
any consumers (or pr6ducers) good is acquired. On the other hand, a
transaction involving the purchase of an asset as expensive and as durable
as a house perhaps merits special consideration, especially where the
buyer is inexperienced and poorly informed, *a universal characteristic
of owner occupancy.
CHAPTER 5. MAJOR SOURCES OF MORTGAGE CREDIT IN NETROPOLITAN BOSTON
The prominent role played by individual investors in mortgage lending
history has already been described. Such mortgagees are as yet subject to
limited public regulation and supervision and little comprehensive data
have been compiled on their operations. Individual investors may enter
the mortgage market for a great many reasons, and may write loan con-
tracts far different from those of specialized institutions. Their in-
terest in the market may involve merely a small loan to a needy friend
or relative; on the other hand, they may invest substantial sums in mort-
gages which often had been initiated by mortgage companies. They may
seek speculative investment through buying heavily discounted second
mortgages, or they may be virtually compelled to accept a second purchase-
money mortgage in order to consummate a property sale. Specific reference
to mortgage lending by individuals in certain local communities will be
given in Part V.
The balance of this study will be concerned largely with the mort-
gage operations of various institutional lenders in the Boston area. Be-
fore making specific reference to these operations, however, some general
economic characteristics of the dominant lender types will be summarized.
The various local thrift institutions, including savings and loan associa-
tions, savings banks, and commercial banks, are described first, followed
by brief reference to life insurance companies, credit unions, and mis-
cellaneous institutions.
THRIFT INSTITUTIONS
The first type of mortgagee to be considered includes the various
types of thrift institutions, which regard the promotion of savings as a
a common objective. These institutions compete with each other in attract-
ing the savings of the general public, and, in so doing, seek to pay
generous dividends on the funds entrusted to them. As pointed out
earlier, however, safety rather than profitability is paramount in the
investment of their funds, largely because of the nature of their deposi-
tary functions. Furthermore, all local savings and loan associations and
savings banks are mutual-type organizations and as such have no stock-
holders equity to cushion the investment of the savings deposits en-
trusted to them. Although these institutions may serve similar ends,
their methods of achieving a safe return on deposited capital varies
widely, as evidenced by their investment portfolios.
Thrift institutions operate as intermediaries between the community
of savers and the host of parties seeking these investment funds. De-
manders of long-term credit may include home buyers, purchasers of other
durable goods, private corporations, other financial institutions, gov-
ernments, and many others. To provide additional funds for any one or all
of these investment outlets, an operating thrift institution may require
an inflow of savings capital from existing and potential depositors,
attracted perhaps by offering higher dividend returns. Depending upon
the sensitivity of savings depositors to interest rate changes, a dif-
ferential increase in dividend rates may provoke a net inflow from the
community at large or it may merely result in a redistribution of the
existing stock of savings. Certainly interest elasticity is much greater
for the individual institution, ceteris paribus, than for the aggregate
of all depositaries. Nevertheless, a significant advance in dividend
rates paid by one institution frequently stimulates prompt retaliatory
action on the part of nearby competing institutions.1
For some concrete evidence of interest elasticity, see "Dividend
Returns" below.
If a thrift institution regards dividend adjustment or even adver-
Uising programs as ineffective or unsatisfactory in expanding savings
accounts in the short-run, sound mortgage requests may be met through
alternative methods. Some lending institutions may acquire investible
funds through borrowing, 1while most others must rely upon loan repay-
ments and prepayments, as well as the sale of governmental and private
securities, foreclosed. real estate, and other assets. The degree to
which an institution can re4y upon these latter methods of course de-
pends upon the composition of its, investment portfolio as well as market
conditions prevailing when liquidity is sought. For example, opportunities
of securing additional loanable funds through converting government bonds
into' cash are extremely limited in the case of savings and loan associa-
tions which frequently place over 90 per cent of share capital in mort-
2gage investment.2 The first major source of home mortgage credit to be.
considered in detail is this latter type of thrift institution, for which
mortgages represent the primary investment outlet, regardless of minor
developments in the outside financial sector.
COOPERATIVE BANKS
Across the nation savings and loan associations provide the largest
source of mortgage credit for home ownership. Some 4,500 associations
are organized and operated under state charters, while an additional 1500
federal savings and loan associations operate under federal charters
At the present time, this option is available primarily to federal savings
and loan associations; state-chartered thrift institutions, even if members
of the Home Loan Bank, may not make new loans with borrowed funds.2 The existence of a heavy concentration of government bonds may guarantee
liquidity to the institution, but perhaps only at a substantial sacrifice
in the form of a capital loss. The effect of the bond market drop in
early 1951 on mortgage lending operations of insurance companies is men-
tioned in Part VII.
.in 1950, these institutions held 29.3 per cent of the total mortgage
debt on 1-h family nonfarm homes. Housing Statistics, January 1952, p. 30.
pursuant to legislation passed in 1933. State-chartered savings and
loan associations, first introduced into this country in 1831, continue
to operate under various names, including building and loan associations,
homestead associations, savings societies, cooperative banks and others.
Cooperative banks, the designation of such associations in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, have been active in financing home purchases in the
Boston area since 1877. At the present time, there are 175 cooperative
banks in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with 76 in the local Boston
area covered in the present study. Regardless of the type of charter or
name of institution, all savings and loan associations serve the two-
fold purpose implied by this title: Providing a local depositary for
the "savings" of the community; and extending "loans" to finance home
ownership.
Although considerable revisions have been made, the modern associa-
tion continues to reflect the intent and policies of its earliest pre-
decessors. The early society was essentially a closed group of pros-
pective home owners who agreed to pool their savings toward this end.
As soon as sufficient funds were accumulated, an auction was held to
extend a home loan to the shareholder offering the highest premium over
and above interest charges. When the last member had been accommodated,
the mutual association was dissolved.
These small private arrangements have gradually evolved into a
system of permanent institutions accepting savings from the general
public and extending loans to any satisfactory borrower who agrees to
purchase at least one share. The auction idea, however, was not for-
gotten in Massachusetts until the recent depression, for, unless by-laws
1The total number of associations dwindled steadily from a peak of 12,804
in 1927, to 9,663 by 1936 and thence down to 5,980 by 1950. The earlier
decline resulted largely from liquidations and the latter from merger
activity. Over the 23-year period, however, total assets of all associa-
tions more than doubled to a 1950 figure of $16.9 billion. Economic
Almanac, 1951-1952, p. 145.
96
permitted otherwise, the prescribed procedure in granting loans to members
involved
.. the disbursal of accumulated funds at each monthly
meeting . .. . according to the premium bid by them for
priority of right to a real estate or share loan, which shall
consist of a percentage charged on the amount loaned in addi-
tion to interest, at a rate not ess than 5 per cent per annum,
payable in.monthly installments.
Sources of Capital
Over their 75-year history, the range of savings plans offered by
cooperative banks has been greatly enlarged, with the result that the
depositary functions of the various thrift institution types are be-
coming more nearly the same. As a fundamental distinguishing feature
of these institutions, however, cooperative banks have always promoted
the habit of regular monthly saving among their patrons through a
special incentive arrangement. Purchasers of serial shares agree to
make payments at the rate of $1 per share each month until the dues
paid in plus any accumulated profits total $200. When this value is
reached, usually stretching over a period of approximately 12 years,
the shares become "matured" after which the holder may withdraw the
full amount if he so desires. Failure to meet regular monthly payments
subjects the serial shareholder to a possible fine of 1 cent per
month for each dollar in arrears, until the interval of delinquency
reaches 6 months. 2  These fines, as well as penalties for withdrawal
of funds prior to maturity, provide a real incentive for the share-
holder to fulfill his initial intentions of systematic thrift.
General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 170, Section 21, as of 1932.
2Although many cooperative banks continue to enforce this fine arrange-
ment, shareholders generally have the option to convert their account
into a conventional savings account where regular savings are not re-
quired and dividend rates are little if any lower. From Interviews.
In order to more effectively serve community thrift needs as well
as to permit larger scale operations, cooperative banks have progressively
been authorized to augment their savings capital by other means. Fre-
quently holders of serial shares at maturity were still earning satis-
factory incomes and faced no immediate cash needs. Inasmuch as alter-
native investment outlets were severely limited unless the funds were
placed in low-yielding saving bank deposits, shareholders welcomed the
opportunity in 1914 to leave their matured shares with the cooperative
bank at generous dividend rates. Six years later cooperative banks were
also authorized'to issue paid-up share certificates in denominations of
$200, thereby attradting large amounts of new capital from individuals
who had not previously held shares. Since May 1947, sources of share
capital have been fuirther expanded to include savings shares, whereby
holders may deposit and withdraw funds at any time without fine.2
Except for the provision that the balance be divided up into savings
shares of $200 each, this thrift plan is virtually identical to that
available at all savings banks.' Some cooperative banks offer addi-
tional savings plans, including club accounts, military share accounts,
dividend savings accounts and others.
The same individual may purchase shares in the various categories,
but his total participation in each is limited. These restrictions re-
flect a basic policy among such institutions of catering to the small
saver lacking suitable alternative investment outlets. No less impor-
tant perhaps is the desire to minimize the dangers of heavy sudden
withdrawals by limiting individual holdings. An individual may hold up
Davenport, p. cit., p. 11.
2Except in emergencies, when a 30-day withdrawal notice may be required.
to 40 serial shares with a maturity value of $8,000, and in addition
may accumulate paid-up shares and regular shares with a combined value
of $6,OC0. These deposit limits may be extended through the issuance of
joint accounts, up to a total of $24,000 and $18,000 in the above cate-
gories, respectively. Dividend returns on the various share accounts
tend to vary inversely with the liquidity retained by the shareholder.
For instance, serial shares involve an essentially long-term investment
program, whereby the holder may actually prefer to borrow if necessary
to avoid delinquency. Such a decision may be economically justified in
view of the added dividend return on serial shares, but it largely re-
flects the desire to avoid the personal embarrassment of paying even a
token fine. Savings shares, at the opposite extreme, afford the holder
an opportunity to convert his balance into cash at any time without
loss.2 As of April 1951, the average dividend rates paid by all Massa-
chusetts cooperative banks ranged from 3.17 per cent on serial shares
3
to 2.15 per cent for savings accounts.
The relative contribution of the various savings programs in the
capital structure of cooperative banks has changed widely over the past
30 years. Although the serial share account continues to represent the
largest single type of account, its importance has declined steadily in
favor of alternate plans. Moreover, as fewer new serial shares are pur-
chased, it would naturally follow that matured shares would also gradually
decline in significance. Accordingly, between 1940 and 1950, the propor-
tion of total liabilities represented by serial and matured shares com-
1As might be expected, the average holdings are far below these legal
maximums. For example, in April 1950, 329,450 members held 3,067,958
serial shares, for an average subscription of 9.3 shares per person.
Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
2 1f he withdraws his funds prior to a dividend payment date, he may
sacrifice interest returns for the current period, just as in the case
of savings accounts in savings and commercial banks.
3See "Dividend Returns" below.
bined fell from 81.1 per cent to.61.6 per cent. (See Table V.) At the
same time, paid-up shares have become increasingly popular, and field
interviews reveal that many local banks have found a ready acceptance
for the newly-authorized savings shares.1
The significant decline in the purchase of unmatured shares is
viewed with alarm by some ardent proponents of true cooperative banking,
who regard a quasi-compulsory scheme as the best means of stimulating
systematic thrift. Furthermore, they insist that the significant
"product differentiation" found in serial shares would still command
wide public acceptance if the plan were effectively promoted.
TABLE V. PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL FUNDS IN MASSACHUSETTS COOPERATIVE
BANKS, AS A PER CENT OF TOTAL LIABILITIES, SELECTED YEARS,
1920-1951
Total Guaranty
Year Liabilities Serial Matured Paid-up Savings Fund and Other
(millions) Shares'hares Shares Shares Surplus Liabilities
1920 $ 174.0 88.9% 6.6 0.3% - 2.8% 1.4%
1925 369.3 69.9 18.1 6.2 - 2.8 3.0
1930 562.7 64.2 24.3 6.8 - 3.3 1.4
1936 456.2 48.4 35.1 8.8 - 5.7 2.0
1940 395.6 43.9 37.2 10.6 - 6.3 2.0
1946 482.8 40.2 32.3 15.9 .0% 8.3 3.3
1948 555.1 37.4 28.6 20.4 .8 8.7 4.8
1950 605.9 35.0 26.6 22.7 2.8 9.0 3.9
1951 646.9 32.8 48.6 4.9 9.1 4.6
Source: Annual Reports, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
*Includes dues and profits capital on both pledged and unpledged shares.
**Matured shares consolidated with paid-up share certificates as of
July 23, 1950.
Perhaps the growing popularity of savings and paid-up shares indicates
that cooperative banks must compete with competing thrift institutions
on a day-to-day basis, and can no longer rely upon long-term contractual
arrangements to maintain a steady, predictable inflow of saving capital.
This development may also result in an increased interest elasticity among
alternate depositaries, as the previous predominance of serial shares
provided an element of immobility to the flow of savings.
Although the latter had accounted for only 4.9 per cent of total liabi-
lities by April 1951 since July 23, 1950, matured and paid-up shares
have been consolidated for reporting purposes. See Table V. ,
2See, for example, "Going IDown," Cooperative Banker, Massachusetts
Cooperative Bank League, August 1951, p. 7.
To provide a cushion against a possible impairment of the safety of
share capital, cooperative banks are required to accumulate loss re-
serves out of net earnings. , aAt each distribution of profits the board
of directors must credit to the guaranty fund and surplus a certain
percentage ,of their net earnings. These two reserve accounts are to be
accumulated up to l0} per cent of a bank's total liabilities, after
which an extra dividend must be declared. As the preceding table
indicates, the reserve position of Massachusetts cooperative banks
has improved steadily over the past 30 years, and the legal limit was
approached by 1951. In addition to this assurance, cooperative banks
are also protected by .the State Share Insurance Fund, created in 1934.1
This compulsory fund is supported by proportional annual assessments
upon member banks, currently set at 1/12 of 1 per cent of share and
creditor liabilities, 2 in return for which all share accounts are
insured in, full.,
Investment Opportunities
The investment policies of cooperative banks continue to reflect
their initial objective of providing credit for home acquisition. Most
of their funds are invested in first mortgages on owner-occupied homes,
where the mortgagor is either an existing or a new shareholder. Until
recent years the share-accumulation plan was almost exclusively used,
under which the borrower would subscribe to a number of serial shares
with a total maturity value equal to the loan amount. This cooperative
form mortgage involves two separate contracts. The first requires monthly
payment on a certain number of shares until the current value of the
Acts of 1934, Chapter 73. See Part IV for a discussion of the institu-
tional background underlying this legislation.
2
The State Fund may also require five additional payments of 1/5 of 1 per
cent, each, but only one such call may be made within any year.
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accumulated payments and accrued dividends equals the face amount of the
mortgage loan. The second contract specifies a monthly interest payment
on the full amount of the loan until maturity is reached.
The basic weakness of this plan, insofar as the borrower is con-
cerned,- is that the term of the loan is a function of the profitability of
the cooperative bank making the mortgage. If general business conditions
are favorable and the bank enjoys generous income flows, the debt may be
extinguished within 12 years. If, on the other hand, the institution is
compelled to reduce or suspend dividend payments during this interval,
the period of repayment is correspondingly lengthened. In the event
of bank failure' a common depression occurrence throughout the country,
the borrower is still liable for the full debt and the share accumula-
tion may be of limited value. Frequently this element of uncertainty
in total debt service has weakened the borrowerts incentives to main-
tain payments and, especially when terms are lengthened, has undoubtedly
aggravated mortgage default. 1
While the mortgagor was subjected to adverse conditions external
to his own control, the cooperative form contract has constituted a
source of strength for the mortgagee. The bank is enabled to modify
the effective rate on all its loans without technically altering any
individual contracts on monthly payment amounts. When business turns
bad, it merely reduces dividend payments, and existing debt repayment
terms are automatically extended.2  Only when the dividend rate on serial
shares exactly equals the mortgage rate of interest is the effective rate
equal to the nominal rate. The mortgagee also has a fairly effective
Bodfish and Theobald, Savings and Loan Principles, Prentice-Hall,
New York, 1938, p. 183.
2Davenport, The Co-operative Banks'of Massachusetts, .ci. 1938,
p. 5. ~
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hedge against loss of seasoned loans through refinancing elsewhere, for
any withdrawal of pledged serial shares before maturity may subject the
borrower to substantial reductions in dividend returns. This interesting
mortgage type may be more readily analyzed by referring to a concrete
example.
Assume that the home buyer seeks a loan of $1,000 from his coopera-
tive bank, and agrees to the terms of a 6 per cent cooperative form
mortgage. Since the principal amount of $1,000 equals the face value of
5 matured serial shares, he subscribes to a capital payment of $5 per
month until the debt is extinguished. The second element in the con-
stant monthly debt service consists of an interest payment of $5 per
month. As .explained above, the total number of level monthly payments
required depends upon the dividends paid by the mortgagee. To take a
relatively prosperous institution, assume a dividend rate of 5 per cent
throughout the whole period. In this case, the loan is terminated after
146 months, found by using this simple annuity formula:
where S the dated value of a set of 146 monthly payments of R dollars
each at the end of the term, and i interest rate per conversion period.
If the less favorable dividend rate of 3 per cent were paid, the repay-
ment period would be extended to 162 months, while a 6 per cent rate would
terminate the mortgage after 138 months. In this latter case, the mort-
gage contract would appear just as any direct-reduction loan at 6 per cent.
In order to compare the relative interest burden on these two types of
mortgage contracts, consider the rate of interest on a direct reduction
type when level monthly payments of $10 are required for a 146 month
term. Once again, using elementary annuity formulas, the effective
interest rate is found to be approximately 6.5 per cent. Obviously,
the effective rate on cooperative form loans increases as the spread
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between dividend and nominal mortgage rates widens.
Because of unfortunate depression experience, the cooperative form
mortgage has largely been abandoned in favor of the more popular direct-
reduction type loan. Permission to extend this new type of mortgage was
granted in 1935, undoubtedly hastened by federal intervention into the
home financing field during this period. The HOLC, FHA, and federal
savings and loan associations all prescribed this type of contract
for all home loans coming under their jurisdiction.2
The primary advantage of the direct-reduction loan has already
been alluded to above, namely, that the mortgagor can know at the
outset the 'exact repayment period and'frequently the effective rate of
interest over the term as well. The monthly payment ordinarily in-
cludes a twelfth'of the estimated real estate taxes on the property,
and frequently hazard insurance premiums as well. Initially, the
maximum permissible loan amount was $8,000, whether the contract be of
the share-accumulation or direct-reduction type, and the loan-value
ratio was limitedato 80 per cent. Gradually, however, the former res-
triction has been relaxed, and currently a cooperative bank may lend
up to $20,000 6n single parcels of real estate, although the aggregate
of loans over $16,000 can never exceed 5 per cent of total assets. 3
The 80 per cent loan-value limit still remains, however, and the unex-
pired term of any mortgage loan cannot exceed 20 years, except where the
An examination of cooperative bank annual reports and field interviews
reveal that this spread was frequently very narrow. Actually, -during
the 1920s, some institutions were approaching a 6 per cent rate on both
loans and shares, made possible largely by various fines and penalties
as well as by revenues from invested reserves. These latter often
covered all administrative costs. for the lending institution. Since a
large proportion of all serial shareholders withdrew their funds before
maturity, these high dividend rates were not actually paid on all shares.
2See below for a description of federal savings and loan associations.
3Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 170, Section 24.
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loan is insured or guaranteed by the FHA or VA. To be eligible for a
home loan, whether insured or not, the mortgaged property must lie
either within Massachusetts or within 25 miles of the main office if in
a contiguous state.
Until the recent depression, cooperative banks were virtually alone
in writing fully amortized mortgages requiring level monthly payment
over the repayment period. Since that time, however, the practice of
putting debt retirement on a convenient income basis has enjoyed uni-
versal acceptance and is currently found in well over 90 per cent of all
new home loans made in the local area.
Although cooperative bank lending is generally associated with the
monthly payment type mortgage, these institutions also have limited
authority to extend straight-term loans. So-called common form mort-
gage loans may be made for a maximum term of 3 years and up to 70 per
cent of value. Amortization is required only during the period when
loan-value ratios exceed 60 per cent. 2 Monthly payment loans may be
converted into straight term loans provided repayment has already pro-
ceeded 4 years and the unpaid debt does not exceed 60 per cent of cur-
rent value. As data on Boston cooperative banks indicate, these loans
were most important'during the depression, constituting about 4 per cent
of total assets in 1936. Apparently a majority of these mortgages repre-
sented purchase-money mortgages written in connection with the sale of
foreclosed real estate.
In addition to providing mortgage credit for home purchase, coopera-
tive banks also extend loans to existing mortgagors for purposes of home
modernization. This may involve the repair, alteration or improvement
See Chapter 11.
2Chapter 170, Section 23.
of the mortgaged property, or merely the purchase and installation of
fixtures and durable appliances. Shareholders may also obtain loans
up to 95 per cent of the withdrawal value of their unpledged shares.2
Similar to an insurance policy loan, these loans are of great conven-
ience to a member in temporary distress when an outright withdrawal might
deprive him of substantial dividend accruals. Although they constitute
one of the safest possible bank investments, share loans have never
assumed any great importance.3 The dollar volume of these loans in-
creased during the early depression years, but continuing unemployment
and loss of income forced many borrowing shareholders to withdraw their
shares entirely.
Cooperative banks in Massachusetts concentrate their investment
activity on home mortgage lending, and accordingly place about -80 per
cent of their assets in this outlet.h -With the remaining 20 per cent,
these institutions seek a more diversified portfolio while operating
within the legal restrictions placed upon them. In order to meet un-
expected demands for share withdrawals and share loans, they must es-
tablish and maintain adequate liquidity reserves. These reserves
generally consist of cash and deposits in one or all of the following:
the Cooperative Central Bank, a national bank or trust company, or the
Federal Home Loan Bank. With the balance of their investible funds,
cooperative banks may select bonds and notes from a restricted list
5prepared by the state supervisory authority. This eligible paper
Passed in Acts of 1945.
2 Chapter 170, Section 25.
3'This form of investment has always constituted less than 3 per cent
of total assets since the First World War. Annual Report, Massachu-
setts Commissioner of Banks.
4Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
5-Taken from the eligible investment lists for Massachusetts savings
banks.
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includes various government and private securities for which there exists
a ready and reasonably s table market.
A cooperative bank may become a member of the Federal Home Loan
Bank in the Boston District, and as such may invest up to 3 per cent of
its assets in Bank stock. Up to the present time, 121 out of 175 coop-
erative banks in Massachusetts have availed themselves of this privilege.
As member institutions, they may borrow from the Federal Home Loan Bank
up to their credit limit, although approval of the State Bank Commissioner
is required for all advances above a minimum amount. Present regulations
limit total borrowings of cooperative banks to 3 per cent of share capital
or $100 thousand, whichever is les6er. 2Moreover, while the Bank System
grants long-term loans for periods of up to 10 years, cooperative bank
members may borrow up to a 1 year maximum, with renewals only where
circumstances warrant. As of April 1951, "notes payable" accounted for
less than 1 per cent of total liabilities among all banks in the Common-
wealth.
All cooperative banks in the state are required to become members
of the Cooperative Central Bank. This Bank, established in 1932, re-
sembles the Federal System in its' stated objectives of promoting elas-
ticity and flexibility in the operations of member institutions. By
pooling together a portion of their reserve funds, cooperative banks are
afforded the opportunity to borrow from the Central Bank when additional
liquidity is required. The Central Bank, along with the Share Insurance
Fund, provides member institutions with the necessary machinery to
lStatistical Summary, Home Loan Bank Board, 1951.
2 Interview, Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston. Under Chapter 195 of the
Acts of 1936, cooperative banks were granted temporary authorization to
borrow from any source to make real estate loans. At the present time,
they- are forbidden to make any loans with borrowed funds.
handle various emergency situations.* When the Bank Commissioner examines
a bank that appears to be in an insecure condition, he certifies this
discovery to the Central Bank. The latter, in turn, operates the
business until conditions permit its return to the original directors
or until liquidation proceedings are completed. Whenever necessary
to protect the shareholders of the certified bank, the Central Bank
may require additional sums from the Share Insurance Fund.
Cooperative Banks in the Boston Area
The system of cooperative banks in the Boston area enjoyed a
continuous growth both in number and asset size from a modest beginning
in 1877 down to the recent depression. During the decade of the 192Cs,
total assets tripled and by 1929 the number of institutions reached
2
a peak of 108 in the Boston vicinity and 228 throughout the Commonwealth.
Their growth pattern has followed rather closely the movements in general
business activity, with share capital rising and falling with income
levels. Often as soon as a small group of individuals believed their
expsnded saving and home purchase plans were sufficient to warrant a
separate community institution, a new cooperative bank would be incor-
porated. So long as boom conditions prevailed, these small banks thrived
on a prompt investment of heavy capital inflows, frequently to finance
the purchase of homes at highly inflated prices. This business was
generally acquired with a minimum of effort and expense, perhaps with
only part-time management operating in cramped quarters. The inherent
shortcomings of setting up undersized units in already overbanked coti-
munities became all too apparent as economic conditions tightened,
1Davenport, op. cit., p. 6.
2It will be recalled that the restricted area considered in this study
includes all communities within 10 miles of the Bbston City Hall.
and many cooperative banks were effectively forced out of the mortgage
market. Although no shareholder lost a dollar of his capital as a
result of the recent depression experience, several banks were turned over
to the Central Bank for liquidation, and many others found it advisable
to merge their operations with stronger institutions in the same community.
The number of cooperative banks in the Boston area declined to 100
in 1936, and to 85 by 1940. Most of this loss, however, was due to the
conversion of 16 banks into federal savings and loan associations, with
the balance resulting from mergers and liquidations. Merger activity
was not confined to depression expediency alone, for the total number
of active banks steadily fell to 76 by 1951.
TABLE VI. NUMBER, TOTAL ASSETS, AND AVERAGE ASSETS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS
IN THE BOSTON AREA, SELECTED YEARS, 1927 - 1951
Year* Number of Banks Total Assets Average Assets
(millions) (millions )
1927 103 $272.1 $2.6h
1936 100 263.3 2.63
1940 85 231.0 2.72
1946 78 274.6 3.52
1947 77 291.9 3.79
1948 77 30h.o 3.95
1950 76 325.6 4.28
1951 76 343.9 4.52
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
*As of October 31 through 1948; subsequent years as of April 30.
As these data indicate, the system of cooperative banks, though
hard hit by depression losses, has perhaps strengthened its overall
position in the local market since the booming twenties. This hypo-
thesis will be more thoroughly examined later in the study, but a few
remarks may be in order here. Many of the "sub-marginal" banks, per-
haps functioning more as a social organization than as a true business,
have been weeded out without material loss to shareholders. During the
recovery period, the surviving institutions were able to increase their
average asset level above that of 1927, despite the fact that the reduc-
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tion in cooperative form mortgages meant an automatic loss of pledged
share capital. Not only has the average bank strengthened its dollar
asset position, but its (guaranty fund and surplus has also mounted
steadily, constituting 9.12 per cent of total liabilities by 1951.
In spite of these indications of growth, cooperative banks con-
tinue to function primarily as small, local sources of home mortgage
credit. 2  The typical cooperative bank has between 3 and 4 shareholders
for each mortgagor, has modest business quarters and currently operates
with a total salary budget of $15,000.3 Except for two institutions in
the $30 million class, each of the cooperative banks in the Boston area
has assets holdings of less than $15 million, with the modal size bank
at less than $2 million.
TABLE VII. SIZE 'DISTRIBUTION OF COOPERATIVE BANKS IN THE BOSTON AREA,
APRIL 1951
Asset Size Group Number of Banks Per cent of Total
(millions of dollars)
All Groups 76 100.0
0 - 1 4 5.3
1S 2 17 22.4
2 - 3 15 19.7
3 - 4 13 17.1
4 - 7 9.2
5-7 9 11.8
7 -10 4 5.3
10-15 5 6.6
15 and over 2 2.6
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, 1951.
Cooperative banks are strictly mutual-type institutions in that
full ownership rests with the shareholders who share in all profits after
operating expenses and reserve allocation have been met. Although this
technicality still remains, however, the traditional mutual character
This percentage applies to all banks in the Commonwealth. See p. 101.
2See the discussion on geographic coverage of mortgage loans, Chapter 12.
Computed from 1950 Annual Report, and applies to all 175 banks in the
state.
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of cooperative banking has gradually waned, particularly over the past
two decades. Mortgagors are selected according to general credit
acceptability, and their dual role as shareholder-borrower is merely
a nominal requirement. Each individual member continues to possess
voting power, but this privilege is seldom exercised, and policy
determination generally rests with salaried management and an elected
board of directors. Regular meetings are held every month for the
whole membership, while certain members of the board meet each week to
pass on mortgage loan applications.
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
Federal savings and loan associations represent the federally-
chartered counterpart to cooperative banks, which are subject only to
state supervision. Authorization to charter these associations was
granted in the Home OwnersT Loan Act of 1933, one of the various
measures enacted during, the depression. Depending on the adequacy
of existing home financing facilities, federals could either constitute
new institutionsor merely involve the rechartering of established
savings and loan associations. As pointed out above, many communities
in the Boston area were already saturated with thrift institutions and
there appeared little justification for new entrants. Accordingly,
all local federals received their charters as converted cooperative
banks, pursuant to enabling legislation passed in 1935.2 Conversion
was easily accomplished during the early years of the program, but
since the late 1930s the task has become increasingly difficult.3
See a brief discussion of the institutional background in Part 1V.
2Chapter 215, Acts of 1935.
3See "Federal Savings and Loan Associations in the Boston Area" below.
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Federal savings and loan associations are similar to cooperative
banks in most respects, except where matters of supervision and regula-
tion are concerned. Regardless of charter, they represent privately
owned and operated thrift institutions whose primary investment outlet
involves home mortgage lending. While the organization of either type
is technically mutual in character, most association members rarely parti-
cipate in policy matters so long as satisfactory operations obtain. At
annual meetings, they may exercise their voting privilege in electing a
board of directors which guides the management and policies of the insti-
tution.1
Unlike cooperative banks which operate exclusively under state
jurisdiction, federal savings and loan associations are chartered and
supervised by the Home Loan Bank Board. Board examiners thoroughly- in-
vestigate the condition of each federal association at least once every
year, and reports on current operations are required each month. As a
condition of membership, a federal must also qualify as a member of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System and. of the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance, Corporation. Membership in the latter two agencies is generally
open to qualified state-chartered associations as well, and by 1950
nearly a third of all such institutions in the country had joined both
2
systems. Cooperative banks in Massachusetts, while permitted to become
members of the Home Loan Bank, must subscribe to their own State Share
Insurance Fund. The two alternate insurance programs are basically
similar except that the coverage of the FSLIC is nationwide and conse-
In the case of cooperative banks, each shareholder receives one vote
regardless of his holdings; in federals, an individual receives one
vote if he is a borrower, or, as a saver, he may cast one vote for
each $100 in his savings account, up to a limit of 50 votes. Rules
and Regulations, Section 144.1.
2 Statistical Summary, Home Loan Bank Board, 1951.
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quently more highly diversified so far as risk elements are concerned.
Both are supported by proportional assessments upon the member associa-
tions, with the current annual premium equal to 1/12 of 1 per cent of
share liabilities in either case.1  Individual savings accounts in
associations covered by the FSLIC are insured against loss up to $10,000,
while the State Fund insures their share accounts in full. Some coopera-
tive bank executives regard the latter agency as unnecessary duplication
and accordingly seek its abandonment in favor of the more extensive fed-
eral program. Many others vigorously maintain that every effort must be
made to preserve the existing dual-system of banking.
Savings Capital
The savings-investment facilities of federal saving and loan asso-
ciations are basically similar to those currently provided by state-
chartered cooperative banks. From the outset, however, federals departed
from their previous reliance upon the serial share with its compulsory
systematic thrift plan, and accepted savings shares of any amount at any
time. They imposed no fines or penalties of any kind, and thus functioned
much as any savings bank. This shift in emphasis away from quasi-
compulsory systematic saving was then regarded as the essential difference
between the two types of charter.3 Perhaps to the chagrin of orthodox
cooperative bankers, this distinction has been substantially weakened now
that savings shares are widely accepted by cooperative banks as well..
The liability for additional assessments is 1/8 of 1 per cent yearly,
for FSLIC, and 1/5 of 1 per cent in the case of the State Fund.
2The relative merits of the two programs are discussed by Messrs. Chamber-
lain and Andrews in Cooperative Banker, June 1951.
3See Davenport, op. cit., p. -43.
See above, p. 98.
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-The predominance of ordinary savings share accounts in the capital
structure of federals does not imply an absence of alternate plans.
Actually many associations offer a bonus saving plan which embraces the
essential features of the conventional serial share account. Any member
desiring a "bonus" agrees to make regular monthly payments of a speci-
fied amount on a savings account until its withdrawal value equals 200
times the agreed monthly payment--precisely the same matured value stipu-
lated under serial shares. Provided the member fulfills this agreement,
without a delay of more than 60 days in any payment and without any pre-
payment of more than 12 months, he shall receive a bonus of 1 per cent
above the regular dividend rate. The bonus saving plan has an added
feature for members who are forced to withdraw their accumulation before
full maturity. A bonus is paid whenever the withdrawal value exceeds
50 times the monthly payment, with the bonus rate increasing by 1 of
1 per cent for each such multiple of 50 up to a full 1 per cent. In
any event, the bonus s aver cannot receive less than the regular divi-
dends.
Federal savings and loan associations generally offer a variety of
other savings plans as well. Investment accounts are available in
multiples of $100, either in certificate or book form, on which semi-
annual dividends are payable in cash. For the convenience of members,
various special accounts are available, such as Christmas clubs, tax
clubs, vacation clubs, etc. Unlike cooperative banks, federal associa-
tions are not required by charter to limit the maximum savings account
held by one individual.
'This flexibility in bonus plans offers genuine benefits to the typical
saver as opposed to the orthodox serial share account. Davenport re-
veals that only 2 out of 5 serial shares reached maturity during a period
when pledged serial shares were used directly in mortgage repayment. He
states that the average life was but h years, which would roughly be equi-
valent to a I of 1 per cent bonus in a federal association. Davenport,
op. cit., pp. 33-34.
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To supplement these sources of savings capital, a lederal savings
and loan association may borrow from the credit reserve facilities of
the'Home Loan Bank. Advances from'the Bank System may be sought to meet
1
unusual savings withdrawals or merely to make additional home loans.
Under its liberal charter, a federal association may borrow in the aggre-
gate an amount equal to one-half of its savings capital from the Home
2Loan Bank and other sources. This is in sharp contrast to the borrow-
ing opportunities available to cooperative banks. Their Central Bank is
primarily designed for assisting members in distress, and even affiliates
of-the Home Loan Bank may secure sizeable advances only with the permis-
sion of supervisory authorities. Actually, many local federals have
relied upon extensive borrowing to maintain capacity lending operations
and thereby to facilitate their rapid growth.
Investments
Although federal. savings and loan associations place most of their
capital in home mortgages, their overall mortgage investment opportuni-
ties are less rigid than those of cooperative banks. From the outset,
they have been authorized to lend up to $20,000 on an individual home,
while cooperative banks were then limited to $8,000 .h Under either type
of charter, however, such loans may not exceed 80 per cent of appraised
value, and must be repayable monthly within 20 years, except where insured
or Vtaranteed by the FHA or VA.
Typical of most thrift institutions, federal associations ordinarily
pay off withdrawal requests on demand, although a 30-day notice may be
required.
2 Rules and Regulations, Section 144.1(9).
3 And never for the purpose of making new loans.
Raised to $10,000 in 1937.
Federals also may make straight mortgage loans under certain condi-
tions. Provided the principal amount does not exceed 50 per cent of
value and provided interest payments are made at least semi-annually,
unamortized loans may be written with a maximum term of 5 years. Higher
percentage loans are sometimes granted for shorter terms, with 80 per
cent construction mortgages permissible for a term not exceeding one
year.
The regular lending area of a federal association consists of the
area within a radius of 50 miles from its main office, plus any additional
territory which had been permissible while it operated as a state-
2
chartered institution. At the present time, loans guaranteed by the
Veterans Administration are exempt from this provision, and hence may be
initiated or purchased without-'regard to the location of the mortgaged
property. Moreover, FHA-insured loans may be made or purchased without
limit so long as the property lies within 1CO miles of the associationts
home office, and even this restriction is waived with special permission.
Under its charter, a federal savings and loan association may invest
up to 15 per cent of its assets in mortgages without regard to certain
of the above restrictions. Within this limit, an association may make
mortgage loans exceeding $20,000 on certain types of improved real estate
other than home properties. The maximum loan-value ratio and loan term
permitted on such mortgages depend upon the type of property considered.
Within this 15 per cent limit, federals may also invest in mortgages on
properties located beyond the regular lending area.
1 Rules and Regulations, Section 145.6-1
2For local associations, this latter area includes the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
37he total amount invested in the latter is included in the 15 per cent
of assets group described below. Rules and Regulations for Insurance of
Accounts, FSLIC, 1951, Section 163.9.
hRules and Regulations, Section 145.6-7. Most real estate owned and
non-in-TEallment loans also come under this 15 per cent limitation.
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Just as cooperative banks may make share loans, any federal associa-
tion may extend loans on the security of its savings accounts, whether or
not the borrower is the owner of such account. Under no circumstances,
however, can the loan amount exceed the withdrawal value of the pledged
account.1  Unsecured loans may be made to home owners for purposes of
property alteration, repair or improvement. Unless the obligation is
insured by a governmental agency, such loans cannot exceed $1,500 and
must be repayable in regular monthly installments within a 5-year term.2
Other than mortgage lending, the investment opportunities of federal
associations are quite limited. These other investments include the
following: securities and fully guaranteed obligations of the United
States government; stock of a Federal Home Loan Bank; and other obliga-
tions of these Banks. Federals may invest without limit in any or all
of these alternative outlets. 3
Federal Savings and Loan Associations in the Boston Area
Pursuant to enabling legislation passed in 1935, 16 cooperative
banks in the Boston area had converted into federal associations by the
end of 1937. Interviews reveal that several additional local institutions
would have followed suit, had state banking authorities not stepped in'to curb
the movement. During 1937 alone, 12 cooperative banks from the Boston
area relinquished their state charters by virtue of a required 3/4 affir-
mative vote of those members present and voting at a special meeting.
Inasmuch as most shareholders in these mutual institutions failed to
exercise their voting privilege, the supposedly stringent requirement
Section 145.7
2The property must be located in the regular lending area as defined
above. Section 145.8.
Section 145.9.
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of a 3/4 vote was easily secured by a small group of federal supporters.
The Bank Commissioner revealed that conversion had been effected on the
average by the votes of approximately 2} per cent of all stockholders
concerned, and at one meeting only 1.1 per cent of the membership were
present to vote. This easy desertion from the state ranks was brought
to the attention of the legislature, and thereupon was promptly checked.
Beginning in 1938-, conversion could be accomplished only after a majority
of all shareholders voted in favor of the measure, whether they be present
at the special meeting or not. Five years later, cooperative banks were
absolutely prohibited from relinquishing their state charter as an emer-
2
gency wartime measure. This clause was successively renewed into the
postwar period as well, so that no new federals were chartered until
late 1951, when a $10 million suburban bank converted. Under current
regulations, a two-thirds affirmative vote of all eligible shareholders
is required for conversion.
Certain advantages available to associations operating under federal
charters have already been outlined. For example, the blanket insurance
of all savings accounts up to a specified limit by a federal instrumen-
tality undoubtedly appealed to many depression-ridden associations. Con-
verting institutions perhaps regarded the word "federal" in itself as
engendering a great deal of public confidence and assurance, while others
were equally adamant in decrying this dangerous spread of federal influ-
ence. Undoubtedly personal and political views of the interested parties
have heavily influenced any decision relative to conversion, whether the
prevailing sentiment be affirmative or negative.
1
Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, 1937, p. iv.
2The number of federal associations -actually declined by one in November
1945,,as a result of a merger of the Suffolk and First Federals.
3 The majority 'requirement is found in Genteral Laws, Acts of 1938, Chapter
163; 'the 2/3 requirement was first specified inthe Acts of 1943, Chapter
243.
4 From interviews.
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The data presented in Table VIII, summarizing some salient features
of the early converting institutions, may suggest additional motives for
conversion.1  The institutions which converted during these years were
quite similar to the remaining cooperative banks in the state so far as
average assets and age of institution is concerned. 2 From Table VIII,
however, it appears that borrowed funds represented a much larger item
in the operations of the converting associations than among those re-
taining their state charter. While most cooperative banks have never
followed a policy of meeting liquidity needs through extensive borrowing,
this account represented 2.1 per cent of total assets among the former
institutions against less than 0.3 per cent for the latter. This con-
trast may reflect either unusually heavy withdrawal demands among con-
verting associations or else a policy of seeking bank advances to make
additional real estate mortgages. The opportunities for more extensive
long-term borrowing from the Home Loan Bank System undoubtedly induced
many of these cooperative banks to seek federal charters. All but four
associations had already joined the Bank System prior to conversion, but
their effective credit line was severely curbed by existing state regu-
lations.
There is additional evidence to suggest that some of the converting
associations were on the average less secure than the others. At their
respective points of conversion, the average guaranty fund and surplus
for the 16 associations represented 4.1 per cent of total assets, while
the non-converters held reserves of 5.9 per cent. This rather sizeable
difference is not due to the influence of an unusually weak member among
1A similar analysis is used by Davenport in considering the conversion of
cooperative banks throughout the state. Op. cit., pp. 1l-43'
2The years of original incorporation ranged from 1880 for Waltham to 1922
for Dudley; the average asset size of the 16 converting banks was $2.34
million against a state average of $2.04 million in 1936 for 187 insti-
tutions, and $2.63 for 100 banks in the local area.
TABLE VIII. COOPERATIVE BANKS IN THE BOSION AREA COIVERTINGQ
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 1935-1937
Cooperative
Bank
Location Total
Assets
T00)
Converted in 1935
Dudley Boston
Harvard Boston
Union Boston
Converted in 1936
Ausonia Boston
Converted in 1937
Coolidge Corner Brookline
Edward Everett Boston
Faneuil Boston
Home Owners Boston
Inman Cambridge
Suffolk Boston
Waltham Waltham
West Somerville Somerville
Winter Hill Somerville,
Wollas ton Quincy'
Metropolitan Boston
Boston Boston
Totals for all 16 converted
banks
Percentage of Total Assets'
Totals for 187 non-converting
banks, as of October 1936
Percentage of Total Assets
Guaranty
Fund and
SurpDlus
(00W)
$ 641 $21
1,027 45
310 14
106 5
763 21
520 28
316 25
357 4
1,131 97
4, 742 254
6,370 246
3,539 181
6,599 265
4,301 174
601 28
6, 234 133
37,557 1,541
100.0 4.1
382,499 22,528
100.0 5.9
Borrowed
Funds
(000)
$ 63
0
0
0
89
0
0
37
10
0
0
100
476.
0
20
0
795
2.1
1,105
.29
IlTO EDlERAL
Foreclosed Real
Estate and
linquent Loans
(00O)
18
114
55
174
71
87
1
348
684
837
634
2,126
606
116
731
6,613
17.6
63,563
16.6
Source: Annual Reprts, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks
*Sum of "Real Estate by Foreclosure"1 and "Loans on Real Estate
Temporarily Suspended."
Dues
the larger banks, for the low figure of 1.1 per cent belongs to small
*350 thousand institution. Actually all of the larger banks held re-
serves:, approximating this 4.1 per cent average, and only two smaller
institutions exceeded this figure, with reserves of 7.9 and 8.5 per
cent, respectively.
There appears to be no significant relatfon between depression
mortgage losses and the propensity to convert. As indicated in the
table, foreclosed real estate plus temporarily delinquent loans, taken
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as a rough index of mortgage experience, constituted a slightly higher
percentage of total assets among converting banks than among the re-
maining institutions.
These overall data on bank borrowings, reserve accumulations, and
mortgage delinquency and foreclosure may indicate that some banks elect-
ing to convert had perhaps encountered more severe depression experience
than the average, although this is not equally true in all cases. The
largest cooperative bank converting during this period appears to have
been in a singularly unfavorable position on all counts, save its reserve
funds. This bank, whose assets represented one-sixth of the total for
all 16 banks, held one-third of all foreclosures and delinquent loans,
and had borrowed three-fifths of the total bank borrowings. Actually,
only 7 out of the -16 associations held any, such "bills payable,t repre-
senting over 10 per cent of total assets in but two cases. On the whole,
it seems reasonable to suggest that, while a few weak banks felt that
little could be lost through conversion, others were among the strongest
cooperative banks and regarded the new charter as an effective means of
achieving a rapid growth.
From this humble beginning local federal savings and loan associa-
tions have enjoyed a phenomenal growth over the past 15 years. Most
federals took advantage of their expanded borrowing opportunities and,
coupled with an aggressive merchandising policy, found a ready market for
their various mortgage loan programs. Specific reference to mortgage
operations, as well as ,to the promotional efforts themselves, will be
made later in the study. Federal associations, proud of these achieve-
ments, have widely publicized their rapid growth by pointing to their
comparative asset position in 1936 and 1951. (See Table IX.)
121
TABLE IX. TOTAL AND AVERAGE ASSETS HELD BY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATIONS IN THE BOSTON AREA, SELECTED YEARS, 1936-1951
Year No. of Associations Total Assets Average Assets
(millions) (millions)
1936 16 $ 37.56 $ 2.34
1940 16 63.04 3.94
1946 15 122.44 8.17
1948 15 148.32 9.90
1950 15 182.81 12.20
1951 16 199.35 12.46
Source: Northeastern Federal Savings League and Federal Home Loan
Bank of Boston
* As of October 1936, or at date of conversion, whichever is earlier.
Subsequent years, as of December 31.
While the asset position of the entire group shows a fourfold in-
crease during the 15-year span, growth patterns of individual associa-
tions have varied widely. The association with the highest asset level
at the date of conversion, mentioned above, experienced the slowest rate
of growth, 62.3 per cent. The two largest federals today have grown
roughly with the average, while the third and fifth largest have dis-
played phenomenal increases in total assets of over 68 and 24 times,
respectively.
As stated above, liberal credit availability from the Home Loan
Bank has undoubtedly played a prominent role in this' growth picture.
As of December 31, 1951, all 16 federal associations currently held
advances from the System, varying in amount from $50 to $2,500 thous and.
Total advances represented 10.0 per cent of aggregate share capital for
the group, while this ratio approached 15 per cent for two associations.
For the entire group, aggregate borrowings were equivalent to 46 per cent
of combined cash and government bond holdings, but exceeded 100 per cent-
in the case of the heaviest borrowers.2
1 Home Owners Federal rose from 0357 thousand to $24.4 million, and
Brookline Federal from $763 thousand to $18.8 million.
2A1l these data are compiled from regular reports filed with the Home
Loan Bank of Boston. The latter data refer to operating conditions
as of June 30, 1951.
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These advances are of several varieties. Throughout the 11 Home Loan
Bank districts the outstanding volume of long-term, secured loans is half
as large as that of unsecured loans with terms up to 1 year. In the Boston
district, however, the directors follow a policy of promoting short-term
advances almost entirely, so that these loans constitute nearly 99 per
cent of the outstanding balance. The local Bank regards unsecured loans
as very desirable inasmuch as these constitute a lien prior to any share-
holder claims in the event of default. Such loans are ordinarily granted
to any qualified member borrower provided its total unsecured borrow-
ings do not exceed 20 per cent of its share capital. No amortization is
required where the term does not exceed 6 months, but quarterly principal
repayment is required on 1-year loans unless secured by federal govern-
ment securities or Home Loan Bank deposits.
While short-term loans are designed primarily to meet immediate
liquidity needs, some local federal savings and loan associations have
used long-term advances from the Home Loan Bank as a means of expanding
mortgage lending activity. Although these secured loans are not widely
used in this capital surplus area, the Bank is authorized to grant fully
amortized loans with terms of up to 10 years. Currently the rate of
interest charged on either type of loan is 2} per cent per annum, equal
to the dividend rate paid by most associations on savings capital.2
Since share accounts may involve additional administrative detail and
expense, borrowing from the Bank may appear to be an economical method
for financing a rapid expansion. Lest this privilege be indiscriminately
exercised, local Home Loan Bank directors attempt to pursue a conservative
lending policy, approving long-term loans only where genuinely justified.
lInterview, Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston.
20n long-term advances, only the current "billing" rate is 2} per cent,
but the "contract" rate is 3 per cent.
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A comparative analysis of growth patterns among federal savings and
loan associations as opposed to local cooperative banks indicates a much
more rapid dollar- expansion among the former. Average total assets in
federal associations rose nearly 41 times between 1936 and 1951, against a
72 per cent increase among cooperative banks. Although non-converting
local cooperative banks in 1936 were slightly larger than those 'conver-
ting, they are now hardly one-third as large, on the average, as federals.
While local cooperative banks tend to be heavily concentrated in asset
size classes under $5 million, exactly one-half of the federal associa-
tions have total assets exceeding $10 million. (See Table x.) The
largest federal, at an asset level of $35 million, is slightly larger
than the leading state-chartered association, with the former increasing
nearly 6 times since 1936 and 'the latter registering a less spectacular
two-thirds increase. 1
TABLE X. SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
IN THE BOSTON AREA, DECEMBER 31, 1951
Asset Size Group Number _of Associations Per Cent
Millions of_ Total
of dollars)
All Groups 16 100.00
$ 0-5 2 12.50
5 - 7 25.00
7 -10 2 12.50
10-415 3 18-75
15 -25 3 18-75
25 and over 2 12.50
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston
Similar to cooperative bank practice, federals are required to
accumulate reserves by successive appropriations out of net earnings until
a level equivalent to 10 per cent of share capital has been re ached.
Among the 16 associations in the Boston area, such reserves and undivided
1 See "Additional Comments on Largest Institutions" at the conclusion of
'Chapter 12.
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profits represented approximately 8.h per cent of aggregate share capital
at the end of December 1951.1 These ratios varied widely among the con-
stituent members, however, ranging from less than 6 per cent to slightly
more than 12 per cent, the latter referring to one of the largest local
associations.
Largely because of the significant role assumed by Home Loan Bank
advances, the liability structure of local federals differs somewhat from
that of cooperative banks. Among the former, share capital and reserves
accounted for 83 and 7 per cent, respectively, of total liabilities in
1951 while among the latter, the corresponding ratios were 87 and 9 per
cent.2
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
Quantitatively, mutual savings banks constitute the most significant
institutional lender in the local long-term capital market. By accumula-
ting and investing the modest savings of thousands of depositors, the 56
local savings banks -in 1951 held total assets valued at over $1.8 billion,
well over 3 times the combined asset valuation of all 91 cooperative banks
and federal savings and loan associations in this area.3 Although mort-
gage loans represent but one among many investment outlets, the predominance
of savings banks in the mortgage market is no less certain.
1 A simple average computed from individual data compiled by the Northeastern
Federal Savings League.
2 The latter figures refer to all 175 banks in Massachusetts as of April 1951.
At that time tnotes payable" represented only 0.44 per cent of total liabi-
lities.
3Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, and Federal Home Loan
Bank.
hSee Part V. In 1951 the dollar mortgage portfolio of the savings banks
was greater than total assets of the above two groups of thrift insti-
tutions combined.
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Historical Development
Mutual savings banks have a long and interesting history, dating back
to their European origin during the late eighteenth century and their
subsequent importation into the United States in 1816. In this latter
year, mutual savings institutions were organized in Philadelphia and
Boston, the latter bank still using its original title, the "Provident
Institution for Savings in the Town of Boston." Founded to provide a
stafekeeping for the limited savings of the growing laboring classes and
other lower income groups, this institution in 5 years held deposits of
$600 thousand and a surplus of $6,200. Commercial banks catered pri-
marily to the financing needs of the merchant and well-to-do classes, and
cooperative banks were not to appear for another half century. As a re-
sult of this virtual monopoly, Massachusetts savings banks, frequently
termed "institutions"' because of general antipathy to "banks," developed
rapidly during the nineteenth century. Accepting deposits of as little
as five cents and meeting most withdrawal requests on demand, these in-
stitutions served the public well by providing convenience, safety, and
reasonable profitability for their savings. By 1875, 180 savings banks
had been incorporated, holding well over a million individual deposit
accounts. At that time, nearly one person in two in the Commonwealth
owned a savings account, with an average withdrawal value of $330. During
the following 75 years, the system of savings banks continued its steady
growth until its 189 members held 3.2 million deposit accounts averaging
$1,032 in 195.
1W. H. Kniffin, The Savings Bank and Its Practical Work, Banker's Pub-
lishing Co., New York, 1912, pp.1-16
2Welfling, op. cit., p. h.
3Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks. In 1950 there was a
deposit account for every 1.47 persons in Massachusetts. Obviously some
duplication is inevitable as many individuals hold savings accounts in
more than one bank.
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Mutual savings banks have become firmly rooted in New England and
the Middle AtlAntic states, but have never flourished elsewhere. Although
the more than 500 existing institutions are spread over 17 states, a
heavy majority are found in Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York.
Several sound reasons have been advanced to account for this geographic
concentration.. The primary factor has undoubtedly concerned the unequal
economic development of the country at the time when most savings insti-
tutions were founded. The more industrialized East had already produced
a sizeable laboring class dependent upon money wages and sorely in need
of a safe depositary for reserves of various sorts. In the frontier
West, economic activity centered about agriculture, mining and lumbering,
largely individualistic pursuits. Any money saving which might arise from
these operations was perhaps invested in speculative endeavors, and .there
appeared little need for philanthropic thrift institutions.
Financing needs of the growing West were generally provided by ordi-
nary commercial banks, who alone had the power to create credit and thereby
alleviate the continuing, capital shortage. Moreover, savings banks, which
regard safekeeping of depositorst funds as paramount, were prohibited by
law or tradition from underwriting the extensive industrial and commer-
cial needs of these entrepreneurs. As industrialization developed in the
newer areas, there emerged a growing wage earning class seeking the ser-
vices of a thrift institution. By this time, however, commercial banks
were so firmly entrenched that demands for savings depositaries were fre-
quently met by the establishment of savings departments within existing
institutions. Where commercial banks failed to sufficiently expand their
services, stock savings banks and building and loan associations were
organized.
lSee Lintner, op. cit., pp. 50-55.
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Mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations are equally
mutual so far as ownership of assets and distribution of earnings are
concerned. In the case of the former banks, however, individual deposi-
tors do not possess even nominal control over the management and policies
of the institution. Complete authority is vested in a self-perpetuating
group of incorporators who select the board of trustees and salaried
personnel. These two types of organization are also distinct with respect
to priority of the institution:'s assets in the event of default. Inves-
tors in savings and loan shares become legal co-owners of the association,
while savings bank depositors are 'technically 'creditors and are accord-
ingly afforded the rights of this status. 1  Despite these legal technicali-
ties, shares in savings and loan associations and savings accounts in sav-
ings banks are generally regarded as close substitutes to the general
public, and hence must be so considered in any realistic approach to the
market.
Decline in Prominence
Although savings banks continue to represent the largest savings
depositary in the states in which they are heavily concentrated, their
share of the market has shrunken considerably since the late nineteenth
century, that is, since real alternatives have been available to the
saving public. That the savings banks! position has diminished nation-
ally may be explained' largely by the relative decline of the mature East
2
where these institutions predominate. Their relative loss in these
latter regions as well, however, must be accounted for on different grounds.
Ibid., pp. 103-104.
2in 1880 deposits in mutual savings banks constituted 87.5 per cent of
total savings in all depositaries in the United States; by 1927, this
share had fallen to 29.2 per cent, and by 1950, to 28.5 per cent.
Lintner, op. cit., Appendix Table 1-1, and Economic Almanac.
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Not until the recent depression was this steady downward movement arrested,
when public confidence was badly shaken in competing depositaries. It is
indeed a tribute to the soundness of mutual savings banks that total de-
posits in Massachusetts institutions actually increased 1.6 per cent dur-
ing the decade of the 1930s, rising in all but 3 years. Over the same
period, savings deposits in commercial banks and unpledged shares in
savings and loan associations in the Commonwealth fell by 38.1 and 7.3
per cent, respectively. 1
The ability to maintain public confidence during periods of distress
is certainly a desirable characteristic, but its competitive attraction
is waning. As stated elsewhere in this study, the universal adoption and
acceptance of deposit and share insurance have undoubtedly led many savers-
to select their depositary on grounds other than mere safety alone.2 Any
severe depression in the future might provoke heavy withdrawal demands
among distressed depositors in all institutions, but the probability of
a heavy transferal of fear money is materially lessened.
Undoubtedly much of the relative gain enjoyed by the savings banks
during the depression years was due to abnormal panic withdrawals from
competing depositaries, rather than to substantial increases in new
saving inflows. Nevertheless, this favorable experience has checked,
perhaps permanently, tfie downward drift in the position of savings banks
in the savings market. Deposits in Massachusetts savings banks as a
1Lintner, oU cit., Appendix Table 11-2.
2All mutual savings banks in Massachusetts are required to belong to the
Mutual Savings Central Fund, Inc., and the accompanying Deposit Insurance
Fund. Organized much as the corresponding central institutions for coopera-
tive banks, each saving deposit account is insured in full. Although sav-
ings banks are also eligible for membership, only one local institution
with assets of $37 million has joined the Home Lban'Bank System. State
regulations permit member savings banks to borrow from the System only
when liquidity needs warrant.
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percentage of total accounts in all thrift institutions fell sharply from
a high of well over 90 per cent in the early 1900s to 66.7 per cent by
1928. As indicated above, however, these institutions were looked upon as
a safe refuge during the depression years, and as a consequence savings
bank deposits represented an increasing share of total thrift accounts,
reaching 73.9 per cent by 1937. As indicated in Table XI, the position
of Massachusetts savings banks has diminished slightly since the immedi-
ate prewar period, but it appears to have reached a new.plateau above
the 1928 level. At any rate, savings banks appear to be firmly entrenched
in the local savings market, holding a volume of savings deposits over
twice as large as the combined holdings of their principal competitors.
Before discussing the current status of savings banks any further,
it may be in order to review some of the factors accounting for their
relative decline in the savings market. This matter is not a focal point
TABLE XI. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAVINGS DEPOSITS IN MASSACHUSETTS
AMONG MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS, SAVINGS DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCIAL
BANKS, AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, SELECTED YEARS,
1910-1950
Savings Savings Deposits in Unpledged Share in
Year Banks Commercial Banks Savings and Loan Associations
National Trust Total Federal State. Total
1910 9241 1.2 0.8 2.0 - 5.9 5.9
1920 76.8 5.3 9.4 14.7 - 8.6 8.6
1928 66.7 12.1 7.8 19.9 - 13.4 13.4
1937 73.9 8.3 4.9 13.2 2.1 10.7 12.8
1940 73.4 7.5 5.2 12.7 3.2 10.6 13.8
1946 69.4 10.9* 6.8 17.7 4.1 8.9 13.0
1950 68.8 -9.9 5.3 15.2 5.4 10.6 16.0
Source: for years 1910-1946, Lintner, op. cit., Appendix Table V-3; for
1950, Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Northeastern Federal Savings
League.
*Includes all time deposits in national banks.
of the present study, but a bank's .mortgage lending activity is inextri-
cably tied to its complementary role as a savings depositary. In
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summarizing some of these underlying factors, the capital structure of
savings banks will be touched on. These data refer to all thrift institu-
tions in the Commonwealth, but the fundamental movements appear to apply
equally well to the immediate Boston vicinity.
As suggested in Table XI, the rising importance of competing institu-
tions is undoubtedly both the cause as well as the consequence of the rela-
tive decline of savings banks in the local market. This tautology is of
little value unless the differential success of other institutions can be
accounted for by other independent variables. These variables may con-
cern the relative attractiveness of the alternative thrift services avail-
able and the effectiveness with which they are presented to the saving
public. Between 1910 and 1928, savings. accounts in national banks, trust
companies, and cooperative banks rose rapidly, while federal savings and
loan associations have made the largest relative gains since 1937.
Savings banks have concentrated on ordinary savings accounts,
whereby individuals may deposit and withdraw their funds at will without
fine or penalty.1  As in the case of cooperative banks, the maximum
savings account to be held by an individual is limited by law to $5,000
plus a dividend accumulation to $10,000, though this amount can be in-
creased through the issuance of joint accounts. While these restric-
tions perhaps reduce the probability of huge sudden withdrawals, it has
undoubtedly meant the loss of some large, stable deposits. Perhaps the
statutory limitation should be related in some fashion to the asset sizd
of the bank, for even a $50,OCo account may not subject a $100 million
institution to undue hazards. Management could still exercise the privi-
lege of refusing any large sum which appeared only transitory. Perhaps
Some banks limit the maximum deposit accepted at one time; moreover, they
may require a 30-day withdrawal notice if necessary for liquidity considera-
tions.
federal savings and loan associations have realized some of their rapid
growth as a result of accepting larger deposits, and even some smaller
ones which would have appeared unstable to savings banks.
While ordinary savings accounts may be economical to operate and
also enjoy wide public appeal, competing institutions have undoubtedly
gained by offering a wide range of thrift plans. The quasi-compulsory
scheme of savings and loan associations has been well adapted to the
needs of savers who regard such a stimulus to be of great importance in
carrying out a long-term savings program. Furthermore, even though most
serial shareholders (and holders of bonus accounts) prove to be unable
to fulfill their initial aspirations, the mere offering of a bonus re-
turn may be sufficient to attract the new account initially.
Savings banks have introduced a variety of special thrift plans to
accommodate the systematic saver, though none has provided the same type
of incentive as the serial share device. The most common programs in-
clude: payroll deduction plans, based on savings bank deposits alone or
in combination with savings bond purchases; school savings; Christmas
2
clubs; and various other special purpose clubs. Another important
program providing the community of savers with real incentives for syste-
matic thrift concerns savings bank life insurance. First authorized in
1907, over-the-counter life insurance has been adopted by 35 institutions
in the Commonwealth, of which 15 are located in the Boston vicinity. This
low-cost, flexible program has been very well received, and has played
lSee Lintner, op. cit.,p. 149-150. Many savings banks refused to accept
an individual deposit above a certain amount at any one time, on the
grounds that these constituted temporary, unstable funds and as such did
not warrant the same dividend treatment as existing accounts.
2See Lintner, O. cit.,Chapter VI for an anlysis of these various thrift
plans.
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an important part in promoting other bank services, especially where
insurance is combined with regular savings plans. As of January 1952,
there were 445 thousand savings bank life insurance policies outstanding,
with an aggregate value of $420 million.
Except in communities where savings bank life insurance has been
effectively introduced, savings and loan associations continue to offer
the most widely accepted systematic savings programs. Perhaps to be
successful as a community depositary, a thrift institution must promote
not one but a variety of loan plans. The serial share plan undoubtedly
contributed to the rapid expansion of cooperative banks up to the de-
pression years, but this compulsory scheme is not sufficient for con-
tinued success. As described earlier, these associations sought authori-
zation to issue savings shares in order to attain a well-rounded thrift
program, and have found a wide acceptance for them.
Professor Lintner has found convenience to be another major factor
2
explaining the relative decline in savings banks as a depositary. Es-
pecially since 1910 the incorporation of many new cooperative banks and
credit unions as well as the introduction of savings departments and branch
offices in existing commercial banks provided savers with a wider range of
conveniently located depositaries. Since 1937, newly-chartered federal
savings and loan associations have endeavored to set up their facilities
in the most favorablq locations. Another important dspect of the con-
venience problem relates to the idea of "department store" banking. If
they desired, commercial banks could perhaps expand their savings depart-
ments by effectively promoting this service to individuals who also hold
C. S. Casady, Self Help for Sale, Savings Bank Life Insurance Council,
1952, See Lintner, op. cit., Chapter VII for a detailed analysis of this
program.
2Lintner, op. cit., pp. 143-147.
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checking accounts or have other business with the bank. Furthermore,
an institution can effectively expand its savings inflows by a more
aggressive merchandising of its other services. Federal savings md
loan associations have at times promoted home mortgage lending almost
exclusively, but in securing a firm foothold in the mortgage market,
they have also greatly increased their savings accounts. Their willing-
ness to make home mortgages, coupled with effective merchandising during
the immediate prewar years, has undoubtedly accounted in part for their
rapid capital growth. This is in sharp contrast to the negative policy
pursued by most savings banks. The latter not only withdrew almost com-
pletely from the mortgage market, but they also set up arbitrary rules
limiting savings inflows.
Perhaps effective merchandising more than any other single factor
has accounted for the rapid relative gain among federal savings and loan
associations. In addition to setting up attractive business quarters,
these associations have hired comparatively expensive management personnel
and have engaged quite heavily in various promotional campaigns, notably
advertising. Although data on salary schedules are entirely lacking,
interviews reveal that executives in federals receive much higher compen-
sation than corresponding officers in either savings or cooperative banks.
Furthermore, the management of a federal association has substantial in-
ducements to expand its operations, as salary scales follow asset size
quite closely.
While specific data are not available, the impression has been gained
from interviews that average advertising expenditures among local federals
are equivalent to nearly $1 per $1,000 of assets. A leading association
1 Interviews. This latter practice was mentioned by officers of local
federals aa well as other parties.
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in the Commonwealth is currently conducting an elaborate campaign costing
in the aggregate at least twice this average amount. Such an emphasis
on advertising contrasts sharply with the practice of other local thrift
institutions, especially savings banks. Advertising has always been of
minor significance among the latter, representing $0.10 per $1,000 of
assets in 1936 and rising only to $0.22 per $1,000 by 1951. The postwar
expansion in savings bank advertising programs has reflected in large
part the general advance in operating expenses, for this item in 1950
2
accounted for a smaller share of total costs than in 1946. Among 'all
cooperative banks in the Commonwealth, advertising expense per $1,000
of assets increased from $0.31 in 1936 to $0.52 by 1951.3
Another factor undoubtedly having some effect on the relative growth
of competing depositaries concerns the dividend rates paid on savings
accounts. Savings banks have traditionally paid lower rates of return
on deposit accounts than have cooperative banks on their serial and paid-
up shares. In the past three years, however, savings banks have gradu-
ally raised their dividend rates, up to a level exceeding those paid on
savings share accounts in cooperative banks and approaching those of
federal savings and loan associations. Higher dividend rates coupled
with more effective promotional efforts on the part of the more pro-
gressive institutions may once again strengthen the overall position
of savings banks in the local thrift market.
lInterviews.
2Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks. These data refer to
all banks in the Commonwealth.
3 Ibid.
See "Dividend Returns" below.
Investment Qpportunities
Mutual savings banks, in order to remain in the competitive race
among alternate depositaries, must not only assure safety of deposits
but also pay reasonable dividends over and above all operating expenses.
Criteria of profitability as well as safety are no less important for
savings banks than for competing thrift institutions. So that the
safety consideration is given due weight, Massachusetts savings banks
are restricted by law in selecting investment portfolios, and in
addition, must set aside a substantial part of earnings to surplus as
further protection. Gmaranty funds and profit and loss accounts are
established and maintained through annual contributions from the bank's
operations until their combined accumulation reaches 15 per cent of
total deposit liabilities. Since the turn of the century, the aggre-
gate surplus account of all savings banks has represented a steadily
increasing percentage of total deposits. From a level of 8 per cent
in 1928, this percentage has advanced every year down to the present,
except during the Second World War, until aggregate reserves represented
2
slightly over 12 per cent of total deposits in 1951. Although these are
intended to function in part at least as loss reserves, savings banks
have traditionally been reluctant to draw upon them to cover heavy mort-
gage losses, as during the recent depression. In order to conceal any
weakness in operations, they hesitated to write down published surplus
figures, thereby resulting in a distorted mortgage foreclosure-loss
3policy.
lCurrently a savings bank is required to set aside 1/8-1/4 of 1 per cent
of its deposits each year until the guaranty fund equals 71 per cent of
deposits; when the combined accumulation of both funds reaches 15i per
cent of deposits, an extra dividend must be declared. Massachusetts
Annotated Laws, Chapter 168.
2Savings Banks Association of Massachusetts.
3 See Lintner, op. cit., pp. 292-298.
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Massachusetts savings banks may place their deposit capital and sur-
plus in, first mortgage loans and in other outlets selected from a list of
eligible investments in accordance with statutory requirements. These
legal restrictions generally limit the total investment in any one outlet,
and prescribe -securities of a certain type and grade. Furthermore, geo-
graphic barriers are frequently imposed as to location of borrower, usually
giving preference to local credit demands.
Until 1949, mortgage investment was restricted to lending on urban
real estate located within the Commonwealth or within 50 miles of the
bank's home office. Within this geographic area, savings banks are
authorized to offer the home buyer a variety of mortgage loan plans,
provided the aggregate loan balance does not exceed 70 per cent of
deposits. The characteristic pre-depression savings bank mortgage
prescribed a straight loan made either on demand or for a term of up to
3 years, with the loan amount not exceeding 60 per cent of the property
value. If these unamortized loans required renewal at maturity, the bank
ordinarily granted the request so long as interest payments were regular
and estimated loan-value ratios were not over 60 per cent.
The evils of straight mortgages, discussed elsewhere in this study,
have become all too apparent, to savings banks and to the general public
as well. Consequently, though such loans may still be made, local savings
banks now deal almost exclusively in amortized. loans of various types.
They are authorized to make 80 per cent mortgage loans up to $12,000,
provided repayment is accomplished within 20 years through monthly
payments including principal, interest, and real estate taxes.2 These
These mortgages investment restrictions are all found in the Massachusetts
Annotated Laws, Chapter 168, Section 54.
2Cf. the more liberal authorization of cooperative banks in making 80 per
cent loans up to $20,000; furthermore, cooperative banks were granted the
authority to make 80 per cent loans much earlier than were savings banks.
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payments must be constant over the loan term, except larger amounts may
be required during the first 5 years. In the case of construction lending,
the bank has the right to require only the interest component of the monthly
payment, with principal amortization deferred until the property is occu-
pied.
Larger mortgage loans are permissible only where the debt-value ratio
is correspondingly lower. A 75 per cent loan may be made up to $16,000,
and a 70 per cent loan up to $50,000, provided the original principal is
amortized no less than 3 per cent per year. The maximum term is 20 years,
and regular payment is required at intervals not exceeding 3 months. When
the loan does not exceed 60 per cent of appraised value, the maximum loan
amount is not specified, but regular amortization is required if the term
exceeds 3 years. Savings banks, unlike cooperative banks and federal
associations, may lend up to 40 per cent of value on the security of un-
improved property, with amortization and maximum loan amount unspecified
but with a term limit of 3 years. Regulations regarding property improve-
ment loans are .similar to those of cooperative banks, whereby monthly pay-
ment loans up to $1,000 may be made for a maximum 5-year term. 2
These above restrictions do not apply to mortgage loans insured by
the FHA or guaranteed in part or full by the VA, so far as loan amount,
term, or amortization requirements are concerned. Until June 1949, how-
ever, such insured or guaranteed loans were subject to the same geographic
limitations as conventional mortgages. At this time, after years of
diligent efforts on the part of some progressive savings bankers, these
1 Up to a maximum of 9 months. Savings banks may also extend straight
75 per cent blanket construction loans to operative builders for a term
up to 2 years.' Such non-amortized loans must be secured by a first mort-
gage upon 2 or more parcels of real estate contained within the same pro-
ject. Furthermore, the aggregate balance of these loans outstanding at
any time cannot exceed one per cent of deposits.
2Clause 10th A, Section 54.
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institutions were authorized'to make a limited investment in FHA-insured
and VA-guaranteed loans without regard to property location. Under present
regulations, a savings bank may invest in each type of loan up to 10 per
cent of its deposits or 50 per cent of the value of all mortgages on in-
state properties, whichever is lesser. The consequences of this signifi-
cant amendment-in creating a more active secondary mortgage market will
be discussed in Part VII.
The principal alternative investments available to savings banks
include: loans on personal security; securities and fully guaranteed
obligations of the United States government, the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, and certain other states; legally issued bonds of the legal
subdivisions of various states; certain bonds and notes of railroads,
street railways, telephone companies, and other public utilities; and
bank stocks. Statutory and administrative regulations limit most of
these investments to a certain percentage of total-deposits, the most
notable exception being federal government securities. Savings banks
are nevertheless afforded considerable discretion in selecting particular
investments within this legal list, their choice resting largely on the
relative availability of alternate investments and their expected rates
of return.2
The net yields on alternate investments must be compared after
due allowance is made for the state excise tax. All Massachusetts savings
banks are subject to an annual state levy at the rate of 0.5 per cent of
their average deposit balances less their dollar investment in real
1 Amendment to Section SbA, approved June 2, 1949. (Acts of 19h9, Chapter
269.) The regulation limiting total mortgage loans to 70 per cent of de-
posits still stands.
2
Lintner., op. cit., p. 216.
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estate taken in foreclosure or used for business purposes, mortgage
loans on property situated within the Commonwealth, various government
securities, and shares of stock in Massachusetts trust companies. This
tax may accordingly render private securities and out-of-state FHA and VA
loans less attractive whenever the value of average deposits exceeds these
allowable deductions.
The investment portfolio of Massachusetts savings banks has undergone
considerable revision over the past 30 years. Whereas cooperative banks
and federal savings and loan associations have traditionally invested
nearly 80 per cent of their capital in real 'estate loans, mortgage lend-
ing has fluctuated widely as an investment outlet for savings banks. Al-
though the mortgage portfolio will be more fully analyzed in Part V, its
relative importance as well as the changing role of alternate investments
is indicated in Table XII below.
TABLE XII. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS IN MASSACHUSETTS SAVINGS
BANKS, SELECTED YEARS, 1920-1951
Total . Public Private Real Loans on
Year Assets 'Securi- Securi- E9Tate Personal
(TI[Tons) ties ties Loan Security
1920 $1.31 17.0 21.4 43.9 14.7
1927 2.02 14.4 21.7 53.7 7.7
1931 2.38 12.1 25.5 53.0 5.6
1936 2.35 24.1 19.2 44.2 1.5
1940 2.40 33.1 15.3 40.0 0.9
1946 3.41 63.5 9.4 24.0 0.3
1948 3.65 59.8 10.5 26.6 0.5
1950 3.74 53.3 9.8 34.0 0.6
1951 3.84 46.7* 10.8 39.3 o.6
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of
.All but 0.08 per cent of this investment represents
gations of the. United States Government.
'Real Estate
by Fore- Cash Misc.
cTosure IGes
0.1 2.1 0.8
0.1 1.6 0.9
1.2 1.6 1.0
6.7 1.2 3.1
5.5 4.1 1.1
0.0 2.3 0.5
0.0 2.1 0.5
0.0 1.9 0.4
0.0 2.0 o.6
Banks.
securities and obli-
As total assets mounted during the 1920s, savings banks concentrated
their investment efforts on mortgages and private securities, and actually
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reduced their dollar holdings of government obligations. The par value
of holdings of federal securities fell by 45 per cent between 1923 and
1931 while holdings of various private securities and mortgages approached
their legal limit. 1uring the next 15 years, however, this pattern was
completely reversed, as nearly every private investment diminished steadily
and federal securities mounted in importance. The dollar reduction in the
mortgage and private security portfolios contributed more to their rela-
tive decline than did the actual increase in total assets. The government
portfolio was increased even in the few years when total resources de-
clined. 2 Just as private securities had been available with generous
yields during the 1920s, these same investments appeared risky and of-
fered smaller interest returns as the depression wore on. Federal se-
curities, on the other hand, became increasingly available, especially
with the onset of World War II, and, while yields were declining along
with the overall interest rate structure, these guaranteed investments
appeared highly attractive. The added interest return to compensate for
the risk element in non-government securities had steadily declined,
especially when the 0.5 per cent state tax is deducted from the yield.
In the postwar period, holdings of government bonds have fallen
considerably from their peak in 1946. This reversal in investment policy
has been accompanied by a renewed interest in private securities but
primarily reflects a vigorous program to rebuild sorely depleted mortgage
portfolios. With a direct turn-about-face, savings banks, after withdrawing
almost completely from the mortgage market in the 1930s, have played a lead-
ing role in the postwar housing boom. Mortgage lending policies of mutual
1Lintner, o. cit., p. 223.
2Ibid., pp. 224-225.
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savings banks in the Boston area will be analyzed in some detail in Part V.
Savings Banks in the Boston Area
The previous discussion of the development of savings banks in Massa-
chusetts applies equally well to the Boston vicinity in particular. Whereas
many new local cooperative banks sprang up during the first 3 decades of
this century, savings banks have been well established for a much longer
period. Of the -6 savings banks currently operating in the Boston area,
only 6 have been incorporated in the present century, all being organized
before the first World War. Of the remainder, at least 10 have been opera-
ting for over 100 years.
Not only are the existing institutions well established in years, but
also the number of savings banks leaving the market has been very slight.
The depression experience of savings banks, as pointed out above, was
singularly favorable so far as the safety of depositors' funds is con-
cerned. Three of the smaller banks merged with their stronger neighbors
and only one bank, the Somerville Institution for Savings, was forced
to liquidate. Since the depression, there have been two additional mer-
gers, one involving a relatively inactive $100 thousand institution.2
The Savings banks in the Boston area have enjoyed a gradual, but
certain growth over the past quarter century, with both total and average
assets more than doubling in dollar amount. (See Table XIII.) Compared
with competing thrift institutions, savings banks as a group in 1951 held
assets valued at nearly h times those of cooperative banks and federal
associations combined. Moreover, in regard to average assets size, local
savings banks are over 2A times as large as federals, and over 7 times as
large as cooperative banks.
1 Closed February 2, 1932, but on July 24, 1933, the institution reopened
as the Somerset Savings Bank.
2 The latter Columbus merged with the Boston Five Cents in 1941; The Black-
stone consolidated with the Charlestown Savings Bank in 1945, with the
latter $75 million institution receiving a convenient branch office in
the hub area.
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TABLE XIII. NUMBER, TOTAL ASSETS, AND AVERAGE ASSETS OF SAVINGS BANKS
IN THE BOSTON AREA, SELECTED YEARS, 1927-1951
Year* Number of Total Assets Average Assets
Banks (Millions) (Milions)
1927 61 $ 903.0 $ 14.8
1936 58 1,159.2 20.0
1940 58 1,193.6 20.6
1946 56 1,618.7 28.9
1947 56 1,173.6 29.9
1948 56 1,705.0 30.4
1949 56 1,729.5 30.9
1950 56 1,787.0 31.9
1951 56 1,829.3 32.6
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
* As of October 31.
The 56 savings banks vary widely with respect to asset holdings,
ranging from less than $3 million to well over $200 million. Just as
in the case of cooperative banks, the 2 largest savings banks are more
than twice the size of their nearest rival, thereby tending to raise the
average size well above the mode. Only 4 banks have assets below $5
million, the size class including nearly 75 per cent of all cooperative
banks in the area. As indicated in Table XIV, savings banks are concen-
trated quite heavily in the $10-25 million class.
TABLE XIV. ASSET SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF SAVINGS BANKS IN THE BOSTON AREA,
1951
Asset Group Number of Per Cent
(Milions ) Banks of Total
All Groups 56 100.0
$o - 5 4 7.1
5 -10 7 12.5
10 -15 11 19.6
15 -25 11 19.6
25 -35 6 10.7
35 -50 8 14.4
50 -75 4 7.1
75 and over 5 8.9
Source: Annual Reports, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
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COMMERCIAL BANKS
Commercial banks have played a subordinate role in the development of
the local mortgage market. As discussed earlier, mutual savings banks
have been serving the thrift needs of the Boston community since 1816, vhen
the city had but 35,000 inhabitants. Commercial banks, while their ori-
gin dates back to the founding of the First National Bank of Boston in
1784 have traditionally concentrated on commercial lending and operating
checking services. They have accepted and invested the time and savings
deposits of individuals, but the bulk of this latter activity has been
handled by the mutual institutions, first the savings banks and, later
on, by savings and loan associations as well.
In the newer sections of the country, however, commercial banks are
frequently the only financial institutions which accept savings, especially
among small rural communities. Consequently these community institutions,
in addition to performing the customary banking functions, are called
upon to supply the mortgage credit needs of home buyers, a highly spec-
ialized activity. Many such commercial banks are too small to maintain an
expert mortgage lending department, and accordingly have suffered abnor-
mally heavy foreclosure losses during depression periods. Indeed, the
advantages of specialization may be indicated by referring to bank failure
statistics. Of the 14,096 bank suspensions during the period 1926-1930,
only 15 occurred in New England, the stronghold of specialized mutual
thrift institutions. Of course, other reasons, such as general unsound
lending practices, depressed agricultural prices, insufficient capital,
and other local conditions may have been more influential in explaining
this geographic distribution, but specialization in mortgage lending
offers decided advantages.
'Welfling, o cit., pp. 182-3.
Traditional bank investment policy dictates that only a small portion
of commercial bank funds should be invested in long-term illiquid assets
such as home mortgage loans. This restriction carries no implication that
mortgages are inherently unsafe as an investment, but rather that they can
rarely be converted into cash on demand. Banks that do accept time or
savings deposits in considerable volume, however, may appropriately invest
a larger portion of these longer-term funds in real estate mortgages. Since
1908 trust companies in Massachusetts have been required to segregate the
assets of their savings department from those of the commercial and trust
departments, and must operate the former just as if it were a savings bank. 1
In national banks, no segregation of assets among the various departments
is required, but such banks are limited for purposes of liquidity in their
aggregate loans on first mortgages. According to current provisions of the
National Bank Act, national banks may invest in mortgages up to 60 per
cent of their time and savings deposits or up to the full value of their
2
capital and unimpaired surplus fund, whichever is greater.
The growth pattern of savings deposits in national banks and trust
companies in Massachusetts has been indicated in Table XI.3 While savings
accounts in savings banks have grown steadily for over a century, savings
deposits in commercial banks were of negligible importance until the 1920s.
Although trust companies had been authorized to accept these funds since
1890, total deposits began to mount only after the separation of savings
departments in 1908. Their peak year was reached by 1920, when these
State regulations on mortgage investment by trust companies do not apply
in general to commercial and trust departments. Funds in the commercial
departments may be placed in 60 per cent mortgages with terms not exceeding
3 years. (General Laws, Chapter 172, Section 33.) Mortgage lending is
generally exclusively conducted in the savings department, with the mort-
gage portfolio representing far less than 1 per cent of total assets in
the other two departments.
2The capital limit is generally smaller and, hence, less limiting in practice.
3See p. 129.
deposits represented 9.4 per cent of total holdings among the various
thrift institutions. Savings deposits in national banks continued to
increase in importance through 1931, but the share of both types fell
during the depression years. The Second World War brought a substantial
inflow of new savings into th ese institutions, so that by 1946 commercial
banks once again held a larger volume of savings accounts than did all
savings and loan associations in the Commonwealth. In the postwar era,
however, savings deposits in both national and state banks have actually
declined, with cooperative banks and federal associations realizing the
greatest relative gain. Trust companies have witnessed a larger postwar
loss in savings accounts than have national banks, partly because of
numerous mergers of the state-chartered institutions with the latter.
The overall decline in commercial bank savings deposits in favor of
savings and loan shares is undoubtedly due in large part to a wide
difference in dividend rates; a factor of increasing importance to the
saving public. Furthermore, many commercial banks accept savings de-
posits largely as a matter of convenience for their <dustomers, and make
little or no effort to promote this phase of their operations.
A primary point of difference between trust companies and savings
companies and savings banks concerns their form of organization. Whereas
the latter are legally mutual thrift institutions, the former are stock
companies and are treated as any other private incorporated business.
Shareholders of the bank receive ordinary dividend returns on their
capital stock, whereas depositors alone share in the profits of a mutual
institution. Furthermore, trust company profits have always been subject
in full to the federal corporate income tax. Profits of mutual thrift
institutions have traditionally been free from this tax, but since 1951
full tax liability' on retained earnings must be assumed after loss
1See "Dividend Returns" below.
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reserves have attained a certain level. Undoubtedly, these two deductions
from the gross income of commercial banks have heavily influenced their
capacity to pay competitive dividend rates, although the extent of this
influence has not been statistically examined.
As stated above, savings departments are operated just as if they
were autonomous savings banks, so far as savings and investment are con-
2
cerned. A separate board of investment is required for the savings de-
partment, and dividends are paid on depositors' funds just as in other
thrift institutions. Identical to savings bank. regulations, trust companies
are required to set up and maintain loss reserves for their savings de-
partments. The aggregate guaranty fund and surplus for the 51 savings
departments in the Commonwealth bore a ratio of 7.54 per cent to deposits
3
in 1950. Although the assets of the savings department are segregated,
the success of this department depends upon the operations of .the whole
bank. With this interdependence, however, savings depositors do have
the added protection of the capital stock as well as the general reserve
accounts of the bank.
Commercial banks may occupy an important position in the home mort-
gage market, even if their mortgage holdings are but a small fraction of
the total. Their investment policies are generally quite flexible, so
that entrance and withdrawal from the active mortgage market may often
be accomplished with relative ease. During the 1920s, rapidly increasing
savings deposits in these institutions across the nation were promptly
invested in high-yielding mortgage loans. Many of these loans were based
on highly inflated property valuations, and subsequent depression losses
were severe in many cases. The primary cause of these difficulties was
lSee "Dividend Returns" below.
2General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 172.
3Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
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not investing an unsound share of bank capital in mortgages, but rather
the prevalence of indiscriminate lending practices and the absence of
appropriate amortization provisions. At any rate, commercial banks
retreated from active participation in mortgage lending, and concentrated
on other phases of their overall operations. The introduction of FHA-
insured loans, as well as more liberal provisions for conventional lend-
ing by national banks in 19352, has enticed these institutions back into
the mortgage market, although on a limited scale in this area. While
this in and out policy of commercial banks and insurance companies may
provide a. degree of flexibility in meeting overall mortgage credit re-
quirements in boom periods, it tends to impede the development of truly
specialized mortgage lending institutions throughout the country. 3  Such
"fair weather lending" has been severely criticized by traditional savings
and loan interests, who, as stated earlier, are virtually compelled to
invest heavily in mortgages regardless of developments in other sectors
of the private capital market. Although the principal investments of
commercial banks and insurance companies are in other fields, ".
when the yields drop in their normal investment fields, (they) barge
into home mortgages. When other investments open up, they desert the
mortgage market. ,4
The most frequent charge levied against mortgage lending by commercial
banks relates to their investing short-term deposit funds in long-term
1
Ratcliff, op. cit., p. 246.
2Not until 1916 were national banks permitted to make urban real estate
loans and then the term was limited to 1 year and the amount to 50 per
cent of value. Furthermore, total holdings of farm and urban mortgage
loans could not exceed 25 per cent of capital and surplus or 1/3 of time
deposits. After years of agitation, the maximum term was increased to
5 years in the McFaddin Act of 1927. On August 23, 1935, the Federal
'Reserve Act was amended to permit national banks to make 10-year, 60 per
cent amortized loans, with the limitations on total mortgage holdings as
given above on page 88. FHA and VA loans are exempt from the above re-
stric tions on loan-value r atios and terms.
3 See concluding remarks at the end of Chapter 15.
hFrom an address by G. Bliss, Cooperative Banker, August 1951, p. 1
obligations. Even if the bank had a large volume of time or savings de-
posits, one school of thought maintains that liquidity needs would still
warrant loans with, a maxiaum term of "3 5 years. By accepting a sin-
gularly low dividend return, savers supposedly assme that immediate pay-
ment is all the more likely,2 and liquidity must be of supreme concern in
all investment decisions'. Public regulation and examination, as well as
improved mortgage lending practices 'and contracts, have materially weakened
the validity of 'this argument. Since s avings departments in Mass achusetts
trust companies are treated as savings banks insofar as savings and mort-
gage operations are concerned, state-chartered commercial banks, at least,
certainly appear to be fully justified in making long-term mortgages.
While no mortgage loan is perfectly liquid, universal principal amortiza-
tion and' the availability of an increasingly effective secondary market
have rendered mortgage investment highly desirable, especially where the
loan is either FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed. Accordingly, national banks,
not legally bound to confine lending operations to in-state properties,
invest freely in insured and guaranteed mortgage loans throughout all
sections of the country.
Another common charge levied at real estate lending by commercial
banks revolves about the money-creating aspects of such credit extension.
At first glance, this distinction may appear to arise from the differing
liquidity characteristics of bank demand deposits compared with conventional
savings or share accounts. In a realistic sense, however, most savings
accounts must be treated as very close substitutes for currency and check-
ing accounts, as the 30-day waiting period is seldom invoked and withdrawal
See below.
2 See Morton Bodfish, "A Sound System of Mortgage Credit and Its Relation
to Banking Policy, " Journal of Public Utility and Land Economics,
August 1935, pp. 215-2-25-.
is ordinarily automatic. Nevertheless, even if demand and savings
deposits are indistingishable so far as liquidity characteristics are
concerned, mortgage lending (or any other type of credit extension) might
have more expansionary potentialities within the system of commercial
banks than within the system of conventional thrift institutions. . While
an individual thrift institution is not required to maintain as large
a share of its deposited funds in cash reserves as does a commercial bank,
the so-called "leakage" of loaned funds is far more significant among the
system of thrift institutions. For example, suppose each individual
commercial bank may invest ,80 -per cent of its deposited funds in mortgage
loans. In this case, there is a very strong likelihood that most -of these
advanced funds will be redeposited and thereby remain within the system
so that additional credit, in turn, may be extended by the banks in--
cluded. The ultimate increase in purchasing power from an initial loan
then depends upon minimum reserve ratios and the extent of such leakages
from the system.
The same type of analysis can be applied to lending by conventional
thrift institutions. Even if each individual bank would invest over 90
per cent of its savings capital in mortgage loans, the probability that the
advanced funds would remain within the system of thrift institutions is
much smaller. On the contrary, a large proportion of these funds would
eventually fall into the system of commercial banks and only a relatively
small proportion would be redeposited into true thrift accounts. In
other words, the expansionary potentialities of savings bank lending, for
instance, as opposed to commercial bank.lending may be theoretically even
more extensive by virtue of lower reserve requirements. In practice,
however, the far more substantial leakage of advanced funds from the sys-
tem of savings banks renders this chain reaction of limited consequence.
Indeed, whereas a large majority of loans made by commercial banks arise
indirectly from deposit liabilities of other banks, s avings banks depend
almost entirely upon their own community savings inflows for loanable
funds.
In addition to direct participation in home mortgage lending, commer-
cial banks influence the mortgage market in other ways. These banks have
played a prominent role in the short-term financing of home building opera-
tions, certainly an appropriate outlet for commercial department funds.
Especially in areas where there .is a continuing relative scarcity of long-
term capital, commercial banks finance speculative builders contingent
upon an advance commitment from outside sources to take the permanent
mortgage. As of June 30,. 1950s construction loans totaled $837 million,
constituting nearly 7.4 per cent of all non-farm real estate loans held
by insured commercial banks across the country.
Another important activity of commercial hanks in the area of real
estate finance concerns the extension of credit to other types of mort-
gage lending companies. Although ordinary thrift institutions have per-
haps resorted to bank borrowing only to meet acute liquidity needs, mort-
gage companies and other types of intermediary institutions frequently
rely upon borrowed funds for working capital. These short-term bank
advances are used to supplement limited equity funds in originating and
holding mortgage loans until a suitable permanent mortgagee is found.
In mid-1950 about 3.5 per cent of all nonfarm real estate loans held by
FDIC-insured commercial banks across the country constituted "loans to
nonbank mortgage lenders," less than one-half of which were actually se-
cured by real estate. 2
1 0perating. Insured Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, FDIC, Report
No. 33, 1950, p. 5.
2lbido, p. 5.
These modest figures on holdings of short-term loans understate the
real importance of commercial banks in financing new construction and the
operations of other mortgage lenders. Funds invested in such short-term
paper have a rapid turnover whereas permanent mortgage credit ties up
investible funds for long periods of time and thus predominates data on
outstanding holdings.
Savings Departments in Local Trust Companies
The number of trust companies operating in thie immediate Boston area
has fallen steadily since the, late 1920s. As a result of several depres-
sion liquidations and later merger activity among trust companies and
national banks, this number fell from 48 in 1927 to 27 by 1950. The
number of trus t companies maintaining savings department:had silmilahrlr: de-
creased from 42 to 22 over the same intervaL.
TABLE XV. TOTAL AND AVERAGE ASSETS OF SAVINGS DEPARTIT IN TRUST COMPANIES
IN THE BOSTON AREA, SELECTED YEARS, 1927-1950
Year Number of Total Assets Average Assets
Savings Tepartments (Millions) (illio6ns)
1927 42 $ 138.6 $3.30
1936 30 80.8 2.70
1940 30 94.0 3.13
1946 24 192.1 8.00
1948 22 170..3 7.74
1950 22 154.1 7.00
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
The data in Table XV reflect wide fluctuations in total resources as
well as in the average size of local savings departments. Although de-
pression losses were unusually severe, aggregate assets recovered to un-
precedented heights during the Second World War. Average assets .nearly
tripled between 1940 and 1946, and have decreased slightly but steadily
since that time.
The 22 savings departments vary widely in asset size, ranging from
$1. to $28.6 million in 1950. Within this range, the remaining 20 de-
partments are evenly distributed with 9 having assets below $5 million
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and 6 above $10 million. 1  Two of the largest Boston trust companies have
no savings department whatever, and the largest institution in the area
with assets of nearly $200 million has a $7 million savings department.
The larger savings departments tend to appear in communities where mutual
institutions are less predominant than in Boston proper. Trust companies,
just as national banks, have set up numerous branch offices in the county
of organization, affording a convenient savings depositary for a great
2
many suburban savers.
DIVIDEND RETURNS ON SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
Perhaps one of the outstanding characteristics of the local savings
market is the increasing similarity of the thrift services offered by the
various institutions, especially since the early depression years and the
introduction of extensive federal intervention. Despite this similarity,
however, dividends paid by the various types of thrift institutions have
consistently covered a wide range. (See Chart TI.)
Rates of return on the various types of savings accounts have changed
in an approximately parallel fashion over the past 25 years. During the
late '1920s, interest and dividend rates had reached a high plateau, rang-
ing from nearly 4.5 per cent on savings deposits in trust companies to
5.5 per cent on serial shares in cooperative banks. The latter institu-
tions paid dividends of approximately 5 per cent on paid-up shares for 7
years through 1932, while rates on savings bank deposits had climbed to
near this level by 1930 but then fell abruptly. Following the general
trend in interest rate movements, average rates on each type of account
fell consistently during the depression years and well-.into the postwar
period as well.
Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
ithin the immediate Boston vicinity there were 22 national banks in 1950,
some with as many as 29 branch offices.
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CHART -I. AVERAGE RATES OF RETURN PAID f COCPDATIVE BANKS, FEDE~iAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS*, 1MUTUAL SAVINGS LANKS, AND SAVING}S DEPART-
MENTS OF TRUST COMPANIES IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1926-1951
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Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks; Federal Home
Loan Bank of Boston.
* Average rates for 15 associations in the Boston vicinity through 195c;
for 16 in 1951.
Dividend returns on accounts in savings banks and in trust company
savings departments realized the greatest decline, both in absolute as
well as relative terms. Falling operating incomes forced a downward ad-
justment from the unjustifiably high rates of the 1920s, but equally sig-
nificant was the failure on the part of most lending institutions to set
up adequate loss reserves on a systematic basis. The unusually heavy
mortgage losses developing during the depression years resulted in good
part from extensive mortgage lending at a time when both dividend payments
and mortgage risk were at a maximum. Following the downturn, mortgage
losses currently developing were so large that dividends necessarily fell
more rapidly than earnings, with the result that depositors in the 1930s
were penalized in favor of those in the 1920s. Decreasing each year
through 1946, dividend rates on savings bank and trust company deposits
dropped to a low point of 1.86 and 1.14 per cent, respectively. 'Dividend
returns on .cooperative bank shares fell sharply during the early 1930s,
but have declined only gradually since that time. Rates on paid-up
shares 2 declined to a low of 2.63 per cent in 1947, while serial share
rates continued to fall to 3.17 per cent by 1951.
Since the early postwar years, average rates have tightened slightly
on all types of accounts except serial shares. Perhaps the saver became
a bit restless after 15 years of abnormally low dividend returns. Al-
though lacking an effective lobby to bargain for higher rates, he does
have the option of investing his funds in Savings Bonds, in life insur-
ance and annuities, or in savings accounts if dividend rates appear
favorable. At the same time, local thrift institutions had finally re-
covered from their severe depression experience, and were in a healthy
operating position. Although expenses had begun to increase, dollar
earnings were advancing more rapidly, and surplus reserves had risen
steadily since the depression. Since these mutual institutions appeared
to be.well fortified for any postwar contingency, it was only natural that
depositors should share in their increasing profits. Just as savings bank
rates fell much faster than did cooperative bank rates during the 17-year
period 1930-1946, they have also showed the greatest relative increase in
recent years. By 1950, they had exceeded average rates on the newly-
issued savings shares of cooperative banks. Complete data on dividend
lSee Lintner, "Our Tremendos Mortgage Debt," Harvard Business Review,
January 1949, p. 97.
2Which were ordinarily somewhat lower than rates on matured shares until
then were consolidated in 1950.
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rates among local federal savings and loan associations are not available,
but recent reports to the Boston Home Loan Bank indicate an average rate
of 2.48 per cent. All but one local federal paid 2.5 per cent on savings
accounts in 1951, slightly higher than dividend rates on comparable ac-
counts in the other institutions. Moreover, the bonus savings plan en-
titles the systematic saver to an addition 0.25 to 1.00 per cent return,
depending on the term of regular saving. This combination rate of 3.5
per cent is well above the yield on the corresponding, but more rigid,
serial share account of cooperative banks.
The rather wide variation in average rates of return on the alterna-
tive types of savings accounts might suggest that depositors are rela-
tively insensitive to expected dividend returns when selecting a deposi-
tary. Indeed, savings deposits in trust companies were receiving a
dividend return of 1.27 per cent in 1950, while federal associations were
paying on the average twice that rate on essentially the s ame type of
savings investment. These comparisons all relate to average rates of
return, a much more stable measure than actual rates paid by the indivi-
dual institutions. In 1950 dividends paid on savings deposits in savings
banks ranged from 1.5 to 4.0 per cent, in savings departments of trust
companies from tl.00 or less" (63 per cent of all cases) to 2.25 per
cent, and rates on cooperative bank serial shares varied from 2.0 to
4.5 per cent.
This wide range in dividend rates, however, does not 'imply that
individual savers are totally ignorant or disinterested in comparative
rates of return. In the first place, the maximum rates cited above are
paid by very few institutions, and these are generally located in rural
1 Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
areas well isolated from the money market centers. Even if the saver
examined the annual reports of all institutions in: the state in order to
place his funds where the return is greatest, he may discover that his
application for a new account would be rejected. Such institutions
operate in a restricted mortgage market, serving only the limited fi-
nancing needs of their own community, and accordingly prefer to accept only
local savings so long as these inflows suffice to meet all mortgage de-
mands. Especially during the depression years when local thrift insti-
tutions shunned away from mortgage lending, new savings accounts were
frequently refused as a matter of policy until more fertile investment
opportunities appeared. Such a negative policy can certainly inflict
considerable damage to the long-run success and public respect of any
thrift institution, especially when competing associations continue to
accept new savings willingly. In rural areas, the community of savers
and home buyers may have limited alternatives, and the institution may
continue to exploit its quasi-monopolistic position. When such restric-
tive policies are pursued by firms in metropolitan areas, such as in the
Boston vicinity during the late 1930s, rival institutions, especially
newly-chartered federal savings and loan associations in this instance,
realize a permanent advantage in the market.
Federal savings and loan associations have not only actively promoted
new savings accounts, but they have offered substantial financial induce-
ments in the form of higher dividend rates. Undoubtedly, the fact that
these associations have consistently paid well over 2 per cent on savings
accounts, as opppsed to the lower rates paid by savings banks and trust
companies, has contributed to their rapid growth. Moreover, the higher
yield on bonus savings accounts in federal associations may partially
explain the relative decline in the sale of serial shares among coopera-
tive banks.
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Actually the added dividend return on serial shares ccmpared to
paid-up or savings shares is narrowing, and at least 10 local coopera-
tive banks are currently paying the same rate on all types of share accounts.
This suggests either that systematic saving may be accomplished without the
offering of special incentives or else that the serial share program no
longer serves the changing needs of the community of savers. All coopera-
tive banks continue to promote the personal gains from regular saving,
but some no longer feel it essential or even desirable to offer extra
dividend returns for this program. Even the attractive bonus plan of
federals, whereby a positive inducement is guaranteed for systematic saving
in contrast to the negative fine-penalty scheme of serial shares, has not
enjoyed universal success among local associations.
Interest Elasticity
The role of the rate of interest in influencing ,the flow of savings
into thrift institutions is difficult if not impossible to analyze. While
most parties interviewed regard other factors, notably income levels, as
more significant in determining the volume of new saving, some thrift
institution executives frequently speak of a minimum return necessary to
induce savers to part with their cash liquidity.2 Even if the total
volume of institutional savings inflow is little affected by moderate
changes in rates of return, this factor continues to influence its allo-
cation among competing depositaries. As hypothesized above, federals may
have accelerated their growth pattern by paying generous dividends on
accounts insured up to $10,000. Furthermore, there is considerable
evidence that savings inflows are definitely modified when some institu-
tions raise dividend rates relative to competing associations. A Boston
1Local Home Loan Bank examiners report that perhaps fewer than 12 federals
in the New England District are promoting the bonus plan on a wide scale.
Many more associations offer the program but are not anxious to push it,
as they feel it appeals to but a small segment of the saving public.
2See, for example, Testimony of R. Rogers, TNEC Hearings, Part II.
cooperative bank doubled its aggregate savings share account from $800
thousand within a month after dividend rates were raised from 2i to 3 per
cent. Executives of the bank believe that only a portion of this increase
was due to a transfer from rival city institutions, but was rather the
result of a re-channeling of new savings.
Professor Lintner has investigated the sensitivity of savers to
moderate interest rate changes in some detail. To test this relationship,
he compared the relative growth of two nearby savings banks -which had
been paying the same dividend rate but during the time under considera-
tion one of them changed its rate. This comparison must be made in the
periods immediately preceding and following the common dividend periods,
for any change in deposits during the given dividend period is strongly
influenced by the volume of dividends credited to existing savings ac-
counts. For this analysis, 66 individual cases were considered, where one
of two nearby banks which had been paying the same rate raised or lowered
its rate while the other bank maintained its existing rate schedule. In
three-fourths of the cases examined, the institution paying the higher
rate realized the greater relative gain in total deposits, thereby indi-
cating that a significant share of the saving community is interest
conscious. Even where this, pattern is not evident, special factors
generally account for the discrepancy. It is impossible to determine
whether the influence of raising dividend rates is of a permanent nature
or merely a short-term matter. However, it is probable that most transfer
of savings from the lower to the higher paying institution would probably
occur promptly during the period of the rate change, so that depositors
may realize the maximum interest gain from the change. Accordingly, any
lLintner, o-. cit., p. 141
significant shift in growth patterns in the succeeding period would largely
reflect 'a change in the depositing of new savings, thus indicating a more
permanent development.
It is perhaps possible that savings depositors are more sensitive to-
relative interest rate changes than to any existing differences in dividend
schedules of alternate thrift institutions. In other words, depositors
in institutions with a long-standing record of low dividend rates may
come to recognize this possible sacrifice in yield as the cost of addi-
2
tional safety or convenience. In conformity with this proposition, one
of the largest Boston savings banks had been enjoying an average growth
even though it had been paying below average dividend returns. As 'soon
as rates were raised in this conservative institution, however, savings
accounts increased at an accelerated pace. As a further illustration, one
of the smaller federal 'savings and loan associations in Boston has con-
sistently paid to of 1 per' cent below the average dividend rate of
all local associations. Nevertheless, its total resources have steadily
advanced by 78.5 per cent since 1946 compared with a less spectacular 63
per cent increase for all 15 associations. 3
Special factors 'may account for the continuing ability of commercial
banks to maintain savings accounts despite the unusually low dividend re-
turns In 1950 dividends on savings accounts in savings departments of
Massachusetts trust companies were paid at the rate of 1.27 per cent,
slightly above the postwar low of 1.14 in 1946. Exact data on dividend
Ibid., pp. 141-2n. This hypothesis of interest conciousness is also
substantiated when one of two banks which had been paying different rates,
adjusted its dividend structure to equal the other. pp. 142-3.
2Some depositors in commercial banks apparently regard a return of 1 per cent
as equivalent to a 2} per cent rate in other depositaries when due allowance
is made for the extra risk and possible illiquidity involved in the latter
account. Such a position is hardly tenable in view of the disasterous loss
experience among trust companies in particular as opposed to the enviable
safety record of other thrift institutions. See below.
3Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston.
rates paid by national banks are not available on a local basis, but
existing evidence points to a rate considerably below the trust company
level. For all insured commercial banks in Massachusetts, interest paid
on time and savings deposits in 1950 amounted to 0.94 per cent of the
total dollar value of their accounts. The corresponding rate for national
banks alone would be significantly less than this average, for, of the 174
banks insured by the FDIC, 58 are state-chartered trust companies and be-
long to the population of institutions paying a rate of 1.27 per cent.
Despite these unusually low dividend returns, savings deposits in
commercial banks have grown rapidly at various times. During the war
years 1941-1946, total resources of the 24- to 30 savings departments of
local trust companies more than doubled in dollar value. Furthermore,
the number of depositors also increased rapidly during this period, and
has ordinarily exceeded the number of depositors in their respective
commercial departments. Especially in the postwar period, however, com-
peting thrift institutions have often promoted new savings through adver-
tising their higher dividend rates, with the result that total resources
of trust company savings departments have declined every year since 1946.
Safety motives may partially account for the continuing existence of
substantial time and savings deposits in national banks . This factor,
however, is much less justified in the case of trust companies in view
of their relatively unfavorable depression experience. The universal
adoption of state and federal insurance of savings accounts in higher
dividend paying institutions actually diminishes the wisdom of depositing
2
savings in either type of commercial bank on the basis of safety alone.
1Annual Report of FDIC, 1950, Table 117, pp. 266-7.
As of Tecember 30, 1950, deposits in all but 8 of 182 national banks and
trust companies in Massachusetts were insured by the FDIC. Annual Report
of FDIC, 1950, Table 103, pp. 226-7.
161
Convenience is undoubtedly an important factor underlying many such accounts.
Individuals who perhaps conduct their ordinary commercial banking at a par-
ticular institution find it much easier to handle their savings business
under the same roof as well, rather than to deal with a separate depositary.
Not only is it easier to make deposits in the "department store" bank, but
also funds are generally assumed to be subject to withdrawal at any time.
An individual who has a temporary surplus in his checking account may
find it convenient to transfer it to a time or savings account for a small
dividend return. Though maximum accounts in savings departments of trust
companies are limited just as in savings banks, savings accounts in
national banks are frequently quite large and highly fluctuating. 1
Despite the singularly low level of dividend returns offered by
commercial banks, other elements in their cost structure effectively
constrain them from setting mortgage interest rates well below the pre-
vailing market level. As stated earlier, commercial banks, just as any
privately incorporated business, must pay dividends to holders of capital
stock as well as to holders of savings accounts. Moreover, these banks
have always been liable in full to the federal corporate profits tax, the
base of which obviously includes revenues from the operations of savings
as well as commercial departments. Although the precise influence of these
two elements is not known, the effective cost of loanable funds is probably -
little less for commercial banks than for other higher dividend-paying
2
thrift institutions.
One local trust company executive regards his $5 million savings
department as far too small to permit efficient operations. Furthermore,
1This is merely an opinion expressed by some interviewed parties and lacks
statistical backing. Individual accounts of $1CO thousand are not at all
unusual.
2The maximum rate permitted by the FDIC on savings deposits of insured
nonmember banks is 21 per cent. Annual Report of FDIC, 1950, p. 203.
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savings deposits could be substantially increased only if dividend returns
were raised from the current 1 per cent rate, a difficult task, as implied
above. While a $5 million asset size may not be optimal, the typical
cooperative bank is less than one-half this size, and still continues to
be active in the local market. Moreover, the savings departments of
several local trust companies have resources exceeding $5 million, but
seldom do mortgage loans dominate their respective investment portfolios.
Undoubtedly many, if not most, local commercial banks prefer not to compete
vigorously in a mortgage market where mutual thrift institutions enjoy such
a commanding influence. Accordingly, a substantial proportion of mortgage
holdings of local national banks results from block purchases of FHA-
insured and VA-guaranteed loans in other parts of the country.
MISCELLAEOUS MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITLJTIONS
Life Insurance Companies
Mortgage lending operations of life insurance companies are much more
significant throughout the nation than in the Boston area alone. The six
insurance companies with home offices in Boston are heavy investors in
mortgages, and in residential and commercial properties as well. In total
mortgage holdings, these companies rank well ahead of commercial banks, and
currently place more funds in mortgages than in any other investment.
IDespite these impressive figures on holdings, local insurance companies
are not an important factor in the Boston mortgage market. As indicated
earlier, they have been tabbed as "fair weather lenders" who enter and
leave the mortgage market on a straight relative yield basis. In the
'Mortgage purchases accounted for )O per cent of their new investments
during 1950, Life Insurance Factbook, p. 70. This ratio applies to all
companies in Tdhenation, out appears to be ecually applicable to local
conpanies interviewed.
163
local money market center, existing thrift institutions are subject to
rigid investment restrictions especially regarding geographic lending
areas. This factor, along with other circumstances producing a relative
abundance of mortgage capital, has led life insurance companies to look
elsewhere for mortgage loans where net yields are more favorable. Con-
sequently, whereas six local life companies hold over one-fifth of the
total mortgage debt held by all Boston mortgage lenders, these and out-
side companies originate less than 5 per cent of all mortgage loans on
local home properties. A substantial proportion of their mortgage
holdings are acquired through purchase rather than origination, but the
extent of such purchases in the local market is negligible. Similarly,
large insurance companies from other states acquire only limited amounts
of mortgages on local properties operating through loan correspondents.
On the whole, it may be safely assumed that the influence of insurance
companies on the local home mortgage market is largely indirect and poten-
tial, contingent upon relative yields on similar mortgage investments
throughout the country.
Fundamentally, life insurance companies collect countless small
payments from millions of policy holders for whom life insurance is a
principal method of protection. In addition to providing protection and
a convenient means of saving, these companies also perform the economic
function of combining such small payments into sizeable amounts of capital
and directing them to their most productive use. By profitably investing
these funds, the policy holder receives protection at a substantially lower
net cost.
lSee Chapter 10.
Just as ordinary thrift institutions, life insurance companies are
restricted in their real estate financing activities by statute and
supervisory requirements of state banking and insurance authorities.
Although most of these restrictions arise from regulations within the
state of organization, frequently life companies are further limited by
requirements-in the various states in which they operate. - These companies
are generally restricted to loans on improved real estate, obviously de-
signed in part to prevent dangerous land speculation. Typical of invest-
ment provisions in most states, Massachusetts life insurance companies are
limited to mortgage loans equal to 66 2/3 per cent of the appraised value
of the property, somewhat more restrictive than corresponding savings bank
and savings and loan regglations.
In regard to lending areas, insurance companies are free to place
mortgage loans on properties located anywhere in the United States,
provided these properties are unencumbered by prior liens.1 Since these
thrift institutions accumulate the savings of policy holders throughout
the country, one might suggest they are morally justified, if not obli-
gated, to seek a wide geographic diversification in their mortgage port-
folio. Savings banks, on the other hand, may regard distant mortgages
as safe and profitable, but the charge is frequently voiced that they
are trying to export "hard earned local savings to foreign borrowers"
instead of accommodating deserving home-town home buyers. 2
In at least one other respect insurance companies operate within a
more liberal framework than other local mortgage lending institutions.
The aforementioned thrift institutions are restricted both in regard to
maximum loan terms and the schedule on which repayments must be made. No
Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 175, Section 63. Cf. restricted
lending area of local savings and cooperative banks.
2 Interviews. Undoubtedly such allegations generally arise from a bank's
refusal of an unsound loan request.
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such statutory limits are placed on most mortgage loans of Massachusetts
life insurance companies, although they may require regular amortization
of loan principal until it declines to 60 per cent of value.
Life insurance companies, just as many national banks, have re-
entered the mortgage market since the depression years largely as a re-
sult of federal intervention. The above restrictions on mortgage lend-
ing are waived in the case of FHA-insured loans (and later of VA-guaranteed
loans as well), a major investment outlet for insurance companies. Since
these companies frequently prefer to acquire mortgages by purchase rather
than by origination, the government insurance feature has performed an
essential service in promoting a higher degree of mobility to long-term
capital.
Credit Unions
Credit unions have hever been an important institutional force in
the home mortgage market. Introduced into this country during the second
decade of this century, credit unions were organized primarily as a re-
form measure, to protect people from predatory "loan sharks." As a coop-
erative type of association, they may be chartered either by the state or
federal government for the purpose of accumuliting the savings of their
members and of making loans to them for various reasons. In performing
the latter function, credit unions provide personal loans at rates much
lower than those charged by other loan agencies accessible to persons of
small incomes. The coordinate function of promoting thrift is accomplished
by selling shares and accepting the savings deposits of their members.
The members of a credit union must have some other common bond of
association, such as similar employment, residence in same community,
1J. L. Snider, Credit Unions in Massachusetts, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1939, Chapter I.
same national origin, etc. Since group interests are of paramount importance,
earnings and profitability have generally been subordinate to service as a
primary objective. Rates of interest charged on personal loans are limited
to 1 per cent per month on unpaid balances under federal charter, while
only a "reasonable" requirement is specified for state-chartered unions.
Loan repayment is frequently accomplished on a weekly basis to coincide
with pay day, and the maximum loan term is limited to 1 year.
Credit unions are severely restricted in their mortgage lending
operations. Federal unions are effectively excluded from this market
altogether by the highly restrictive provisions in their charters.
State-chartered unions may extend secured real estate loans, but again
statutory requirements eliminate a large portion of them from active
participation in this market. They may invest in mortgage up to 50 to
70 per cent of their assets, depending on the size of the credit union.
Under no circumstances, however, can a single real estate loan exceed
5 per cent of total assets or $8,000, whichever is the lesser. Within
these limits, credit unions are authorized to make 60 per cent mortgages,
provided the accompanying note is payable either on demand or within 3
years. Mortgages with loan amounts up to 80 per cent of value may also
be written, so long as regular amortization is required until the loan
balance is trimmed to 60 per cent of value. 2
In view of these various restrictions, only one-fourth of the 215
credit unions in the Boston area hold any mortgage loans whatever. The
average organization held total assets of $150 thousand in 1950, hardly
adequate to permit the maintenance of a sound, diversified mortgage port-
As of 1937, such loans were limited to $200 or to 10 per cent of the
union's unimpaired capital and surplus, whichever is greater, with a
maximum term of 2 years. Snider, op. cit., p. 17.
These weekly, monthly, or quarterly payments must retire the principal
at least 6 per cent per year. Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter
171, Section 24B.
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folio. In Boston alone, there were 125 credit unions, only 6 of which
held assets of over $1 million.
During-the early development of credit unions in Massachusetts, real
estate loans were a major investment outlet, actually exceeding the volume
of personal loans as late as 1925. Small personal loans, however, are the
natural field for credit unions, and have generally dominated lending opera-
tions since the late 1920s. At various times, members have sought small
second mortgages to supplement funds secured from conventional lenders,
but this activity has not been extensive in recent years. Under current
regulations, credit unions may make second mortgages only where the com-
bined first and seconid mortgage loans do not exceed 80 per cent of value,
or $8,000, whichever is lesser.1  As of December 1950, the 457 credit
unions in Massachusetts had invested on the average 24.2 per cent of
total assets in real estate loans, all but 0.33 per cent being in first
mortgages.2 Over one-third of the combined mortgage holdings of all
credit unions in the Boston vicinity were held by a Malden association.
This union, being the largest in the area with assets of $2.6 million,
held nearly $1.4 million in mortgages in 1950. It appears as if credit
unions concentrate on extensive mortgage lending only in neighborhoods
or communities where conventional thrift institutions are less active.
As stated above, capital funds are acquired either through selling
shares or accepting ordinary deposits. Dividends paid on these accounts
have followed the same general pattern as those of other thrift institu-
tions. After reaching a low level in 1946, rates on both capital accounts
have gradually risen, and by 1950 amounted to 2.8 and 2.0 per cent
1 Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 171, Section 24B.
Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
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on shares and deposits, respectively.
Other Mortgage Lending Institutions
In addition to the previously described institutions, several other
types of lenders play a minor role in the local mortgage market. These
latter are generally included in that heterogeneous category, "individuals
and others," and very little is known about its composition. Perhaps most
significant among this group are the various sorts of mortgage companies
and brokers. These organizations specialize in real estate credit, buy-
ing up mortgages for resale to others or merely functioning as middlemen
for lending institutions and prospective mortgagors. Such agencies ordi-
narily have limited equity funds of their own, and frequently rely on
short-term advances from commercial banks for working capital whenever
necessary. Because of their low capitalization, mortgage companies de-
pend upon a fast turnover of mortgage inventories in order to enjoy
economy operations.
So-called "mortgage companies" have become increasingly significant
since the intro duction of FHA-insured loans, and later on of the VA-
guaranteed home loan. These agencies frequently collaborate with operative
builders in arranging construction loans with nearby or distant commercial
banks and in placing the permanent mortgages with outside institutions.
They generally seek advance commitments from insurance companies, savings
banks, and, until recently, the Federal National Mortgage Association, 2
selling the paper at above or below par depending on current market condi-
tions. Although these sales commissions constitute an important source of
income, mortgage companies depend upon servicing fees as a primary revenue
These dividend rates apply to all 457 credit unions in Massachusetts.
Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
2See Chapters 8 and 14 for a description of FNMA and its operations.
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producer. The mortgage purchaser ordinarily leaves all servicing functions
with the mortgage company, and pays a fixed percentage fee for this detail,
generally equal to I or 1 per cent of the unpaid loan balance. Before an
agency can operate as an originator or servicer of FHA-insured loans, it
must first qualify as an FHA-approved mortgagee.
In the Boston area, such organizations function primarily as brokers,
and seldom possess an inventory of mortgages on their own account. In
areas where long-term credit is abundant, most home financing needs are
met by local thrift institutions that both originate and service mortgage
loans to maturity. Accordingly, servicing fees constitute a minor source
of income for mortgage brokers in the Boston vicinity, except where the
servicer is a loan correspondent for a life insurance company. Mortgage
operations are frequently operated in connection with other real estate
activity, thereby permitting the realtor to collect the customary sales
commission from the previous home owner in addition to a possible mort-
gage fee. This latter compensation has become increasingly prevalent in
the postwar period, ordinarily representing 1 per cent of the mortgage
principal. Whether a brokerage fee, if any, is paid by the lender or by
the borrower depends on the current competitive conditions existing in
the local market.
Various creations of the federal government have also figured promi-
nently in the local home mortgage market. As a direct lender, the govern-
ment has intervened only through "emergency" measures, two such cases
lSee Chapter 12. As of May 31, 1951, the Federal Reserve found that there
were 20 so-called "mortgage companies," 30 "mortgage brokers," and 306
"real estate brokers or agents" operating in Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk,
and Suffolk Counties. Although these organizations represented nearly
one-half of all mortgagees in the local market, their combined mortgage
holdings accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the total mortgage debt held
by all institutions. Across the nation, there were 26,734 such "non-
institutional" mortgage lenders out of the grand total of 43,771 regis-
trants as of mid-1951. In contrast to the local area, mortgage holdings
of mortgage companies, brokers, etc., represented nearly 6 per cent of
the aggregate nationwide mortgage debt.
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involving HOLC loans during the depression and the current program of
home loans to veterans. Through the ordinary FHA and VA home loan
programs, the federal government has exerted a strong influence on the
local market, although the FHA program has been more widely received in
other sections of the country. Lastly, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA) and RFC Mortgage Company have at various times pur-
chased large quantities of FHA and VA mortgages, providing an effective
secondary market for this paper. These federal government activities
are considered in greater detail elsewhere in this stucr, and merit
but brief mention here.
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PART IV. THE METROPOLITAN BOS'TON HOME MODRTGAGE MARKET: A PREWAR SETTING
Although the primary emphasis of this study concerns the postwar
market, it seems wise to present some of the institutional background under-
lying mortgage operations over the past two or three decades. Cyclical
fluctuations have been unusually severe in the housing industry, with
market valuations and the volume of new construction exhibiting violent
swings. The severity of these movements has been aggravated by the vary-
ing qualification standards set up by mortgage lending institutions in
passing on loan requests. In boom periods they abet the inflationary
spiral through providing unjustifiably liberal credit, while in depressed
periods many have virtually withdrawn from the market. Since the postwar
economy has evidenced continuous prosperity and inflationary pressures,
mortgage lending has been largely geared to these circumstances. To pre-
sent a more rounded picture, brief mention should be made regarding lend-
ing practices during the depression of the early 1930s. Moreover, the
major structural changes arising out of the depression experience must
be recognized and analyzed in discussing the current operations. An
additional reason for this historical summary concerns the long-term
nature of mortgage lending: except for the new or rapidly expanding insti-
tutions, a significant proportion of existing portfolios consists of loans
made in the prewar years. Among the institutions visited, one holds some
mortgages which have been on their books since the late nineteenth centuryl
In this section, some characteristic weaknesses in the home mortgage
network will be touched on, especially in the period prior to the depres-
sion of the early 1930s. Much of the descriptive material vdll be general
in scope, and concrete reference to the local situation will be drawn
only where relevant data are available. This discussion will be followed
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by an outline of the aalient features of various federal measures designed
to promote a permanent improvement in urban real estate finance. Special
consideration will be' devoted to the FHA program and its influence on the
local home mortgage market. Data on mortgage lending activities in the
Boston area will be presented in later sections dealing with the postwar
mortgage market.
CHAPTER 6. WEAKNESSES IN PRE-DEPRESSION MARKET
The unprecedented building boom of the 1920s brought to the forefront
many glaring weaknesses in the whole mortgage network. Numerous specula-
tors had seized the opportunity to reap quick profits during those buoyant
days, taking full advantage of easy credit availability. Mortgage invest-
ment had long been regarded as a choice outlet for institutional funds, on
both counts of yield and safety. Since business prosperity had provided
them with an unprecented inflow of savings, thrift institutions eagerly
bid against each other in underwriting continued speculative activity.
It was inevitable that their unsound lending pr actices would soon under-
mine the whole shaky credit structure. 1
Although lenders undoubtedly recognized the illiquid nature of such
investment, many evidenced a blind faith in the ultimate soundness of any
mortgage loan. Even if certain large loans to speculators would involve
short-run foreclosure and loss, the undeniable long-run inflation in land
values would guarantee eventual recovery. Temporary economic reversals
would certainly give way to rising property values as a result of better
standards of living, population growth, etc. While the history of land
lIt should be mentioned that not all speculative mortgage borrowing con-
cerned the buying and selling of real estate. Many existing home owners
took out mortgages on their property in order to secure funds for the
purchase of consumer durables or for stock market speculation. Home
Mortgage Lending, American Institute of Banking, New York, 1938, p. 12.
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values would demonstrate a good deal of truth in such optimism, it is hardly
a prudent investment policy. Numerous local real estate crises and, later
on, the severe debacle of the early 1930s have shattered its universal
validity. Furthermore, neighborhood blighting and economic degradation
may be a permanent phenomenon, despite the fact that population and in-
comes continue to expand in adjacent communities.
It is perhaps unfortunate that competition among lenders did not
assume the form of price concessions or, in other words, lower interest
rates. Many local thrift institutions felt obliged to offer dividend re-
turns of 5 or 6 per cent in order to maintain savings accounts in tact.
At the same time they hardly felt justified in cutting interest rates
below the customary 6 per cent, but preferred the more tethical" technique
of inflating property apprisals to place new loans. From a sampling survey
of mortgage lending on single-family homes during this period, Professor
Tucker found the average nominal rate of interest on first mortgages in
the country to be 6.2 per cent.2 Among the 52 cities included in a
nationwide study of urban housing finance in 1934, Wickens chose 4 New
England cities.3 On first mortgages the weighted average nominal rate
was 4.93 per cent for the New England cities, compared with a national
average of 6.18 per cent. Contract rates appeared more concentrated about
a single value in New England than elsewhere; three-fourths of all reported
cases bore a 6 per cent rate in this region against one-half ratio across
.he nation. One-fifth of all loans in the country were written at 7 per
cent, while rates as high as 12 per cent were reported.
1See below. So long as the ratio of loan amount to "appraised" property
value did not exceed a conservative 50 or 6C per cent, the mortgage was
regarded as reasonably secure.
2A. F. Bemis, "The Economics of Shelter," The Evolving House, Technology
Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1934, Appendix
Chapter X, p. 582.
3 These were Portland, Maine; Nashua, New Hampshire; Worcester, Massachusetts;
and Providence, Rhode Tsland. For some data, Waterbury, Connecticut, was
also studied. D. L. Wickens, Residential Real Estate, National Bureau of
Economic Research, New York, 191.
The actual costs of borrowing for home purchase far exceed nominal
interest charges stipulated on loan contracts, on account of various forms
of bonuses, commissions, discounts, renewal charges, and service charges.
Wickens found the weighted average effective rate on first mortgages to be
6.17 per cent for the region and 6.54 per cent for the nation as a whole.
As will be pointed out shortly, heavy charges in connection with junior
financing sharply increased the overall costs of home purchase.
The risks involved in mortgage lending, in part because of the instabi-
lity in real estate values, led institutional lenders to restrict first
mortgage loans to rather low percentages of appraised property values.
Legal and traditional limitations of 50 to 66 2/3 per cent of valuation
were designed to protect the mortgagee and individual savings depositors
from loss in case of default. Rather than defer home purchase until the
necessary down payment had been accumulated, two options were frequently
open to the buyer.
He could shop around from one institution to another seeking the
largest possible advance to supplement his limited down payment equity.
All too frequently the lender, eager to maintain his loan volume, per-
mitted the overvaluation of property necessary to trim the loan-value
ratio to a point where the required loan amount no longer appeared un-
reasonable. As mentioned above, the lender perhaps felt justified in
extending such loans in order to keep funds actively employed and, in
event of default subsequent disposition of the property would be profit-
able in an inflationary economy. Since risk was assumed to vary directly
with. initial loan-value ratios, little weight was ascribed to the borrower's
capacity to carry the debt burden or to environmental factors which might
indicate a premature depreciation of mortgaged property. With such un-
scientific and unsatisfactory risk analysis,l it was inevitable widespread
The following statement was made during the FHA Hearings: "There is an
erronious opinion around that loans were made on a 50 or 60 per cent valua-
tion. They were made on a 50 or 60 per cent selling price, not a valuation.
(Footnote continued)
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foreclosures would accompany any downturn in economic activity.
D)espite the tendency toward liberal "curb appraisal" techniques,
many home purchasers were compelled to resort to the second option of
junior financing. The unsatisfactory, costly, and frequently illegal
system of second and third mortgage lending has been a major cause of
delinquency in fulfilling first mortgage obligations. Such credit has
ordinarily been supplied by second mortgage companies, or by individuals
or builders who are sellers of the property (involving purchase-money
mortgages.) Although never common in this region, builders s ometimes
accepted a small equity payment and a land contract for the remainder.
In a sample survey, Wickens found weighted average contract rates of
interest on second and third mortgages to be 6.76 per cent in New England
and 6 .44 per cent in all 52 cities surveyed. These rates appear sur-
prisingly low, for available records indicate nominal rates of 10 per cent
plus substantial commissions, service charges, etc. Most contracts re-
quired monthly amortization over a period not exceeding five years,
2
and any failure to make regular payments meant prompt foreclosure. Specu-
lative builders would take second mortgages only to consummate a sale, and
would seek to free working capital from this risky operation by discounting
them wherever possible. In the late 1920s when cash -down payments dropped
to as low as 5 per cent, builders could dispose of their second mortgage
kickens, op. cit., p. 252. The corresponding effective rates were 7.85
and 7.02 per cent, respectively. The reliability of these findings must
be considered in the light of the smallness of the sample.
2Toward More Housing, Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph
No. b, 194 , p. 79.
.I happen to be living in a house which I could reproduce today for
$18,000, that has a $25,000 building and loan mortgage on it." Testimony of
J. G. Caffrey (representing Ohio Association of Real Estate Boards), Hear-
inf before the Committee on Banking and Currency, U. S. Senate, 73d Congress,
2d Session on 5,3603, 1934, p. 4l. It should be noted in passing that the
tenacity of such mortgagors to continue mortgage payments in face of severe
market declines accounts in part for the preference of institutional lenders
for loans on single-family, owner-occupied homes.
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loans only at discounts of up to 50 per cent. In order to emerge with a
profit, the builder began to price his product to cover this heavy dis-
count. Thus a vicious race between home prices and mortgage discounts
developed, rendering the combined mortgage obligations of the home buyer
virtually prohibitive.
Further evidence of oppressive junior financing has been described
2
by Albert Farwell Bemis. Standard discounts to be deducted from the
original loan amount ranged from 8-10 per cent on a one-year loan, up
to 20 per cent on a five-year mortgage. Of course, the borrower was
also obliged to make regular interest payments on the unpaid balance, in
3
addition to paying an initial brokerage fee of 2 or 3 per cent. At
least one of the local institutions visited suffered extraordinary depres-
sion losses resulting from the refinance of previous first and second mort-
gages into a single instrument. Even though the rewritten contracts pro-
vided for full amortization, the loans had been initially made on the basis
of such inflated valuations (especially considering the builder's second
purchase-money mortgages) that even regular principal amortization was
inadequate to trim the outstanding balance to a safe figure by the early
1930s.
Ibid., p. 79.
2Bemis, op. cit., pp. 368-9. The discount technique was often employed as
a means of ividing usury laws; since the purchaser of a second mortgage
could sell it at any discount,, a third "tstraw man" was frequently set up
to initially take the lien thence' endorse it over to a mortgage company
which would sell it at a discount, turning over the proceeds to the bor-
rower.
3Ibid., p. 369. The company referred to is the U. S. Bond and Mortgage
Company of New York.
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Another basic source of weakness in the mortgage picture was the
unsound practice of employing short-term contracts to finance essentially
long-term obligations. Except for building and loan associations (i.e.,
cooperative banks), most institutions drew up straight mortgage notes with
maximum terms of 3 to 5 years. It was rare indeed when a family could
accumulate sufficient funds in such a short period to pay off its debt
at the end of the term. Ordinarily, however, so as not to lose the loan
via refinanbe, the lender would promptly renew the loan upon payment of
various renewal fees, and might even include unpaid taxes and interest in
the new principal. Although advances in property values frequently served
to reduce outstanding loan-value ratios, the relation of the vast sums
invested in real estate mortgages to the changing values of the underlying
security was seldom examined carefully.
Lenders placed unwarranted confidence in the apparent liquidity of
such investments. At least one-third of the outstanding balance became
due every year, since the term rarely exceeded 3 years and renewal loans
ordinarily stipulated repayment on call or merely extended the term one
year. Accordingly, thrift institutions accepting deposits from the public
with an implicit responsibility to meet most withdrawal requests on demand,
felt fully justified in investing in "liquid, convenient, high-yielding"
mortgage loans. They had no scruples about renewing loans indefinitely,
especially if interest and taxes were not in arrears, as the depositors'
funds were continually employed with a minimum amount of effort. Inter-
views have revealed instances where local institutions had actually dis-
couraged repayment in order to maintain steady income from sound loans;
Colean suggests that repeated governmental efforts during times of dis-
tress to postpone or modify principal repayment had contributed to the
practice of writing short-term mortgage loans, in hopes of completing
payment before a new crisis and moratorium intervened. M. L. Colean,
The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United States,
pp. 80-81.
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rather than repay the loan, the mortgagor was urged to augment his savings
account as an emergency reserve. On the other hand, many borrowers per-
haps looked upon eventual repayment as but a remote possibility. They
felt that "when they succeeded in borrowing the money, that was all they
had to: do. . . . (if) they had to replace it they would replace it .
by borrowing from somebody else, and they lost. . . the ambition to pay
off their debt.ti
The artificially short-term character of mortgage loans served to
aggravate the severity of economic crises. In many cases, frantic de-
positors would rush in to withdraw their funds from the thrift institu-
2-
tions in which their confidence had been shaken. Supposedly liquid
demand loans as well as fully amortized loans were of limited immediate
assistance in meeting these heavy withdrawal requests. Since declining
employment and incomes are characteristic of depression periods, the
mortgagor was frequently unable to make substantial principal payments
and, in the absence of government intervention, widespread foreclosures
were inevitable. This procedure hardly solved the lender ts acute liquidity
problems, however, for foreclosed properties would bring in limited sales
revenues in a depressed real estate market. Hence, it became apparent
that short-term loans were no less damaging to the lender than to the
borrower.
Another basic weakness in the mortgage contract concerned the lack of
adequate repayment provisions. Except in building and loan associations
where repayment was systematically accomplished through a sinking fund
arrangement, most mortgage loans were written for a short-term with little
or no principal amortization. The only regular payments made by mortgagors
Testimony of C. A. Miller, President of Savings Banks Trust Co., New York,
FHA Hearings, op. cit. pp. 302-3.
2As pointed out in Part III, precisely the opposite tendency characterized
local savings banks operations, as deposits increased steadily during the
1930s, while other institutions enjoyed less universal public confidence.
consisted of interest, usually on a monthly or semi-annual basis. This
method of repayment, while extremely convenient (at least simple) for the
individual lender, created serious problems for the borrower. 1 The capital
outlay required at the end of the term was frequently so heavy that fore-
closure was inevitable unless the loan could be extended or refinanced
elsewhere. Undoubtedly, the "economic man" would accumulate a a pecial
fund out of current income to cover amortization, tax payments, etc. In
real life, however, any such scheme is unlikely on a wide scale unless
enforced on a compulsory basis.
The available data indicate that systematic amortization of principal
has been less prevalent in New England than in the nation at large. Wickens
reveals that less than one-fourth. of all reporting loans were amortized in
New England, while nearly two-fifths. provided for contractual amortization
2
among all 52 cities (in the early 1930s.) This contrast reflects in'large
part the predominance of savings banks in the New England region, as these
institutions wrote relatively few direct-reduction loans until the imme-
diate prewar period. Their predominance is also manifest in Wickenst
findings on frequency of principal and/or interest payment. Semi-annual
payment was required in 31 per cent of the cases across the nation while
in the 4 New England cities the corresponding proportion was 62 per cent.
As stated earlier, monthly payment is most frequent among fully amortized
loans, such as those made by savings and loan associations. Semi-annual
remittance, .on the other hand, was typical of straight-term mortgage con-
tracts, such as those made by savings banks. 3
Unfortunately, the flat mortgage was well suited for speculative operators,
who held title to a piece of property for a .short period. Hoping to repay
the initial loan with subsequent larger resale revenues, they would have
found amortization requirements inconvenient.
2Wickens, op. cit., p. 278.
3lbid., p. 280.
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The failure of the mortgagor to accumulate reserves for real estate
taxes on a systematic basis has also aggravated risks of default. Many
local savings banks and cooperative banks suffered their greatest depres-
sion losses because of delinquent tax liability. Frequently foreclosed
property would be burdened with tax liens of 5 or 6 years' standing,inasmuch
as the mortgagee seldom bothered to investigate this matter so long as mort-
gage obligations were fulfilled.
As indicated above, the capacity of the borrower to carry the mortgage-
burden was rarely investigated on an objective basis. Since repayment was
seldom accomplished through regular amortization, the whole transaction
was not translated into income concepts. Retirement of the obligation
was implicitly regarded as a .contingent "wealth" or "asset" problem, while
only interest and occasionally tax payments constituted an integral part
of the family budget. Undoubtedly some mortgagorv felt little motivation
to fulfill the mortgage contract as stipulated". Particularly where straight-
term mortgage was involved, the home owner frequently would lose little
equity in the property even if it were taken over by foreclosure. Hence,
he might have been relatively insensitive to minor differences in precise
rates of interest and other contract terms; moreover, the impotency of
deficiency judgments would safeguard him from more extensive personal loss.
An obstacle which has impeded the development of a nationwide mortgage
market down to the present day has been the inherent localization in mort-
gage lending. Until recently at least, tradition and legal restrictions
have prevented most institutions from operation over a wide area. As a
result, mortgage portfolios have been denied a proper geographical risk
distribution, and their soundness frequently depended upon the economic
fortunes of a single industry or firm. Most lending agencies were isolated
1Interviews.
from the capital markets of the country, and lacked any mechanism to
facilitate transfer of funds from regions of surplus to those of dearth.
Hence, all institutional lenders, with the notable exception of insurance
companies, were primarily dependent upon the irregular and uncontrollable
flow of local savings for home mortgage credit.
Undoubtedly this extreme localization is both a cause and a conse-
quence of the poor marketability of mortgage paper. As will be discussed
in Chapter 14, a product must be highly standardized before it can be
freely bought and sold in an organized, impersonal market. In view of the
haphazard methods of appraisal, the variety of loan contracts, repayment
provisions, rights of parties, foreclosure regulations, etc., character-
istic of mortgage lending, it was inevitable that the mortgage network
would consist of many local, isolated markets. Especially during the
late 1920s, it became more and more apparent that the home mortga'e mechanism
critically needed a major revamping, to safeguard the interests of both
mortgagee and mortgagor, as well as to achieve a greater degree of stabi-
lity and rationality in this important sector of the economy.
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CHAPTER 7. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
The debacle of the early 1930s set the stage for a series of sorely
needed remedies in the ill-fated mortgage market. Injudicious lending
especially during the late 1920s culminated in an unprecedented wave of
mortgage delinquency, foreclosure, and liquidity demands of depositors.
Although foreclosured real estate remained a minor item in the asset struc-
ture of Massachusetts institutions throughout the 1920s, it is signifi-
cant that the number of savings bank foreclosures tripled between 1925 and
1926 and increased steadily over the next decade. Despite these and other
indications of impending trouble, most institutions did little to stem
the inflationary spiral. New lending among savings banks began to de-
cline after 1926, even though the average loan continued to rise and con-
tractual amortization was rarely required.1
During the early years of the depression, foreclosure accounts for
both cooperative banks and savings banks rose steadily until 1936, when
they constituted 11.86 and 6.73 per cent of total assets, respectively.2
Cooperative banks, however, disposed of their foreclosed property more
rapidly than savings banks, and by 1941 the corresponding ratios for these
institutional groups were 5.84 and h.08 per cent, respectively.3
There were a great many instances where'foreclosure appeared unnecessary
or unwise, especially where the mortgagor appeared to be in only temporary
difficulty or where merely foreclosing a delinquent loan would not assist
institutions in meeting critical liquidity requirements. In 1931 coopera-
tive banks were granted limited permission to suspend temporarily the regu-
lar monthly payments on pledged shares.4 Relief was afforded many mortgagors
1Lintner, op. cit., p. 273.
2Annual Reports, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
3For a detailed analysis of mortgage foreclosure policies of Massachusetts
savings banks, see Lintner, op. ci Chapter .
hAct of 1931, Chapter 365.
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by this clause, and by 1936 such distress mortgages accounted for 15 per
1
cent of the total assets of cooperative banks in the local area studied.
To determine the extent of substandard mortgages in the portfolios of
savings banks, Professor Lintner analyzed the volume of loans earning cur-
rent yields of 3 per cent or less during the depression and subsequent war
years. Since few loans had been' initially written at rates of interest
as low as 4 per cent, mortgages yielding 3 per cent or less would indicate:
(1) interest delinquency; (2) a voluntary reduction in rates charged on
existing loans for distress purposes; or (3) concessions granted on
purchase-money mortgages arising from the sale of foreclosed real estate.
Substandard mortgages so delineated represented an increasing proportion
of mortgage portfolios until 1943 when a peak of 14.34 per cent was reached. 2
There is some' evidence that depression foreclosure experience has been
somewhat less favorable in New England than in other parts of the nation.
Professor Saulnier found a foreclosure rate of 28.8 per cent among all
loans made by 24 American life insurance companies 'on New England properties
during the decade 1920-29, this' rate being the highest among the 9 census
3
regions in the country.
By 1935, general business recovery appeared to be well underway, and
real estate activity had begun to improve. Considerable damage, however,
had already been inflicted upon the mortgage system, and the process of
readjustment was necessarily a tortuous one. Continued unemployment threat-
ened many mortgagors with foreclosure and existing home owners suffered
a severe capital loss if they were compelled to dispose of their property.
On the other hand, thrift institutions still held investment portfolios
saturated with frozen mortgages and were struggling to remain solvent.
1 Computed from Annual Reports, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
2Lintner, op. cit., pp. 277-8.
3 Saulnier, op. cit., p. 87.
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By this time, however, positive steps had already been taken by the federal
and state governments to effect a permanent improvement in the mortgage
market.
INTERVENTION BY STATE GOVERNMENTS
Intervention by state governments was necessarily limited in scope,
inasmuch as their fiscal and credit regulatory powers are very similar
to those of private parties. Most states enacted debtor relief legisla-
tion relative to mortgage moratoria, redemption periods, and the restric-
tion of deficiency judgments . Massachusetts, however, took positive steps
to restore and maintain public confidence in the existing s tate-chartered
thrift institutions.
Before any public relief machinery could be set up, the Bay State
Trust was organized in 1931 to prevent the suspension of several weak
cooperative banks. The stronger members contributed about $125,CCO to a
pool used for advances to banks in imediate danger. This trust arrange-
ment served as a stop-gap emergency measure until the Central Cooperative
Bank was established in 1932.2 This latter institution was designed to
function as a central reserve agency to facilitate flexibility and elas-
ticity in the operations of member cooperative banks. In practice, the
limited resources in the Central Bank have permitted advances to member
banks for emergency purposes only, and not merely to finance additional
mortgage lending.3 A somewhat analogous institution was incorporated by
savings banks in 1932, called the Mutual 'Savings Central Fund. In addi-
tion to the above functions, this agency with assets of $3.7 million
Dlavenport, op. cit., p. 12.
2Acts of 1932, Chapter h5.
3
On April 30, 1950, resources of the Bank totalled 9.h million, of which
$30 thousand represented unsecured loans to member banks. During the
year ending April 30, 1951, these advanced increased sharply to $1,445
thousand. Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
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assembles pertinent data on bank operations and undertakes various studies
for member banks.
In 1934, the Massachusetts General Court provided for the establish-
ment of share and deposit insurance funds for all savings and cooperative
banks in the Commonwealth. Both funds are managed by member banks under
state supervision, and are. an integral part of the two central reserve
organizations described, above. Supported solely by proportionate assess-
ments of insured members, these funds differ slightly from corresponding
federal schemes in that every- deposit or share account in every bank is
to be insured in full, with claims payable in cash. Although the dis-
tinction is popular advertising material, the apparent superiority of full
over partial coverage (e.g.,.of all deposits up to $5 or $10 thousand) must
be considered in the light of the average (and maximum) deposit..or share
2
account.
The last important depression measure enacted by the Massachusetts
legislature (considered here) authorized savings and cooperative banks to
.3
write mortgage loans on a direct-reduction basis. This type of mortgage
had long been promoted by the federal government4, and its appearance in
urban real estate finance was hastened by the efforts of the HOLC, FHA,
Federal Home Loan Banks, and federal savings and loan associations. Imme-
diate public acceptance of this type of contract compelled its adoption by
cooperative banks, but savings banks wrote few direct-reduction loans until
the late 1930s.
1Acts of 1934, Chapters 73 and 43, respectively.
2As of October 31, 1950, total assets. of the Deposit Insurance Fund were
$22.4 million, while the corresponding April 30 figure for the Share
Insurance Fund was $6.4 million. Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner
of Banks.
3Acts of 1935, Chapter 191.
It had been used by Federal Land Banks since 1917.
5See below.
6
See Chapter 11.
Many of the fundamental weaknesses in the home mortgage system de-
manded extensive public programs beyond the means of financially cripped
state governments. Indeed, hile state relief measures were at best alle-
viative, the persistent attempts at protecting the debtor at the expense
of his creditor threatened to block recovery. In order to stimulate the
flow of private capital back into the mortgage field and to promote a sound,
nationwide mortgage structure, vast programs vould be required. It was
soon apparent that such operations could be undertaken only by the federal
government.
This stuctr does not attempt to analyze or evaluate the contributions
of all the various depression measures, whether they be permanent or merely
relief in character. To avoid becoming lost in a maze of administrative
detail, only the salient features of those programs directly related to
home financing will be outlined here. These programs will be discussed
under the following headings: The Federal Home loan Bank System; refinance
activities of the Home Owners Loan Corporation; federal savings and loan
assciations; Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; and lastly,
the Federal Housing Administration. Only the last named, the FHA, will
undergo a fairly detailed investigation in this and succeeding chapters.
At the conclusion of this section, the Veterans Administration home loan
program will be briefly reviewed.
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM
As early as 1918, building and loan associations began to agitate for
the creation of a central agency to serve mortgage lending institutions
much as the Federal Reserve and Federal Farm Loan Systems functioned in
the fields of commercial banking and agricultural credit, respectively.
1 Colean, op. cit. p. 94.
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Interest in a central mortgage bank waned during the ensuing postwar ex-
pansion, but was quickly revived at signs of impending trouble in the late
1920s. Small building and loan associations had traditionally borrowed
from commercial banks to meet temporary cash requirements, but follovring
the financial collapse 'of 1929, these institutions were forced to look
2,
elsewhere for funds. At a widely publicized conference of leaders in the
mortgage lending and real estate fields, President Hoover in 1931 proposed
the creation of a system of home loan discount banks.3  His efforts bore
fruit, in the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, which sought a permanent
strengthening of the shaken mortgage market through a regular examination
of member institutions, and through making available central reserve funds
to facilitate a free inter-regional flow of credit. In addition, it was
hoped that the discount facilities would alleviate the acute liquidity
pressures facing mortgage lenders, thereby providing a more satisfactory
handling of borrowers in distress. This being accomplished, foreclosures
would be minimized and the steady downward drift in real estate values
checked.
The new System followed the analogous Federal Reserve and Federal Farm
Loan Systems in that it was governed- by a central board and a group of
regional banks. After various amendments and modifications, the Home Loan
Bank Board now consists of three members appointed by the President, and
the country is'divided up into 11 districts. As envisioned by President
Hoover, membership is open to all qualified savings and loan associations,
savings banks, and insurance companies. Unfortunately, however, banking
and insurance interests-from the outset opposed the extension of federal
1Colean, o cit., p. 92.
2TNEC Monograph No. 8, op. cit., p. 84.
3See Publications of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home
Ownership, Vol. XI, Washington, 1932.
47 Stat. 725-741, approved July 22, 1932.
187
control into the home mortgage field. Savings and loan associations, with
much to gain and little to lose, took early command of the situation and
have molded it to suit their own purposes. This unexpected concentration
of membership in a single type of institution has severely handicapped the
1
System's overall effectiveness in meeting national mortgage problems.
Member institutions are required to purchase stock in their regional
Bank in an amount equal to at least 2 per cent of the unpaid balance of
their mortgage holdings, but not less than $5CO. 2 As in the case of land
banks, Treasury stock subscriptions supplied most of the initial capital
requirements, but, as a result of the increase in the number axid asset size
of members, total member-owned stock equaled Treasury holdings by late
1948. By December 31, 1950, member institutions owmed 76.5 per cent of
all stock in the System, and in February 1951, the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Boston retired in full all stock owned by the Treasury.3
Services Rendered
Three services rendered by the Bank to member institutions merit
brief description here. Perhaps most important to member associations
is the loan service, whereby they may borrow up to 12 times their Bank
As of December 31, 195, the distribution of membership in United States
and Massachusetts was as follows:
All Mutual Insurance Savings and
Members Savings Banks Companies loan Assations
United States 3,930 29 739
Massachusetts *158 7 0 151
Metropolitan Boston 73 1 0 72
*Institutions located within 10 miles of Boston City Hall, as of December
31, 1951, including 16 federal savings and loan associations. United States
and Massachusetts data derived from Statistical Summary, 1951, Home Loan
Bank Board. Among all 5,980 savings and loan associations in the country,
only 65 per cent have joined the Bank System, but their assets represented
nearly 92 per cent of the grand total as of 'December 31, 1950.
2Annual Report of Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1950, p. 174. Up to
June 27, 1950, the minimum subscription had been 1 per cent of the mort-
gages held.
3Ibid., p. 174 and Statement of Condition of Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston,
Iecember 31, 1951. All regional banks have now retired government stock
investment.
h so services were outlined by Herbert N. Faulkner, President of the Boston
Bank, in an address at the 63rd Annual Convention of the Massachusetts
Cooperative Bank League, September 19-20 and 21, 1951.
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stock held. Interest rates charged on these advances have recently risen
from 1 3/h to 2 1/2 per cent, but are certainly competitive in view of the
upward drift in dividend rates. Member associations are sharply divided
as to the desirability of extensive borrowing from the Bank. Some believe
sound bank management permits borrowing from a central agency only in the
event of real hardship, and are opposed in principle to pledging their
own assets as security for loans, thereby creating a lien prior to the
claims of shareholders. Such a view is not uncommon, for only 57.9 per
cent of all member associations were Bank borrowers in 1950. Other mem-
bers, on the other hand, regard short-term borrowing from the Bank as a
convenient and economical method of meeting annual property tax payments
as well'as handling unusually heavy loan demands. A large share of the $50
million now advanced to New England member institutions undoubtedly pro-
3
vided working capital for aggressive federal savings and loan associations.
The demand and time deposit facilities of the Home Loan Bank also
provide an important service for member associations. The demand deposit
service offers convenient checking facilities, and a telephone call is suf-
ficient to transfer funds from one type of account to another. Ordinary
time deposit accounts are widely used for accumulating tax and Christmas
clubepayments. The right to require 30 days ' withdrawal notice has not-
1
In 1935 provision was made to permit advances to non-members on the
security of FHA-insured mortgages. This privilege has rarely been used,
and in 1950 only one non-member borrower was indebted to the Bank. Annual
Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 172.
2Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 172. Both secured and unsecured loans are
included in this service.
3See Chapter 5.
been invoked as yet, and a generous dividend rate of 1 per cent is paid on
these accounts. For funds left in the Bank for longer terms, deposit certi-
ficates are issued, which bear interest at - of 1 per cent above the basic
time deposit rate.
The Bank also provides members with statistical service and assistance
in operational and administrative matters. Periodically, it conducts
surveys on various issues of current interest to member institutions. At
the same time, however, the local examining staff has found it advisable
to render assistance to individual members only when requested and to
minimize the administrative detail in their mutual undertakings. Recently
the Bank has introduced a new service whereby it will act as an inter-
1
mediary in the sale and purchase of mortgages.
Sources of Funds.
The Bank has three basic sources of funds, two of which, stock sub-
scription and time deposits, have already been mentioned. To secure addi-
tional funds, consolidated notes are sold on the open market. These de-
bentures are secured only by the 11 regional Banks, and bear interest
yields of -1 of 1 per cent above the corresponding government bond rate.
Operating efficiently in a period of expanding economic activity, the
Banks have- been able to pay their own expenses, establish generous re-,
2
serves, and consistently pay dividends to member stockholders.
Although it gave promise of effecting permanent improvements in the
defective mortgage structure, the System was ill-equipped to cope with the
shattered mortgage market of 1932. As indicated above, only one branch
of the mortgage lending fraternity chose to come under the regulations
See Chapter 14.
2 a r
At a rate of li per c ent during 1951.
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of the new federal agency. Moreover, the Banks were granted little
direct control over lending practices and interest rates charged by member
institutions. Changing interest rates on Bank advances soon proved an
ineffective tool in stimulating mortgage lending among member associations
during the depression. The small amount of funds being advanced by the
Banks, used almost exclusively to meet withdrawal demands of shareholders,
could hardly promote a recovery. Section 4 (d) of the original Act had
provided for direct loans to distressed home owners, but the necessary
machinery to execute this emergency measure had not been set up before
the Home Owners Loan Corporation was organized. Board Chairman John
Fahey testified that "the Bank System was unable to contribute in any
important way toward relief,"2 and that emergency machinery was urgently
needed to stem the rising tide of foreclosures and to arrest the decline
in real estate values.
HOME OWNERS IDAN CORPORATION
Under the leadership of the new admiistration, an appropriate emer-
gency measure was rushed through Congress.' In June 1933, the Home Owners
Loan Corporation was established under the 'dire.ction of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, with a $200 million capitalization and authority to issue
3bonds. up to a limit of $2 billion. The distressed home owner io was
threatened with foreclosure or was already dispossessed could apply to the
See below. This emergency clause was thence repealed in the Home Owners
Loan Act of 1933.
Hearingg, Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 11, "Construction
Industry", 1939, p. 53M.
48 Stat. l.8-135. The maximum bond authorization was subsequently raised
to $4.75 billion. Moreover, in order to provide a better market for
these debentures, an amendment in 1934 extended the government guarantee
to the principal as well as interest.
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Corporation to refinance his obligation. At the same time, the mortgagee,
receiving an HOLC bond for the outstanding balance up to a limit of $14,0Co,
was relieved of substantial frozen asset holdings. The HOLC as the new
holder of the mortgage debt rewrote the contract on liberal terms, usually
at a 5 per cent interest rate and repayable over a 15-year term with level
monthly payments.
HOLC refinancing operations assumed gigantic proportions before ter-
minating in 1936. More than one-third of the existing home mortgage debt
had been the subject of an HOLC application, while one-sixth of the total
debt, involving over a million home owners, was actually taken over by
2the HOLC. Through June 27, 1935, it had made 20,713 loans in Massachu-
setts, in an aggregate anount of $92.4 million. Since 1936, the HOLC
has been in orderly liquidation, servicing its dwindling stock of mort-
gage loans and disposing of property where loans had become so hopelessly
delinquent that foreclosure was necessary. The Corporation has always
encouraged its borrowers to prepay their loans as rapidly as possible,
or to refinance them with local thrift institutions. Beginning in June
1949, the HOLC began to sell its mortgage portfolios at public offerings,
finding a strong market among thrift institutions and commercial banks.
By May 29, 1951, this liquidation had been completed.
The record of the HOLC has been a most favorable one. It was called
upon to take over the least desirable of all possible home loans, where
1
These provisions were further liberalized in 1939 to meet FHA terms, when
rates on existing loans were rewritten at 4, per cent with the term ex-
tended to 25 years. Ratcliff, Urban Land Economics, op. cit., p. 260.
E. S. Wallace, "Survey of Federal Legislation Affecting Private Home
Financing since 1932, 1 Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1938, p. 492.
3Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, 1943.
Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, pp. 194-6, and Housing Statistics, January 1952.
Between 194 and 1950, the mortgage debt oTnT1- family homes held by the
HOLC dropped from over $1 billion to $10 million. Statistical Summary,
1951, Home Loan Bank Board, p. 18.
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both the borrower and pledged property were associated with heavy risk.
The borrower appeared incapable of assuming even a generous long-term
mortgage contract, and the mortgaged property could have found a buyer
only at distress levels. eNevertheless, endowed with efficient management
and the good fortune of operating during a period of improving business
conditions and general prosperity, the HOLC has closed its books with a
net profit over and above all expenses.
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
When the creation. of the Bank System was being considered, many
building and loan leaders urged the establishment of federally-chartered
institutions as well. They argued that the variety of existing regula-
tions surrounding state-chartered associations would seriously impedes
the development of a sound, flexible nationwide mortgage structure. After
the Bank System was established, these interests ascribed' the disappoint-
ingly slow growth in its membership to the widespread lack of adequate
2
mortgage lending institutions. As a result of this agitation, the establish-
ment of federal sssociations was authorized as a section of the ostensibly
relief Home Owners Loan Act of 1933. These analogues of national banks in
commercial banking are to be either newly-formed associations in under-
serviced areas or merely converted state-chartered institutions. Examined
and supervised by the Home Loan Bank Board, these local institutions are
to "operate on a uniform plan embodying the best practices and operating
13principles of savings institutions specializing in the financing of homes."
'When liquidation was completed in May 1951, the HOLC had: retired all of
the $3 . billion of government guaranteed bonds; repaid in full the $200
million of capital initially subscribed by the Treasury; paid all ex-
penses without any general Treasury funds; and turned over a surplus of
$14 million to the Treasury. Annual Report, HHFA, 195C, p. 194, and
Housing Statistics, January 192.
2 Shaw, Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1938, p. 494.
3 Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 183.
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As was explained in the previous chapter, federals are required to be
members of the Bank System and to have their accounts insured by the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
As provided in the enabling act, applications for the chartering of
new associations are considered in the light of all relevant information,
such as: (1) the character and responsibility of the organizers; (2)
the necessity for such an institution in the area to be served; (3) the
probability of its success and usefulness; and (h) whether or not its
formation -would inflict undue injury or hardship on established thrift
institutions in the community. Substantial financial inducements were
offered federal associations from the outset. The Treasury was authorized
to subscribe up to one-half of the shares in any one institution, with an
aggregate actual investment of $50 million across the nation. When this
Treasury investment was completed in 1935, the HOLC began to invest in
federally- and state-chartered associations belonging either to the Bank
-2System or to the FSLIC.
Of the 1,526 federal savings and loan associations in the nation as
of December 31, 1950, 663 were new associations, while the remaining 863
3
represented converted state-chartered institutions. Since this area
has traditionally been well supplied with thrift institutions, -all 16
federal savings and loan associations in the Boston area are former state-
chartered cooperative banks. As discussed elsewhere in the study, the
1
TIbid., pp. 183-4.
2Savings and loan shares in an aggregate amount of $261 million were
purchased by the HOLC.
31bid., p. 184.
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rapid growth and aggressive tactics of federals in Massachusetts as well
as elsewhere have stirred up much unfavorable comment among state-chartered
institutions. The latter publicize the virtues of time-tested cooperative
banking, and have attempted to prevent further conversions by setting
up various legal and administrative barriers. The Home Loan Bank Board,
pursuing a strict policy of impartiality between the two types of insti-
tutions, applies the same eligibility standards whether an uninsured
association (i.e., shares are not insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation) seeks to convert to a federal or merely to qualify
for share insurance under its state charter. By preserving a balance of
power between these two groups of thrift institutions, the Board feels
that each may act as a healthy check on the operations of the other.
The ensuing chapters in this study will discuss the role of federals
in the postwar mortgage market. It should be noted here, however, that
these associations refinanced a great many mortgages in the depression,
and undoubtedly contributed to general recovery through the investment of
private funds.
FEDERAI SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION
Any serious financial crisis threatens thrift institutions with a
devastating two-edged sword. Depositors clamor to withdraw their savings,
either because of shaken confidence in the safety of their funds, or,
what is equally likely, because that "rainy day" of reduced income and
mounting debt has beset them. At the same time, thrift institutions in
Ibid., p. 184. This procedure is of small import locally, as all
cooperative banks have their share accounts- insured by the State In-
surance Fund.
meeting heavy liquidity demands of depositors and other creditors must
frequently resort to extensive borrowing or to foreclosing on delinquent
loans. The HOLC and other features of the Bank System were designed to
rescue mortgagees from the evils of frozen assets holdings especially
during the depression period. To abate the steady drain of deposited funds
from thrift institutions, the federal government took positive steps at
insuring depositors in certain state- and federally-chartered institutions.
The safety-fund idea is not a novel one, as 150 bills for this purpose
2
were introduced into the Congress between 1886 and 1933. The first such
permanent measure set up the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, de-
signed to insure deposits in all national banks and in qualified state
commercial and mutual savings banks up to $5,000.
The FDIC was enthusiastically received from the outset by millions
of depositors. Bank failures, especially among state-chartered commercial
banks, provoked a mass exodus of funds into newly-insured institutions.
During a one-week period, a solvent suburban trust company.lost over a
million dollars in savings deposits to a smaller national b ank one block
distant. 5 As of December 31, 1950, all but 8 of the 182 commercial banks
in Massachusetts (including 116 national banks) were covered by the FDIC,
with the insured banks holding nearly 98 per cent of aggregate deposits
in the Commonwealth. Although nearly half of the 742 mutual savings banks
in the country are similarly insured, the 189 Massachusetts institutions
continue to operate under their own Mutual Savings Central Fund exclusively.
1Local savings banks constituted a noteworthy exception to this condition.
2Annual Report, FDIC, 1950, pp. 63-101.
3See Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. p. 168.
hSubsequently raised to $10,00G in 1950
5The local bank executive reports that these savings deposits have not been
regained down to this day, despite the fact that both banks are now covered
by the FDIC.
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Across the nation, federal insurance of bank deposits created addi-
tional liquidity problems for competing savings and. loan associations.
Unusually hard hit by the depression, these institutions lost over a billion
dollars in share capital pursuant to the establishment of the FDIC. To
remedy the situation, these interests led by Chairman Fahey proposed and
secured the establishment of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
2
poration pursuant to Title IV of the National Housing Act in 193h. The
$100 million capitalization was fully subscribed by the HOLC through an
ingenious costless scheme wherebr the stock of one corporation was traded
3for the bonds of the other. As is the case with the FDIC, insured mem-
bers remit annual premiums based on average deposits, which to date have
4
proved to be more than sufficient to cover all claims. In September 1950,
the maximum insurance for each shareholder was raised from $5,C00 to
5$10,000 under both FDIC and FSLIC programs.
Insurance is mandatory for federal savings and loan, asociations but
optional with state-chartered associations. To qualify for insurance,
the latter must meet specified eligibility requirements and accept addi-
tional examination and regulation of their operations and policies. As
of December 31, 1950, approximately 48 per cent of all savings and loan
associations had contracted for share insurance with the FSLIC., With the
notable exception of Massachusetts cooperative banks which are required to
support their own Share Insurance Fund, most of the larger associations
have applied for and qualified for FSLIC coverage, as the insured group
6
constitutes 81 per cent of the asset holdings of all associations.
1Testimony of Morton Bodfish, Hearings, TNEC, op. cit. p. 5099.
48 Stat. p. 1246-1265 .
3 Shaw, op. cit., p. 497. This "swindle" was attacked in the editorial
comments of the 1943 Massachusetts Bank Commissioner, Annual Report, p. ix.
4The current assessment rate for both programs is 1/12 of 1 per cent of
average shares -or deposits, with various credit deductions, etc. See Rues
and Regulations for FSLIC and latest FDIC Annual Report.
5Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 190.
6Statistical Summary, 1951, Home Loan Bank Board, p. 8. As of December 31, 1950,
(Footnote continued)
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In Massachusetts there has frequently been heated controversy over the
relative merits of the two types of share insurance, but there is every
indication that the dual system will be retained, for the time being at
least.
In the past, opponents of FSLIC have tabbed as most unsatisfactory the
method by vihich settlement payments were to be made to shareholders of an
insolvent institution. Inasmuch as share investment in savings and loan
associations has often been regarded as less liquid than an account in
a savings bank, FSLInsurance was supposedly designed only to guarantee
2
solvency while the FDIC specifically assured liquidity for all depositors.
The State Share Insurance Fund allegedly contained the desirable liquidity
features of the latter in that all settlements were paid in cash. Al-
though there have been minor variations regarding precise methods of
making payments,3 present regulations prescribe the identical procedure
for the two Corporations:
(The Corporation is authorized to make payment of the insured account)
. "(1) by cash or (2) by making available to each insured
member a transferred account in a new insured institution in the
same community or in another insured institution in an amount
equal to the insured account of such insured members."
See Editorial Comments in the 1943 Massachusetts Commissioner of Bankst
Annual Report, pp. ix-x.
2See Robert H. Skilton, The Government and the Mortgage Debtor, University
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 194, Chapter X.
3Earlier regulations -of the FSLIC offer each saver in an insolvent insti-
tution either (1) an account in another insured, solvent association,
or (2) 10 per cent in cash, h5 per cent in non-interest bearing deben-
tures payable within one year, and 45 per cent in similar debentures
payable within three years.
4Sec. h05(b) of the National Housing Act as Amended.
total assets of all insured 2,860 associations aggregated $13.7 billion,
whereas 13,64C commercial and mutual savings banks insured under the FDIC
had total assets of $182.7 billion. Statistical Summary and Annual Re-
port of FDIC, 1950.
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At any rate, the FDIC and FSLIC programs curbed much of the panic-
withdrawal activity during the early depression years, and undoubtedly
contributed to a more rational policy of handling temporarily deli nquent
mortgage ioans among insured members. Enjoying nearly two decades of
rising economic activity, 'their economic soundness has never been put to
a severe test. Nevertheless, the public has enjoyed the confidence of
placing their funds in guaranteed safekeeping, and, as a consequence,
safety alone is perhaps less of a competitive attraction than it was 20
years ago. Undoubtedly, profitability and convenience play an increas-
ingly prominent role in determining the allocation of savings funds
among competing thrift institutions.
See Chapter 5 above.
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CHAPTEl 8. FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
With the sole exception of the FDIC, the aforementioned measures were
all established under the aegis of the Home Loan Bank Board. The Board
supervises operations of the 11 Home Loan Banks, charters and examines
federal savings and loan associations, and controls the policies of the
HOLO and FSLIC. While some aspects of these programs were ostensibly
relief in character, their long-run objective was to augment permanently
and stabilize the flow of credit into real estate finance. Stress was
laid upon strengthening the position of existing mortgage lenders, es-
pecially savings'and loan associations, through regular examination and
limited central supervision, insurance of share capital, and accessi-
bility to a common pool of funds for additional liquidity.
Although positive steps had been taken toward rescuing millions of
distressed home owners from foreclosure and toward relieving institutions
of frozen asset holdings, the stimulation of new mortgage lending had been
largely overlooked. The many segments of the vast home building industry,
especially including labor organizations, supply and equipment manufac-
turers and dealers, real estate agents, etc., eagerly sought new construc-
tion and a restoration of full employment. Enthusiasm for new building
was not universally shared by mortgage lending institutions, however,
particularly those holding large amounts of foreclosed real estate during
this period of depressed values. Mr. Orrin C. Lester testified at the
FHA Hearings as follows:
. . . . (Any) lending institution will be relatively prejudiced
on (the idea of new building), because the institutions hold
the bag of existing investments, and therefore it takes a
good deal of courage. . . to initiate the thought that there
is a need for a large amount of new construction in this country . .
1
FHA Hearings, op. cit., pp. 318-9. Mr. Lester was vice-president of the
Bowery Savings~lnkEof New York City.
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At least two different modes of attack were proposed to revive the
idle construction industry. In order to further strengthen their own
position, saving and loan interests proposed that the HOLC program be
expanded to provide earmarked funds for direct utilization in new home
building. By purchasing insured shares in these truly "building" and
loan societies, federal funds would earn a 3 per cent interest return until
disbursed. They insisted that only through the encouragement of sound
cooperative institutions would federal intervention promote their avowed
long-run objectives.
Others proposed federal intervention of a different nature, perhaps
less direct but certainly capable of wielding a powerful influence on
every phase of the home mortgage structure. The vast amounts of mort-
gage credit required for a real recovery in home construction were not to
be found among the hard-hit savings and loan associations. Hence, if
these needs were to be met out of private funds, it appeared essential
to tap the huge idle reserves of commercial banks and life insurance
companies, which had largely retreated from active mortgage lending during
the early 1930s. The FHA insurance program provided a means of drawing
out these funds once again:
There is an undoubted dearth of mortgage money in most urban
centers. ... and the only way to restore long-term credit
facilities and reduce the rate to borrowers, is for the Govern-
ment to throw the weight of its credit behind the mortgage
structure, not as a taker of mortgages,2but as a supporter
and protector of the investment itself.
Shifting the focus of federal intervention from the lending institu-
tion to the individual mortgage loan itself, the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration was established pursuant to the National Housing Act of 1934.
By insuring private institutions against loss on certain mortgage loans,
Ibid., pp. 251, 257.
2Testimony of Walter S. Schmidt, Chairman of the Mortgage Finance Committee
of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, Ibid., p. 424.
this vast program was designed "to encourage improvement in housing stan-
dards and conditions and to guide the creation of a sound mortgage market."'
It was not set up to make direct loans or to plan and build homes; neither
did it seek a short-cut solution to the acute housing needs of low-income
groups. However, by underwriting lending operations of various types of
private mortgagees, the FHA sought a renewed interest in new lending and
home construction, thereby effectively promoting individual home ownership
on a wide scale.
MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE SYSTEMi
This permanent feature of the FHA program provides for the insurance
of approved mortgagees against loss on home mortgage loans. Inasmuch as
the FHA was initially designed to interest existing and potential mort-
gage lenders in stimulating new home construction and purchase, only 1-
to h-family structures were eligible for insurance. However, in the 1938
amendments to the National Housing Act, private rental housing was afforded
similar coverage in a separate insurance fund. Since the present study is
concerned primarily with home mortgage loans, the latter Section 207 will
not be described in detail.
For the purposes of this introductory analysis, three aspects of
home loan program merit examination: the mutual mortgage insurance fund;
the risk analysis prescribed; and, lastly, the specific contract terms
required or recommended.
The Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund
Private lending institutions may theoretically set up their own
self-insurance schemes, but the execution of such a program would be
extremely difficult. Most progressive mortgage lenders seek to minimize
1Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 211.
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loss by proper diversification and scientific risk analysis, but their
only efforts toward setting aside funds to cover contingent mortgage
losses consist of accumulating surplus reserves out of current earnings.
Many lenders simply build up these reserves until the legal limit has been
reached, after which time an extra dividend must be declared. If, on
the other hand, a bank's investment portfolio is dominated by government
bonds and other low-risk investments, a lower surplus-savings capital ratio
may be most satisfactory.
There are many practical impediments to the establishment of a
systematic self-insurance program. If accomplished, interest rates would
have to include a specific insurance premium adequate to meet the expected
risk inherent in the particular type of lending concerned. Unfortunately,
very little actuarial data have been compiled from the mortgage loss ex-
perience of various types of lenders throughout the country. Even if rele-
vant statistics were readily available, however, the problem of formu-
lating an actuarially sound insurance premium for each particular lending
institution would remain. In solving this problem, due allowance would
have to be made for the major variables influencing mortgage risk, such
as location, age and type of property, credit rating of borrower, rela-
tion of unpaid loan balance to current property value, etc. Furthermore,
before the law of large numbers could be used to advantage, any insuring
agency would have to pool together risk premiums for a great many indivi-
dual insured event.
Mortgage lending may be more difficult to insure than most other
random events, since such loans are seldom independent of one another.
While one premature death may have no connection whatever with the life
expectancy of others, mortgage default tends to be a cumulative phenomenon.
Prudent lenders strive to develop a degree of independence in their portfolio
by deliberate diversification among loan types. So that overall lending
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risk is subject to a. variety of economic forces, they avoid excessive lending
in single industry towns, on single purpose properties, on extreme, non-
conventionally designed homes, etc. Even after these precautions are taken,
however, there generally persists one economic phenomenon against which
hedging is extremely difficult. Lenders.may attempt to stagger new lend-
ing and 'maturity dates uniformly over the years, but any severe economic
recession tends to be accompanied by a wav'e of mortgage foreclosure and
loss. As far as the individual mortgagee is concerned, perhaps the funda-
mental advantage of the vast government-sponsored FHA program over any
self-insurance arrangement concerns the minimization of loss from loans
defaulting during depression periods.
In spite of the difficulties in formulating insurance premiums,
institutions with a consistent record of sound lending policies and prac-
tices may accumulate adequate contingency reserves quite easily. Not only
is such a procedure possible, but its widespread adoption should be en-
couraged. Professor Lintner has attributed the uneconomic foreclosure-
loss policy of Massachusetts savings banks during the recent depression
largely to their failure to establish adequate loss reserves on a systematic
basis. Indedd, even where they had accumulated sizeable reserves in their
guaranty fund and profit and loss accounts, many banks were still reluc-
tant to draw on them to cover current losses, largely because of a fear of
2
revealing weakness in published reports. Since a share of any mortgage
portfolio is almost certain to entail a real loss, the current practice
of valuing these assets as the unpaid balance of all loans is questionable.
Professor Lintner likens this procedure to the truly more defensible prac-
tice of carrying premium bonds at original purchase prices until sold. 3
1Such as churches, hospitals, hotels, race tracks, etc.
2See Lintner, op. cit., Chapter X.
31bid., p. 322.
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He concludes that if Massachusetts savings banks had set aside an amount
equivalent to.0.6 per cent of the outstanding mortgage portfolio each year
between 1906 and 1945, the accumulated reserves would have covered all
net losses arising out of these holdings during the entire 39-year period. 1
Guaranteed Mortgages and Mortgage Bonds. The notion of creating a special
agency to insure mortgage loans, such as the FHA, reminded many people of
their recent disasterous experience with guaranteed mortgages and parti-
cipation certificates. Especially after 1920, title guarantee companies
in New York found a booming business in making mortgages for various
building promoters and thereafter reselling them as fully guaranteed mort-
gages. They applied a portion of the interest payments toward an insurance
pool and found a ready market for their paper at to a full 1 per cent
2
below current mortgage yields. Savings banks, particularly in outstate
New York,regarded guaranteed mortgages as a rich opportunity to hold metro-
politan mortgages without the nuisance or expense of making direct contact
with the mortgagor. By 1930, the volume of all such guaranteed mort-
gage obligations in New York had reached $3 billion.3
These unregulated operations.soon became associated with graft and
misrepresentation as the buildip4g promotor and mortgage guarantor were
virtually the same party in many cases. Collateral underlying these
obligations became impaired, and unsuspecting investors suffered heavy
losses of principal and interest in the ensuing depression.
Ibid., p. 339.
2Welfling, o.O cit., pp. 57,59.
3Fisher, broan Real Estate Markets and Their Financing Needs, op. cit.,
Chapter II.
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The experience with mortgage bond issues was no more favorable. This
type of financing also flourished during the 1920s, partly because of the
popularity of government bond financing during World War I. Both indivi-
dual and institutional investors could purchase mortgage bonds in con-
venient denominations, for various maturity dates and with relatively
high rates of return. Often the willingness of the issuing house to re-
purchase its own bonds added both support for and confidence in its paper.
As with guaranteed mortgages, however, the trustee and issuing com-
pany shared mutual interests, and often funds were allegedly used for stock
market speculation rather than for real estate improvement. Not only was
graft and corruption rampant, but frequently the continuing existence of
the issuing house depended upon the satisfactory fulfillment of a single
large income-property loan. The default of auch a contract spelled cer-
tain disaster for the issuing house and the mortgage bonds widely dis-
tributed throughout society became practically worthless. Following a
series of spectacular failures among issuing houses, the Congress inter-
vened through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in subjecting the re-
maining companies to more rigid governmental regulation.1
FHA Insurance System. To gain widespread public acceptance, the FHA had
to demonstrate its superiority over the latter two schemes in remaining
solvent in the face of an economic downturn. The mutual insurance system
has sought to do this in four distinct ways: (1) by excluding large pro-
perties from the eligibility lists, where overvaluation is common; (2)
by prescribing a more scientific and conservative method of risk rating;
(3) by distributing overall risk among many individual properties; and
(4) by securing the backing of the federal government, which is finani-
cially able to hold foreclosed properties off the market until a satisfactory
1lIbid., Chapter II.
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price can be realized.
The FHA program provides for a self-supporting mutual mortgage insur-
2
ance system, whereby approved lenders can convert certain mortgage risk
elements into an explicit cost. Although risk may represent an inherent
characteristic of mortgage lending, an individual institution can mini-
mize mortgage loss by shifting such elements to a specialized insuring
agency.
The mutual insurance fund (associated with Section 203) is subdivided
into group accounts, each with insured mortgages displaying similar risk
characteristics and maturity dates. In practice, a new set of group
accounts is opened at the beginning of each calendar year and the mort-
gages insured during that year are appropriately classified according to
maturity and risk function. The risk-rating technique prescribed by the
FHA is used as the basis for assigning loans into the three quality groups.
Each group account is credited with the income and charged with the
expenses and losses of all mortgages in the group. If such income ex-
ceeds all expenses and losses, the resultant credit balance is dis-
tributed in the form of participation payments to mortgagors, either upon
payment of their mortgages in ull, or upon termination of the group ac-
count. Such termination is effected when the amounts to be distribtued
are sufficient to pay off the unpaid balance of all remaining mortgages
in the group, or when all outstanding mortgages in the group have been
retired. Tb orovide a reserve to absorb the deficits of the less fortunate
group accounts, and also to cover general operating expenses, terminating
lSkilton, op. cit., Chapter X.
2
The "reinsurance fund" of $10 million (see below) was initially supplied
by the government, to cover excessive losses and a share of administra-
tive expenses during the early years. Since July 1, 1940, all FHA opera-
ting expenses have been paid out of its own funds. Annual Report, HIFA,
1950, p. 232.
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groups are required to allocate a share of their insurance payments to
the reinsurance account.
The opportunity to share in these mutual insurance refunds serves to
emphasize the importance of appropriate allocation of individual mort-
gage risks among the three quality groups. The s'egregation of risk cate-
gories also obviates the practice of charging varying insurance premiums,
a task beset with serious administrative difficulties. Mortgage loans
accepted for FHA insurance may or may not represent a random sample from
the population of all home mortgages. Strict risk-rating techniques may
permit only the choicest loans to be eligible for insurance among the
many applicants. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that many
lenders submit a mortgage to the FHA for insurance only where risk appears
too severe to accept the loan application on a conventional basis.2 Any
significant bias might affect the soundness of the insurance fund itself,
although in practice the existing premium schedule appears to be adequate
to cover most contingent losses.
Adequacy of FHA Insurance Premiums. Mortgage insurance premiums are re-
mitted to the FHA by the lender, but are to be shifted directly to the
borrower. The annual premium, currently set at } of 1 per cent of the
unpaid principal, is expected to more tcan cover any anticipated losses. 3
Proponents of the mutual insurance program demonstrated how loss reserves
could permit full retirement of many 20-year mortgages after 17 years.
1Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 345. Reimbursement to mortgagrors was
first made in 19Z7 and by late 1950 over $23 million had been paid on
250 thousand insured loans. p. 233.
2See Chapter 13.
3Although actuarial validity could not be assured, FHA analysts based
these premiums on limited data available, including: experience of life
insurance companies for the period, 1913-35; records of building and loan
associations in Boston, Cleveland, Peoria, and St. Louis; and the study of
the Home Title Guaranty Company of Brooklyn by Lodge. Insured Mortgage_§
Portfolio, FHA, July 1937, p. 22.
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Furthermore, even if 25 per cent of the insured loans were to default
after little principal repayment and if the foreclosed property were sold
in a depressed market, the fund would still remain solvent and group parti-
cipants would become debt-free in the nineteenth year.
In order to avoid paying the mutual mortgage insuranc e premium, the
borrower may prefer to have his mortgage obligation rewritten on a con-
ventional (i.e., uninsured) basis after a substantial portion of the ori-
ginal debt is retired. To prevent the loss of this profitable premium
revenue, FHA regulations may require a prepayment premium of up to 1 per
2
cent of the principal value. In addition, the mortgagor may lose a
contingent refund from the mutual insurance fund. These refinance penal-
ties are not designed to discourage prepayment in general. On the con-
trary, mortgagors are encouraged to prepay up to 15 per cent of the ori-
ginal loan each year whenever possible. During the war years, all pre-
payment penalties were dropped as a counter-inflationary measure, eDcept
where refinance was the sole motive. Incidentally, the FHA will insure
refinanced mortgage loans only where the mortgagor is unable to secure
equally favorable accommodations on a conventional basis.
Other features of the FHA program further attest as to the adequacy
of the premium schedule. The elaborate risk analysis prescribed and the
custom-tailored mortgage contract written serve to minimize risk of de-
fault when the loan is initiated. Moreover, with full amortization of
principal required, foreclosure revenues would ordinarily be sufficient
to cover the unpaid.principal and most foreclosure costs, especially if
the loan is well-seasoned.
FHA Hearings, op. cit., p. 19. These calculations were apparently based
on the higher premium schedule referred to in the original bill, namely
1 per cent of the orig nal principal amount.
20r the sum of all subsequent insurance premiums, whichever is smaller.
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In the event foreclosure on an insured loan does become necessary,
the mortgagee may either transfer title to the FHA or retain it himself.
If the former option is chosen, the FHA issues to the mortgagee debentures
for the loan balance and a certificate of claim to cover his foreclosure
expense in the event subsequent sale of the property produces an excess
over the loan balance. These debentures are negotiable instruments maturing
3 years following the maturity date of the foreclosed mortgage. The
principal and interest (not exceeding 3 per cent, currently at 2- per cent)
are to be disbursed out of the appropriate group account, but are uncon-
ditionally guaranteed by the United States government.
The FHA may improve, repair, or retain foreclosed property until market
conditions warrant its sale at a reasonable price. By thereby disposing of
the property at the opportune moment, the FHA can inject an element of
stability into an otherwise helpless real estate market. If a surplus
still remains after all foreclosure costs are met, the defaulting mort-
gagor may share in the proceeds.
FHA insurance does not eliminate all lending risk, but the range of
probable mortgage yields is substantially narrowed. The maximum yield is
roughly equal to the interest rate stipulated in the contract, hile the
minimum is largely governed by two principal deductions in the event of
foreclosure. If the property is turned over to the FHA for settlement,
the mortgagee risks the loss of part or all of the costs of foreclosure.
Furthermore, instead of receiving cash upon the sale of foreclosed pro-
perty as would ordinarily be the case under conventional financing, he gets
low-interest debentures for the unpaid balance maturing 3 years after the
Unless foreclosed property is sold by the mortgagee in an inflated market
at a price which far exceeds the loan balance and all expenses.
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mortgage maturity date. The extent to which this latter factor reduces net
yields depends upon the interest rates concerned, mortgage term, and date of
foreclosure. (See Table I.)
TABLE I. NOMINAL ANNUAL YIELD, CONVERTED SEMI-ANNUALLY, OF 5 PER CENT
FHA-INSURED LOANS PURCHASED AT PAR AND EXCHANGED FOR 2 3/4
PER CENT DEBENTURES
Exchanged at
End of Year 10 15 20 25
1 2.97 2.91 2.89 2.87
5 3.97 3.63 3.h6 3.36
10 5.05* 4.52 4.18 3.97
15 5.05 h.76 h.50
20 - 5.05 h.88
25 - - 5.05
Source: Insured Mortgage Portfolio, FHIA, October 1938, pp. 1h-15.
* Exceeds nominal 5 per cent rate because of semi-annual conversion.
See below.
Perhaps this arrangement of joint assumption of mortgage risk is truly an
element of strength of the FHA program, for it may instill a genuine
interest on the part of the lender to minimize mortgage loss on insured
loans.
Even up to the present time, the true adequacy of the mortgage
insurance premium is largely an academic question. Income has exceeded
all expenditures for many years,: leaving sizeable funds for reserve accu-
mulation and dividend payment. By 1950, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance
Fund stood at $133 million, out of which few loss claims have been met.
The FHA has, however, operated in an expansionary period, and will perhaps
1
not be subject to a true test until a serious recession is encountered.
Risk Analysis Prescribed By The FHA
When selecting eligible loan applicants, the FHA faced a task unique
in American urban mortgage history. By prescribing liberal contract terms,
lSee Chapter 13 for data on FHA operations locally and nationally.
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it sought to enlarge the opportunities of home ownership to millions
previously denied the privilege. At the same time, however, it was to be
relatively free of government subsidy, operating on a businesslike, self-
supporting basis. In view of this responsibility the FHAdministration set
up an organization for the purpose of appraising dwellings offered as secu-
1
rity and of rating the risks involved in proposed mortgages. The purpose
of the Underwriting Mnual is to state the principles and to establish
-uniform methods and procedures to be followed in selecting qualified mort-
gage applicants across the nation with minor adaptations to meet local
conditions.
The risk-rating procedure is based upon the individual evaluation of
many separate factors affecting the risk involved in the proposed mortgage.
The purposes of the system are twofold, namely (1) to determine whether or
not any given mortgage transaction is economically sound, and, if so, (2)
to determine and ascribe to the mortgage a numerical rating of the relative
2degree of underlying risk. Since every transaction involves some risk, the
FHA system sets up a technique whereby the extent of this risk can be uni-
formly determined.
In analyzing the "economic soundness" of a proposed transaction, the
Administration delineates three groups of risk elements. In contrast to
prevailing practices in many quarters, the FHA elevates the importance of
borrower risk analysis up to a par with property requirements. The strategic
position of the mortgagor warrants careful examination of his past, present,
and expected future willingness and ability to meet his financial obligations.
The risk rating process follows many of the principles set forth in earlier
writings of the Director of The Underwriting Division, F. M. Babcock. For
example, see Real Estate Valuation, Bureau of Business Research Studies,
Vol. h, No. 1, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1932.
2Underwriting Manual, FHA, Revised January 1947, paragraph 201. The second
purpose serves to assign mortgages into appropriate quality groups.
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The possibility of mortgagor default should not be disregarded in risk
analysis, however, so the mortgaged property and its location are also
rated according to many criteria, including appraised value, income
potentialities, probable future life, marketability, etc. Except for
minor physical improvements in the property itself, these risk elements
are largely fixed in character, and a low score means an unquestioned re-
jection of the application.
Whflle the above risk elements are relatively fixed, the degree of
overall mortgage risk can usually be changed if the loan contract itself
is changed as to amount, repayment period, or method of repayment. This
is true because risk depends in large part upon the relation between various
contract dements and the present and prospective characteristics of the
borrower, property, and its location. Consequently, the probability of
incurring mortgage loss is effectively minimized through a proper adjustment
of contract terms for each individual case. By refraining from the time-
honored practice of regarding debt-value ratios as the sole criterion of
soundness, the FHA relies upon the appraisal of various risk elements to
secure a well-balanced analysis.
Before a mortgage application is approved for loan insurance, the
underlying security must meet certain minimum property requirements. The
attractiveness and livability of the home as well as its structural and
durability qualities are carefully rated. Moreover, certain: adjustments
must frequently be made for non-conventionality in regard to design, con-
struction methods or materials, etc., especially where the marketability
of the property may be impaired. Furthermore, some properties may be
entirely appropriate in certain neighborhoods but decidedly out of favor
in others, because of architectural design, size or price class of home,
etc. These property requirements benefit borrower as well as lender. The
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borrower is protected against purchasing a property with decidedly inferior
design, shoddy construction, or undesirable location, while the lender bene-
fits by dealing with a satisfied customer in a marketable home.
The valuation process described in the Underwriting Manual merits brief
comment here. The concept of value for homes relates to that price "which
typical prospective owners are warranted in paying for long-term occupancy
in the case of an amenity-income property. . . ." This "value," arising
from the prospective flow of services from the property, may deviate widely
from actual market .valuations, as has frequently been the case in the post-
war inflationary period.
Three "independent" methods of appraisal are employed by the FHA in
arriving at a true estimate of value. Since the buyer is not justified in
paying more for a property than it would cost him to provide a reasonable
substitute, current costs of replacenent new and the market price of com-
parable properties set upper limits to appraised value. The third method
of evaluation utilizes a variant of the capitalization process, whether the
income from the property accrues in the form of amenities or net money re-
turns. In the case of owner-occupied homes, the FHA underwriting staff
first makes an estimate of the monthly rent that the property would bring
in the market. As a second step,
the risk and burdens of ownership are compared with the
security and benefits arising therefrom.2 Further, investi-
gations into the market will show a relationship between
the monthly rent that similar types of property will bring
and the price paid for the title. Stated differently, the
purchase price will be found to be in a range of so many times
the mo thly rent. (This number is termed). . . a rent multi-
plier.
Manual, paragraph 1134.
2This intricate provision is designed to make due allowance for amenity
income as opposed to satisfactions derived by tenants.
3 Underwriting Training Handbook, FHA, "Valuation," pp. 13-14.
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These three estimates provide the "brackets of value," from which the
lowest is, generally taken as the final valuation. Despite the detailed
procedures prescribed by the FHA, however, any property evaluation still
depends in large part upon the subjective judgment of experienced appraisers.
Indeed, the reliability of any appraisal based on a comparable sale de-
pends upon the recentness of this sale, the similarity of properties and
locations, and the circumstances or motives underlying the transaction
(e.g., whether or not the property was dumped on a singularly depressed
market, etc.) On a more abstract level, the analytical inter-dependence
among the three "independent" approaches to nvalue," especially where a
comparison of similar properties is dictated, raises serious doubt as to
the net contribution of the ambitious capitalization procedure described
above. For instance, the conversion factor or rent multiplier depends
upon relationships derived from "typical properties" in the market. Ob-
viously these standard properties have been valued by some unmentioned
method other than that of using gross rentals and conversion factors.
Hence, the capitalization process is hardly a distinct method of evalua-
tion, but is merely a corollary of the earlier methods.
Taken as a whole, the FHA risk-rating technique stands but as a
notable pioneer achievement in a hitherto helter-skelter activity. Its
objective approach has contributed to the development of a sound mortgae
market, through its applic ation to conventional as well as insured lending.
Nevertheless, the goals as portrayed by the most sanguine proponents of
FHA have failed to materialize. Some undoubtedly looked for a uniform,
sound, and objective method of valuation and risk analysis which could be
See laura M. Kingsbury, The Economics of Housing, i. t. pp. 126-132.
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readily used not only by housing officials but also by the consumer-
purchaser. As stated above, the subjective element in such analyses is
still an 'essential ingredient requiring the expert judgment of an exper-
ienced appraiser. Moreover, the FHA program has not been hailed with en-
thusiasm in all quarters. Especially in the local Boston area, insuring
operations have been so slight that the influence of the aforementioned
techniques on local lending practices is negligible.1
Mortgage Contract Required or Recommended
Once again it should be mentioned that the FHA is not engaged in the
business of making home loans. It operates more or less as any private
insurance agency, setting up acceptability standards, collecting insur-
ance premiums, and indemnifying the insured against loss. In performing
the first of these functions, establishing acceptability standards, the
FHA may exert an indirect, though certain, influence on the lending prac-
tices of insured mortgagees. Although the latter are free to set specific
contract terms within broad limits, eligibility standards can often be
molded to effectively modify these terms. While these standards are de-
signed primarily to put insurance operations on a sound business footing,
they have allegedly been used as a tool to accomplish broader social and
2
political ends as well. The basic philosophy underlying government inter-
vention in home mortgage finance is beyond the scape of the present study,
and will accordingly receive but passing reference here.
See Chapter 13.
2The literature on this issue is too voluminous to permit reference here.
For instance, see Colean, The Impact of Government on Real Estate Finan-
cial in the United States, 22. cit., Tid Abrams, The Future of Housing,
op. cit.
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Interest Rates. When the mutual insurance program was initiated in 1934, the
maximum interest rate (exclusive of insurance' premium) on insured loans was
limited to 5 per cent per year of the unpaid balance, except in certain
areas where the Administratbr was authorized to set a maximum of 6 per
1
cent. Mortgage insurance premiums were set at - of 1 per cent of the
original principal amount, and, in addition, lenders were permitted
to charge an extra of 1 per cent as a service charge. Consequently,
total mortgage debt charges could have been as high as 7 per cent per
year on certain FHA-insured loans.
Since the mid-1930s, debt charges on insured loans have been reduced
on all three counts. Maximum interest rates were cut to h4 per cent in
2
1938, thence to 4 1/4 per cent in 19,0. Insurance premiums have also
been liberalized, and under current regulations the lender is required to
make an annual remittance equivalent to 2 of 1 per cent of the average
3
unpaid balance. Moreover, the provision for a service charge on a con-
tinuing basis has been dropped. At the present time, the mortgagee may
levy an initial sei-vice fee against the borrower-of 1 per cent of the
original principal,4 but competition among lenders has rarely permitted
its imposition in the local capital surplus area.
The FHA strives to adjust rates of interest on insured loans to chang-
ing market conditions, both locally as well as nationally. It should be
repeated that specified rates are price ceilings, and may or may not coin-
cide with market rates of interest. In practice, however, FHA maximum
rates are virtually minimums as well, except in certain money market centers.
Under static economic analysis assuming a high degree of homogeneity among
'National Housing Act, Section 203b.
2Except under extraordinary conditions where an additional 1 per cent is
warranted.
3 The premium was reduced to ' of 1 per cent on certain mortgages for a
short period after 1939.
A charge of 21 per cent is permitted if the mortgagee makes both con-
struction and permanent loans.
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loans, competition among lenders would result in limited insured lending,
if the ceiling FHA rate (including mortgage insurance) were significantly
above the market rate of interest. Conversely, a ceiling set far below
the market level might produce a surge of buyer demand for insured loans,
but once again lenders would promote conventional lending as far as pos-
sible. Of course, mortgage loans are inherently heterogeneous and "the
competitive" price is hardly a realistic concept even for loans with basic-
ally similar risk characteristics. The relative contract provisions on
insured and uninsured loans in the Boston area will be analyzed in Chapter
13 of this study.
The substitution of a small certain cost for a possible greater loss
may effect an outward shift in the lender's supply schedule. His policy
regarding insured lending may depend in large part upon the relative net
yields on the two types of mortgage loans. Net yields on uninsured loans
for purposes of this comparison would be computed by deducting from gross
contract interest rates the estimated costs of accumulating adequate loss
reserves. As discussed in an earlier analysis of mortgage risk, many
lenders have undoubtedly shunned away from risk repaym'nt functions with
wide disperson. If such loans were made at all, lenders perhaps felt
justified in charging almost prohibitively high rates of interest. If
this practice were widespread, the opportunity to narrow such dispersion
by using FHA insurance might be expected to stimulate a renewed interest
in home mortgage lending.
When the FHA program was' launched, few conventional mortgage loans
in the country were written at interest rates of less than 6 per cent.
Even though Massachusetts has characteristically been regarded as a capital-
surplus area, the average rate of interest on real estate loans held by all
cooperative banks in 1934 was 6.03 per cent. The average rate on savings
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bank loans was nearly a full 1 per cent lower, in part because of the
presence of large income-property loans as well as some loans carried at
abnormally low distress rates. Most lenders were writing new mortgages
at interest rates below their respective average levels, however, so
that maximum rates on FHA loans conformed rather closely with interest
movements in the local market.
In other areas, however, FHA "ceiling prices" have consistently fallen
below corresponding interest rates on conventional loans, in the postwar
as well as prewar periods. The current agitation to increase FRA maxi-
mum rates serves to illustrate the effects of any continuing unbalance
between rates on conventional and insured loans. Inasmuch as the FHA
strives to promote individual home ownership through liberalizing mort-
gage credit availability, it is hardly surprising that maximum rates on
insured loans have become minimum in practice in many quarters.
Length of Loan Term. The FHA program has further facilitated home pur-
chase through extending the average term of insured loans. Up' to-the
recent depression, commercial and savings banks rarely wrote loans with
terms exceeding 3 to 5 years, and the typical cooperative form mortgage
was retired in 12 or 13 years. The evils of financing a home purchase
with a short-term instrument were undoubtedly recognized long before this,
but the universal adoption of long-term loans had to await positive fed-
eral intervention and direction. The HOLC, federal savings and loan
associations, and the FHA all promoted home mortgage loans with terms
extending up to 20 years. Beginning in 1938, the maximum term on insured
loans was increased to 25 years, provided the property was new and cost
2
no more than $6,000, and provided it was purchased for owner-occupancy.
'For example, see "Mortgage Crisis," The Magazine of Building, pp. 121-124,
August 1951.
2Amendment to National Housing Act, 1938.
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This preferential treatment for low-cost homes still exists, although the
precise terms are adjusted to conform with Regulation X and other emer-
gency measures.
While lengthening the contract life of a single mortgage facilitates
the purchase and ownership of residential properties, overall mortgage
risk may not diminish correspondingly. Certainly short-term mortgage
loans have not been satisfactory to either party in the contract, but
merely extending the term carries no assurance of reduced risk. First of
all, the risk of mortgage default may actually be heightened as terms are
indefinitely extended, for the greater probability of death, periods of
unemployment or deflation, etc., may impair the mortgagorts ability to
2
continue contractual obligations. Furthermore, the marketability of the
mortgaged property may become seriously impaired over a long period of
time, so that a subsequent foreclosure sale would produce insufficient
revenues to cover the unpaid loan balance and foreclosure costs. These
risks are effectively minimized, however, when the mortgage contract
provides for full amortization, as will be shown later.3
Although the lender is able to shift most of these risks to the FHA
through loan insurance, he must still incur the risks associited with tying
up loanable funds for long periods of time. Lacking full knowledge of
developments in the capital market, he may forego long-run income maxi-
mization in the event of material advances in interest rates. Moreover,
even if the paper were reasonably marketable, the mortgage holder would
still incur a capital loss if he elected to convert his holdings into
higher income-earning assets. This condition is not reversible, however,
1Current regulations limit the term to 25 years for properties valued at
$12,000 or less, and to 20 years for more expensive properties.
2In order to allow for the eventuality of mortgagor death, most lenders
deliberately adjust the term of the loan in accordance with the age of
the borrower, viile insurance companies have vigorously promoted package
arrangements whereby both mortgage loan and a life insurance policy are
included in the same unit. See Chapters 11 and 12.
3Another advantage of long-term mortgages concerns the lender's opportunity
to spread loan acquisition costs over a longer period of time. Although
(Footnote continued)
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for interest rate declines subsequent to the issuance of a long-term mortgage
would merely entail its rewriting at the new lower rate.
Amount of Loan. As the third major element in the mortgage contract, maximum
loan amounts and loan-value ratios have been liberalized to facilitate home
purchase without resort to junior financing. Under original regulations,
maximum loan amounts were limited to 80 per cent of the FHA-appraised pro-
perty value or $16,000, whichever amc.unt was the smaller. Following the
1938 amendments, purchasers of new small homes could obtain insured loans
up to 90 per cent of value, with maximum loan-value ratios declining pro-
gressively as more expensive properties are mortgaged. At the present
time, insured loans on single-family properties are limited to $14,000,
and maximum loan-value ratios are subject to changing emergency credit
controls.2 Operative builders may also qualify for insured loans, but
maximum loan-value ratios are 5 percentage points less for builders than
for owner-occupiers in each price bracket.
The promotion of 90 per cent loans represented a radical departure
from the hitherto conventional 60 per cent savings bank loan. Hence,
it is not surprising that these generous contract provisions would arouse
some skepticism as to the overall economic soundness, of insured loans.
Although debt amortization mitigates the 'dangers involved, a slight de-
cline in real estate values might entail severe loss upon an early fore-
closure.
1
Especially when only first mortgage loans are obtainable, raising maximum
loan amounts from F0 to 90 per cent may have quite a stimulative impact of
home buying. This -apparently small change in loan-value ratios effectively
doubles the purchasing power of a prospective home buyer's Cown payment.
Provided the additional burden of servicing a larger debt is not excessive,
2 the purchaser may be quite willing to pay much more for a home than otherwise.As of September. 4,.1951, maximum loan-value ratios declined gradually from
90 per cent on properties worth up to $1,0C, to 50 per cent on homes costing
$24,500 or more. Effective June 11, 1952, these maximum ratios were raised
to 95 and 60 per cent, respectively.
Certain initial costs are shifted to the mortgagor through special fees, the
share borne by the lender is often substantial. See Chapter 11.
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The case for high loan-value mortgages appears much stronger when
these funds constitute the only borrowed funds present in the home pur-
chase. "Conservative" 3-year mortgage loans were extremely hazardous,
because many borrowers had to supplement limited equity resources with costly
second mortgage loans. The debacle of the early 1930s, however, brought
heavy loss and liquidation among second mortgage companies, making home
purchase all the more difficult. The subsequent efforts of the FHA and
other federal agencies toward larger first mortgage loans have eliminated
much of the need for junior financing. Except during the early postwar
years when the Veterans Administration guaranteed second mortgages up to
20 per cent of value, the FHA has insured loans only where there are no
other mortgage liens on the property.
Mortgage insurance on 90 per cent loans is deemed prudent only on
small, new, owner-occupied homes where estimated mortgage risk is at a
minimum. New homes perhaps depreciate less rapidly than existing proper-
ties, and are usually located in growing, well-planned neighborhoods.
Moreover, lower-cost homes ordinarily enjoy a ready market, while more
expensive,.individualistic properties may be extremely difficult to sell,
especially during depression periods. Ower-occupants are assumed to be
preferred credit risks on grounds that their incentives for mortgag;e com-
pliance are more deeply-rooted than are those of other investors in urban
properties. On the other hand, the social aim of more widely diffused
home ownership has undoubtedly been an important factor underlying this
favorable treatment.
Method of Repayment. Although many thrift institutions had long regarded
regular debt retirement as a desirable practice, the FHA made full amorti-
zation a prerequisite for insurance eligibility. Direct-reduction loans,
sponsored by the FHA as well as other newly-created federal agencies en-
joyed an immediate public acceptance. Shortly thereafter, state-chartered
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thrift institutions were authorized to make direct-reduction loans, whether
insured or not. For cooperative banks, the change did not appear too
significant at the outset, since their cooperative form note had always pro-
vided for equal monthly payment until the debt was retired. As explained
earlier, however, the repayment term on such mortgages depended upon the
bank's dividend rates and hence profitability, while the direct-reduction
type specifies the maturity date on the contract itself.
Direct-reduction type loans offer real advantages to lender and
borrower alike in that debt service is put on an income basis. Since the
lender is kept in constant touch with the home owner, delinquency in re-
gard to property tax liability as well as mortgage debt service is effect-
ively minimized. Furthermore, contractual debt amortization may engender
a more genuine borrower's "insurable interest" in the outcome of the in-
sured event. Although the lender is the insured party, the borrower
2
foregoes an increasing equity upon foreclosure as maturity is approached.
The significance of this "insurable interest" is substantially weakened in
cases where the mortgaged property depreciates nearly as rapidly as equity
accumulates.
A steady and fairly predictable inflow of mortgage principal and
interest payments enables lending institutions to adjust their investment
policies to changing interest rates, price levels, and new investment op-
portunities. Moreover, whenever debt service is put on a monthly payment
basis, a slight discrepancy between nominal and effective rates of interest
In theory, this would be true whether the loan were insured by the FHA
or covered by self-insurance.
2Home Mortgage Lending, op. cit., pp. 146-7.
Indeed, it is quite possible that the rate of depreciation might actually
exceed equity accumulation.
In contrast to the simple administrative detail involved in straight term
lending, economies in servicing monthly payment type mortgages generally
accrue only to large-scale operations. Accordingly, individual lenders
seldom achieve a scale of operations sufficient to warrant their quali-
fication as FHA-approved mortgagees.
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arises in the lender's favor. Because of the frequency of conversion,
a nominal 5 per cent rate on a 20-year amortized mortgage loan with level
monthly payments of $6.60 is equivalent to a 5.05 per cent rate payable
semi-annually (as most bond yields are quoted.)
A possible limitation of the level payment plan concerns the ability
of the mortgagor to meet all recurring obligations over a period of 20
or more years. Actually total housing costs mount during the later
years of the repayment term, because of necessary repair and maintenance
expense. To provide for constant housing costs over the life of the con-
tract, perhaps mortgage payments should be larger during the earlier years.
On the other hand, if home purchase is to be made easier for young families,
the existing system is quite satisfactory in that prospective incomes will
be rising over the loan term.
EMERGENCY ASPECTS OF THE FHA PROGRAM
In addition to the permanent mortgage insurance system, the initial
FHA legislation set up machinery to promote certain emergency relief and
recovery objectives as well. Title I of the National Housing Act was
aimed directly at solving the acute unemployment problems prevailing in
the building industry. Lending institutions were to be insured against
loss on unsecured loans made to finance the alteration, repair, improve-
ment, or conversion of existing structures. The insured portion of each
loan was initially limited to 20 per cent of original loan amount, but
was subsequently reduced to 10 per cent in 1936. During the early period
of the FHA, the maximum insured loan was set at $2pCO, on which no insur-
1
The corresponding effective yield y on an annual payment basis is nearly
5.12 per cent, as found by solving the following equation in ' .
7r= '/ ' = (+i
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ance premium was levied.
Although this initial authorization terminated in 1937, Congress
reactivated the emergency Title I program to stave off another impending
recession one year later. Institutional lenders, building supply dealers,
and other groups reaping the benefits of the program eagerly supported its
restoration. Provision was made for an insurance premium of up to 3/4
of 1 per cent of the proceeds of the loan. This premium was borne by the
lender, and was paid into a non-mutual fund used to defray the adminis-
trative expenses of Title I. On all property improvement loans, the maxi-
mum discount rate was $5 per $100 per year of the face amount, with the
loan term limited to 3 years and 32 days. Stated differently, the maximum
effective yield on these short-term loans was a generous 9.72 per cent.
Although Title I was originally designed as an emergency depression
measure, it proved to be too popular among interested business groups to
be dropped lightly. The wartime housing shortage presented another emer-
gency situation during which time Title I was reinstituted as an aid in
remodeling and converting existing residential properties. In the early
postwar period, the Class 3 small home loan program was also set up under
Title I as a part of the Veterans Emergency Housing Program, designed to
apply to situations where ordinary Title II standards could not be met.
On these home loans, the maximum rate of interest was Q per cent, plus
of 1 per cent mortgage insurance premium on the face value of the loan,
with a term not axceeding 20 years and 5 months.2
1
Moreover, the initial act provided for direct government loans to insti-
tutions on the security of insured Title I loans. This emergency Section
3 was repealed on April 3, 1936.
2Ratcliff, op. cit., pp. 264-5
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Since the average loan has been about $400 with a term of less than
3 years, Title I has had only limited connection with the long-term mort-
gage structure. Most loans have been made to finance structural altera-
tions, heating and plumbing installations, insulating and roofing, etc.,
frequently arranged through contractors and'dealers. Nevertheless,
Title I has been widely used in certain areasto assist in low-cost home
construction. At the present time, Section 8 provides for FHA insurance
on new home loans, with contract provisions very similar to those of Sec-
tion 203. As with earlier Class 3 loans, Section 8 is designed to cover
loans on properties in areas "where it is not practicable to obtain con-
formity with many of the requirements essential to the insurance of
mortgages on housing in built-up urban areas." 2
To assist in the housing of war workers migrating into war production
centers, the FHA set up a new emergency Title VI program. 3 eeting these
critic al demands through ordinary investment channels might entail a high
degree of mortgag-e risk, as housing was quickly required in areas with
an uncertain future. Title VI provided for the establishment of a non-
mutual insurance system with a special fund to insure certain 90 per cent
mortgage loans, either to builders or home buyers. Except for the omission
of the "economic soundness" requirement in defense housing, similar rules
and regulations applied to insured lending under both Titles II and VI.
Mortgage loans on single-family homes (Section 603) were restricted to a
maximum of $5,,400 for a term of 25 years. Title VI provided the bulk of
Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 229.
Title I, Section 8(a) of National Housing Act as amended April 20, 1950.
Statistics on postwar FHA activity in Metropolitan Boston will be pre-
sented in Chapter 1lJ.
Approved March 28, 1941.
In 1942 Title VI was expanded to provide insurance for 90 per cent
mortgages on new rental housing, Section (6C8), with a maximum loan
amount of $1,350 per room.
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FHA operations during the war years and by 1944 nearly 235 thousand mort-
gages had been insured, three-fourths of which involved single-family
homes .
The return to peacetime presented another critical housing problem,
this time to accommodate the acute needs of millions of returning veter-
ans. As an important phase of the emergency housing program for veter-
ans, the Title VI program was continued well into the postwar period.
Maximum interest rates were reduced to 4 per cent, and allowable mortgage
loan amount were raised to $8,100 in keeping with inflated costs. These
emergency provisions (of Sec. 603) terminated in April 1948, but shortly
thereafter the mutual insurance program (Section 203) was substantially
2
liberalized.
The past discussion illustrates the versatility of the loan insurance
principle in implementing-federal housing policies. Within its short life,
the FHA has already set up emergency machinery to stimulate an economic
recovery, to provide for civilian -;artime housing needs, and to assist in
postwar readjustment programs.
FEDEAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
The final feature of the FIA program described here relates to the
establishment of an effective secondary mortgage market, within which
mortgage investors may freely. trade in their paper. If such a market
were attained, lenders in capital-deficient areas could sell their mort-
gage holdings either to gain added liquidity or to make more loans. At
the same time, mortgage investors in surplus areas would be afforded an
opportunity to maintain sound, diversified portfolios at all times.
1Ratcliff, op. cit., p. 209.
2 See above.
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The activities of mortgage bond houses represented a dismal attempt
at solving the secondary market problem. Aside from the weaknesses men-
tioned above, bond companies gave little promise of facilitating single-
home purchase, in that their activities were concentrated almost entirely
on farm and urban income-producing properties. Moreover, the paper was
never freely traded in the open market. The issuing house provided the
primary support for its own paper, and no exchange developed whereby
issues of various houses could be objectively weighed and valued.2
The first serious attempt by the federal government at establishing
an effective secondary market came as an important corollary of the Home
Loan Bank Act. By standardizing and strengthening mortgage lending in-
stitutions, it sought to facilitate a free inter- and intra-regional flow
of funds through making secured and unsecured advances. As pointed out
above, however, only saving and loan interests chose to enter the System
in force. Furthermore, affiliated institutions were unable to sell their
mortgage holdings outright, but could only borrow against them to gain
immediate liquidity from an otherwise illiquid instrument.
Supporters of the National Housing Act foresaw an acceptable, stand-
ardized mortgage loan as an essential ingredient of a sound secondary
market. Once such an instrument were devised, it was hoped that new special-
ized mortgage institutions would find it profitable to implement this de-
velopment by trading in mortgage paper. Such private institutions under
federal supervision would make, purchase, and sell home mortgages and, on
the basis of such security, offer their debentures to the public. FHA
sponsors hoped that the insurance feature would facilitate this development,
1See description of these operations on p. 39.
2M. L. Colean, "What Makes a Secondary Market Ticky' Savings and Loan
Annuals, 1948, pp. 147-153.
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especially since insured loans appeared to offer an attractive investment
for commercial banks and life insurance companies.
To encourage the establishment of private national mortgage associa-
tions, substantial financial inducements were offered under Title III of
the National Housing Act. Despite these inducments as well as subsequent
relaxations of qualification standards, no privately-capitalized insti-
tutions were organized by 1938. The first step toward establishing a
federal agency to deal in mortgage exchange was the creation of the RFC
Mortgage Company in 1935. Originally designed as an HOLC for income
property, this Company began to purchase insured mortgages on new homes
as a stimulus for the depressed housing industry.
As a more permanent measure, the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion was formed with RBFC capital in 1938. This instrumentality was or-
ganized to stimulate insured mortgage lending by providing a secondary
market for such paper, particularly for newly-authorized 90 per cent loans.
From that time on, these two agencies operated jointly in the secondary
market until the RFC Mortgage Company was terminated in June 1947. During
the 10-year interval, the Company dealt with mortgages on homes built be-
fore 1937 and, later on, with Title VI and VA-guaranteed loans, while the
former, concentrated on trading mortgages on new small homes. The market
for VA loans slipped drastically following the termination of the RFC
Mortgage Company, but support for the paper was restored one year later
2
when FNMA operations were extended to cover certain VA-guaranteed lonns.
Especially in regard to FNMA purchases of VA loans, the advance commitment
procedure assumed a significant role in the rapid expansion of mortgage
credit. Until such purchases were restricted to an over-the-counter basis
Ratclifff, op. cit.., p..275.
2Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, pp. 70-71.
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by the Housing Act of 1950, many nominal mortgagees looked upon the FNMA
as a virtual primary source of unlimited rortgage credit.
Under current regulations, the FNLIA offers to purchase certain insured
and guaranteed mortgages at no more than par from approved mortgage ori-
ginating institutions. The mortgaged properties must meet prescribed
construction requirements and original principal amounts must not exceed
$10,000 for each single-family dwelling. Total purchases are limited to
50 per cent of the total volume of otherwise eligible insured loans ori-
2
ginated by the seller-mortgagee. Usually the mortgage originator re-
tains all servicing functions, and receives as compensation therefor i
3,
of 1 per cent of the unpaid balance. Statistics regarding the operations
of these two federal agencies will be reviewed i'n Chapter 14, at which time
the current status of the secondary mortgage market will be analyzed.
VETERANS ADMIINISTRATION HOME LOAN PROGRAM
The guaranty of home loans was one among many benefits afforded
veterans under the Servicements Readjustment Act of 1944. Veterans re-
turning to civilian life faced a critical housing shortage and frequently
lacked the down payment necessary to buy a home under conventional finan-
cing methods. To cope with these problems, the Act provided means whereby
the veteran could become a home owner with little or no equity down payment
and with moderate monthly debt service. The primary loan plan, under Title
III, authorized the guaranty of home mortgages up to $2,000 for qualified
veterans, with the interest rate limited to 4 per cent and the loan t erm
to 25 years. The inflation in real estate values had so boosted home
1 See Chapter :114.
2VA-guaranteed loans were exempt from this limitation as of December 1950.
After June 29, 1951, all FNMA purchases were restricted to mortgages
insured or guaranteed on or after March 1, 1951.
3Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, pp. 72, 75.
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prices that the $2,OCC limit failed to enable the veteran with limited'
cash resources to buy the home he needed. Accordingly, in December 1945,
this entitlement maximum was raised to $4,00 or 50 per cent of the loan,
whichever amount was the smaller. 1
A second plan under the Servicements Readjustment Act provided for
combination loans whereby the first mortgage was insured by the FHA and
the second guaranteed by the VA. The guaranteed second mortgage was li-
mited in amount to $2,000 or 20 per cent of the cost or purchase price of
the purchased property. This section gave the veteran a tremendous ad-
vantage in the housing market by making possible a loan covering the total
purchase price of the property. 'Roughly one-sixth of all VA home loans
closed were of this combination variety until the Housing Act of 1950
2
provided for its termination by December 31, 1950.
A third major phase of the VA progran is perhaps yet in its initial
stages. The Housing Act of 1950 authorized the Vetzrans Administration
to make direct loans to veterans in areas where 4 per cent mortgages are
3
unobtainable through usual lending channels.3 These loans are limited
to a maximum amount of $10,000 and are to be made only to veterans who
have not previously used their entitlement and who appear to be a good
credit risk to carry the proposed mortgage obligation.
A few unique features of the VA home loan program merit brief mention
here. To protect the veteran from paying an excessive price for his home,
the VA initially required appraisers to determine the "reasonable normal
value" of the property. Since this criteria constrained appointed ap-
praisers from permitting current market conditions to dominate their
1
The Housing Act of 1950 further increased this maximum to $7,500 or 60
per cent of the, loan amount. Veterans -who had used part or all of their
entitlement under earlier regulations could seek another loan guarantee
for the difference between $7,500 and the amount already used. Housing
Statistics, HHFA, September 1951, pp. VII-IX.
2 The actual termination occurred during late October 1950. Housing
Statistics, September 1951, p. IX.
3Sec. 512 of this Act provided for the expiration of this authority on
June 30, 1951, but the Defense Housing Act in September 1951, revived
(Footnote continued)
findings, the term "normal" was subsequently deleted. For a short time,
the VA sought to speed up operations by permitting lenders to select an
appraiser from an approved panel. This proccdure, however, invited a
certain amount of laxity in appraisal technique. Although the veteran
was forbidden to pay more for a property than the VA appraisal dictated,
neither the lender nor borrower would complain if the chosen appraiser were
1
to wink at the term "reasonable." As a result, present regulations stipu-
2
late VA-appointed appraisals once again.
The settlement procedure pursuant to d efault on VA home loans differs
somewhat from that on FHA-insured loans. At the option of the VA, one of
two plans is to be followed. The first provides for cash payment tothe
holder of a defaulted loan in an amount not exceeding the guaranteed a-
mount of the original loan, but shall be less (or more) according to the
extent of subsequent loan repayment (or increase.). On the other hand,
the Administrator may choose to-take over the defaulted mortgage by as-
signment and pay off the obligation in full. From an economic point of
view; the relative preference for the two options may depend upon the
state of the real estate market; at the time of foreclosure. If the VA
were operating as a "profit maximizer" it would take over a mortgage by
assignment only when property values were at a sufficiently high level to
permit its disposition at a profit. Whether or not such criteria have been
or will be adopted is not entirely clear as yet.
1 Federal Home Bank Review, January 1947, pp. 101-104.
2Maximum permissible loan-value ratios have been abnormally liberal; as of
June 11, 1952, no down payment was required on properties costing $7000
or less.
3 The criteria used by the VA in providing "upset prices" on foreclosed
property, etc., are beyond the scope of this study.
the provision. The initial appropriation for direct lending was limited
to $150 million.
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Since the h per cent limit on interest rates has been far below pre-
vailing rates on conventional loans in many areaslenders have at various
times been reluctant to participate in the VA program. To provide a
ready market for this paper, both the RFC Mortgage Company and FNMA have
been authorized to purchase VA-guaranteed loans at different times in the
postwar period. The significance of this support is amply demonstrated
by the critical shortage of such h per cent credit which developed during
the interval between the termination of the RFC Mortgage Company in 197
and the rechartering of FNMA in July 1948. Subsequently, between January
1949 and October 1951, FNMA purchases of insured or guaranteed mortgages
amounted to more than $2.2 million, of which 85 per cent represented VA
home loans. As revealed in later analyses, the Boston market has typi-
fied a capital-surplus area during the postwar period, and as such has
had little difficulty in providing the veteran with h per cent mortgage
credit.
Although slow in gaining momentum, the VA home loan program has played
a major role in postwar mortgage lending activity. By granting singularly
generous credit to many veterans who were otherwise destined to remain as
tenants, home construction and owner-occupancy have risen to unprecedented
levels. During its first 6 years of operation, the VA program was in-
volvsd in over one-sixth of all 1- and 2-family starts across the nation.
The participation of local mortgage lenders in these operations will be
summarized in Chapter 13.
Housing Statistics, September 1951. Most of these purchases were
initiated through the inflationary advance commitment procedure. As
stated above, the Housing Act of 1950 restricted the Association to
over-the-counter purchases exclusively after that time.
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PART V. HOME MORTGACE LENDING IN THE BOSTON MARKET
The preceding chapters in this study have been concerned with the
principal institutional forces operating in the Boston mortgage market.
In Part II some of the major economic variables underlying the demand for
housing assets and home mortgage credit were summarized, with special re-
ference to the local market. Following this, some elementary risk theory
and circular flow analysis were applied to mortgage lending. The devel-
opment of mortgage lending institutions in the Boston area was briefly
sketched, including the relative growth patterns and investment policies
of the various mortgagee types. Part IV considered the efforts of the
federal government in promoting a permanent strengthening of the disor-
ganized, undisciplined mortgage market. The balance of this study con-
sists of an analysls of the mortgage operations of lenders in the Boston
area. Data on mortgage holdings and new lending will be presented first,
followed by a discussion of.lending practices and specific contract terms.
As indicated in the introductory section, the postwar mortgage market is
the primary focus of the study. Preceding this analysis, however, brief
reference will be given to the local market in three selected prewc.r
years: 1927, 1936, and 1940. These particular years were chosen as
representative of three phases of mortgage operations in the interwar
period: the booming 1920s; severe depression slump; and prewar recovery.
CHAPrER 9. MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE FOSTON MARKET UP 20 1946
The spectacular growth in total resources experienced by all local
thrift institutions during the prosperous 1920s has already been charted.
No less significant was the rise in mortgage portfolios, with total mort-
gage holdings of cooperative banks increasing nearly threefold during the
decade. Savings banks had dominated mortgage lending in this area for a
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much longer period, but their portfolios still more than doubled in dollar
volume during the 11-year span through 1931. Commercial banks also figured
heavily in this real estate boom, as trust companies in particular invested
their rapidly increasing savings deposits in high-yielding mortgage loans.
These various thrift institutions felt they were providing a valuable
community service by financing an unprecedented volume of new residential
construction during these buoyant days. At the same time, they felt justi-
fied from a business standpoint in investing heavily in real estate loans
inasmuch as their experience with these profitable investments had been
singularly successful up to that time. In so performing these moral obli-
gations, local mortgagees abetted the dangerous inflation in real estate
values by neglecting sound lending practices and vigorously competing for
the available business.
The year 1927 has been chosen as representative of this boom era.
By that year, the peek in real estate activity had already been reached,
as foreclosures among savings banks had begun to turn up and the volume
of new construction to decline. Nevertheless, prices continued to spiral
upward and new mortgage lending while proceeding at a reduced rate, in-
volved progressively larger loan amounts. Total mortgage holdings of
local thrift institutions continued to increase slightly through the end
of the decade, and even through 1931 in the case of savings banks,
COOPERATIVE BANKS AND FEDERALS
In 1927 the aggregate mortgage debt held by the 103 cooperative banks
in the Boston area had reached $254.6 million (See Table I), a dollar level
1
not surpassed again until 1951 by the 76 remaining banks. These portfolios
1Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks. When federals are
included, as is perhaps the only valid basis for comparison, this level
had been exceeded as early as 19h6.
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consisted almost entirely of small residential mortgages, written on the
traditional sinking fund basis. Since these loans were written primarily
to finance small home purchase, the avera :e mortgage balance was valued at
$3.87 thousand. Although this value may appear conservatively low, the
average principal amount on new loans was perhaps considerably higher, and
continued to rise further through 1930. Moreover, the 1927 level for
average mortgage balance was not reached again until 1950 during the current
1
postwar housing boom. While share capital was rising at a rapid pace,
mortgage holdings increased even faster, absorbing a dangerously high
proportion of cooperative bank assets during the 1920s. In 1927, real
estate loans represented 93.6 per cent of aggregate assets held by all
local cooperative banks, with the ratio exceeding 98.6 per cent for at
least one institution. Although cooperative shares were generally regarded
as less liquid than savings bank accounts, the inherent dangers in in-
vesting so heavily in long-term mortgages were soon brought to the fore-
front. When economic activity abruptly slackened in the early 1930s,
mortgagors encountered serious difficulty in maintaining regular monthly
payments, and the contractual inflows from self-liquidating cooperative
form mortgages were sharply. reduced. As a result many banks were ex-
tremely hard pressed to meet shareholders' demands for withdrawals and
share loans during the early depression years.
Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks. The real or
effective mortgage debt under the cooperative form contract was somewhat
less than these book figures; even though these loans are regarded as
amortized, the repayment sums were accumulated as pledged share capital
and were not applied to debt retirement until maturity. Hence, the 1927
level was undoubtedly reached much earlier than 1950, since nearly all
mortgages are now written on a direct-reduction basis. The same explana-
tion applies to the above figures on total mortgage portfolios.
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TABLE I.. TOTAL MORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS OF COOPERATIVE BANKS, FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, SAVINGS DEPARTMENT OF TRUST C012ANIES,
AND SAVINGS BANKS IN THE BOSTON AREA, SELECTED YTARS, 1927-1951.
(Millions)
Cooperative Federal Savings Dept. Savings
Year Banks Savings and of Trust Banks Total
Loan AssTns Companies
1927 $ 254.6 $ - $ 81.7 $470.6 $ 806.9
1936 191.2 2.5# 35.5 483.1 712.3
190 173.7' 52.1 38.0 441.3 .705.1
1946 204.3 87.0 46.9 380.8 719.0
1947 216.8 n.a. 55.5 406.9 679.2*
1948 235.9 n.a. 58.7 49.8 744.5*
1949 252.8 n.a. 60.1 499.6 812.5*
1950 252.8 151.9 60.2 623.6 1,088.5
1951 273.8 165.8 n.a. 761.7 1,201.3*
Source: Annual Reports, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks; Annual Reports,
Federal Savings and Loan Associations.
# Represents an approximation from available data on assets of the h
associations concerned.
x Of this amount, $25.5 million represents mortgages held by the 12 banks
converting in 1937.
n.a. not available.
* In years where data are incomplete, total figures are likewise understated.
e As of April 30, 1950. Reporting date changed from October 31 after 1948
to present date of April 30.
Previous discussions have referred briefly to the unfavorable depres-
sion experience of cooperative banks. In 1936 real estate held by fore-
closure represented roughly 7 per cent of total assets, with mortgages on
which dues were temporarily suspended accounting for an additional 6 per
cent of assets. At the same time when foreclosure accounts mounted and
debt repayments continued at a reduced but steady pace, local cooperative
banks found a negligible demand for new home mortgage credit. As a re-
sult, total mortgage holdings fell more rapidly than total resources,
so that the average mortgage-assets ratio dropped to 72.8 per cent by 1936.
Of the new mortgages written during this period, a substantial pro-
portion undoubtedly consisted of purchase-money mortgages taken back on
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sales out of foreclosure. Frequently written on a straight-term basis,
such common form mortgages in 1936 represented 4 per cent of total assets.
Cooperative form mortgages were waning in significance as a result of the
growing popularity of. newly-authorized direct-reduction loans, the latter
accounting for 4 per cent of total assets as early as 1936. The average
loan balance had declined to $3.17 by this latter year, an 18 per cent drop
from the 1927 level. This rather significant decline reflects the sub-
stantially lower valuations on real estate and consequently on new loan
amounts, but it also stems from continued repayment on existing mortgages
and the low volume of new loans written.
Recovery Period
By 1936 the worst of the depression appeared to be over, and fore-
closure accounts and delinquent mortgages represented a progressively
smaller proportion of total assets. Perhaps profiting from their past
errors and shortcomings, local cooperative banks, and particularly their
newly-chartered federal counterparts, re-entered the mortgage market with
caution and a certain degree of confidence. The level of new mortgage
demands had recovered somewhat from the early 1930s, but was far below that
of the previous prosperity period. The number of permit applications for
residential building in-Massachusetts had doubled between 1934 and 1936,
but, even as late as 1940, this index of construction activity was still
2far below one-half that of the mid-1920s. Although the volume of new
home building was on a limited scale during the prewar recovery, cooperative
banks and federals were able to enlarge their mortgage portfolios each
The same factors, in addition to foreclosures mentioned above, serve to
account for the 25 per cent decline in total mortgage holdings. Beginning
in 1936, these figures on outstanding mortgage amounts had a progressively
downward bias, as a result of the rewriting of old cooperative form notes
on a straight-term or a direct-reductio'n basis. As explained earlier,
pledged share capital was directly applied against principal repayment when
rewritten.
2See Table VII, Part II.
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year after 1936. A significant proportion of this increase reflected
refinancing of existing mortgages which had been held by other local thrift
institutions, notably savings banks.
By 1940 local cooperative banks and federal savings and loan associa-
tions had greatly strengthened their overall position in the mortgage
market. As a proportion of aggregate holdings of local thrift institu-
tions, portfolios of savings and loan associations declined slightly dur-
ing the early depression years but had recovered to a significantly higher
32 per cent by 1940. 2  The 17 per cent increase in outstanding mortgage
holdings between 1936 and 1940 is indicative of an even greater relative
increase in new lending, for cooperative banks and federals were almost
alone in writing new loans on a direct-reduction basis. In contrast to
straight-term loans, direct-reductiori mortgages supply lenders with a steady
inflow of principal repayment sums, thereby necessitating a continual writing
of new loans in order to maintain existing mortgage levels, let alone in-
crease them.
Mortgages represented an increasi'ng proportion of total assets among
local cooperative banks and federals during the immediate prewar years.
Of the cooperative banks that did not convert, total resources increased
only $2 million between 1936 and 1940, but mortgage portfolios increased
fully $8 million, thereby raising mortgage-asset ratios from 72.8 to 75.2
'Unfortunately, data are entirely lacking as to the volume of local refi-
nance activity. Although perhaps most refinancing by a new mortgagee arose
out of the sale of mortgaged properties, a significant proportion reflects
a rewriting of the loan without change in ownership. As will be indicated
later, federals in particular recast many savings bank mortgages on the
popular direct-reduction basis.
2Chart I. The drop from 31.6 to 27.2 per cent between 1927 and 1936 perhaps
reflects a relatively heavy repayment on amortized loans, especially where
pledged share capital was applied to the retirement of cooperative form
loans.
3 Compare straight-term and amortized loans by means of the circular flow
analysis. Chapter 5.
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CHART I. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ACGRF~'ATF 10RTGAGE PC RTFOLIO HELD
BY SAVINGS BANKS, COOPERATIVE EANKS, FEERAL SAVINOE AND LOAN
ASSOCIATIONS AND TRUST COMPANIES I THE BOSTON AEA, 1927-1950
/00
Source: See Table I.
t Mortgage holdings of cooperative banks converting in 1937 are included
only with federals in 1936.
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per cent. The 16 local federal savings and loan associations registered
a far more spectacular growth during the h-year period through 194C, as
total assets rose from $37.6 to $63.0 million, and mortgage portfolios from
2
an estimated $28.2 to $52.1 million.
During the ensuing war years shere capital continued to accumulate in
local associations, but a sharply curtailed volume of new home construction
resulted in diminished mortgage demands. Nevertheless, a steady volume of
new loans was written so that mortgage-assets ratios of local cooperative
banks and federals had fallen but slightly to 7h.5 and 71 per cent, res-
pectively, by 1946. Dring this 6-year interval mortgage holdings of fed-
erals advanced 67 per cent and those of cooperative banks 18 per cent, with
,government bond portfolios registering the greatest relative gain. Since
the aggregate mortgage debt held by local thrift institutions continued
to decline through the war years, .the relative position of these associa-
tions mounted steadily until their combined holdings represented over
40 per cent of that debt by 1946.~3
Reasons for Relative Gain
Two principal factors may have contributed to the rising importance
of cooperative banks and federal savings and loan associations in the
local mortgage market. In the first place, these institutions were vir-
tually pushed into a dominant role by default, for savings banks retreated
lSee Table I. The $17.5 million drop in cooperative bank mortgage port-
folios merely reflects the conversion of 12 additional local banks. Only
4 small institutions had federalized by the 1936 reporting date.
2 
'Mortgage-assets ratios increased from 74.4 to 82.6 per cent. The 1936
data for the 12 associations which had not yet converted are taken from
their respective annual reports as cooperative banks. For the 4 federals
which had converted, data are taken as of the date of conversion.
3Chart I.
1
from their previous active participation in the mortgage market. At
the same time, cooperative banks and federals saw rich opportunities in
sound mortgage lending during the prewar recovery period. Although they
were authorized to make FHA-insured mortgage loans with a minimum of risk,
most local associations preferred to select and carry their loans on a
conventional basis. Uninsured mortgage loans offered attractive yields
and, what was most important for the borrower, they were written with many
of the same liberal provisions as FHA-insured loans, at least so far as
loan-value ratios and loan terms are concerned. As pointed out in Part III,
both cooperative banks and federals were permitted to write 8C per cent
loans with terms ranging up to 20 years. Furthermore, both groups con-
centrated almost exclusively in the popular direct-reduction type of mort-
gage, in contrast to the straight-term loans still characteristic of sav-
ings bank lending.2 By 1940 this newer mortgage type accounted for 31
per cent of total cooperative bank mortgage holdings, while the share re-
presented by the cooperative form note had fallen to 57 per cent. This
trend indicates that nearly all new loans were written on a direct-reduction
basis, as the 12-14 year term on the older variety would account for its
continuing, but declining, predominance during these years. Dhring the
war years, most cooperative form mortgages were either paid off or rewritten
on a direct-reduction basis, and their proportionate share fell to 21 per
cent by 1946. Common form mortgages also steadily waned in importance,
as existing loans were repaid and few purchase-money mortgages were written
after depression foreclosure activity subsided.
1
See "Savings Banks" below.
2See pp. 253-h, for specific reference to debt-value ratios on mortgages
held by local savings and loan associations in 1940.
Owing to the substantial inflow of amortization payments as well as the
moderate level of property valuations, the average mortgage balance among
cooperative banks continued to fall through 19h0 to $2.98 thousand. By
1946 new loans written for progressively higher amounts had produced a
slightly higher average balance of $3.28 thousand. Computed from Annual
Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
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Federal s avings and loan associations were far more aggressive than
cooperative banks in promoting their mortgage operations. Taking advan-
tage of liberal lending opportunities, including the permission to make
individual loans up to $20,000, local associations were a major source of
home mortgage credit for both home purchase and refinancing purposes.
Although data are not available on new loans made, interviews indicate
that federals made solid contracts with local home builders and contrac-
tors during this period and accordingly placed a significant share of all
mortgages on new .homes. Construction activity and demands for short-term
contruction loans were not extensive, but the willingness, and desire as
well, of federals to supply these credit needs proved to be an invaluable
asset in the postwar period. Perhaps most 6f their mortgage lending ac-
tivity concerned the purchase of older properties and the rewriting of
existing mortgages held by other lenders. Much of this business was
achieved through ambitious advertising programs, publicizing the benefits
accruing to the "newer-type" mortgage. Promotional literature informed
prospective home buyers as well as existing mortga.gors of the dangers in-
volved in straight-term lending, under which repayment might be required
on demand. In a similar vein, federals undoubtedly hastened the decline
in holdings of cooperative form mortgages among local cooperative banks,
for the assurance of a definite maturity date on direct-reduction loans
enjoyed popular appeal among mortgagors. All in all, local federals as-
sisted a great many new and existing home owners in retiring mortgage
obligations through making convenient monthly payments over an extended
See "Contruction Loans," Chapter 12.
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COMAERCIAL BANKS.
Little specific data are available on the mortgage operations of local
commercial banks. Until the depression years, national banks were severely
restricted in making urban real estate loans on grounds that such long-term
investment was not an appropriate activity for an institution specializing
in short-term credits. In 1935 all banks were given limited authorization
to make conventional loans on a. 10-year, 60 per cent basis and FHA-insured
loans without regard to these restrictions. In spite of their enlarged
lending opportunities, national banks have continued to play a subor-
dinate role in permanent mortgage financing in the local money market
center. Trust companies, on the other hand, have traditionally operated
in a more liberal legal framework, investing quite heavily in real estate
loans, especially during the 1920s. Rapidly increasing savings accounts
in their newly-formed savings departments were promptly placed in mortgage
channels. In 1927 the 42 local state-chartered institutions with savings
departments held $81.7 million in mortgages, representing 59 per cent of
total assets. This dollar volume in the late 1920s is at least one-third
greater than total mortgage holdings in any succeeding year, including the
2
postwar period when total assets reached an all-time high in 196.
1 More specific data on new lending by all cooperative banks and federals
throughout the Commonwealth are presented under, "Savings .Banks" below.
The following data on new loans made by all savings and loan associations
in the nation portray the relative importance of new construction and
refinancing (Dollar amounts in millions):
Total Purpose of Loan
Year Loans Construction Home Purchase Refinance Other
1936 $ 755 $178 $230 $178 $169
1937 897 234 327 181 155
1938 798 220 . 265 160 153
1939 986 301 340 182 163
1940 1,200 399 426 198 177
Source: Housing Statistics, HHFA, January 1951, p. 60.
As described earlier, trust companies suffered heavy casualties during
the early depression years, and liquidation and merger activity' stepped up
considerably. By 1936 mortgage portfolios of the remaining 30 savings
departments had fallen to $35.5 million, accounting for 4 per cent of
total assets. In the prewar recovery period, savings deposits began to
rise and trust companies once again proceeded to build up mortgage port-
folios on a limited scale. During the war years, however, savings capital
more than doubled and, although mortgage portfolios continued to rise,
the mortgage-assets ratio. for all local companies fell to 24.4 per cent
by 1946. Despite this decline in mortgage-assets ratios, trust companies
had actually strengthened their relative position in the local mortgage
market since the mid-1930s, largely because of the retreat of savings
2banks' from the mortgage market.
SAVINGS BANKS
Although new lending operations of cooperative banks and trust com-
panies reached unprecedented heights during the 1920s, mortgage holdings
of local savings banks consistently exceeded the combined portfolios of
the former. Mortgages held by local savings banks continued to increase
through 1931, but net increments diminished markedly after 1925. In 1927
mortgage holdings of the 61 savings banks in the Boston area aggregated
$470.6 million, constituting 52.2 per cent of total assets. Not until
1949 was this peak dollar volume exceeded again, while the mortgage-assets
ratio has never been approached since that time. New Loans amounting
1 Computed from Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
22See Table I, Chart I.
The mortgage debt perhaps rose slightly through 1929, although these
data have not been computed on a local basis.
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to $78.1 million were written in 1927, a volume equivalent to one-sixth
of the year-ending portfolio. The average loan balance of $7,930 reflects
the dominant influence of new loans made at existing high valuations as
well as the absence of systematic amortization provisions in mortgage
contr'acts. The fact that average loan balances were considerably higher
in savings banks than in cooperative banks is largely explained by the
relatively more important role played by large income-property loans in
mortgage portfolios of the former.
As indicated earlier, the year 1931 marked a major turning point
in the mortgage and overall investment policies of local savings banks.
In contrast to the previous decade when mortgage loans and high-yielding
private securities dbminated investment portfolios, the depression years
and the subsequent wartime period as well witnessed'a virtual retreat
from these markets altogether. Steadily increasing deposit liabilities
as well as funds released from other investments were placed almost
entirely in government bond portfolios. The ratio of mortgage loans
to total assets among local savings banks fell continuously to 41.7 and
36.9 per cent by 1936 and 1940, respectively; and at the close of the
war in 1946, real estate loans represented an all-time low of 23.5 per
1
cent of total assets.
Mortgage-asset ratios declined not only because of steadily advancing
savings capital but also because of a substantial dollar reduction in
mortgage holdings. By 1936 mortgage portfolios had fallen from their
previous peak amounts as a result of foreclosures, etc., but remained
slightly above the 1927 level. Whereas mortgage holdings of all other
thrift institutions mounted steadily from their depression depths, savings
1 Computed from Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
2h6
banks' portfolios. continued to decline through the balance of the decade
and on through the war years as well. By 1946 the outstanding mortgage
debt.held by the 56 savings banks in the Boston area had dropped to
$380.8 million, more than 20 per cent below the corresponding 1936 level.
Reasons for Decline in Mortgage Portfolios
As in the case of cooperative banks, foreclosures undoubtedly con-
tributed to the sharp decline in mortgage portfolios held by local
savings banks. During the 15-year period through 1945, total fore-
closures among all savings banks in the Commonwealth amounted to nearly
65 per cent of the beginning portfolio. This substantial foreclosure
activity does not spell complete loss for the mortgagee, however, for
nearly all such property had been sold by the end of the period, frequently
entailing. a purchase-money mortgage at the time of sale. The net drain
on mortgage portfolios because of foreclosures was significant during
the early depression years, contributing approximately 60 per cent of
2
the net decline for the 5-year period through 1936. During the succeed-
ing 9 years, however, foreclosure operations continued at a rapid pace,
but had a negligible effect on the progressively declining mortgage port-
folios. Indeed, during the early war years, the volume of purchase-
money mortgages written in connection with foreclosure sales actually
exceeded the dollar amount of mortgage principal foreclosed, with the re-
sult that foreclosure activity tended to increase rather than r educe
3
existing mortgage holdings. At any rate, it seems clear that only a
lSee Table I.
2
Lintner, op. cit., p. 228.
3Ibid., pp. 228-9.
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small part of the decline in mortgage portfolios between 1931 and 1946
is to be ascribed to mortgage foreclosure activity. Furthermore, its
influence progressively declined after 1936, v7hile mortgage portfolios
continued to fall through 1945 just as rapidly as during the early de-
pression years.
Principal repayment constituted another drain on mortgage portfolios,
undoubtedly more significant than mortgage foreclosure. Professor
Lintner has calculated repayment sums for all Massachusetts savings banks,
2
relating them to outstanding portfolios at the beginning of each year.
As might be expected, loan repayment was of negligible importance during
the early depression years, and never approached the 1C per cent level
of the middle 1920s until the late war years. Most mortgages had been
written on a straight-term or demand basis, and savings banks rarely
asked for debt repayment unless additional liquidity were sought or more
profitable investment opportunities appeared elsewhere. As explained
earlier, loans called during the depression generally found the mort-
gagor having serious liquidity problems as well, and foreclosure, loan
extension, or some other adjustment was a more likely result than loan
repayment. During the war years, however, rising incomes coupled with
more extensive amortization provisions resulted in heavier inflows of
mortgage repayment. Over the 15-year period, as a whole, repayments
1
Although most mortgage losses originated during the early depression
years, a large proportion of these were not charged off until the later
war years. While small residential properties were readily s old during
the 1930s, the market for larger income properties remained weak until
194C at least. Accordingly, most savings banks retained these latter
foreclosed properties until their sale appeared expedient, but unfor-
tunately failed to write off most of these losses until the time of
sale. See Ibid., pp. 285-298.
2Ibid., pp. 229-230.
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probably averaged less than 5 per cent per year of outstanding mortgage
portfolios.
The relatively low level of principal re payment during the 1930s
is reflected in the steady but decidedly slow decline in average loan
balances. The $8.0 thousand value for 1936 is slightly higher than that
of 1927, owing in part to the influence of larger loans written during
the late 1920s. Heavier repayments as wAell as smaller new loans re-
sulted in progressively lower average mortgage balances, falling to $7.15
thousand in 1940 and to $6.03 by 1946. This decline in average new loan
-amounts reflects a change in the composition of mortgage portfolio as
well as lower real estate valuations. Whereas many savings banks made
a substantial volume of mortgages on large income properties during the
booming 1920s, post-depression lending was concentrated primarily on
2
smaller 1- to h-family properties.
The extremely low level of demand for new mortgage credit was a
significant contributing factor in the decline in mortgage portfolios.
The volume of mortgage loans written by local savings banks in 1936
represented but 4.7 per cent of the year-ending outstanding balance,
and was less than one-third of the total volume written in 1927. When
allowance is made for the fact that purchase-money mortgages perhaps
accounted for two-thirds of all new loans made during the early depres-
sion years, the drop in "original" lending was even more striking. Even
when mortgage demands appeared to be on the upswing again, however,
savings banks continued to invest in government bonds instead of home
Ibid., p. 230.
2
See Chapter 12 for an analysis of the reasons underlying this shift in
investment policy.
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mortgages. The moderate recovery in new construction and real estate
transfer activity prompted but a minor response in new mortgage lending
by local savings banks. As late as 1940, all new loans written totaled
less than. $33 million, representing 7.5 per cent of year ending debt
balance and two-fifths of the 1927 volume of new loans.
Whereas mortgage portfolios among all local thrift institutions regis-
tered heavy depression losses, all but savings banks took positive steps
toward a strengthening of their position during the prewar recovery
period. As pointed out above, federal savings and loan assoc-iations in
particular conducted extensive promotional campaigns in order to at-
tract new mortgage business. Inasmuch as data on new lending by federals
and cooperative banks are not available on a local basis, exact com-
parability with savings bank activity during the prewar period is not
possible. The declining share of the aggregate mortgage debt held by
savings banks does, however, provide a rough indication of the relative
volume of new loans handled by these and competing thrift institutions.
Whereas the outstanding mortgage debt held by local s avings banks in
1936 was 2.5 times that held by cooperative banks and f ederal savings and
loan associations, this ratio fell sharply to 1.95 by 1940' and by the
2
end of the war in 1946, to 1.31. The 1940 Census ascribed an even greater
predominance-to savings banks as holders of first mortgages on owner-
occupied 1- to h-family properties, the ratio being 3.15 for the "Boston
Metropolitan District" as defined in that year.3
lEven as late as 1941, Lintner estimates that the volume of purchase-
money mortgages exceeded that of original loans written, op. cit., p. 231.
2See Table I, Chart I.
3This discrepancy in ratios arises largely from the fact that cooperative banks
and federals tend to be more heavily concentrated near Boston proper and,
hence, to the restricted area chosen for the present stuctr. The Census defi-
nition of the 'District covers an area several times as large as this, in-
cluding communities where savings and commercial banks are relatively more
significant. For further evidence of this relative concentration, see "Other
Lending Institutions" below.
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In contrast to their predominance in "stock" held, the."flow" of
new loans made by all savings banks in Massachusetts was consistently
smaller than that made by all savings and loan associations through
1946. From data on mortgage recordings of $20,CO0 or less, it is clear
that until the war began the dollar volume of new home loans made by the
latter institutions was more than twice that made by savings banks. (See
Table II.) Moreover, the share of total recordings represented by savings
banks actually appeared to be increasing through 19)1; accordingly, it
may be surmised that, if data were available, the retreat of these insti-
tutions from new home mortgage lending was even more striking in the imme-
diate post-depression period. To summarize, s ince the volume of new
loans written by local savings banks was only about one-third that of
competing institutions holding but a fraction of the aggregate mortgage
debt, the relative decline in savings banks' portfolios was inevitable.
In terms of new lending, these data indicate that commercial banks
were also losing ground to savings and loan associations, although less
markedly than in the case of savings banks. In 194C national banks and
trust companies held over 16 per cent of the aggregate mortgage debt on
owner-occupied home properties in the "Boston Metropolitan District"
as well in the Commonwealth, this ratio being somewhat higher than that
2
for all savings and loan associations. During the years under considera-
tion, however, commercial banks accounted for roughly 8 per cent of new
home mortgage recordings while the corresponding ratio for cooperative
banks and federals exceeded 40 per cent. Life insurance companies, on
the other hand, participated in the prewar mortgage market nearly as
1By considering only those recordings of $20,OCO or less, it is to be
understood that these data refer primarily to mortgages on 1- to h-
family properties.
2
See Table III below.
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TAELE II. TOTAL mOLLAL VOLUME AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION AE1UONG VARIOUS
INSTITUTIONS OF MORTGAGE RECORDINGS OF $20,000 OR LESS ON NON-
FARM PROPERTIES IN. MASSACHUSETTS, 1939-1946
Percentage Recorded By
Total Savings Savings Insurance Commercial Indi- Others
Year Millions) Banks and Loan Companies Banks viduals
Asstns
1939 $164.4 20.1% 44.7% 5.1% 8.2% 12.4% 9.5%
1940 202.0 21.9 46.7 4.0 7.3 12.4 7.8
1941 236.3 24.8 47.6 1.2 6.5 17.4 2.6
1942 186.2 24.6 45.2 1.6 6.4 18.4 3.8
1943 164.7 24.1 43.1 1.6 6.1 15.5 9.5
1944 196.3 23.6 45.1 0.9 6.4 14.9 9.2
1945 242.6 27.3 44.5 0.6 7.5 13.5 6.6
1946 497.7 32.8 41.3 0.5 9.5 9.9 6.0
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Review, and Statistical Supplement, 1947;
reprinted in Lintner, op. cit., p. 234.
heavily as commercial banks, although their portfolios as reported by
the 1940 Census were but one-eighth as large. Perhaps the more wide-
spread utilization of FHA-insurance provisions among insurance companies
accounted for their renewed interest in new mortgage lending during the
prewar period. 1
As remarked earlier, savings and loan associations and insurance
companies strengthened their foothold in the local mortgage market both
by lending on new properties as well as in financing the purchase of
older homes or in refinancing activities. A crude indication of the
relative contribution of these lender groups toward the recovery in new
home building is found in Census data pertaining to the age of mortgagred
properties. In 1940 homes built within the preceding 10 years constituted
21.4 per cent of all owner-occupied, 1- to 4-family properties on which
savings and loan associations held first mortgages. The corresponding
ratio for life insurance companies was 64 per cent, with all but 10 per
cent of the remaining properties being built since 1920. For savings
banks, properties less than 10 years old represented only 16.7 per cent
1 See Chapter 13.
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of all mortgaged properties, thereby indicating a much smaller emphasis
in financing the purchase of new homes.
A signific ant factor underlying the r elative decline in new mortgage
lending by savings banks relates to the types of mortgage contracts
offered by the various lending institutions. Yihereas savings and loan
associations and insurance companies wrote nearly all of their new home
loans on the popular high-percentage, direct-reduction basis, savings
banks continued to make traditional straight 60 per cent mortgages. It
is perhaps true that these institutions have been more restricted in
making liberal mortgages than cooperative banks and federal savings and
loan associations. Whereas the latter had long made 80 per cent loans,
savings banks were authorized to make 70 per cent, 20-year loans only
in 1937, and 6 years later this permission was extended to cover loans
representing 75 per cent of appraised value. Even today, they may write
80 per cent mortgages only if the loan amount does not exceed $V12,000,
as opposed to a $20,C00 limit for all savings and loan associations.
Nevertheless, in addition to this successive liberalization in lending
opportunities, savings banks have- been authorized since 1935 to make
liberal FHA-insured loans regardless of loan-value ratio or loan term.
In spite of the growing popular acceptance of direct-reduction mort-
gages, most savings banks during this period refused to depart frmm the
non-amortized, low-percentage loan, whereby repayment could be demanded
at any time after a 3-year term. In 1940, out 'of over 30 thousand home
mortgages held by savings banks in the Metropolitan Boston District,
fully two-fifths required no principal payments whatever. When con-
tractual amortization was not provided, nearly all mortgage contracts
11940 Census of Housing, Volume IV, part 2, Table E-4.
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specified interest remittance on a quarterly basis. Indeed, even where
principal payments were required, regular monthly payment was only slightly
more common than quarterly payment. Reflecting in large part the tradi-
tional cooperative form mortgage, savings and loan associations almost
universally insisted on regular principal repaeyment throughout the entire
term, usually on a monthly basis. The lack of interest among savings
banks in the newer direct-reduction type loan undoubtedly figured pro-
minently in rapid rise of competing lending institutions. Professor
Lintner observes that, even as late as 1942, less than 6;, per cent of
outstanding mortgage portfolios of Massachusetts savings banks consisted
2
of 70 per cent, 20-year mortgages and FHA-insured loans.
Loan-value Ratios in 1940
The 1940 census sheds some light on average debt-value ratios among
the mortgage portfolios of local lending institutions. Perhaps the
most striking observation from these data is the marked similarity among
all mortgagees in this regard. The only exception concerns the HOLC,
which granted long-term, high-percentage loans to distressed home owners
during the early depression years. By 1940 the average HOLC loan in the
Boston Metropolitan District had been paid off to some extent so that
outstanding first mortgage balances on s ingle-family properties repre-
sented 67.h per cent of estimated value. For all other types of mort-
gages the ratio of the current unpaid balance on first mortgages to
the appraised property value ranged from 54.1 per cent for savings banks
and commercial banks to 59.0 per cent for life insurance companies.
11940 Census, op. cit., Table E-5. Among the latter institutions,
principal amortizaElon was required in over 90 per cent of the cases.
2Lintner, op. cit., p. 236.
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The tendency for loan-value ratios to be closely grouped together
perhaps results from various conditions. In the first place, any such
ratios are reliable only to the extent that "value" represents a valid,
realistic estimate. The home owner 's appraisal of his own property may
bear a variable and unpredictable relation to what it would bring in the
actual market. However, assuming these ratios represent valid estimates,
the cited loan-value ratio f or savings banks probably r eflects few high-
percentageloans and a heavy concentration about the 60 per cent figure
where systematic amortization requirements were rare. On the other hand,
the average debt-value ratio for savings, and loan associations was 55.3
per cent, resulting from a well-seasoned portfolio of loans which were
initially made at high percentages but have subsequently been paid off
by varying degrees. Perhaps average ratios are singularly high among
insurance companies for analogous reasons. That is, these latter insti-
tutions concentrated on high-percentage, direct-reduction type mortgage
loans, with monthly payment required in 90 per cent of all cases. Since
a significant proportion of their rortfolios consisted of loans on new
properties and consequently were relatively new loans, only a small
share of original principal amounts had been paid off by 1940.1
The failure to write the type of mortgage loan sought by the home
buying community suggests a more fundamental reason for the relative
decline of savings banks in the local mortgage market. During the pre-
war and war years alike, these institutions were reluctant to make new
loans under either type of contract, except for purchase-money mortgage
Census of Housing, op. cit., Table E-3. Corresponding debt-value ratios
on 2- to 4-family properties were slightly higher among each major type
of mortgagee except savings and loan associations. For all types, the
ratios were 55.3 and 58.0 per cent, respectively, on single- and 2- to
h-family dwellings.
or for applicants displaying exceptionally desirable credit elements.
Just as all mortgage lending institutions, local savings banks were
busily engaged in handling delinquent and defaulted loans .and in disposing
of foreclosed properties during these years. Nevertheless, the heavy
volume of foreclosures and subsequent losses taken on account of loans
made earlier convinced many lenders, particularly savings banks, that
mortgage lending was an unsound investment per se and hence was not an
appropriate outlet for depositors' finds at that time. As Professor
Lintner conclusively demonstrates, most mortgage losses sustained during
the depression and early war years resulted from unsound mortgage lend-
ing practices during the previous boom period, and that risks associated
with current lending operations have little connection with the handling
of such losses. On the contrary, mortgage risks appear to be relatively
low during depression years and in early recovery periods as well. Hence,
largely because of improper and occasionally inadequate provision for the
absorption of mortgage losses, mortgage lending policies of savings banks
became dangerously distorted. Not only were these institutions reluc-
tant to assume the risks associated with conventional lending, but they,
were equally disinterested in making FHA-insured loans where most risks
could be shifted to another party, As indicated earlier, even if the
latter mortgages ended in default ad foreclosure, the mortgagee could
exchange the property for marketable debentures, and in any event would
receive a net yield over and above rates on long-term government bonds.
To summarize, local savings banks
" . largely withdrew from the mortgage market at the
time when the risks on new lending were relatively smallest
and when they most needed the income both to maintain more
nearly the ratio of dividend payments to their depositors1
and to absorb losses arising out of their past mistakes."
Lintner, p. cit., p. 237.
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OTHER MORTGAGE LENDING INSTITUTIONS
Before proceeding with an analysis of postwar mortgage lending,
brief.reference will be made to the mortgage holdings of other types of
institutions in 1940. Some of the data in Table III have been used in
connection with the preceding analysis of the local mortgage market.
TABLE III. TOTAL AND PERCENTArE DISTRIEUTION AMONG MORTGAGEE TYPES OF
FIRST MORTGAGES ON 1- To h-FAMILY GUNER-OCCUPIED NONFARM
PROPERTIES, EOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, 1940
Percentage Share Represented By
ype of Total Savings Savings Comner- Life In- MorT
Propery Det and Bank cial surance gage HOLC Indi- Oth
(L00) L Bank Company Company vidual ers
1-4 family $426.9 13.6 42.8 17.1 2.3 0.8 7.2 7.7 8.5
1-. f amily 271.4 16.7 37.8 18.5 3.0 0.9 6.3 7.1 9.7
2-4 family 155.5 8.2 51.4 14.6 1.1 0.7 8.8 8.7 6.5
Source: 1940 Census of Housing, Volume IV, Part 2, Table E-3.
These data indicate some relationships which may appear at first to be
inconsistent with those drawn from data presented earlier in Table I and
Chart I. Most discrepancies, however, can be resolved when the bases
of the two tabulations are made clear. First of all, Table I relates to
aggregate mortgage portfolios of four major types of lending institutions
whose home offices are located within 10 miles of the Boston City Hall.
The 1940 Census data refer to c ertain properties within the Boston etro-
politan District as defined at that time, including roughly all communi-
ties within a radius of 20-25 miles of the City Hall. Whereas the former
data apply to all real estate loans held regardless of property type of
location, Census data refer only to mortgages on "11- to h-family owner-
occupied nonfarm properties without business" located within the given area.
Perhaps the most striking difference between the two tabulations con-
cerns the relative importance of savings and loan associations and commer-
cial banks as compared with savings banks. The primary factor accounting
for the smaller significance of commercial banks in Table I is the absence
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of. data on national bank portfolios. Another f actor explaining the
heavier influience of both commercial and savings banks relative to
savings and loan associations in Census data relates to the differences
in geographic areas considered. As stated earlier, cooperative banks
and federal savings and loan associations tend to be more heavily con-
centrated in the immediate Boston vicinity, in contrast to the more
even distribution of commercial and savings banks throughout the Census
District as well as the Commonwealth. In 1940 only 56 of the 192 savings
banks in Massachusetts, compared with 85 of the 183 cooperative banks,
were included within the immediate "10-mile" area. Furthermore, 16 of
the 27 federals in Massachusetts were within this restricted Boston area,
with only one additional association located within the whole Census
Metropolitan District. Not only were savings banks more evenly dis-
tributed in numbers and presumably total resources, but their relatively
heavier concentration in suburban sections may also have increased the
relative importance of loans on owner-occupied homes in their respective
portfolios. As pointed out in previous demand analyses, large population
centers such as the immediate Boston vicinity tend to have a high propor-
tion of rental units in their housing stock. Hence, inasmuch as lending
operations of cooperative banks in particular have tended to be highly
localized, properties mortgaged by them vould display a heavy concentra-
tion within the immediate Boston area. There is also reason to believe
that the methods of enumeration produced a bias understating the holdings
2
of savings and loan associations in favor of commercial and savings banks.
Footnote, p. 249.
2See Census of Housing, Volume IV, Part 1, United States Summary, p. 4.
Perhaps home owners were frequently confused as to whether a cooperative
bank was a savings and loan association or an ordinary s avings or commer-
cial bank.
The Census data bring out clearly the relative importance of single-
family and multi-family units among the various mortgage portfolios. In
the case of savings and loan associations, the dollar volume of loans was
fully twice as large on single-family than on 2- to h-family properties.
This reflects a basic policy among these institutions, as well as among
life insurance companies, in that concentrating on loans on small resi-
dential properties is a primary method of minimizing overall mortgage risk.
Mortgages on 2- to h-family properties were much more significant among
savings banks t portfolios, aggregating nearly h0 per cent of their total
1- to h-family holdings. Many local savings banks also held a substan-
tial volume of mortgages on large income properties in 1940, holdings
2
which are obviously excluded from this Census coverage. The HOLC has
held a steadily diminishing share of the total mortgage debt, standing at
7.2 per cent in 1940 and falling to zero before the termination of all
liquidation proceedings. The fact that the HOC was relatively more
prominent in holding loans on 2- to 4-family than on single-family proper-
ties perhaps reflects a more severe depression experience among the former
property owners.
It is likely that mortgage holdings of mortgage companies and indivi-
duals are slightly overstated in Table III because of a bias in enumeration
procedures- Each home owner was asked to identify the current holder of
the mortgage, whether or not it had been assigned to a different party sub-
sequent to its origination. Frequently, however, he could only give the
name of the individual or mortgage company initiating the loan, with the
1 See "Loan Amount and Mortgaged Properties," Chapter 12.
2It is interesting to note, however, that even after making this latter
deduction from mortgage portfolios, savings banks' share of the combined
1-4 family debt held by all savings banks and savings and loan associations
in the Boston Metropolitan District was larger than their corresponding
share of aggregate holdings (including income-property loans) within the
immediate Boston vicinity. As indicated above, this rather surprising
observation either reflects an extreme dissimilarity in the two geographic
areas with respect to the relative importance of savings banks and savings
and loan associations, or else the inherent bias in overstating the role
of savings banks in Census data.
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result that the importance of other mortgagees, notably insurance com-
1
panies, is understated. Perhaps the mortgagor continued to make monthly
payments to the mortgage broker from the outset, and never discovered
that the latter was simply a loan correspondent and servicing agent for a
life insurance company.
11940 Census, Volume IV, part 1, p. 4.
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CHAPTER 10. POST7.AR HCLNE i.ORTGAGE LENDDIG IN THE EOSTON ARIT.
The postwar period has witnessed a tremendous surge of demand for
new home purchase and hence for home mortgage credit. As millions of
returning war veterans sought adequate housing accommodations, a feverish
scramble for existing stocks of both rental- and single-family units soon
developed. Critical housing shortages appeared in many areas, and de-
mands for new home construction reached unprecedented levels. Accord-
ingly, in 1950 alone, 1.4 million new dvelling units were completed, a
volume over half again as high as the peak level of the 1920s.
While the postwar housing boom in the Boston area has perhaps been
less spectacular than in other sections of the country, new construction
activity has surpassed all previous records, both in terms of number of
units as well as total estimated cost. Although current mortgage port-
folios of local thrift institutions reflect highly inflated property
valuations, new lending has attained record heights in number of loans
as well as dollar amount. The growth in mortgage holdings of local sav-
ings banks, savings and loan associations, and trust companies has been
2
indicated in Table I. Before considering the postwar operations of these
major lender groups.in greater detail, it may be helpful to present the
overall distribution of mortgage debt held by all mortgagees in this area.
Unfortunately, until findings of the 1950 Census on home mortgages are
available, any analysis of significent shifts in mortgage holdings or loan
contracts over the past decade will lack full statistical verification.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE OUTSTANDING MORTGAGE DEBT
Although Census data are incomplete as of this writing, a rich source
lSee Table III, Part II.
fP. 236.
of supplementary data has arisen as a by-product of Regulation X and
its enforcement by the Federal Reserve Board. Under the provisions of
this regulatory order, all lenders extending real estate credit (1) three
or more times, or (2) in amounts aggregating more than $5O,OCO a year are
required to register with the Federal Reserve Bank in their district. The
initial registration statement required lenders to specify the amount of
different types of mortgages held on May 31, 1951, together with the volume
of mortgages serviced for others. It should be strongly emphasized that
these data relate to mortgages held by local institutions, regardless of
the location of property underlying the debt, and accordingly do not neces-
sarily represent indebtedness in the restricted area under consideration.
This method of reporting corresponds to that used by the State Bank Com-
missioner in the various Annual Reports, but is unlike that of the Cen-
sus Bureau, where property location is used as the basis of classifica-
tion. The implications of this distinction are highly significant, and
will be taken up more fully in subsequent analyses of the secondary mort-
gage market. At this point, it is sufficient to point out that, although
the four counties for which these data are available represent but 1.9
per cent of the nation's population, their mortgage holdings account for
fully 3 per cent of the aggregate nonfarm residential mortgage debt.
This observation reflects the national significance of Boston as a mort-
gage money center with its vast amounts of life insurance company and
savings bank funds.
For the purposes of the present analysis, four counties in north-
eastern Massachusetts are considered, the population of -which is 82 per
cent within the "Metropolitan Boston Area" as defined by the 1950 Census.
As of May 31, 1951, there were 786 individuals or institutions which indi-
cated that they either owned or serviced mortgages, as defined above.
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(See Table IV.) These registrants held about $2.2 billion in mortgages
for their own account, and serviced an additional $92 million for others.
In terms of number of registrants," real estate brokers" constituted the
largest single lender type, although in terms of mortgage holdings they
were of minor significance. These and Other types of brokers strive to-
minimize portfolio holdings, preferring to concentrate on other phases
of their real estate operations. Indeed, over half of such agents regis-
tering with the Federal Reserve in New England held no mortgages whatever
1
in mid-1951. Especially in other parts of the country, such non-
portfolio lenders are engaged in extensive servicing operations for dis-
tant mortgagees, and even in the local area they account for 82 per cent
2
of the limited amount of "servicing for others."
On the basis of dollar value, four groups of institutional lenders
dominate mortgage holdings in this area, accounting for nearly 99 per cent
of the total outstanding debt held by all registrants in mid-1951. Mutual
savings banks constituted the largest block, holding 4l.1 per cent of the
residential mortgage debt and 36.7 per cent of the grand total mortgage
debt. (See Table IV.) Insurance companies were not far behind, holding
22.2 per cent and 31.6 per cent of these respective totals. The signifi-
cantly higher showing of insurance companies in the grand total, of course,
reflects the relatively more important role of loans on farm and commercial
properties in their respective portfolios. This is in direct contrast to
local federal savings and loan associations and cooperative banks, which
held 28.6 per cent of the residential mortgage debt but only 22.3 per cent
of the aggregate debt. As the fourth major type of institutional lender
in the local mortgage market, comnercial banks held 6.9 per cent of the
lSee "Mortgage Holdings of New England Lenders," Monthly Review, Federal
Reserve-Bank of Boston, February 1952, p. 6.
2The economic factors underlying this geographic variation in servicing
operations are explained in Part VII.
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total residential debt and 8.1 per cent of the aggregate mortgage debt.
TABLE' IV. NUMBER OF REGISTRANTS, PRINCIPAL TYPES OF MORTGAGES HFID,
AND VOLUME OF MORTGAGES SERVICED BY EACH LENDER GROUP IN
FOUR MASSACHUSETTS COUNTIES,* MAY 31, 1951
Typeof Lender
Commercial
. Banks
No.
Mortgages (in Million of Dollars)
Resi- Farm Other TotalAServiced
dential Property Property for
Property Others
63 $115.5 $ 0.5 $ 62.1 $178.9 $ 3.5
Trust Depart-
ments of Com-
mercial Banks
12
Savings Banks 69
Federals and 105
Cooperative
Banks
Life Insurance
Companies
Sales Finance
Companies
Small Loan
Companies
Mortgage
Companies
Mortgagex
Brokers
Real Estate
BrokersX
Builders
Contractors
Schools, etc.
Investors
Trustees
All Others
Total
1.6
689.1
479.0
7 371.9
0.0
1.4
30
306
0.9 2.5 1.7
0.5 114.0 803.7 0.9
0.0 10.4 489.5 2.0
96.4 226.3 694.6 6.5
0.0
0.0
0.3
2.0 . 0.0
0.2
0.1
1.0
4.5
0.2
0.0
786 $1,676.3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.6
0.0
0.2
1.1
0.3
0.6
0.1 0.0
4.2 0.2
0.3 29.1
2.6 46.1
0.2 0.1
0.1
1.2 -
5.6 0.1
0.5 0.3
.1 1.5
97.5 $417.0 $2,190.7 92.0
Source: Registration Reports from Federal Reserve 3bank of Boston.
K Figures may not add up to stated totals because of rounding.
* Includes Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, and Suffolk Counties.
x The distinguishing features of these three groups are not always clear.
Real estate brokers generally bring the buyer and seller together, whereas
mortgage brokers bring borrower and lender together; mortgage companies
invest funds either on their own account or for the account of others, but
usually hold mortgages for short periods of time only. Since some firms
perform all three of these functions, classification is not always uniform,
and hence a joint category would perhaps be preferable for purposes of
analysis.
Ave. Res.
Mortgage
Portfolio
$ 1.84
0.13
9.99
4.56
53.13
0.01
0.02
0.20
0.01
0.01
O.01
0.01
0.20
0.10
0.03
0.09
$ 2.13
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The remaining 1.2 per cent of the mortgage debt was held by a variety of
registrant'types, notably trust departments of banks, mortgage companies,
1
and individual investors. It is quite likely that the role of individual
investors is understated in these data, inasmuch as a great many home sellers
or builders are forced to take back small second purchase-money mortgages in
order to make a sale. Since such individuals may lend only infrequently and
in small volume, their operations do not warrant registration under Regula-
tion X. No specific data are available on this matter, but the role of
individuals in recording new mortgages indicates that their mortgage hold-
2
ings are qnite significant in the aggregate.
As explained above, these data on mortgage holdings do not necessarily
reflect the relative importance of the various registrant types in local
lending activity. life insurance companies in particular strive to main-
tain a mortgage portfolio with national coverage, seeking to place loans
on properties where net yields are optimal. As indicated in Table VI,
new lending operations of all insurance companies, whether they be or-
ganized locally or elsewhere, are of minor significance so far as local
home properties are concerned. In 1940 all insurance companies held but
2.3 per cent of the total mortgage debt on 1- to h-family, owner-occupied'
properties in the Boston Metropolitan District,3 and it is doubtful if this
percentage share has increased substantially during the postwar period.
1
The concentration of mutual savings banks in the Northeast is demonstrated
by comparing the above mortgage distribution with that of the nationwide
1- to h-family mortgage debt. In 190,, the $6.9 billion debt was held
as follows: savings banks, 8.2 per cent; insurance companies, 17.9 per
cent; savings and loan associations 29.3 per cent; commercial banks,
20.2 per cent; and individuals and others, 24.4 per cent. Survey of
Current Business, October 1950.
2 See Table VI.
3 Table III.
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Hence, the fact that locall-y organized life insurance companies in 1951 held
22.2 per cent of the residential mortgage debt and a substantially higher
share of the aggregate mortgage debt does not imply a corresponding domi-
nance in local mortgage activity.
It has become increasingly necessary to make a similar allowance for
mortgage holdings of Massachusetts savings banks. Since 1949, when these
institutions were authorized to make a limited investment in mortgages on
out-of-state properties, the non-local component of their mortgage port-
folios has risen sharply. Consequently, the fact that the 69 savings
banks held 4l.1 per cent of the total residential mortgage debt slightly
overstates their relative prominence in the local area by virtue of their
2
acquisition of $100 million in out-of-state mortgages. Similar to life
insurance companies, national banks have always been free to make mortgage
investment without regard to geographic location, but the extent of their
out-of-state lending activity is not known.
Of the four major mortgagee groups, only savings and loan associations
have depended upon local mortgage demands almost entirely in maintaining their
portfolios. Although some large federal savings and loan associations are
becoming increasingly interested in outside mortgages, the primary focus
of most associations concerns placing loans in their immediate communities.
Cooperative banks are perhaps more circumscribed in their geographic cover-
age, both by custom and statute, than any other major type of lender.
In summary, the fact that some, but not all, local lending institu-
tions are permitted to make mortgage investment anywhere in the country has
tended to distort their relative importance on the local level. Although
lSee Table IV. ctually only 6 of the 7 companies reported mortgage port-
folios in 1951, all of which are located in Suffolk County (Boston).
2See Part VII.
3For specific reference to this localization, see "Lending Area" below.
such an inter-regional flow of mortgage credit constitutes a two-way
avenue, existing supply-demand relationships have resulted in a minimum
amount of capital inflow into this money market center. Perhaps most of
this latter activity arises out of mortgages originated or purchased
through loan correspondents of outside life insurance companies. Al-
though this activity is relatively small in the aggregate, its competi-
tive influence in the local market has been quite significant at various
times, especially where the refinance of well-seasoned mortgages is con-
cerned.
TABLE V. PE:CENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF OR TGAGES
HELD BY THE MAJOR LENDING GROUPS, IN FOUR MASSACHUSETTS
COUNTIES, MAY 31, 1951
Type of Lender
Type of Commercial Savings Federals Life Total
ortgage Banks (incl. Banks and Coop. .Insurance
Trust Dept.) Banks Companies
Residential 64.9% 85.7% 97.9' 53.6% 76.5%
Property
FHA-insured 12.4 9.7 1.2 16.8 10.2
VA-guaranteed 13.6 24.8 32.0 8.0 20.0
Conventional 38.9 51.2 64.7 28.8 46.3
Farm Property 0.2 0.1 0.0 13.9 4.4
All other Property 34.9 14.2 2.1 32.5 19.1
Grand Total 100.0 100.0 1C0.0 1C0.0 100.0
Source: Table IV.
Types of Mortgaged Properties
Loans on residential properties predominate in the portfolios of all
major lender types and in mid-1951 accounted for 76.5 per cent of aggre-
gate mortgage holdings. (See Table V). This proportion mould be signi-
ficantly higher if it were not for the substantial investment by insurance
companies in loans on farm and commercial properties, ordinarily located
outside the Boston area. Savings and loan associations more than any
1See "Rate Cutting" below.
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other group concentrate almost exclusively on small residential properties,
writh such loans constituting 97.9 per cent of their respective mortgage
holdings in 1951. Loans on commercial properties ,re perhaps less impor-
tant among all local mortgage portfolios than would be expected in view of
the high rate of construction activity 'in this field. This development
perhaps reflects the use by business of retained earnings and other sources
of funds as well as the introduction of novel financing methods, such as
special sale and lease-back schemes. On the other hand, many local lending
institutions, particularly anong the savings banks, have abandoned their
previous high esteem for large income-property loans where servicing costs
are admittedly minimized but where overall risk may be significantly higher. 2
A policy of preferring loans on small residential properties with few ex-
ceptions appears to have been widely followed among most lenders in the
postwar period. Such a policy has not been difficult to pursue in view
of the unprecedented wave of new home construction and the attendant de-
mands for home mortgage credit since 1946.
NEY MORTGAGE LENDING SINCE 1946
Combined mortgage portfolios of savings banks, cooperative banks,
federals, and trust companies in the Boston vicinity have nearly doubled
in the postwar period, rising from $719 million in 1946 to an estimated
3$1,260 million in 1951. During this 5-year span, the volume of loans made
to finance new construction as well as the purchase of older properties has
far exceeded gross inflows of repayment sums. This phenomenal rise in out-
1
"Mortgage Holdings of New England Lenders," Monthly Review, February 1952,
p. 6.
2 See "Loan Amounts and Properties Mortgaged, " Chapter 12.
3Table I above. Mortgage portfolios of trust companies are taken at roughly
$60 million.
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standing debt has taken place despite the increasing importance of com-
pulsory amortization payments on a monthly basis. Complete data on new
lending operations are not available for the immediate Boston vicinity alone,
but mortgage recordings of principal lender groups have been tabulated for
the four Massachusetts counties referred to earlier. These data have been
collected on a county basis by the Boston Home Loan Bank, taking the weekly
figures on mortgage recordings as reported by the Banker and Tradesman.
So that the influence of loans on commercial and large residential proper-
ties are minimized, only mortgage recordings of $20,000 or less have been
considered in this tabulation. Furthermore, it should be repeated that
although the included counties are the same in either case, the data in
Table VI refer to loans on local properties whereas Federal Reserve data
in Table 1V relate only to aggregate mortgage holdings of local institu-
tions. Furthermore, data on mortgage recordings do not necessarily re-
present the acquisition of new mortgages, as a significant proportion un-
doubtedly results from the transfer of property from one mortg'agor to
another with the total debt remaining relatively unchanged.
These data in Table VI as well as the accompanying Chart II demon-
strate- the varying degrees to which local lending institutions have parti-
cipated in the recent housing boom. Since the immediate postwar days, at
which time lending patterns for the four counties corresponded quite closely
with those for the entire Commonwealth,1 some institutions have actively
expanded mortgage portfolios while others have remained relatively dormant.
Except during early 1949, total recordings by all mortgage lenders in-
creased every year both in number as well as dollar volume. Much of this
advance in dollar volume, however, merely reflects rising real estate
1Cf. Table II, p. 251.
TABLE VI TOTAL VOLUME AiONG VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF MORTGAGE RECORDINGS OF $20,000 OR LESS ON NONFARM
PRQPERTIES IN FOUR MASSACHUSETTS COUNTIES,* MIDYEAR 1946 - EARLY 1952
(DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS)
52-Week Member Of Home Loan Bank
Period Cooperative Savings Fedleral
Through Banks Banks Savings &
Loan Ass hs
16,036
80,985
17,795
87.866
15,712
82,193
17,245
90,128
16,927
100,285
7/26/47
No.
Amt. $
7/31/48
No.
Amt. $
7/30/49
No.
Amt. $
7/29/50
. No.
Amt. $
7/28/51
No.
Amt. $
26 Wedcs
thu
2/2/52
No.
Amt. $
Source: Banker
*~ Essex~
1,1422
10,813
1,369
10,623
406
3,164
and Tradesman,
5, 274
35,505
5,459
38,180
5,485
38,827
6,273
45,379
5,972
48,009
3,275
26, 201
Non-Members of
Cooperative Savings~
Banks Banks
4,673
20,084
4,899
20,706
4,1)43
17,982
3,368
15,606
2,959
16,265
1,633
9,536
16,821
102,107
19,675
122,253
19,775
128,841
21,893
146,415
23,991
178,590
12,926.
99,786
Home Loan Bank
Commercial Individuals
~~anks
5,003
32,139
5,001
31,471
4,111
26,463
4,559
28,777
4,210
29,091
2,232
15,810
and Others
11,1465
49,313
11,580
49,235
11,435
48,299
11,715
49,417
11,332
53,274
5,752
25,773
Total
59,272
320,133
63,1409
349,711
60,614
342,605
66,475
386,533
66,760
436,137
34,524
231,935
compiled on county basis by Home Loan Bank of Boston.
Middlesex Norfolk, and Suffolk Counties. banks in 1951., , fJ- Included in data for member cooperative banks; there were two member savings
8,-300
51,668
prices, for during the 5-year period ending July 1951, total dollar record-
ings increased 36.2 per cent while the number of loans written rose only
12.6 per cent. The pattern of mortgage recordings has followed to some
extent the course of new home construction, with a temporary decline in both
indices occuring during-the recession of early 1949. During the year end-
ing July 1949, the number of mortgages recorded by cooperative banks and
commercial banks was fully 2D per cent below the level of the preceding
52-week period, and the upward drift in new lending among savings banks
and federal savings and loan associations was temporarily retarded.
COOPERATIVE BANKS
Local cooperative banks have invested an increasing proportion of
their share capital in home mortgage loans. From a level of $204.3 million
in 19h6, mortgage portfolios of these 76 institutions increased to $273.8
million by 1951, representing an advance in mortgage-assets ratios from
74.5 to 79.6 per cent. 'Despite this active participation in postwar
mortgage lending, cooperative bank recordings have represented a diminish-
ing share of aggregate recordings, this share having fallen from 29 per
2
cent in 1946 to 27.4 per cent by late 1951. This relative decline largely
reflects the vigorous, mortgage programs of competing institutions, notably
federal savings and loan associations and savings banks.
Cooperative banks continue to function primarily as local community
institutions, operating on a modest scale and lending on small residen-
tial properties. In 1951 average mortgage holdings were $3.6 million,
while at least 11 of the 76 local banks had portfolios of less than $1
Cf. p. 55.
2Table VI.
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PERSCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG MAJOR LENDITG GROUPS OF MORTGAGE
RECORDINGS OF $20,000 OR LESS ON NONFARM PROPERTIES IN FOUR
MASSACH-SETTS COUNTIES, MIIiCEAR 19h6 - EARLY 1952
CHART II.
4A0
/95-a /97-/c9?/f
Year
Source: Table VI
Mortgage recordings for Home Loan Bank member savings banks estimated
from available data.
F~d~4/~v~ 9 ~/ ', X."~tdo~
60'
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million. Although cooperative banks are authorized to make 8G per cent
loans up to $20,000, they concentrate primarily on less ex-pensive proper-
ties, generally located in a community adjacent to the bank office.
Average loan amounts have consistently been less than the average for all
2
lenders, ordinarily by a margin of at least 10 per cent.
Direct-reduction loans dominate the mortgage portfolios of local coop-
erative banks, accounting for 92 per cent of aggregate holdings in 1951.
Roughly one-third of these loans were partially guaranteed by the VA,
while FHA-insured loans represented less than 1 per cent of the total.
The traditional cooperative form loan has continued to decline in signifi-
cance as a result of gradual retirement and recasting on a direct-reduction
basis. By 1951, such loans constituted 6.5 per cent of aggregate mort-
gage holdings, with practically none being written during the entire post-
war period. Most of the local bank officials interviewed indicate that a
few of these old-fashioned mortgages remain on their books, but that
every effort is being made to eliminate them. The added interest returns,
received by virtue of the differential between dividend and mortgare in-
terest rates, is insufficient to compensate for the extra administrative
costs involved in holding a small volume of such loans. Frequently it is
extremely difficult to convince existing mortgagors that the share-
accumulation mortgage subjects them to unnecessary expense and risk. In-
stead of accepting a rewritten contract specifying a definite maturity date
and total debt service, these die hards prefer the old pledged serial share
method of accumulating a separate repayrment reserve until the entire debt
is retired.
lSee "Lending Area" below.
2Table VII, Page 274.
3See Part VI.
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TABLE VII. AVERAGE LOAN AMOUNTS ON MORTGAGES OF $20,00 OR LESS RECORDED
BI VARIOUS LbiNERS IN FOUR MASSA3HUSETTS COUNTIES, IJDIEAR
1946 - EARLY 1952.
(Thousands of Dollars)
52-Week Cooperative Federal Savings Commercial Individuals
Period Banks Savings & Loan Banks Banks and Total
Through Assodiations Others
7/26/47 $ 4.88 $ 6.73 $ 6.07 $ 6.42 h.30 $ 5.40
7/31/48 4.78 6.99 6.21 6.29 h.25 5.52
7/30/49 5.04 7.08 6.52 6.h4 h.22 5.62
7/29/50 5.12 7.23 6.75 6.31 4.22 5.82
7/28/51 5.87 8.04 7.47 6.91 4.70 6.53
2/2/52* 6.16 8.00 7.72 7.09 h.48 6.72
Source: Table VI. Data for the first three periods .on cooperative banks
includes member savings banks.
26-week period only.
Straight-term mortgages are of negligible importance among local coop-
erative bank portfolios. Purchase-money mortgages arising out of depression
foreclosure sales have been largely retired, end converted mortgages have
never been widely sought by holders of amortized loans. Mortgage delin-
quency appears to have risen slightly during recent years, as "mortgages
on vhich principal payments are temporarily suspended" doubled between
early 1950 and 1951. Delinquency was not a serious problem in the latter
year, however, as such loans represented but 0.5 per cent of aggregate
portfolios, compared with a peak ratio of 6 per cent in 1936.
Although cooperative banks ordinarily write smaller mortgare loans
than any other major lender type, average loan amounts have followed upward
movements in market valuations rather closely. Average new loan amounts in-
creased from $4.88 thousand in 1946 to $5.87 thousand in 1951, while average
1
outstanding balances advanced from $3.28 thousand to $4.20 thousand. In-
deed, whenever amortized loans predominate, average loan amounts on new
mortgages tend to exceed average outstanding balances so long as market
1Table VII and Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
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valuations are not declining.. As might be expected, loan amounts tend to
be considerably higher among those banks which are also members of the Home
Loan Bank System. Nonmembers tend to be included among the smallest banks
in the area, and have perhaps participatedless actively in securing new
mortgages.
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
In the postwar period, operations of local federals have evidenced
the same active interest in expanding mortgage por tfolios that has char-
acterized their operations since the mid-193Cs. Except during the war
years, mortgage holdings have mounted more rapidly than share capital,
and short-term advances from the Home Loan Bank have frequently been used
for supplementary mortgage credit. During the first 5 postwar years,
mortgage portfolios nearly doubled to $166 million and mortgage-assets
ratios rose from 71 to 83 per cent. In 1951 average mortgage holdings
among the 15 federals were slightly above $11 million, over 3 times the
corresponding average holdings of cooperative banks.
In spite of this spectacular postwar growth, however, federals in the
local four- county region have not strengthened their relative position in
terms of dollar mortgage recordings. As seen in Table VI, in each postwar
year through 1951, federals consistently accounted for approximately 11 per
cent of total dollar recordings. These dollar recordings reflect the con-
tinuing upward trend in property valuations, for the number of recordings
in 1951 was but 13 per cent above the corresponding number in 1946. If
data were available for the immediate Boston area alone, lending operations
of federals would perhaps appear more significant in every year because of
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a relatively heavy concentration of these associations within the restricted
10-mile area.
Federal savings and loan associations have taken full advantage of
their liberal mortgage lending opportunities, especially with regard to
making 60 per cent loans up to $20,000 without limit. Furthermore, they
have conducted extensive merchandising programs, and have taken an active
2
role in financing new home construction. A heavy concentration of.high-
percentage loans on expensive' as well as low-cost home properties has ac-
counted for relatively large average loan amounts. As shown in Table VII,
average principal amounts have consistently been higher among federals than
among any other major lender type, this margin being at least 20 per cent
above the corresponding cooperative bank level. As in the case of coopera-
tive banks, however, average outstanding balances are undoubtedly con-
siderably smaller than new loan amounts, for full amortization is required
on nearly all mortgages held by federals.
SAVINGS BANIES
Perhaps the most significant development in the postwar mortgage market
has concerned the rejuvenated interest in mortgage lending among local mutual
savings banks. In a complete reversal of investment policy, these institu-
tions abandoned their 15-year virtual withdrawal from the market and re-
bounded with an unprecedented enthusiasm for this investment outlet. Dur-
ing the decade ending 1946, total assets of the 56 savings banks in the
Boston vicinity rose steadily from $1.16 billion to $1.62 billion, while
mortgage portfolios dropped from $483 to $381 million. At the end of this
period, mortgages accounted for only 23.5 per cent of total assets, with
government bonds occupying the predominant role.
lSee p. 257 above.
2
See 4Construction Lending" below.
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In contrast to the rayid growth of savings capital during the war years
when civilian buying was severely curtailed, the postwar period has wit-
nessed a much slower advance. During the 5 years ending October 1951, total
assets among the local savings banks increased by 13 per cent to $1,83 bil-
lion. This relatively minor increase in total resources undoubtedly re-
flects a far less significant advance in net savings inflows. Indeed,
among all savings banks in the Commonwealth, total deposit liabilities
have risen steadily during the postwar period, but for 3 successive years
through 1950 aggregate dividend payments on existing accounts exceeded the
gross increase in total deposits. The fact that cooperative banks and
federals enjoyed a net increase in share capital each year undoubtedly
stems in part fmm the rblatively higher dividend rates offered by these
2
institutions.
Against this background of slowly rising savings capital, local savings
banks have rapidly expanded mortgage portfolios. Indeed, during the first
5 postwar years, total mortgage holdings doubled in dollar volume to a
level of $761.7 million by October 1951. Inasmuch as total resources had
increased by only $210 million during this interval, a significant propor-
tion of this new mortgare investment entailed substantial declines in gov-
ernment bond portfolios. While home mortgages appeared to be an attractive
investment for local savings banks, new government bond issues declined
abruptly after the end of the war. In addition to their increasing avail-
ability, new mortgages and private securities, by virtue of their relatively
high yields, offered local institutions an opportunity to reverse the steady
decline in bank earnings. Until early 1951 at least, conversion of govern-
ment portfolios was accomplished, with a minimal sacrifice, as the federal
bond support program assured their sale at a premium. Since this artificial
supportwas removed, however, shifting of assets from bond to mortgage
Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
2See "Dividend Returns" in Part III.
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portfolios has involved the possibility of substantial capital losses on
the former.
The consequent shift in investment portfolios among local savings
banks is readily demonstrated by changing mortgage-assets ratios as well
as by data on new lending operations. From the historic low level of
23.5 per cent in 1946, mortgage-assets ratios mounted steadily to 41.6
per cent.by 1951. During the same 5-year period, average mortgage hold-
ings of local banks doubled to a level of $13.6 million, and average
residential portfolios of banks in the entire four-county area had reached
2
nearly $10 million by mid-1951.
In the local four-county region, savings banks have become increasingly
dominant in financing the purchase of local home properties. As indicated
in Table VI and Chart II, the share of total mortgage recordings of $20,CCO
or less represented by savings bank lending rose from an estimated 34.5 per
cent in 1946 to 44.5 per cent by late 19,L. In every respect, the role of
these institutions in the mortgage market has advanced more rapidly than
that.of any other type of lender. Whereas cooperative banks and particu-
larly federals had dominated new mortgage lending during the prewar re-
covery period, savings banks had once again surpassed the combined dollar
recordings of these institutions by early 1949. In terms of dollar volume,
the rate of new mortgage recordings by savings banks in late 1951 was
nearly twice that of 1946. Furthermore, savings banks were alone among the
various institutions in recording a successively larger number of new loans
in each postwar year. The average loan amount on new mortgages appears to
1This eventuality was especially applicable to certain large insurance com-
panies which had vast sums pre-committed ibr investment in low-yielding VA
and FHA loans at the time when the government bond market dropped.
2Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks; and Table IV. Although
data on average residential holdings are not available for federals alone,
it appears as if these values are roughly the same for local federals and
saving2s banks; in terms of average total resources, however, the latter are
more than twice as large.
The rather substantial difference between average residential and average
total mortgage holdings reflects in part the influence of large income-
property loans in the latter. Perhaps a more significant factor, however,
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have corresponded rather closely with rising home prices, advancing nearly
30 per cent over the 5-year interval.
The unprecedented volume of new mortgage lending by local savings banks
includes not only loans on local residential properties, but also an in-
creasing volume of out-of-state home loans as well as some large income-
property loans. Local banks have recently made substantial purchases of
insured and guaranteed loans in the secondary market, with the pledged
properties being located primarily in the South and Southwest. This out-
of-state mortgage investment largely accounted for the accelerated increase
in mortgage-assets ratios between 1949 and 1951. As reported in their
published annual reports, the aggregate dollar volume of new loans made by
local savings banks has increased steadily during each postwar year. As
early as 1946, new loans had surpassed the previous all-time highs re-
corded in the 1920s, and by 1951 this volume had reached $228.1 million.
This latter volume was nearly as large as the combined mortgage portfolios
of all 76 cooperative banks in the Boston vicinity, and was 10 times the
corresponding volume recorded by savings banks in 1936.
While new mortgage loans were being made at 4n unprecedented rate,
.aggregate portfolios increased at a more moderate pace as a result of heavy
repayment inflows. During periods of rising incomes and employment, mort-
gagors frequently accelerate mortgage principal repayment wherever possible.
1see Part VII. During this 2-year span, mortgage-assets ratios jumped
from 28.9 to 1.6 per cent.
2is the difference in geographic coverage of the two figures; the $lC
million average refers to all savings banks in the four-county area,
whereas the 13.6 value is restricted to banks within the immediate Boston
vicinity and thus affords added weight to the importance of the large
Boston banks.
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Furthermore, homes are more commonly resold during boom periods, with the
result that existing mortgages are prepaid and perhaps taken elsewhere by
the new buyers. Existing portfolios are also trimmed down by a continual
inflow of regular amortization payments, a requirement on most new loans.
(See Table VIII.)
TABLE VIII. PCSTWIAR MORTGAGE LING ACTIVITY OF SAVINGS BANKS IN THE
BOSTON AREA, 1946-1951.
(Dbllar Amounts in Millions)
Year Portfolio at New Loans New Loans Gross Year Net
Ending beginning Written Beginning Repayment Ending Increase
October of Year Portfolio Port-
folio
1946 ~ .0 $ 92.0 - - $380.8 -
1947 $3RO 99.8 26.2% $73.7 406.9 $ 26.1
1948 4009. 101.7 25.0 58.8 449.8 42.9
1949 449; 111.9 24.9 62.1 499.6 49.8
1950 49!6 208.1 41.7 84.1 623.6 124.c
1951 63i67 228.1 36.6 90.0 761.7 138.1
1952 76.7 - - - -
Source: Computed from Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
During the war years, outstanding average loan balances decreased
steadily, reflecting a combination of heavy principal repayment on existing
holdings and a small volume of new lending. In the postwar period, however,
new loans have dominated savings bank portfolios and average balances have
evidenced a steady upward tendency, rising from $6.03 thousand in 1946 to
$7.28 thousand by 1951. Original principal amounts on these new mortgages
have followed the general upward movement 'in reel estate prices quite
closely, and have thus tended to increase averagre loan balances. The f act
that new loan amounts on small residential properties have been only slightly
larger than average outstanding balances reflects in large part the pre-
ponderance of relatively unseasoned mortgages among the portfolios of local
1
thrift institutions. The existence of substantial holdings of large income-
property loans among certain savings banks also accounts for a relatively
high average outstanding loan balance.
1Cf. Table VII.
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Whereas savings and loan associations insist on full amortization in
nearly all mortgage contracts, the traditional straight-term instrument
continues to occupy an important position among the mortgage portfolios
of many savings banks. As late as 1947, such 60 per cent loans still re-
presented 39.1 per cent of total real estate loans held by all savings
banks in assachusetts. When considering new lending alone, direct-reduction
loans are undoubtedly far more significant, owing in large part to the pre-
dominance of loans on small home properties. Many banks, nevertheless, are
still reluctant to write high-percentage, long-term contracts unless the
loan is partially guaranteed by the VA. In 1947, conventional 80 per cent,
20-year loans accounted for a negligible 0.4 per cent, and 75 per cent,
10- to 20-year loans another h.h per cent of aggregate mortgage holdings
2
of all savings banks in the Commonwealth.
COIj ERCIAL BANKS
In terms of home mortgage recordings, commercial banks have steadily
declined in relative importance since 1946. As indicated in Chart II, the
share of total dollar recordings accounted for by national banks and trust
companies fell from 10.04 per cent in 1946 to 6.67 per cent in 1951. Lend-
ing operations of these institutions declined in absolute terms as vell,
for mortgage recordings in 1951 were 16 per cent less in number and 10
per cent less in dollar volume than in 19L6.
1See Part VI.
2These data refer to all savings banks in Massachusetts. From Eutual
-Savings Central Fund, reported in a survey conducted by the Worcester
County Institution for Savings, 1948. It will be shown later in the
study that there is reason to believe that liberal conventional mortgages
are more prominent today than in the early postwar period, especially in
regard to new construction.
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Although new lending operations were on a modest scale, mortgage-
assets ratios among local trust companies rose steadily during the early
postwar period, largely because of the sharp decline in savings capital.
Indeed, between 1946 and 1950, total assets of these savings departments
fell 20 per cent to $154 million hile mortgage portfolios advanced over
25 per cent to $60 million. As a result of this combination, the average
mortgage-assets ratio increased from 24.4 to 39.0 per cent.
1
Among the major lender types, mortgage holdings of comiercial banks
are perhaps least concentrated in the hands of large lenders. Within the
local four-county region, average holdings of residential mortgages anong
the 63 commercial banks were $1.83 million, compared ith an average of
$6.78 million for the four major lender groups. In terms of aggregate
holdings of all types of mortgages, the corresponding average amounts were
2
$2.83 and $8.88 million, respectively. As stated earlier, some of the
largest trust companies in Boston have no savings departments whatever
and time deposits of the largest national banks are relatively small.
Most of their participation in the real estate market concerns the fi-
nancing of large-scale housing projects where the permanent mortgages are
taken by other mortgage lending institutions. Only in suburban communi-
ties where conventional thrift institutions are less predominant do com-
mercial banks play a significant role in the local long-term mortgage market.
Indeed, in 1950 only three trust companies in the Boston area held over $5
million in mortgages, and of these banks none was located in Boston proper.3
Furthermore, out of 510 commercial banks in New England, only three with
1The decline in total savings deposits deposits is discussed in Part III
under "Dividend Returns.
2See Table IV. The former value corresponds quite closely with average
holdings of local trust companies in December 1950, the latter value being
$2.74 million, Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
3The largest portfolio had loans amounting to $12 million. Annual Report,
Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
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combined portfolios of $139 million held over $25 million in mortgages
of all types.
Average loan aounts on new mortgages written by commercial banks have
consistently exceeded the average for all lenders, but this margin has
narrowed substantially since 1946. (See Table VII.) Perhaps this narrow-
ing margin reflects a policy of approving relatively large loan requests
only where such amounts bear a conservative ratio to appraised property
values. Furthermore, these institutions, generally less anxious to enlarge
portfolios than other lenders, have perhaps refused to permit current in-
flated market valuations to dominate their appraisals. Consequently,
average loan amounts have risen very slowly during the recent expansionary
period.
Specific information is not available as to the various types of mort-
gage contracts written by commercial banks. In communities where compe-
titive conditions appear favorable, these institutions function much as
any other thrift institution in making popular high-percentage, direct-
reduction loans. In other communities where savings banks and savings
and loan associations predominate, commercial banks are less ambitious
in their mortgage operations and frequently refer business to these com-
peting institutions.. One local trust'company visited continues to write
2
only 60 per cent demand mortgages, except for a few VA-guaranteed loans.
INDIVIDUALS AND OTHERS
In terms of mortgage recordings the miscellaneous "individuals and
others" category has steadily declined in relative importance since the
immediate postwar period. The share of total dollar recordings repre-
sented by this category dropped from 15.h per cent in 1946 to 11.1 per cent
1
"Mortgage Holdings of New England Lenders," op. cit., p. 7. Undoubtedly
a significant proportion of these mortgages were on distant properties.
2 The mortgage officer of this bank realizes that this old-fashioned mortgage
(Footnote continued)
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in late 1951. The dollar volume of such recordings has not kept pace 'with
rising market valuations, and the annual number of loans made has declined
somewhat since the early postwar era.
It is interesting to note that this catch-all group includes mortgage
lenders at the two extremes in terms of asset size. At one extreme are
the various insurance companies which occasionally make mortgage loans on
local properties. As explained earlier, these companies figure prominently
in aggregate nationwide mortgage holdings, but are of negligible importance
in this money market center. As concluded from scattered information
available, life insurance companies make approximately 2 per cent of all
home loans in the local four-county region.1 At the opposite extreme are
the various individual lenders who operate in the mortgage market for a
variety of reasons. Their mortgage activities are generally confined to
making small loans, frequently involving either a purchase-money mortgage
or an ordinary second mortgage. Individuals undoubtedly dominate this
miscellaneous category and largely account for the fact that averag;e loan
2
amounts are substantially below the average for all lenders.
This impression is confirmed by tabulations taken from Banker and Tradesman
by the local Home Loan Bank.
2The average home loan made by insurance companies is comparable in amount
with that of federals and savings banks. From data compiled by Metropoli-
tan Mortgage Bureau.
is outdated, but prefers its simplicity. Moreover, he feels that borrowers
should have enough "confidence'" i:the bank to realize that repayment would
not be called for at an inopportine moment.
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CHAPTER 11. PRICE OF HOME MORTGAGE GREDIT
The remaining two chapters in Part V are concerned with more de-
tailed analyses of the postwar lending practices and policies of local
mortgage lending institutions. The present chapter will briefly re-
view available data on the various price elements associated with mort-
gage-financing. Some of the primary economic variables influencing the
determination of these price elements among the various institutions
will thence be analyzed in the succeeding chapter.
INTERFST RATES
Very little aggregate data are available to indicate either nominal
or effective interest rates charged on new mortgage loans. All inter-
viewed parties have discussed existing rate patterns freely, but it has
been extremely difficult to assemble more than informed impressions
about rates charged by all lenders in the local mortgage market. Over-
all trends in interest rates may be gathered from the annual reports
submitted by all state-chartered thrift institutions to the Massachusetts
Bank Commissioner. Accordingly, Tables IX and X indicating average con-
tract interest rates on aggregate mortgage holdings have been prepared
for savings banks and cooperative banks operating within the immediate
Boston area. The steady dowmward movement in average rates over the
past quarter century appears to have followed quite closely the path
charted by dividend rates as well as interest rates in other capital
markets.
Little data are available on interest rates charged by other mort-
gage lenders in the Boston area. The Housing Census of 19h0 tabulated
existing rates paid on single-family home loans by owner-occupants within
the Boston Metropolitan District. Unfortunately, findings ofthe(1950tesus
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TABLEX. AVERAGE CONTRACT RATES OF INTEREST ON REAL ESTATE LOANS HELD BY
COOPERATIVE BANKS IN THE BOSTON AREA, SELECTED 3EARS, 1927-1951
Average Number of Banks at Each Annual Reporting Date*
Rate of
Interest 1927 1936 19ho 1946 1947 19h8 1950 1951
4.oo-4.24 2 2 2 2 5
h.25-4.49 h 13 14 18 19
h.50-4.74 10 17 27 31 31
4.75-4.99 29 26 21 15 lh
5.00-5.24 7 17 12 9 6 5
5.25-5.49 1 2 13 11 h 2 2 2
5.50-5.74 71 56 4 2 2 2
5.75-5.99 25 15 6
6.00-6.2h 39 12 3 1 1
6.25-6.49 26
6.50-6.7h 8
6.75-6.99 3
7.0-7.24 1
Total 103 100 85 78 77 77 76 76
Average Rate 6.20 5.72 5.59 h.98 h.82 h.7h h.69 4.59
Ave. Dividend
Rate** 5.65 3.84 3.73 3.32 *3.23 3.20 3.19 3.17
Rate Spread .55 1.88 1.86 1.66 1.59 1.54 1.50 1.42
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
As of October 31, through 1948; as of April 30 thereafter.
Average dividend rates on serial shares for all banks in Massachusetts.
have not been published as yet, thereby precluding a definitive comparison
of the current with the prewar interest rate structure. Perhaps the most
striking observation of the 1940 picture is the similarity of rates charged
by the various lender types. Except for life insurance companies and the
HOEC, average rates ranged between 5.40 and 5.47 per cent for all groups.
As of 1940, all HOLC mortgages were written at rates of 4.50 per cent,
while the average rate among insurance companies was 5.C6 per cent. The
highest average rate among all lender groups was 5.47 per cent, charged
both by savings and loan associations and commercial banks. There is no
breakdown available to indicate rates charged by federals and cooperative
banks individually, but from interviews with various local officers there
appears to be little difference between these groups in the aggregate.
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Because of the paucity of relevant date, the following analysis of
interest rates refers primarily to local cooperative banks and savings banks.
TABLE X. AVERAGE CONTRACT RATES OF INTEREST ON REAL ESTATE IDANS HELD BY
SAVINGS BANKS IN THE BOSTON AREA, SELECTED YEARS, 1926-1951
Average Number of Banks at Each Annual Reporting Date*
Rate of
Interest 1927 1936 1940 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
3.75-3.99 4 5 4 3 4 2 1
4.00-4.24 2' 4 13 18 19 20 23 28
h.25-4.49 2 2 11 19 25 24 26 22
4.5o-4.74 3 5 18 11 7 6 3 3
4.75-4.99 1 7 6 2 2 2 2 2
5.00-5.24 5 12 3 2
5.25-5.49 1 26 21
5.50-5.74 2 14 2
5.75-599 19 1 1
6.00-6.24 36 1
6.25-6.49 1
Total 61 58 58 56 $6 56 56 56 56
Average Rate 5.99 5.28 4.96 4.45 4.33 4.31. 4.30 4.29 4.27
Average Dividend 4.70 2.87 2.33 1.86 1.90 1.97 2.03 2.19 2.32
Rate**
Rate Spread 1.29 2.41 2.63 2.59 2.43 2.34 2.27 2.10 1.95
Source: Annual Reports, -Massachusetts Comraissioner of Banks.
As of October 31.
* Average dividend rates for all savings banks in assachusetts.
A perusal of Tables IX and X suggests a few immediate observations.
First to be noted is the substantial decline in average interest rates,
continuing down through 1951. Between 1927 and 1951, average rates on
portfolios of local savings banks fell from 5.99 to .4.27 per cent, while
the corresponding decline among cooperative banks was from 6.20 to 4.59
per cent. If data were available on new loans alone, the decline would
be much sharper, for mortgage portfolios in any given year included many
loans which had been written in previous years of higher rates and were
still carried at those rates. Until recent years at least,, however, the
continuing decline in average interest rates has reflected in part a
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rewriting of such existing mortgages as well as the writing of new loans
at prevailing lower rates.
Although average interest rates have fallen steadily over the past
quarter century, corresponding rates among the individual institutions
have varied widely. This continuing phenomenon reflects variations in
mortgage lending policy as well as an unequal distribution of mortgage
origination and maturity dates in the portfolios concerned. The former
factor will be considered more fully in succeeding chapters, while the
latter will be briefly described here. As indicated earlier, since
new lending operations of local savings banks were sharply curtailed
during the prewar years, mortgage portfolios reflected an abundance of
loans still carried at the 6 per cent level of the 1920s. At the same
time, other savings banks were perhaps more active either in making new
loans or in rewriting existing mortgages, thereby accounting in part
for the wide variation in average rates both in 1936 and 1940. By the
postwar period, old high-rate loans were either rewritten or paid off
and, by 1951, 90 per cent of all loans lay in the 4 -41 per cent cate-
tory.
Cooperative bank datn have followed a somewhat different pattern.
By.1936, the upper extremes had been trimmed through refinance and re-
payment so that average rates covered a narrow 1 per cent range. During
the postwar years, however, this spread broadened ccnsiderably, with
average rates distributed over a range of l per cent. This reflects a
varying emphasis upon 4 per cent VA-guaranteed loans as well as a continuing
1Competitive aspects of writing down interest rates are analyzed more
fully in "Rate Cutting" below in Chapter 12.
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differential in interest rates charged on new conventional mortgages.
Many banks insist on a 5 per cent interest return on all new loans, while
others and most savings banks are quite willing to charge a lower h or
4 per cent rate. The reasons for as well as the consequences of these
continuing differentials will be brought out in subsequent analyses.
Although rates have continued to fall among all local institutions,
average interest rates charged by cooperative banks have consistently
exceeded those of savings banks. This margin has ranged from 0.21 per
cent in 1927 to 0.63 per cent in 1940. This significant differential is
due in part to the relative importance of income-property loans among the
portfolios of the larger savings banks, -where rates are generally up to
a full 1 per cent below conventional home mortgage rates. Costs of
servicing per dollar of loan amount are no doubt substantially lower on
2
large income-property loans than on single-family home loans. The ele-
ment of administrative cost may also account for an interest rate differ-
ential on small residential mortgages, inasmuch as savings banks wrot
most such loans on a straight-term basis until the postwar period.
Cooperative banks, on the other hand, have always arranged mortgage debt
service on a monthly basis, despite the admittedly more expensive servicing
procedures. In addition to a differential in administrative expense, there
is some evidence to indicate that home mortgages made by cooperative banks
tend to be associated with more substantial risk elements than correspond-
ing savings bank mortgages.
1 The fact that relatively few local banks had substantial holdings of
income property loans perhaps accounts in part for the wide variation
in average rates in 1936 and 1940. Cf. p. 287.
Cf. similarity of interest rates on single-family mortgage loans held
by savings and loan associations and savings banks in 1940 Census tabu-
lations. For the Boston Metropolitan District, average rates were 5.47
and 5.42 per cent, respectively.
3See Chapter 12.
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During the postwar period, average interest returns on the portfolios
of savings banks and cooperative banks have grown more closely together, the
absolute margin having declined from 0.52 per cent in 1946 to 0.32 pbr cent
in 1951. This development reflects in large part the prominent'pesition of
4 per cent VA-guaranteed home loans among the mortgage holdings of both types
of institutions. Moreover, certain of the- above factors accounting for the
continuing differentials are perhaps waning in significance. In the first
place, the recent expansion in mortgage portfolios of local savings banks
has been eoncentrated on small residential properties, because of relative
2
shifts in market demands as well as in bank investment policies.
In the second place, whereas amortization was required in little over
one-tenth of all residential loans made during the 1920s, it is now almost
universally specified in new loans written by savings banks.3 In the past,
such requirements were perhaps most common among loans on large income pro-
perties and least common among single-family loans. The increasing signi-
ficance of direct-reduction mortgages results in part from a universal
public preference for monthly debt service, especially in the purchase of
home properties. In addition, lenders have come to realize that overall
risk of mortgage loss tends to vary inversely with the extent of contractual
amortization provisions within their respective portfolios.4 At the present
time, amortization is required under provisions of Regulation X whenever
loan-value ratios exceed 50 per cent. The extent of this regular repayment
lSee Part VI.
2See tLoan Amounts and Properties Mortgaged," Chapter 12.
3Amortization was required in less than 12 per cent of the loans made
between 1918 nd 1931 included in the sample used by Professor Lintner,
op. cit.,-p. 410.
Among single-family loans made during the years 1918-1931, subsequent
losses were 30 per cent greater when no amortization was required than
otherwise. Ibid. p. 413.
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must either reduce outstanding principal balances 5 per cent each year
or fully liquidate the loan at maturity. Most institutions also require
that real estate taxes be included in aggregate monthly payments, while
hazard insurance premiums are frequently handled by the mortgagor directly
so long as no delinquency appears. The added expense involved ,in servicing
monthly-payment mortgages as compared with straight-term loans has not
been calculated precisely. Furthermore, even if the cost differential were
significant, it would be difficult to analyze its influence upon the narrow-
ing spread between savings bank and cooperative bank mortgage rates. To
partially offset a probable larger cost of servicing, the lender realizes
1
a higher nominal annual yield on monthly-payment type loans. At least
one local cooperative bank attempts to minimize administrative expense in
servicing direct-reduction loans through promoting a special cost-saving
arrangement. Although all mortgage contracts specify level monthly pay-
ments on the basis of a 5 per cent interest rate, borrowers from this
bank are afforded a 10- per cent discount in total interest charges by
agreeing to prepay on a quarterly basis. This scheme does not imply a
41 per cent rate of interest, however, because of a substantial prepay-
ment of both principal and interest.2 At any rate, the offering df this
1See Chapter 2 above.
2The precise extent of this discount over the entire repayment term can be
demonstrated by considering an illustrative case. Assume that the bank
makes a $1,000 loan on a 5 per cent, 20-year basis, calling for a contractual
monthly payment of $6.60. Ordinarily, total interest payments over the en-
tire loan term would amount to $58h. If the borrower agreed to prepay two
months' debt charges four times each year (i.e., pay $19.80 at the end of
the first, fourth, seventh, and tenth months, instead of $6.60 at the end
of each month), he would receive a 10 per cent "discount," equal to a total
of $58.4 in this case.
Inasmuch as the mortgagor prepays both principal and interest, the present
cost of each quarterly payment when made is necessarily larger than the ab-
solute amount of $19.80 paid. Assuming a 5 per cent "internal discount
rate" or "opportunity rate," the total effective cost of each payment when
made .would be $19.88: on the first such quarterly remittance, the cost of
the first month's payment would be exactly $6.6C; for the two prepaid
amounts, the present cost would be $6.6275[t-wo,* -)Jad d .g2ns&27- ,)
(Footnote continued)
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special discount has attracted new business to this bank and has minimized
the loss of choice loans to rival lenders through rewriting at lower rates.
OTIR FEES
As indicated in previous theoretical analyses, nominal interest rates
are but one fundamental factor determining total mortgage costs. Various
fees and special charges are generally required at the time of origination,
and many others may be levied in the event the mortgage contract is not ful-
filled as stipulated. That the combination of such fees may be equivalent
to a significant advance in effective interest rates has already been shown.
Almost without exception, local institutions insist that the prospective
mortgagor share in the costs entailed in processing the loan application,
and in inspecting the underlying property. Accordingly, many banks charge
an initial application fee of 10 or $2C, vhich may or may not be returned
2
in the event the mortgage request is rejected. Title search and other
legal fees constitute the major, element in this miscellaneous category,
ordinarily amounting to $75-$100 or roughly 1 per cent of the original
loan amount.
See Table I, Chapter 2.
2The Cooperative Bank League has urged its members to refund this fee only
if the request is granted, and not offer a free ride to any applicant who
has extreme difficulty in securing a loan and consequently makes an-attempt
at many institutions.
30perative builders are generally required to pay a flat fee of $3 - $5 per
unit for each bank inspection made during the construction period. On the
other hand, lenders appear to absorb the small costs involved in obtaining
a professional credit report on the borrower, whenever such a report is
deemed necessary.
respectively. The effective cost of these quarterly payments over the entire
20-year term would be '$1,591, with the interest component being $591. By
deducting the $58 discount, total effective interest charges mould become
$533 net. A total interest payment of $533 on a $1,000 loan over a 20-year
term is equivalent to a level monthly payment of $6.386. By interpolation,
the effective rate of interest is thus found to be 4.717 per cent.
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Some interviewed lenders express a preference for enlarging the extent
of these extra charges following the present policy of most commercial banks.
These- offici.als believe that each borrower should be assessed the full
amount of the direct costs entailed with the loan origination, with an aim
toward reducing nominal interest rates on all new loans. At the present
time, however, most lenders continue to absorb a substantial share of the
various origination costs, thereby reducing net yields below contract rates.
A local cooperative bank executive has estimated that it takes 9 months of
monthly interest payments before the non-shiftable origination costs are
covered.
In order to spread out these absorbed costs over a sufficiently long
period of time, many lenders impose special penalties whenever prepayment
exceeds a certain amount. A common practice is to permit prepayment up
to 15-20 per cent per year of the original principal amount without penalty.
Beyond that point, however, the mortgagor may be liable to a penalty equi-
valent to 1 - 2 per cent of the original loan amount or the sum of all
2
remaining interest charges, whichever is lesser. Such penalties are de-
signed primarily to prevent the loss of choice loans to rival lenders via
3
refinancing at lower interest rates, longer terms, etc. Local lenders are
perhaps most likely to enforce prepayment penalties in situations where,
after financing a new site development, the ensuing home buyer seeks to
take the permanent mortgage to a rival institution. Inasmuch as fairly
1See H. R. Andrews, "Prepayment vs. Cost," Cooperative Banker, Apr-1 1945,
pp. 2-3.
2
Under current regulations, federals may require up to 6 monthst advance
interest on that- part of the aggregate prepayment which exceeds 20 per
cent of the original loan amount, provide'd the loan contract makes speci-
fic reference to this penalty.' Rules and Regulations, Section 145.6-12.
3Some institutions enforce the same prepayment provisions in the event the
mortgagor resells the property before the initial loan is retired.
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heavy costs are absorbed in financing site developments, many institutions
actually forbid the sale of the completed home unless the long-term mortgage
is retained. If the prospective buyer fails to meet the necessary credit
standards or else refuses the contract terms offered, the builder must seek
a new buyer.
Even though lenders tend to maximize net profits when loans are carried
to maturity, provided interest rates do not rise materially during the term-
moderate prepayment is ordinarily encouraged as a desirable practice. Mort-
gagors should be afforded an opportunity to secure a debt-free home as soon
as their means permit, whether the additional funds arise out of enlarged
incomes, an inheritance, or other windfall gains. Accordingly, after a
loan has been repaid to a considerable extent, some institutions are in-
clined to waive all penalties if valid reasons are offered to account for
its refinance.2
To avoid later misunderstanding, most lenders find it advisable to
specify in writing the various prepayment opportunities, especially with
regard to possible penalties. Indeed, some mortgage lenders indicate
that their long-standing policy of imposing no penalties at any time has
proved to be a valuable business asset. Such an assurance has attracted
a steady volume of sound loan requests and has resulted in a minimmn loss
to rival lenders via refinance, even where new construction is involved.
Even in the absence of refinancing penalties, however, the mortgagor is
ordinarily obliged to pay the requisite initial legal and servicing fees
to the new mortgagee.3
See "Construction Loans" in Chapter 12.
20r if they feel unable to make similar concessions.
3Although these fees may be absorbed in full or part, if competitive
conditions warrant. See "Rate Cutting" below.
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LOAN-VALUE RATIOS
Overall costs of mortgage debt service have been effectively reduced
through the adoption of high-percentage, long-term loans. Mortgagors are
spared expensive renewal fees every 3 - 5 years , and are less frequently
forced to seek costly second mortgage loans. Little precise information
is available on mortgage contracts written in the Boston area, but the
following discussion summarizes impressions gained from interviews as well
as some limited data.
Loan-value ratios are heavily influenced by custom and a multitude of
legal restrictions and federal interventionary measures. As indicated
earlier, all local thrift institutions except life insurance companies are
currently authorized to make certain conventional loans up to 80 per cent
of appraised value. Inasmuch as conventional loans written by insurance
companies are limited to 66 2/3 per cent of value, the bulk of their home
mortgage funds are invested in other sections of the country where interest
yields are more generous and high-percentage conventional loans less common.
Insurance companies, however, have found FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans
to be highly attractive investments, in vhich case the above restriction on
2loan-value maximums is waived. In the local market, they have achieved a
large proportion of their home loans through refinancing well-seasoned mort-
gages held by local thrift institutions, where the new loan amount is seldom
as high as the conventional two-thirds limit. This constitutes an attractive
investment, as risk is low and the companies are prepared to make substantial
concessions in interest rates and loan term if necessary.
1Renewal fees were undoubtedly less common when loan extension was merely
a verbal agreement.between the two parties involved.
2See Part VI.
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While other institutions are permitted to grant 80 per cent mortgages,
the actual ratios are substantially below this figure. From data on 1509
mortgage recordings and home sales compiled by the Metropolitan Mortgage
Bureau, the following table has been prepared. The number of cases included
in this sample is perhaps too small to warrant conclusive generalizations and,
in addition, current conditions may vary somewhat from those prevailing in
the immediate postwar period. Nevertheless, these data suggest some rela-
tionships which are substantially borne out today as well, considering im-
pressions- gained from interviews as well as data for individual lenders.
TABLE XI. LOAN-VALUE RATIOS FOR SMALL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES PURCHASED
AND MORTGAGED IN THREE TYPES OF COMMUNITIES IN THE BOSTON AREA,
LATE 1945 - EARLY 1946.
Loan Amount as Percent of Value
Community Type* Total and
Institution A B C No. of Cases
Savings Banks 65.C% 67.OP 73.0% 69.9% 456
Cooperative Banks 76.5 76.4 77.8 77.2 715
Federal Savings and 78.5 78.6 78.3 78.5 258
Loan Associations
Commercial Banks 60.5 39.5 72.6 66.0 80
Total 72.0% 73.4% 76.2% 74.6%
No. of Cases 469 137 903 1509
Source: Computed from original records of Metropolitan Mortgage Bureau,
Boston.
Communities are classified according to average purchase price:
A - Belmont, Newton, Winchester; B - Arlington, Lexington;
C - Dorchester, Quincy
In the first place, there appears to be a significant difference in
average loan-value ratios among the various lender types. Without excep-
tion, federal< savings and loan associations granted the highest percentage
loans during this period, slightly exceeding 78 per cent of purchase price
in each of the three community groups. Next in order were the local coop-
erative banks hich also made high-percentage loans but loan-value ratios
were consistently below those of federals. Both types of institutions
lIndeed, the executive officer of one local federal expressed the opinion
that 90 per cent loans are inherently no less desirable in terms of overall
mortgage risk than 50 - 60 per cent loans. So long as the ratio of debt
service to income appears manageable, he regards the loan-value ratio as of
minor significance in screening applications. It should be added, however,
(Footnote continued)
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specialize in facilitating small home purchase for families of moderate
means, and approach their legal loan-value limit in accomolishing this ob-
jective. Undoubtedly a significant proportion of these loans were written
under the loan guaranty program of the Veterans Administration, in which
case loan-value ratios approach 100 -per cent. Nevertheless, conventional
loans written by these savinas and loan associations have also been con-
siderably larger in relation to purchase price than those of either savings
or commercial banks. The proposition that larger debt-value ratios involve.
a higher risk assumption on the part of the lender undoubtedly contributes
to the existing rate differentials among the various institutions.
At the end of the war, savings banks were perhaps still writing a
great many loans .on the old 60 per cent basis, but VA-guaranteed home loans
as well as higher percentage conventional loans were becoming increasingly
common. Hence, since the time period covered in Table XI, local savings
banks have undoubtedly narrowed the spread between their loan percentages
and those of federals. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to presume that the
latter continue to offer more liberal loan amounts than the more conserva-
tive, though progressively more active, savings banks. The smallnes's of
the sample precludes a.valid appraisal of commercial bank activityr, although
local banks have perhaps followed the same basic policy as savings banks in
preferring conservative loan-value ratios. The abnormally low ratio of 39,5
per cent arises out of a small sample of 4 loans.
See 'Variable vs. Fixed Rates," below. Professor Lintner has compared
savings banks' experience with 50-60 per cent loans against those of ho-50
per cent, and found that with regard to each type of residential property,
"both the proportions foreclosed and the net loss ratios were only about
half as large on the loans having the lower debt-value ratio." Lintner,
op. cit., p. 418.
Cf. data on average loan amounts granted on new local mortgages, Table VII .
that this federal writes nearly all loans (except VA) at a 5 per cent rate.
See following footnote.
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At the present time, debt-value maximums are establish, d in accordance
with the provisions of Regulation X. These provisions are enforceable
only in the ourchase of dwelling units constructed since mid-1950, although
a voluntary -credit restraint program has been set up to impose similar re-
strictions on transfers of older properties. These counter-inflationary
measures have undoubtedly produced a general lowering of loan-value ratios,
although substantially less rigid limitations are imposed on VA home loans.1
The Bureau of Lab.or Statistics has conducted sample surveys of new home
construction and attendant mortgage financing within the Boston Metropolitan
Area. One such survey covered homes completed during the fourth quarter of
1950, a period when the above emergency controls had not yet become fully
effective. The findings of this survey covered a wide range of topics,
some of which are particularly relevant for this and the succeeding discus-
sion of FHA and VA home loan activity in the local area. (See Table XII.)
TABLE XII. NWM SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSES COMPLETED IN THE FOURTr QUARTER OF 1950,
BY TYPE OF LORTGAGE TRANSACTION, AND BY AVERAGE PURCHASE PRICE,
LOAN-VALUE PATIO, AVERAGE MONTHY PAYMENT, DURA TION, AlD IN TEREST
RATE, BOSTON ETROPOLITAN AREA
Number Average Loan- Average Average Average
Mortgage Status of Purchase Valie Monthly Duration Interest
and Type Houses Price Ratio Payment in Years Rate
(000)
All 1-family houses 2200
Unmortgaged houses 160
Mortgaged houses 1950 $ 13.2 69.2- $54.0 21.9 4.1%
Unknown 90
Primary mortgage only 1890 13.3 69.0 54.7 21.9 . .1
FHA-insured 230 18.2 55.1 67.6 20.3 4.1
VA-guaranteed 970 11.7 82.8 52.3 2h.9 h.0
Uninsured 690 13.7 58.6 51.7 18.1 4.2
Combination FHA-VA 60 12.2 76.8 56.7 21.7 4.1
Mortgage
Source: Computed from data compiled by Bureau of Labor Statistics, released
August 14, 1951.
Also homes costing up to $12,000 receive favorable treatment.
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Lenders are generally inclined to permit higher loan-value ratios in
connection with the purchase of newly-constructed than in the transfer of
older properties. Moreover, market price is perhaps taken as the lenderts
"appraised value"t more frequently in the case of a new home purchase, par-
ticularly if it is included in a large-scale site development, than where
an :exibttang property is sold without nearby comparable sales. In order to
make foreclosure an effective hedge against loss, lenders base their maxi-
mum loan offering upon the relation between the anticipated market value
of the property and the outstanding loan balance at some future date when
default might occur. Inasmuch as new homes are generally assumed to be
fairly marketable for several years at least, a relatively high initial
loan-value ratio may be most satisfactory, provided regular amortization
is required. Even if default should occur during the early years of the
repayment term when the loan balance is still quite large, a reasonably
steady market would serve to minimize risk of mortgage loss. On older con-
struction, however, lenders may regard current market valuations as un-
justifiably high in relation to the long-run marketability of the property,
and accordingly reduce allowable loan-price maximums. At any rate, it seems
likely that the loan-value .ratios as reported in Table XII are significantly
higher than would be the case if loans on older properties were also included
in its coverage.
Although the BLS data refer to new home purchases before Regulation X
became fully effective, the conservative average loan-value ratio of 58.6
per cent on conventional mortgages was well within the provisions of this
regulation. The VA home loan program in particular has heavily influenced
overall ratios, as these liberal provisions were used in 53 per cent of
all cases considered. The FHA home loan has been less widely received in
this area, constituting 12 per cent of all loans on new properties and
involving loan-value ratios somewhat more conservative than those on
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uninsured loans.1
Home purchasers tap two primary sources in order to meet dovn payment
requirements. In the above survey of new home construction in late 1950,
the BLS found that accumulated savings were used in 73.5 per cent of the
known cases. Revenues from the sale of previously owned real estate were
next in importance, representing 17.8 per cent of the total. Undoubtedly
ttiis latter source of funds accounted in large part for the fact that 7 per
cent of all new home buyers required no mortgage financing whatever. Sale
of securities, gifts, other borrowing, etc., constituted the remaining
sources of down payment funds.
IDAN TERM
The average loan term is also dominated by the generous provisions of
federally-sponsored programs, although conventional mortgages have steadily
approached these levels. On new properties in particular, local institutions
are inclined to lend up to the limit of 20 years permitted by statute and
Regulation X, provided all other risk elements are favorable. As seen in
Table XII, conventional loans on homes completed in late 1950 had ei average
term of 18.1 years, while terms on insured or guaranteed loans ranged up to
nearly 25 years. This represents a radical departure from even the tradi-
tional long-term cooperative form mortgage, where repayment was generally
completed within 13 years. The trend toward longer terms has gained momen-
tum in the postwar period, ,and the data of Table XII indicate a significant
extension from findings of a similar survey one year earlier. For homes
constructed during late 1949, average terms ranged from 17.0 years on un-
insured loans to 21.0 years on VA-guaranteed loans.2 Whereas most new loans
1 See Part VI.
2Unpublished report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Over the same one-
year interval, average interest rates on uninsured loans declined from
4.5 to 4.2 per cent.
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are written for terms of 15-20 years, extensive prepayment, refinancing with
rival institutions, etc., have resulted in an average mortgage life of only
.1,
7-10 years.
Although local thrift institutions are increasingly willing to write
loans with terms up to 20 years on newly-constructed properties, they prefer
to restrict the term maximum on older homes to 12-16 years. Just as loan-
value ratios are frequently tailored to suit .properties of varying ages, terms
should be so adjusted that the property value will always exceed the out-
standing loan balance over the repayment period. Inasmuch as the probability
of a continuing ready market tends to decline as older pr'operties are con-
sidered, maximum loan terms are shorted'ed accordingly. A local mortgage
broker and insurance company correspondent follows the followingguide in
establishing term maximums: 25 years if the property is not over 5 years
old; 20 years if 6-15 years old; and beyond this point, the loan should
be fully amortized before the dwelling is 35 years old. 2
Another vital element influencing loan term maximums relates to the
adequacy of the borrower's anticipated income stream to cover the proposed
debt service over the entire repayment term. A primary risk concerns the
possible death of the home buyer before repayment is completed and wThere
supplementary incomes are insufficient to continue the debt service. In
order to minimize this risk, nearly all lenders adjust repayment periods in
accordance with the life expectancy of the mortgagor. Life insurance com-
panies meet this problem by offering a package mortgage deal whereby the
mortgagor receives a life insurance policy covering either the outstanding
loan balance or a specified amount equal to the original loan amount. 3
lInterviews. On the other hand, an institution may hold a mortgage on a given
property for far more than 20 years if the property is sold, improved, or
converted, or if the loan term is extended for any other reason.
2 Interview.
3 The Federal Reserve estimates that, as of early 1951, roughly 42 per cent of
all families with married persons within the 18-44 age category had mortgage
debts amounting to 40 per cent of more of property value; for persons 45 or
over similar mortgag e obligations were assumed by 12 per cent of all cases.
(Footnote continued)
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As mentioned earlier, the lending institution risks the loss of long-
run income maximization by tying up loanable funds for a 20-year term. Es-
pecially where interest rates appear abnormally low, there might be some
hesitation in writing only 20-year loens for fear of substantial hikes in
rates in the near future. To minimize this risk, some lenders write out
their loan contracts at a 5 per cent rate but agree to charge only 41 per
cent so long as the current market conditions remain unchanged. Others
write mortgage contracts at a 4 per cent rate but reserve the right to alter
the billing rate at any time, provided the mortgag:r is given fair notice
and is granted the option to refinance his obligation elsewhere if more
favorable provisions are available. A third method used by a local national
bank calls for a mortgage drawn up on a 5-yeax demand basis, but providing
for monthly repayment on a 12-20 year amortization schedule. After the
minimum 5 years, the instrument becomes an "open mortgage" by which the
lender reserves the right to change interest rates, call for repayment or,
if so desired, permit the borrower to continue monthly repayment until the
debt is retired.- A leading savings bank in Boston grants 20-year loans
for most new home purchases, but prefers to be more conservative in lending
on older properties. So that the buyer is not forced to pay an excessive
monthly debt service and also so that the lender can adjust contract pro-
visions reasonably soon, the note is written for a lC-year term, but pay-
ments are made on a 20-year amortization schedule.1
VARIAELE VS. FIXED INTEREST RATES
The influence of varying the loan term, amount, and contract interest
rate upon total debt service has been analyzed in some detail in Part II.
lInterviews.
"1951 Survey of Consumer Finances," Fart V, Federal Reserve Bulletin,
December 1951, pp. 1516-26.
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Now that nearly all mortgage contracts are written on a monthly payment
basis, lenders are able to offer borrowers considerable flexibility in re-
gard to specific repayment provisions.
Undoubtedly many, if not most, lending institutions continue to r egard
the value of the pledged property and its relation to loan amount as the
supreme criterion of risk rating. Nevertheless, lenders are increasingly
aware of the importance of properly relating monthly debt service to pros-
pective incomes as a means of minimizing mortgage default in the first
place. For a young family purchasing a new home, the lender may feel justi-
fied in granting an unusually long-term loan, inasmuch as the relatively
low monthly payments may be conveniently handled during the early years when
incomes are at a minimum. In later years when maintenance and improvement
expenses mount, aggregate housing costs will be easily handled as the family's
long-run income prospects appear favorable. Most lenders regard a mortgage
application as a sound risk only if totel housing costs, inclucding mort-
gage principal, interest, insurance, and real estate taxes, do not exceed
20-25 per cent of the borrower's anticipated income over the entire loan
term. Such rules must not be adhered to indiscriminately as worthy excep-
tions are entirely probable. Furthermore, even though monthly carrying
charges decline as terms are extended, the inherent dangers in pushing this
dimension too far in order to accomplish a given debt service-income ratio
1
need not be repeated.
The matter of adjusting mortgage contracts to suit individual home
buyers suggests the continuing controversy over variable vs. fixed interest
rates. This issue generally arises from a lender's method of treating two
lIn the BLS survey referred to above, monthly mortgage paryment as a propor-
tion of income ranged from 19 per cent where incomes were less than $2
thousand to 10 per cent in the $6-$7.5 thousand bracket.
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important components in interest rate determination, particularly whether
differences in these implicit cost components should be reflected in inter-
est rate differentials, or whether interest rates should be invariant to
such differences. Differences in the risk component will be considered
immediately while administrative cost differentials will be analyzed
briefly in a succeeding section.1
Preference for fixed or variable rate determination in accordance with
differentials in mortgage risk is not peculiar to any lender type in the
Boston area, but the variable rate idea is perhaps most common among savings
and loan interests. Those favoring standardized rates regard the component
for risk compensation as analogous to an insurance premium and as such should
be the same for all qualified loan applicants who meet the minimum require-
ments. A leading Boston savings bank stands ready and willing to grant h
per cent loans to all qualified applicants on this basis, whether the re-
quested loan amount represents 40, 60, or 80 per cent of property value.
The mortgage officers of this bank feel that a policy of discrimination
according to varying degrees of risk invites favoritism and results in
undue embarrassment and administrative detail. They believe that by offer-
ing a standard minimum rate to all their qualified borrowers, they can
select only the most desirable among all applicants and maintain a sound,
well-diversified portfolio.
Other local institutions regard a variable rate structure as the only
fair way of handling the wide variety of loan requests. Even if the
attendant monthly carrying charges are not excessive in relation to pros-
pective income, a high-percentage, long'term loan ordinarily subjects the
lender to greater overall risk than a loan with more moderate contract
1See "Loan Amounts and Properties Mortgaged" below.
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provisions. These groups feel it unjust to charge the latter mortgagors
the same risk premium, While the corresponding risk elements are significantly
lower. Whereas the fixed rate school would refuse a mortgage application
altogether if the requested loan amount appeared unusually high in relation
to property value, variable rate advocates would perhaps accept it if a
higher interest return were available. Several local institutions consis-
tently follow a policy of offering loans at 4 per cent only if the initial
loan-value ratio does not exceed 60 per cent. For higher percentage loans,
rates of 41 and 5 per cent are charged but only if the term appears reasonable
and debt service manageable. It is true, however, that a small institution
is hardly justified in extending a loan to a person with a decidedly inferior
risk rating, even at interest rates of 6 and 7 per cent. One local coop-
erative bank had considered making a group of such loans some time ago,
but the investment board rejected the idea as unsound for borrower and
lender alike.
Some variable rate -advocates believe that their schemeshould apply
not only to new loans made, but also to existing mortgages held in portfolios.
As mortgages are gradually amortized and current loan-value ratios decline,
interest rates should be progressively reduced in accordance with the de-
creasing risk. Such a system is actually employed with notable success by
a federal in Milwaukee. This association charges $6.55 per month per $1,000
for a 20-year term and realizes a net weighted interest yield of 4.90 per
cent. The interest pattern proceeds as follows:
6 per cent for the first 30 payments,
5.4 per cent for the next 30 payments,
4.5 per cent for the next 60 payments, and
2
3.6 per cent for the last 120 payments.
1The dispersion on such a small sample would be too great even where, using
notation from Part III, P is sufficiently high to provide an acceptable
expected value X.
2Letter of G. L. Bliss, reprinted in Cooperative Banker, April 1945, p. 6.
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Such a variable rate structure would effectively eliminate portfolio raiding
6f well-seasoned loans by rival lenders, inasmuch as rates are automatically
reduced as soon as refinance would appear profitable.
Just as some institutions grant loans at h per cent to all acceptable
applicants, others refuse to slip below their established minimums of h}-
or 5 per cent under any conditions. A cooperative bank had a conservative
loan request of $12 thousand in connection with the purchase of a desirable
$40 thousand residence. This particular bank had a policy of charging no
less than 4:2L per cent, even if the accompanying risk would easily warrant
a lower rate. Largely because of ignorance of alternative opportunities,
the home buyer willingly paid the 4 per cent rate despite the fact that
nearby savings banks would have gladly made the same loan at h per cent. 1
By and large, however, the fact that some institutions continue to find an
ample force of home buyers willing to pay interest rates of 5 per cent is
due in large part -to the availability of higher loan-value ratios or longer
loan terms at the higher rate. Specifically, this explains to some extent
the continuing differential in average rates charged by savings banks as
opposed to federals and cooperative banks, the latter institutions ordi-
narily permitting more liberal loan-value ratios.2
Summarizing, it appears quite compatible with a moderate degree of
competition that two institutions may exist side by side and still charge
a different price for their output. Actually a one price market is hardly
to be expected, inasmuch as the products sold may be quite dissimilar for
the two institutions. The institution lowering its rates or maintaining the
lower rate structure may attract the bulk of the loans associated with a
10n the other hand, a suburban savings bank, preferring not to make an ex-
ception to its existing h per cent minimum, actually referred a highly
desirable loan applicant to a Boston bank where he could receive the h per
cent loan to which he appeared justified.
2See Table XI.
minimum of risk, while the other may grant higher percentage loans, etc.
The advocates of variable rates, however, believe it most desirable to
accommodate both types of mortgagors for the well-being of all parties
concerned. The following chapter will summarize some additional factors
accounting for the continuing co-existence of thrift institutions vith
significantly different interest rate structures.
Another interesting aspect of the mortgage interest rate structure con-
cerns the almost universal use of conventional "price lines." Similar to
most capital markets perhaps, the 194C Census reveals that well over 90
per cent of the mortgagors in the etropolitan Boston District were paying
interest at rates of whole numbers or fall halves -- i.e., 4, -, . . .
6-1, 7 per cent, etc. This is certainly a convenient procedure for lender
and borrower alike, making interest end amortization calculations simple.
Nevertheless, a -I of 1 per cent shading of interest charges results in
substantial savings to the borrower over a 2C-25 year repayment term.
(See Part II.) Especially since FHA maximum rates are set at W7 per cent,
it may be advisable for some lenders to consider raising or lowering its
rate by this smaller amount if a full i of 1 per cent change appears un-
necessarily high.
?06
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CHAPTER 12. OTHER LENDING PRACTICES
Mortgages constitute an essential and highly desirable investment
outlet for local thrift institutions. Even after due allowance is made for
the additional risk and administrative expense involved, mortgage lending
on a sound basis constitutes a most profitelle investment activity. As
indicated above, net yields generally compare favorably with returns on
long-term government bonds or high-grade corporate securities.
Although there is no specific statutory limit, federals and coopera-
tive banks generally regard a mortgage portfolio equivalent to 8C - 85 per
cent of total assets as an optiimial condition. Beyond that point, an
institution runs the risk of lacking sufficient liquidity and flexibility
either to meet sudden withdrawal demands or to take advantage of new,
highly profitable investment opportunities. Indeed, surplus reserves and
borrowed funds constitute such a substantial proportion of total liabili-
ties among local federals that aggregate mortgage portfolios frequently
exceed share capital. Both cooperative banks and federals must rely
heavily upon the continual inflow of repayment sums to provide them with the
requisite liquidity for normal bank operations. It should be borne in mind,
however, that any significant economic recession might seriously impair this
prospective income stream, thereby. rendering a bank t s borro-ing capacity
as an indispensable liquidity hedge.
Savings banks are permitted to accumulate mortgage holdings only up to a
limit of 70 per cent of total savings deposits. This restriction, as indi-
cated earlier, is designed to protect their depositors I funds by promoting
a well-balanced investment portfolio. Inasmuch as savings deposits are
ordinarily payable on demand, it has been considered poor investment policy
to place these funds too heavily in illiquid mortgages, especially where
amortization provisions are lacking. With the increasing importance of
compulsory amortization and government-insured loans, however, this statutory
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requirement is perhaps less essential. Especially where an institution is
active in purchasing loans in the secondary market, the dangers of accumu-
lating unsound mortgage portfolios at unjustifiably low interest rates are
materially lessened. From an economic point of view, a savings bank may
find it prudent to sell low-yielding government securities and place the
proceeds as well as new savings inflows into government-insured loans so
long as net yields on the latter exceed those on alternate investments.
This, of course, is true only after the necessary allowance is made for
the possible added risk and servicing expense involved in any mortgage
investment. Although the secondary market is discussed more fully later,1
it should be pointed out here that such buying and selling operations per-
form the economic function of narrowing the spread between net yields on
various investments. By selling low-yielding governments and buying
higher-yielding FHA-insured loans, effective returns tend to become equalized
through a corresponding adjustment in current market prices. Under exist-
ing conditions, savings banks are effectively constrained from investing
over 60-65 per cent of savings capital in mortgage loans, for an institution
approaching the 70 per cent limit may be unable to exploit new profitable
mortgage investment opportunities as they arise. Furthermore, when con-
sidered as a share of total resources, mortgages are virtually limited to
50-55 per cent, since surplus funds account for iC per cent of total
liabilities.
METHODS OF OBTAINING MORTCKASE BUSINESS
Construction Loans
Financing the construction of new homes either on a contract or operative
basis has provided local institutions a primary means of enlarging mortgage
portfolios. The home building industry is somewhat unique in that entrance
See Part VII.
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and continuing operations are possible with a minimum of equity capital, as
nearly all (and sometimes more than all) costs of construction are renerally
provided by credit. In most types of short-term business lending, the
producing firm is afforded a considerable degree of latitude in determining
pricing policies, marketing methods, and specific output characteristics.
In the case of home construction financing, however, credit extension re-
volves about the product itself rather than the producing firm. The lender
generally looks upon the housing project as the primary credit element and
the general risk rating of the builder, vhile important, is frequently of
secondary concern. This unique circumstance is due in no small part to the
localized, undisciplined, and disorganized state of the home building in-
dustry itself, Entrance is easy, as any boom period finds a vast army of
newly-converted carpenters and others who are able to commence operations
with. a negligible capital investment. Exit may be equally prompt, for the
qmall operator, frequently inexperienced in business management, may be
forced to desert a partially-completed project at any time if faced with
adversity.1 -Jerry-building and fly-by-night operations are not limited to
small concerns, however, for boom organizations frequently become danger-
ously over-expanded and infested with mismanagement.
The construction lender must insist that the builder always retain
some equity in the undertaking in order to guarantee his continued inter-
est in its satisfactory completion. Accordingly, project credit is a com-
plicated matter to handle, ordinarily involving periodic installment pay-
ments as work progresses. Since the lender has such a dominant financial
interest in the project, he must make periodic inspections to check on the
quality of construction as well as to see if loan disbursements are properly
employed. Because of the complexity of such lending as well as the attend-
lSince his equity capital is severely limited, the typical builder is rarely
able to embark upon truly large-scale operations, a factor perhaps impeding
the introduction of major cost-saving devices.
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ant risks involved, many mortgage lending institutions have refrained from
construction financing altogether, preferring to take the permanent mort-
gage when the home is finished and sold. As a consequence, builders have
frequently had to resort to'less responsible and more costly sources of
construction financing.
The introduction of FHA-insured loans and the accompanying issuance
of firm commitments ha' e induced lenders in many areas to engage in con-
struction financing on a wide scale. In the Boston area, however, many
thrift institutions have begun to extend such short-term credit only during
2
the postwar period, and then primarily on an uninsured basis. As indicated
earlier,3 new property is generally regarded as highly desirable loan secu-
rity, especially where the construction is supervised and periodically ex-
amined. Hence, local institutions have found construction lending a con-
venient and sound method of enlarging and maintaining mortgage portfolios.
Furthermore, competitive elements in the local capital-surplus area have
perhaps induced lenders with abnormally small mortgage portfolios at the end
of the war to grant substantial concessions to acceptable builders in order
to expand their holdings.
Relatively few lenders in the Boston area have engaged in construc-
tion financing on an extensive scale. Indeed, only the largest lending in-
stitutions possess the necessary resources to finance site developments
1
See below, pp. 314-15.
2See Part VI.
3See pp. 299-3C0. Professor Lintner observes that of the 1- and 2-family
loans made in the period 1918-31, loans made on new or recent construction
consistently had a far superior loss experience relative to principal amount
than did loans on older properties. This favorable experience on new prop-
erties resulted primarily from relatively smaller losses on loans taken in
foreclosure, not from a smaller foreclosure account itself. Actually fore-
closure was twice as common with loans on new than on older 2-family prop-
erties. On single-family loans, the net loss ratio was less than 3.5 per
cent on properties built after 1920, but over 6 per cent on older proper-
ties. Lintner, op. cit., pp. 401-6.
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including 25-100 individual units. In addition, most operative builders
lack the requisite equity capital and business acumen to embark on such an
undertaking. Many lenders, even if their asset size were sufficiently large,
refuse to assume the heavy risks involved in financing.developments where
more than 2 - 4 units are put up at one time. Inasmuch as construction
lending is highly specialized and requires close control over building
operations, institutions underwriting large projects must maintain a staff
of trained experts who concentrate on this activity. These experts must
be thoroughly versed with the procedures involved in site developments and
must generally make weekly inspections of the new construction in order to
determine the appropriate installment payment. Even when all reasonable
precautions have been taken, housing projects occasionally fail and the
builder is forced in to bankruptcy, thereby forcing the lending institution
to complete the project on its own account. This contingency illustrates
the point that extensive construction lending should be ventured only if
a properly staffed mortgage department can be maintained, a requirement
that is either impossible or inadvisable for all but the larger banks.
Many of the smaller cooperative banks are effectively eliminated from
financing speculative builders by virtue of a statutory provision limiting
the total lending to any one party to Q25,COO or 1 per cent of total assets,
whichever Amount- isgreater. Perhaps this limit is rarely reached among
local institutions, as construction lending by small banks is restricted
primarily to contract-built homes for owner-occupiers. Indeed, some of
the lenders interviewed are reluctant to finance speculative builders to
any extent, firmly believing that the shoddy construction techniques so
characteristic of site developments seriously impair the security of the
loan.
Short-term construction credit may be handled in a number of ways.
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Some banks write a blanket mortgage for the entire housing development,
while others prefer to make a separate contract for each individual unit.
In the former case, suppose the project when completed is to contain 30
houses selling for $10 thousand each, on the security of which the mort-
gage lender is prepared to extend 80 per cent, 20-year loans to qualified
buyers. Thence the lender draws up a blanket mortgage of $240 thousand in
the name of the builder, who in turn will receive installment payments as
work progresses. As homes are completed and .sold, generally with the stipu-
lation that the permanent mortgage be retained, the builder receives the
balance of the purchase price and the outstanding construction loan balance
is correspondingly reduced.
Local lending ins.titutions differ in regard to possible penalties in
the event the buyer does seek to take the permanent financing elsewhere.
Many Boston banks refuse to release the mortgage under any circumstances,
demanding that the builder must find another buyer for the home. Others
are prepared to make exceptions provided most buyers agree to stay with the
construction lender, although prepayment penalties of 1 - 5 per cent of
the mortgage amount are commonly imposed. Lenders argue, with some justi-
fication, that construction lending per se is a losing proposition and that
the long-term mortgage must be retained if a profit is to be realized from
the operation. Furthermore, they maintain that if a buyer cannot qualify
for the proposed mortgage contract, the interests of builder, buyer, and
community at large are best served if a new buyer is sought.
The mechanics of construction lending cannot be described in detail
in this study. It will be sufficient to add that, although procedures and
fee schedules vary somewhat among the various thrift institutions, most
appear to offer substantial financial inducements to eligible home builders.
No principal payments are required during the first 6 months of the term,
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and interest rates are generally identical to those on the permanent in-
strument, that is, h - 5 per cent. Interest charges are commonly paid on a
quarterly basis and are payable on the borrowed funds only as they are dis-
bursed. Furthermore, the builder is often spared from paying title search
and certain other legal and servicing fees, as these fees are borne primarily
by the home owner at the time of sale. In the case of FHA-supervised devel-
opments, however, the builder is required to pay a 045 application fee to
the local insuring office. If the final home mortgage is also insured by
the FHA, $25 of this fee is refunded, but not otherwise. In the latter
case, some lenders, especially where prepayment penalties are not strictly
enforced, offer a brokerage fee of 1 per cent of loan anount to the builder
if the uninsured permanent mortgage is retained.
Savings banks in particular have found liberal construction lending
almost indispensable in realizing a rapid growth in mortgage holdings,
while still maintaining a sound portfolio. Indeed, several of the larger
savings banks have realized fully one-half of their postwer mortgage ex-
pansion in this manner. One of the large banks visited consistently main-
tained an outstanding construction loan balance of $4 million until its
70 per cent mortgage limit was approached. During the late 193Cs, federals
were perhaps the only institutions who genuinely encouraged new construction
and mortgage lending, and builders encountered considerable difficulty in
securing suitable financing elsewhere. Hence, in entering the postwar era,
federals retained these solid contacts made earlier end already had a firm
foothold in the market. During the 12-month period through February 1951,
the 15 associations in the Boston vicinity relied upon construction lending
for 32.8 per cent of all new mortgages made. Among the three largest fed-
erals, all located in Boston proper, construction loans actually exceeded
the dollar volume of new loans written to finance the purchase of older
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properties.' Savings banks, on the other hand, armed with vast sums of
loanable funds, faced the difficult task of re-entering the market after
years of relative inactivity. Disbursement schedules and other contract
provisions have been continually modified to fit the needs and desires of
operative builders. These disbursements are generally made in 5 - 7 in-
stallments, but one of the savings banks visited has subdivided its payment
schedule into 33 individual items.
Although thrift institutions are perhaps more active in construction
financing today than in prewar years, many builders are still forced to tap
other sources for short-term credit. In many communities, commercial banks
have extended construction loans to builders strictly on a commercial-loan
basis not desiring to hold the permanent mortgage. As of June 30, 1950,
secured construction loans held by all insured commercial banks in Massa-
chusetts comprised 6.2 per cent of aggregate holdings of secured residen-
2tial loans. In addition, specialized realty companies have frequently
been organized to extend short-term credit to speculative builders and to
operate as brokers in placing the permanent.mortgage elsewhere. Since
their equity resources are ordinarily quite limited, these companies depend
upon a fast turnover of working capital for optimal operations. In con-
struction lending they are prepared to suit the special needs of builders
who are perhaps inexperienced or otherwise unacceptable to thrift institu-
tions. Such non-portfolio lenders maintain an extremely close watch over
the projects which they are financing, and accordingly feel justified in
demanding generous compensation for the added service and risk involved.
Although the average life of such an organization is perhaps rather short,
Data computed from monthly reports of federals to the local Home Loan Bank.
20perating Insured Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, FDIC, p. 8. This
practice is especially commonTi other sections of the country where there
is a relative shortage of long-term capital. Undoubtedly a significant prop-
ertion of the short-term construction loans held by local banks refersto
distant site developments.
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one company interviewed has euccessfully financed operative builders for
over 25 years. This company writes most construction loan contracts on a
conventional discount basis under which the builder agrees to pay, for
example, $10,000 at the end of 6 months for the use of $9,700, disbursed
in installments throughout the interval. Although the nominal rate may be
regarded as slightly over 6 per cent, the effective rate is considerably
higher, as the builder is charged for the full 6 months' use of the funds.
Brokers.
Real estate and mortgage brokers of various sorts have provided local
thrift institutions with a continuing inflow of new mortgages. These pri-
vate agencies frequently combine selling operations with the placement of
home mortgages, a natural union in that the latter is ordinarily an indis-
pensable element in consummating a property sale. Such middlemen play a
vital role in joining together buyer, seller, and financer in urban real
estate activity. Indeed, a leading expert in housing economics has ascribed
the role of the salesman as more important in this than in any other field
of economic activity. Such an agent is frequently able to induce the pros-
pective buyer to pay a slightly higher purchase price if in so doing more
2
convenient financing can be arranged.
The existence and incidence of brokerage fees have reflected changing
competitive conditions in the local market. During the prewar period when
mortgage lenders, notably savings banks, were indifferent toward making n'ew
loans, individual home buyers were often obliged to pay a fee of 1 - 2 per
cent in order to secure the requested mortgage.3 Especially since the war,
lIf progress payments were evenly spread out over the 6 month term, the builder
would be paying roughly 12 per cent; indeed, if the company had a great many
similar loans outstanding, the average amount disbursed on each would approxi-
mate $5,000.
2Interview with Prof. E. M. Fisher, Columbia University.
3Interview with a Boston mortgage broker. Data are not available to deter-
mine the precise extent of this practice.
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however, an active competition for new mortgage loans has changed the
picture, and home buyers are now forced to. pay a brokerage fee only if
certain elements of the mortgage request are unacceptable to most lenders
because of abnormal risk, etc.
The practice of imposing a brokerage fee upon the institution making
the loan has been largely promoted by some of the larger savings banks in
Boston proper. These institutions, situated at a considerable distance from
areas of brisk housing activity, sought an effective means of enlarging their
sorely depleted mortgage portfolios at the end of the war. Some banks were
interested in raising their total- mortgage holdings by over $5c million, an
overwhelming task especially considering their previous years of inactivity.
ConstructioW loans have been an invaluable aid in securing mortgages on new
properties, while brokers have been particularly helpful when. the transfer
of older properties is concerned. Many local officers indicate that these
two sources have accounted for a heavy majority of all new mortgage loans,
and that the offering of a 1 per cent origination fee has been of inesti-
mable assistance.- Although most if not all mortgage officers interviewed
are opposed to the principle of paying such a commission, many have felt
obliged to honor the practice as a "necessary evil."
It is interesting to note that brokerage fees, while highly signifi-
cant among banks in or adjacent to Boston, have found only scattered accept-
ance among suburban institutions. A large Boston bank had initially planned
to pay origination fees for new loans only until aggregate mortgage holdings
had reached a desired level. After this level had been reached, however, the
bank found that its portfolio could be maintained in tact only by continuing
the practice. Several suburban lenders, on the other hand, have paid brokerage
fees on various occasions when a rapid inflow of new mortgages was sought,
but suffered no undue hardship upon its suspension. These latter institutions
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undoubtedly enjoy a significant geographic advantage in teing located so
close to the properties on which the most desirable mortgages are being
written. Home buyers prefer to deal with their own community institutions
in many cases, even though monthly payments are ordinarily handled by mail.
Accordingly, they may insist on a local mortgagee despite the fact that
the broker could perhaps secure 4n additional 1 per cent fee if the mortgage
were placed in a Boston bank.
The large Boston institution with a heavy inflow of amortization pay-
ments every day may find brokerage service well wvorth the nominal fee in
order to keep savings capital fully employed. Since many of these mort-
gages are written on a long-term basis with enforceable prepayment penal-
1
ties, net yields are not seriously diminished. In the case of larger
banks, brokers perform vital functions which mould perhaps otherwise be
handled by their own salaried personnel. As soon as a broker has brought
in several loans toa particular institution, he gradually ascertains the
various standards employed by the lender in selecting eligible applicants.
Thereafter, he is more discriminating in channeling loan requests to the
various institutions, and places them where approval appears most likely.
In cases where no application fees are charged, lenders occasionally are
flooded with a mass of loan requests from suburban brokers seeking the 1
per cent origination fee. This eventuality is generally minimized, however,
after a broker receives a series of flat rejections. The president of a
Boston savings bank indicates a heavy reliance upon 2 or 3 brokers for
1 The nominal annual yield (converted semi-annually) on 5 per cent direct-
reduction mortgages purchased at a 1 per cent premium and held to maturity
varies as follows: Term in Years Yield
10 4.83
15 4.90
2C 4.93
25 4.95
bringing in new mortgage loans. These individuals carefully analyze the
property value and the buyerls capacity to carry the debt burden before re-
ferring the application to this institution. Hence, a continuing relation-
ship is built up, with the lender regarding, the commission fee as just com-
pensation for this preliminary screening. Brokers in suburban comunities
frequently prefer to concentrate on selling real estate exclusively, and
prefer not to bother with shopping around for mortgage financing anymore
than is necessary.
Some brokers advertise the availability of 4 per cent mortgage credit
to home buyers, without "red tape, fees, or other charges." If the loan
request is less than 2/3 of appraised value and superior in every respect,
brokers frequently channel the mortgag;e to a correspondent life insurance
company, collecting the origination fee and frequently retaining all ser-
vicing functions as well. If the broker is not so affiliated and is not
a servicing agent, he may refer the request to one of several savings banks.
If, however, the required loan amount appears unusually large in relation
to property value, it may be referred to a federal savings and loan associa-
tion, in which case a higher interest rate is usually charged. A suburban
broker has indicated that every request he has sent to a Boston savings bank
paying a commission has been rejected because the desired loan amount was
excessive. Hence, he now refers all home buyers to nearby suburban lending
institutions for mortgage financing, where incidentally a higher interest
rate is charged. Brokers frequently prefer dealing with small suburban
institutions because of the quick and convenient manner in thich their loan
requests are processed. Such institutions rarely offer broker commissions
lSome brokers have f ound insurance companies reluctant to pay any premium
unless the mortgage is written at h per cent.
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nor do they compete with Boston s c.vings banks on interest rates, but a
record of s atisfectory servic e is of prime importance to brokers and home
buyers alike. One c8oper~,tive bank visitec he,S a policy of making a pre-
liminary decision on a mortgage applic etion VIithin 24 hours, while other
larger institutions may requi}:,e a full week at times.
A finEl appra.is &1 of existing pr'CJc tices in regard to the payment of
brokerap:e commissions is i15.if ficul t to formulate. Certcdnly the fact that
some' but not all locel lenders have felt obliged to pay a finder's fee
reflects a de -'1'ee of impeI>fect competition in the market. On the other
hand, there is serne evidence, thouZh not subject to statisticc~ verifica-
tion, tLa.t the offering of this premium by cert~n lending institutions has
attracted choice loans 2-S 1111311 c;S provided essential merchcmdising floU1ctions
in their l ehelf. Some lenders point to the;:)ossibilit;y that this practice
may eventually be extended to all loc2~ mort2:ages, in which case the com-
petitive advanta;'e of its offering would be los t. Fr01'1 the lender's point
of view, the "compulsion" of pa-ying commissions merely reflects the com-
petitiv8 uspects of a C 2pital surplus area, and a.s such constitutes a mild
form of price shccinc:~. It would be far more desirable', however, for this
price shading, to take a more positive and overt form so that the home buyer-
mortgagor would reap the savings.
Price Cutting.
Outright pri.ce cutting, whjJ.e perhaps rcl'E'ly promoted as a virtuous
practice, h2s not been eJ,tooether absent from the 10ccJl m2Tket., IncJ.icat50ns
of priCE: shading h2V6 a.ssumed Illc1ny different fo::.,oms, most of yrhich cannot be
vec-ified statistic c:'lly l,ut depend upon the reliabilit,Y of ililp-:>essions gathered
from various interviews. The p2yment of broker fees 3.S well 2S the offering
of highly attractive construction loans as descri bed atove constitute mild
forms of price sh&ding, 2DC have played 2. prominent role in pos twar mortgage
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operations of large savings banks. Another technique frequently employed
by local lenders involves the absorption of various initial charges ordi-
narily borne by the borrower. Particularly where a highly desirable housing
development is considered as a package deal, the lending institution may
agree to waive certain legal and servicing fees in order to secure the business.
At the end of the war, some of the large savings banks in the local area
sought to attract a considerable volume of loans held by other institutions
through the offering of lower rates. Boston banks in particular publicized
the availability of 4 per cent loans, and offered brokers (and allegedly
using some salaried personnel as well) the customary commission for bringing
in this business. A favorite target consisted of well-seasoned mortgages
written at 4 and 5 per cent by other institutions, frequently located in
suburban communities. This portfolio-raiding became a serious problem in
the case of some smaller banks, as a significant proportion of their most
desirable mortgages were lost. Prepayment penalty clauses had not been
written into many of these contracts, and the victims were compelled either
2
to give up the loans or else make similar concessions. To provide an
added inducement for refinance, the new mortgagee frequently offered to
absorb part or all of the various legal and inspection fees, which muld
otherwise be borne by the mortgagor. Portfolio-raiding is perhaps less
prevalent today than in the early postwar years, partly because of a smaller
spread in mortgage interest rates among rival lenders aswell as the effect-
iveness of the above described techniques in building up portfolios. Fur-
'Once again it should be repeated that this ihformation is acquired from
executives of suburban cooperative and savings banks who have supposedly
been victims of this practice.
2 Several suburban lenders interviewed apparently make substantial "price"
concessions on existing holdings only if the mortgagor is offered an equi-
valent concession by a rival institution, but not otherwise.
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thermore, savings banks are now authorized to invest considerable sums in
insured and guaranteed mortgages throughout the country. As a consequence,
they are perhaps more anxious to achieve a widely-diversified portfolio
1
than to further antagonize other members of the lending fraternity. At
one time, however, portfolio-raiding became such a serious matter that the
State Bank Commissioner was obliged to urge its discontinuance.
Although portfolio-raiding is not a common practice today, the rate
differential between Boston and suburban banks has persisted throughout
the postwar period. The largest savings banks in Boston seeking a rapid
and continuing inflow of new mortgages have felt it advisable to maintain
interest rates on prime loans 'at 4 per cent.. When this rate was initially
established, many seasoned mortgages held by suburban banks were still
carried at higher rates of 5 and even 6 per cent. This spread was suffi-
cient to prompt a considerable volume of refinance activity, for the sav-
ings to the mortgagor would readily cover the various conversion costs
within a relatively short period as well as compensate for the possible in-
convenience involved. Suburhan institutions, however, began to write down
rates on existing mortgages and to make new uninsured loans at rates as
low as 4 per cent, but seldom lower. When rate differentials decline to
A of 1 per cent, refinance is far less attractive or profitable from the
mortgagor's point of view.
Actually some mortgage officers in Boston regard a differential of 2
of 1 per cent as not only the minimum spread for refinance but it also
spells the minimum compensation necessary to offset the geographic advantage
enjoyed by suburban banks. Except where precluded by tying agreements be-
tween the operative builder and lending institution extending construction
lSome smaller, less strategically located savings banks allegedly persist
in portfolio-raiding, but the extent of such activity is slight.
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credit, the typical home buyer ordinarily prefers to patronize his own
community institutions. Whether he be a depositor or not, the buyer per-
haps appreciates the friendly, cooperative atmosphere of the small suburban
bank, a spirit which is difficult to instill in larger city banks. Further-
more, he may regard the local community association as more inclined to ease
the debt burden in the event of hardship or depressed income. Actually,
however, it is possible that the reverse conclusion is more likely, be-
cause large mortgage lenders are perhapa better equipped to make conces-
sions in view of their well-diversified portfolios. If a small institu-
tion felt constrained by custom or other factors to lend primarily in its
immediate vicinity, hardship cases may arise from the same source and hence
be cumulative.
By and large, suburban banks continue to make sound loans at rates
of 2 to a full 1 per cent above those charged by the large Boston savings
banks. As stated earlier, the narrowing rate differential on new loans
made by local savings and cooperative banks as implied by data on average
2
rates.is influenced heavily by the existence of 4 per cent VA home loans.
Similarly, even if average rates charged on all new loans by suburban banks
exceed those of large Boston institutions by a declining margin, a signi-
ficant differential may still persist on uninsured loans. Within Boston
proper, competition among the several large savings banks has made the
existing h per cent rate an essential ingredient in maintaining mortgage
This preference is.substantially overcome, however, when a mortgage
broker affiliated with a city bank paying a finder's fee convinces the
buyer on the relative advantages of a h per cent interest rate.
Tables IX and X.
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portfolios in tact. One institution, upon approaching its legal limit in
mortgage holdings, attempted to remain at this plateau with a higher 4I
per cent rate and without any aggressive merchandising efforts. This
policy was short-lived, however, as brokers who had played such a promi-
nent role in the past merely by-passed this bank in favor of others who
willingly made new loans at 4 per cent. Hence, although individual home
buyers rarely shop around in quest of the lowest interest rate, brokers
are forever checking on current rates charged by 'iarious institutions.
Inasmuch as brokers frequently advertise the availabbility of 4 per cent
mortgage money, they will naturally channel all prime loan requests to
2
the bank offering the most satisfactory provisions. As stated earlier,
where the loan amount requested is larger than these banks would grant,
brokers generally refer the application to a federal or a cooperative bank
where interest rates are correspondingly higher. The latter institutions
rarely pay finder's fees, but the willingness to write higher percentage
loans, when such are necessary to complete a home sale, accounts in part
for their continuing ability to attract new loans at 5 per cent, even
where. adjacent savings banks write lower-percentage loans at a full 1 per
cent lower rate. 3
In the late 1930s, the Bowery Savings Bank of New York attracted considerable
new mortgage business by cutting rates on FIA-insured loans from the maxi-
mum 5 to 14 per cent. These rates do not include the mortgage insurance
premium, an item conspicuously absent from promotional literature pub-
licizing this rate cut. Mr. Henry Bruere of the Bowery believes this
move attracted nearly $10 million of loan applications, although most of
this volume reflected refinancing or taking new business from rival lenders
rather than the stimulation of new home construction. TNEC Hearings,
Part 11, op. cit., pp. 5116-7.
2In cases where the broker is also a loan correspondent, he may refer a
choice mortgage to the affiliate life insurance company at a 4 per cent
rate, thereby injecting another competitive element into the market. Loan
correspondents often seek to service as many mortgages as possible and
accordingly refer most acceptable requests to their affiliate company,
even if a finder's fee is not included.
3 See "Lending Area" below.
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When mortgage lending institutions enter a new market area, they
generally endeavor to create a minimum of ill-feeling by meeting rather
than materially undercutting prevailing interest rate structures. For
example, local federals and savings banks have recently extended their
operations into the Cape Cod region, where the going rate on prime loans
had been 5 per cent. Most institutions merely met this rate, but at least
one invading Boston savings bank has offered the same h per cent loan pro-
Visions on the Cape as in the Boston market. The overall effectiveness of
this overt price-cutting is not known, but some interviewed mortgage officers
have regarded these tactics as both undesirable and unnecessary at this time.
Some local federal savings and lozin'associations continue to write a
limited volume of mortgages through refinancing, but the extent of this
activity is perhaps significantly less today than in the prewar era. Then
a change in mortgagee is involved, the federal has often secured the loan
by offering a special type of price concession, such as a larger loan amount
or longer term, but often including a higher interest rate as well. During
the 12-month period ending February 1951, refinance constituted 7.6 per cent
1
of all loans made by the 15 local associations.
A form of portfolio-raiding is still pursued by certain outside life
2
insurance companies operating in the local area through loan correspondents.
These agents contact existing home owners through the mails or door-to-door
canvassing in order to determine their current mortgage status. If the mort-
gage is well-seasoned and the mortgagor appears to be a sound credit risk,
the agent may offer to refinance the obligation so as to reduce monthly
1Home Loan Bank of Boston. It will be recalled that refinance may merely
involve the rewriting of any existing mortgage, regardless of any possible
change in property ownership.
2See "Modern Banking in a Changing World", an address by J. E. Perry, Commis-
sioner of Banks, reprinted in The Savings Banker, October 1940, p. 4.
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carrying charges far below existing levels. This reduction may result from
lower interest rates, but it results primarily from a substantial extension
of loan term. Furthermore, while monthly mortgage payments are reduced,
aggregate monthly payments are maintained, the balance consisting of pre-
miums on an accompanying life insurance policy. These so-called package
mortgages provide ordinary life insurance protection for the mortgagor,
allegedly at no extra cost. Although the merits of this combination arrange-
ment will not be analyzed here, it should be mentioned that local mortage
lenders decry the promotional tactics employed as full of misrepresentation
and as such constitute a real menace to a stable mortgage market.1
Advertising and Nonprice Competition.
Advertising budgets of the various thrift institutions have been
reviewed in Part III, so only brief reference will be made here. Federals
continue to spend the largest proportionate amount on advertising, although
cooperative banks and certain savings banks have greatly expanded these
programs in recent years. Federals and cooperative banks advertise quite
heavily in local newspapers, ordinarily stressing the availability of
savings accounts earning generous dividends, but frequently mentioning
home loan plans as well. In addition, savings banks and federals sponsor
various public service radio programs, either individually or collectively
as trade associations. As in most business pursuits, however, personal
contact and satisfied customers are regarded as essential ingredients for
a continuing success in mortgage lending. To this end, individuals who
utilize other services of the institution are frequently flooded with pro-
motional literature stressing its expert mortgage department and urging
them to share the word with friends and neighbors. Furthermore, certain
1 Savings banks can and do perhaps offer essentially the same arrangement
to home buyers, via combining a conventional mortga-e and a life insurance
policy.
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federals and cooperative banks have at various times offered special induce-
ments to persons who would open up a new savings account or merely return
a self-addressed envelope. The prizes offered range all the way from an
address bookor wallet to membership in the "Hopalong Cassidy Club."
Although these gifts have undoubtedly assisted in attracting new savings
accounts,'there is some evidence pointing to an increasing consumer sensiti-
vity to relative dividend returns. 1 At any rate, non-price competition has
provided an effective means of securing new business in both savings and
mortgage departments, and its significance should not be overlooked.
Before leaving this discussion, the increasing importance of joint
advertising efforts of builders, realtors, and lenders should be mentioned.
The interdependence of the operations of these three groups has been amply
demonstrated by various newspaper advertisements as well as other promo-
tional media. Indeed, builders frequently ally themselves with real estate
agents in marketing their homes, the former preferring to concentrate on
construction activities alone. The indispensability of mortgage lenders in
providing adequate financing is reflected both in construction lending as
well as in granting long-term home mortgages. Hence, it is only natural that
each leg of the triangle promotes its own self-interest by promoting the
continuing success of all three. Frequently a different "development cor-
poration" is established to handle the affairs of each individual housing
project, operating as a collective unit. In promoting the sale of these
homes, neither the builder putting up the property nor the institution fi-
nancing it is mentioned by name. Furthermore, newspaper advertisements,
while stressing the desirable features of the new homes and their location,
often fail to mention selling price, The direct-reduction mortgage has
See "Elasticity," Part III.
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become so widely accepted that the low monthly payment is frequently the
only price element referred to in the acvertisement. For example, an
attractive spread in a Boston newspaper mentions only the 4$628 down payment
and the popular phrase, "monthly payments less than rent." Another case
gives somewhat more complete information, noting in small print that the
W0 equity payment and $60 monthly payment is computed on a 25-year, 4
per cent basis.. Still another mentions the monthly payment of $73.92
but makes no reference whatever to selling price, loan amount, interest
rates, or loan term. These illustrations serve to emphasize the elements
foremost in the minds of prospective home buyers. Quite justifiably, two
primary considerations are adequacy of equity savings and the relation be-
tween monthly debt service and prospective incomes.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze the net effect of the
various advertising schemes on the local home mortgage market. Although
the mere existence of advertising evidences a degree of imperfection in
the competitive market, its overall stimulative effect is dependent in large
part upon the extent of this imperfection. The increasing rivalry among
competing institutions for new mortgage business has manifest itself in
expensive advertising campaigns, but it has also resulted in tangible price
concessions to prospective customers. Interest rates have been reduced,
loan terms extended, loan-value ratios heightened, and debt amortization
arranged on a convenient, monthly-payment basis. So long as the home
buying community is largely ignorant of alternative mortgage plans offered
by various lenders, a moderate volume of "informative" advertising may
truly improve the competitive structure of the market. Tenants who hereto-
fore were unaware of the relative ease with which home purchase can be
1 From Boston Sunday Herald, Real Estate Section, November 18, 1951, and
January 6, 1952.
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financed become active demanders for mortgage credit. Provided the adver-
tising copy makes specific reference to interest rates, loan terms, etc.,
he will also be sensitive as to the relative merits of alternative loan
plans' available.
If, on the other hand, the local market has adequate housing accommo-
dations and new home building falls off drastically, the net stimulative
effect of advertising on overall mortgage demand is severely diminished.
From this point on, it becomes more "manipulative," and merely results in
a redistribution of the existing mortgage debt. Provided price c.oncessions
are included, this activity may continue to benefit the home owner, but
there is a real danger that non-price elements may become the dominant
selling point. Mortgagors may be induced to refinance their obligation
elsewhere solely because of a lower monthly mortgage payment. What is not
emphasized, however, is the considerable extension in repayment term and a
possible advance in interest rates. The lower mortgage monthly service is
undoubtedly a primary selling point for package mortgage deals promoted by
certain life insurance companies. Similarly, joint advertising efforts of
builders, realtors, and lenders frequently play down certain essential parts
of the mortgage contract, notably interest rate and loan term. Hence, there
is the danger that home buyers are induced to select their new home on the
basis of monthly payment and initial equity requirements alone without care-
fully examining other essential mortgage elements. At the same time, how-
ever, the widespread utilization of the VA home loan program locally and of
the FHA plan elsewhere has instilled a certain degree of sensitivity among
new home buyers as to the merits of alternate mortgage plans. The maximum
4 per cent rate on the former loans has become general knowledge among
lIndeed, the apparent ease with which home ownership may be accomplished has
perhaps prompted a certain amount of unjudicious purchasing.. INortgage credit
is offered individuals who may be better advised to remain as tenants unless
circumstances change in the future. Unfortunately, the prospective purchaser
deals only with parties standing to gain from an affirmative decision, and
does not often receive the judgment of an impartial counsel.
veterans and non-veterans alike, and has undoubtedly created an increasing
awareness of mortgage interest rates.
LAN AMTOUNTS AND PROPERTIES LIORTGAGED
As mentioned earlier, a policy of making larger lcans on residential
and commercial properties partly accounts for the characteristic lower
interest rates charged by local savings banks. Cooperative banks and federal
savings and loan associations, on the other hand, have generally concentrated
their mortgage lending on 1- to h-family residences, although the latter
have loaned relatively large amounts on these properties.
Undoubtedly administrative costs per dollar of loan amount decline
steadily over a wide range of possible loan amounts. Total costs of ser-
vicing are but little more for a $10,CCO loan than for one half that size,
for the detail involved in processing monthly payments is little affected
by the dollar amount concerned. Hence, if risk and other mortgage alements
remain unchanged, the lending institution is justified in charging higher
interest rates on unusually small loans in order to compensate for the
added costs involved.
Some institutions have adopted a variable rate schedule which reflects
this differential cost factor. One federal savings and loan association
visited charges 6 per cent on all loans up to $2,C0O, and 5 - 5} per cent
for loans up to $5,CCO. A progressive savings bank officer has examined
the element of administrative cost very carefully in determining a sound
interest rate schedule for postwar mortgage operations. By constructing a
series of cost charts, he ascertain. d- the appropriate interest rate re-
quired to cover the costs involved in making and servicing loans with
various original principal amounts. Although minimum rates vary inversely
with loan -mount, the entire rate schedule itself supposedly falls as
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total mortgage holdings increase. At the close of the , when this bank's
portfolio was sorely depleted and overburdened with small loans on run-
down properties, handling costs per dollar of loan amount were unusually high
and so also were minimum interest rates. In expanding its mortgage port-
folio, this institution has offered liberal credit availability to new home
purchasers in growing communities, where both risks and servicing costs per
dollar of loan amount are minimized. Now that this progran has been in
effect several years, mortgage holdings have more than doubled, administra-
tive costs per dollar of loan amount have fallen substantially, and minimum
interest rate requirements have been correspondingly reduced within each
loan amount category.
While administrative costs per dollar of loan amount tend t be a
decreasing function of loan amount, overall lending risk appears to work in
the opposite direction. In regard to lending activities of Massachusetts
savings banks, Professor Lintner observes that both risks of foreclosure
2
and risks of loss tend to increase as larger loan amounts are considered.
Among all loans written during the years 1918-1931, overall mortgage ex-
perience was uniformly most favorable when original principal amounts did
not exceed $25 thousand. This observation does not infer that size of loan
lIt should be pointed out that such a method of setting interest rates hints
of a variant of the traditional "full-cost" pricing. In other words, this
bank may be reducing rates on relatively "high-cost" small loans in accord-
ance with falling overall average costs per dollac of loan amount, but the
decline in average costs may be due only to the increasing significance of
choice "low-cost" large loans. Under the preferred "marginal" pricing
scheme, the bank would be justified in reducing rates on small loans only
if economies arising out of large-scale lending operations actually reduced
the direct costs attributable to handling loans within each loan amount
category.
2See lintner, op. cit., pp. 390-4C1.
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per se is the primary criterion for risk rating, but rather that the most
desirable property types for security purposes tend to fall within smaller
value groups. For example, loss experience appeared to be far less favor-
able on income-property loans than on residential loans, but for reasons
other than mere size alone. On the contrary, whereas loans on stores,
stores and offices, stores and lofts had the largest average size ($59.h
thousand), their loss ratio of 10.6 per cent was the lowest among all loans
on income properties. The corresponding net loss ratio for single-family
loans was 4.6 per cent, compared with slightly higher ratios of 6.1 and 8.6
per cent for loans on 2-family and 3- to h- family properties, respectively.
Professor Lintner has pointed out that, even if risks of foreclosure
and loss were no greater on each individual large loan than on each small
loan, the former in general would still be less desirable as a bank invest-
ment. Because of the operation of the law of large numbers, a bank can
expect a much more predictable loss experience if a given sum of money is
spread over a great many small loans rather than a few large individual mort-
gages.2 The probability of complete loss is progressively lessened, and
aggregate losses would be spread out over a longer period of time, thereby
permitting a more rational handling of loss reserves and overall fore-
closure policies. Furthermore, a well-diversified mortgage portfolio is
more easily attained if a great many small loans are distributed over a
wide variety of risk elements. This factor is particularly relevant in the
case of moderately-sized institutions, which lack the necessary resources
to achieve a properly diversified portfolio by making only large loans.
Nevertheless, the inherent danger in concentrating on large income-property
1lkintner, op. cit., pp. 395-6. The average for all income properties was
15.7 per cent, with loans on garages least f avoratle with a net loss ratio
of 34.9 per cent.
2See "Mortgage Risk and Probability Theory," Part III.
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loans does not imply that a thrift institution should make only loans on
single-family properties. A well-diversified portfolio should be well for-
tified against possible shifts in public preferences or changing neigh-
borhood trenda, and should accordingly include a limited volume of loans on
2- to h-family residences. Similarly, large institutions may find it pru-
dent to invest a modest proportion of their savings capital in loans on
large income properties, rather than concentrate on home properties ex-
clusively.
The trend away from large individuzl loans has been most marked among
some of the largest savings banks in Boston proper. During the booming
1920s, these institutions invested heavily in such mortgages, so that by
1927 average outstanding loan balances exceeded $20 thousand in the port-
folios of four local savings banks. Indeed, the largest bank in the area
had so concentrated its investment efforts in this direction that in 1927
average loan balances had reached $77.3 thousand in a portfolio of 309
loans. Most of these large individual mortgages have been eliminated from
local bank portfolios via repayment and foreclosure, and have subsequently
been replaced by smaller home loans. As .a consequence,'average loan bal-
ances are materially lower among the four savings banks mentioned above,
the value being less than $15 thousand in each case. Among those banks
which continue to make a limited number of loans on income properties,
small business properties used for chain stores and supermarkets have ap-
peared singularly attractive.
Local institutions have adopted a variety of rules.and principles to
follow in regard to making large individual loans. Some have a blanket
policy of refusing all mortgage applications vhere the requested loan
amount exceeds $50 thousand on single parcels of real estate. Others place
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a limit on the total number of mortgages over a specified amount, such as
$20 or $25 thousand. Regarding the type of property accepted as collateral,
most local institutions shun away from single purpose buildings, such as
churches, hospitals, hotels, etc. Foreclosure is frequently difficult or
unwise in the event of delinquency and, even if the property is acquired via
foreclosure, poor marketability would seriously impair its sale at a satis-
factory price. Many of the local cooperative and savings bank officers
interviewed indicate a definite preference for loans on small, single-family
homes. Past experience has demonstrated a relatively low risk attached to
such mortgages, and this preference is further strengthened by the avail-
ability of federal guaranty and insurance provisions.
Most local lenders, on the other hand, have no objection to lending
conservative amounts on 2- to h-family residences, and some may even pre-
fer such loans to all others. Provided the properties are properly con-
structed or reconverted to accommodate more than one family, such invest-
ments are desirable in that the mortgagor can apply rental incomes toward
making monthly mortgage payments. Opinion appears to be sharply divided on
this matter, however, for some lenders will accept a moderate volume of
multi-family loans only if property location and other risk factors are
superior. These latter lenders fear that the resale market on such pro-
perties may be less stable than for single-family homes, and that the possi-
bility of widespread vacancies may impair the mortgagor's ability to main-
tain regular payments throughout the loan term. Owner-occupiers of single-
family properties do not risk this loss of rental income, and may have a
more deeply rooted incentive to prevent mortgage default.
1Professor Lintner found that in every case, whether the loans were on
1-, 2-, or 3- to 4-family properties, foreclosure was little more than
one-half as prevalent among owner-occupied than among tenant-occupied prop-
erties. Lintner, op. cit., pp. 409-10.
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Insurance companies, for example, weigh the intangible benefits
accruing to owner-occupancy quite heavily in selecting mortgage portfolios.
Inasmuch as most properties underlying insurance compeny mortgages are
located at a considerable distance from main headquarters, risks of.de-
fault can be minimized only by a proper motivation on the part of the mort-
gagor. Indeed, servicing agents can hardly be expected to exercise the
same discretion in handling loan delinquency, etc., as would an ordinary
portfolio lender. Past lending experience has shown the superiority of com-
bining a predominance of single-family loans with a conservative volume of
large income-property loans in attaining a proper portfolio distribution.
Indeed, a large company with main offices in Boston has concentrated pri-
marily on the former, and has encountered only one default among 25 thou-
sand uninsured loans made in recent years. Further reference to the geo-
graphic distribution of mortgaged properties will be made immediately below.
LENDING AREA
In formulating overall policy in regard to lending area, mortgage
lending institutions must reconcile at least two opposing tendencies. In
the first place, most thrift institutions have traditionally considered the
immediate community as their natural lending area. Provided the safety of
depositors funds is not impaired, they have perhaps felt a moral obligation
to provide financing needs for their own depositors and other members of
the community before accepting any outside business. Furthermore, the ty-
pical lender is most familiar with the risk elements involved in lending in
the immediate vicinity, as he is well acquainted writh local sources of income,
1 This company has but one home mortgage in the Boston arda. Another insur-.
ance company differs from most in its mortgage investment policy; whereas
small home mortgages constitute a majority of the number of loans, income
property loans dominate the portfolio as the average loan amount is over
2CO thousand.
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long-run neighborhood trends, general credit rating of residents, etc.
Not only does he possess a more intimate insight into the various forces
affecting risk, but he can exert a positive influence in minimizing default.
The community institution is readily accessible to local mortgagors both
for making monthly payments as well as for working out any unexpected pro-
blems which might develop during the repayment period. Administrative ex-
pense is undoubtedly lessened if mortgage properties are located near the
bank, for initial and subsequent inspections are more conveniently made and
extensive advertising and promotional effort outside the community is
minimized.
Professor Lintner has dealt with the issue of lending areas in con-
nection with the mortgage loss experience of Massachusetts savings banks
on loans made in the years 1918-1931. His findings in regard to loans on
1- to h-family residences indicate rather conclusively that proximity of
mortgaged property to the lending institution has a favorable influence
upon lending risk. For every $100 thousand loaned on single-f amily prop-
erties in their own or adjacent town, the banks incurred subsequent net
losses of 3.8 thousand. Where the dwellings were located 2 or-3 towns
away, average net losses were $7.1 thousand; and finally, average losses
on more distant properties were $10 thousand for each $100 thousand of
principal loaned. These results point to a positive correlation between
proximity and lending risk, thereby indicating a decided advantage in con-
centrating lending operations on a bank's immediate vicinity.
In spite of these advantages, lending in a narrowly limited area
subjects the' mortgagee to significant inherent risks because of this
concentration. First of all, the above discussion refers only to uninsured
Lintner, op. cit., pp. 4C6-7.
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lending, and does not suggest a preference for local properties when the
m6rtgage is insured or guaranteed by a federal agency. Indeed, there are
decided advantages in spreading out latter mortgages not only throughout
the metropolitan area but across the nation as well. Even with conventional
lending, most interviewed lenders regard a proper geographic distribution
of mortgaged properties as an indispensable element in maintaining well-
diversified portfolios. They severely limit their operations in commu-
nities dependent upon a single company or industry, and prefer to hedge
themselves against adverse neighborhood movements, etc. In so doing,
however, they must be aware of the hazards involved in invading a new dis-
tant region in which their past experience and insight may be of limited ap-
plication. Such dangers, on the other hand, are seldom so severe as to pre-
clude a wide diversification of mortgag(Le properties throughout a given
metropolitan area. Indeed, depositors in most institutions are scattered
over wide areas. Frequently a family has done business vith a particular
bank for several generations, and continues this patronage regardless of its
changing residence. Others prefer to deposit savings funds near their
place of business rather than of residence. Furthermore, depositors in
local mutual-type institutions are little concerned with the identity of
borrowers so long as their qualifications measure up to accepted standards.
Only in cooperative banks is the borrower required to be a shareholder as
well, and even this nominal regulation is frequently met through the pur-
chase of one share at the time of mortgage origination.
Mortgage officers endeavor to keep a close check on the locations of
mortgaged properties, so as to insure a proper geographic distribution.
Several indicate that these properties are spread over as many as 50 separate
communities, although the immediate vicinity generally receives the heaviest
concentration. At the same time, however, the prominence of local thrift
1.
See Yart VII.
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institutions as mortgage lenders in their own immediate communities varies
considerably, both regarding type and size of institution as well as main
location. To demonstrate these relationships, consider the proportion of
all home mortgages recorded in various communities accounted for by local
institutions. Primary data for Table XIII have been gathered by the Metro-
politan Mortgage Bureau from the registry of deeds, and have been grouped
according to community and lender type. The 10 communities are classified
into four groups, A - D, arranged in descending order according to average
purchase price of home properties. To maintain comparability, mortgage
lending operations of each type of institution are included in the commu-
nity totals only if a member of this type is located within the given
community. For example, data on federals are excluded from communities A
and B because there are no federals located in any of the 5 cities and towns
concerned.
Several interesting observations may be drawn from this tabulation.
The data are-fairly complete so far as lending activities of these in-
stitutions within the given areas are concerned, and appear to have followed
a similar pattern during each postwar year. Within each community type,
local cooperative banks account for a higher proportion of total mortgage
recordings by all such banks than do local savings banks relative to total
recordings by all savings banks. This difference narrows steadily as one
moves from the A to D communities, although the absolute pErcentage share
of total recordings represented by local institutions among either type re-
mains roughly the same in all but the D communities. IData on federals are
perhaps too small to permit much generalization, but their attitudes and
policies toward lending areas appear to lie between those of savings banks
and cooperative banks.
lSee p. 341.
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TABLE XIII. NUMBER OF MOR TGAGES RECORDED BY SAVINGS BANKS, COOPERAUTIVE
BANKS, AND FEDERAL ASSOCIATIONS ON PROPERTIES W1ITIN CERTAIN
COMUNITIES OF METROPOLITAN EOSTON, CLASSIFIED70 ACCORDING TO
LOCATION OF LENDER AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY, 1946-1951
Type of Lender
Rating of Community*
A B C D
Locally-Located
Savings Banks
Cooperative Banks
FederalsX
Total
All Locations-
Savings Banks
Cooperative Banks
FederalsX
Total-
Ratios: Local
All Locations
Savings Banks
Cooperative Banks
Federals
Total
3,259
3,086
6,345
8,511
5,318
13,829
1,934
1,684
3,618
4,661
3,355
8,016
1,030
4,473
1,385
10,180
9,531
9,435
3,167
22,133
38.1% 41.5% 42.3%
58.0 50.2 47.5
- - 140.9
45.8 45.1 44.6
Source: Computed from primary data compiled by
Bureau.
390
557
245
1,192
1,557
2, 0141
4o5
4,003
9,613
10,092
1,630
21, 335
24,260
20,1149
3,572
47,981
25.0% 39.6%
27.3 50.1
60.5 45.7
29.8 44.5
the Metropolitan ortgage
* Including: A - Belmont, Newton, Winchester; B - Arlington, Lexington;
C - Dorchester, Medford, Quincy; D - Roxbury, Somerville
x Because there are no federals located in any A or B communities, or
in Roxbury, data on federals are excluded accordingly.
Cooperative banks perhaps more than any other type of thrift insti-
tution continue to function in much the same manner as their early pre-
decessors. Both in regard to selling shares and in making loans to
shareholders, most such banks strive to accommodate their own community
first and foremost. Among the 10 communities referred to in Table XIII,
local cooperative banks in all except Roxbury and Somerville dominate
lending by such associations, and in Arlington end Lexington the single
cooperative bank in each town wrote more local loans than any other coop-
1 There are some notable exceptions among those banks with less desirable
locations. See below.
All
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perative bank in every quarter during the 5-year period.
Savings banks, on the other hand, have traditionally been more fluid
in regard to placing mortgage loans and proximity of property per se is
perhaps of lesser significance than among local cooperative banks. Never-
theless, it is entirely possible that both types of thrift institutions dis-
play the same preference for local loans, with the significant difference
in ratios as indicated in Table XIII being due largely to the influence of
large Boston institutions. While local savings banks made more loans than
non-local banks in communities A, B, and C in over 80 per cent of the
quarters concerned, they were followed very closely by several Boston
banks in every base. Especially within the choice residential areas of
Belmont, Newton, and Winchester, the latter banks are anxious to place as
many mortgages as possible. This enthusiasm perhaps wanes gradually as
communities B and C are considered, thereby accounting in part for the
increasing importance of local as opposed to non-local savings banks,
as well as the narrowing margin between corresponding cooperative and
savings bank ratios.
The preference of savings banks for loans on properties within the more
exclusive sctionsi ei amply demonstrated by the data in Table XIV. In
order to secure this choice business, savings banks have been compelled to
pursue vigorous merchandising campaigns, utilizing both price and non-price
competitive tactics in its accomplishment. Especially after their virtual
retreat from mortgage lending during the preceding 15 years, this postwar
task appeared doubly difficult. These institutions publicized a 4 per
cent rate on prime loans and offered a 1 per cent finder's fee to brokers
bringing in the business. As indicated earlier, extending liberal con-
struction credit to large-scale operative builders has also provided Boston
savings banks in particular a steady inflow of new permanent mortgages.
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TAELE XIV. NUIBER OF MORTGAGES RECORDED BY VARIOUS TYPES OF LENDING
INSTITUTIONS ON PROPERTIES LCCATED i!ITHIN CER3TAIN lOCAL COM-
MUNITIES, 1946 - 1951
Per cent of Total Represented by Each Lender Type
Type of Lender
A B C D Per cent No. of Loans
Savings Banks 44.7 45.5 39.9 33.0 41.8 24,260
Cooperative Banks 28.0 32.7 39.3 43.2 34.7 20,149
Federal Ass'ns 12.0 13.4 14.1 20.6 13.8 8,013
Commercial Banks 10.7 6.6 6.2 3.0 7.5 4,336
Life Insurance 4.6 1.8 0.7 0.2 2.2 1,257
Companies
Total - per cent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -
No. of Loans 19,016 10,252 211,025 4,722 - 58,Ci5
Source: See Table XIII. Total mortgage recordings are included, whether
or not all lender types are located within each of the 10 commu-
nities.
Inasmuch as most new home construction has been concentrated in suburban
areas, the relative importance of savings banks is strongly felt in such
communities as A and B.
Mortgage lending operations of commercial banks and life insurance
companies are even more concentrated in the A communities than are those
of savings banks. In fact, the concentration among the former groups of
institutions is so marked that the share of total recordings made by sav-
ings banks is higher in B than in A communities. Commercial banks have
received this choice business either through construction lending, mortgage
brokers or, perhaps even more likely, through personal contact. It should
be noted that the most active commercial banks are outside Boston pro'per,
notably in Newton and Quincy, in which communities their mortgage recordings
frequently exceed those of local cooperative banks and federals. In almost
every suburban community, local comercial banks dominate lending activity
by such institutions, and the large Poston banks are virtually excluded in
all communities except Roxbury and Torchester, where branch offices are
1 The latter generally involving requests from existing bank customers,
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numerous. Life insurance companies undoubtedly realized some of their loan
volume through refinancing mortgages held by other institutions, as des-
cribed earlier. On the other hand, loan correspondents frequently operate
as short-term construction lenders, and in extending such credit retain
some rights in regard to placing the permanent mortgage.
The declining relative importance of the aforementioned institutions
as lenders in the less exclusive communities is matched by a corresponding
rise among cooperative banks and federal savings and loan associations.
.As seen in Table XIV, the share of total recordings made by each of the
latter groups increased steadily as one moves from left to right. In
community-type A, the combined share of all federals and cooperative banks
is roughly 23- times that of commercial banks and insurance companies, while
in D it is nearly 20 times as large. Similarly, their combined mortgage
recordings were but 90 per cent of savings bank recordings in type A but
nearly twice as large in D.
With the possible exception of federal savings and loan associations,
this striking contrast in lending areas is not due to the relative avail-
1
ability of the various lender types in these communities. The absence of
loans on properties in D communities among many mortgage portfolios is hardly
due to accident, but rather reflects a definite investment policy. Although
there are certain districts within which such rules do not apply, many sav-
ings banks have a blanket policy of refusing all loan applications where the
property is located in less desirable communities. They shun awray entirely
from the lower-income districts of Boston, such as the South End, Charles-
town, Roxbury, etc., and concentrate on communities such as A, B, and C.
1lindeed, thrift institutions are distributed in the four community types
as follows: A B C D
Savings Banks 5 2 3 5
Cooperative Banks 6 2 11 4
Federals 0 0 3 2
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These institutions regard mortgage lending in lower-income districts as
a death trap, for both borrower and pledged property are generally assumed
to be associated with high risk. In the event of default, the mortgagee
takes over the property, but can perhaps find a buyer only if another risk-
laden purchase-money mortgage is taken back as part payment. Thus once an
institution sinks its'funds into such a neighborhood, an easy loss-free
withdrawal is seldom possible. Hence, such loan requests are refused as a
matter of principle, regardless of interest rate or.loan-value ratio.
Not only do many outside savings and cooperative banks prefer to stay
clear of such lending operations, but institutions situated within these
restricted areas also appear to have similar notions. Referring back to
Table XIII, it is clear that the share of all loans made by savings and
cooperative banks in Roxbury and Somerville represented by local institu-
tions is significantly lower than the corresponding share in the remaining
community groups'. Indeed, local institutions made only about one-fourth
of all mortgages in D c6mmunities, and were the dominant lender in roughly
one-fourth of all quarters during the 5-year period concerned. In the 21
postwar quarters for which this information is available, the two Roxbury
cooperative banks have never written as many loans on local properties as
1
has a cooperative bank in downtown Boston.
The executive officer of a Roxbury cooperative bank indicates that
mortgage lending has been singularly difficult during recent years. This
bank has a moderate one-half of its total resources invested in real estate
2
loans compared with a four-fifths ratio for all benks in the area. Fur-
thermore, its portfolio is overburdened with inferior mortgages on local
dwellings, many of which have been on the books for decades although ownership
1 See below. In 4 quarters a Roxbury savings bank was the largest savings
bank lender in the Roxbury section.
2This ratio would perhaps be considerably lower if the bank offered ordinary
savings share accounts, but this will be done only when and if a need for
added share capital appears.
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has changed hands rather frequently. Most residential properties consist
of 2- to- 4-family flats and converted single-family dwellings constructed
shortly after the Civil War. Rather than continue entertaining new loan
requests on local properties, this bank as well as other savings and coop-
erative banks in the community have sought to replenish portfolios vith
loans on newer homes in other communities. The cooperative bank official
visited has encountered considerable difficulty in entering suburban resi-
dential areas, however, for existing institutions have already made firm
contacts with builders and real estate agents operating in these areas.
Small banks are not equipped to finance large site developments and, unless
shareholders or bank officers possess an inside track on such transactions,
prime loans can often be secured only through real estate agents. Coopera-
tive banks, however, have generally been most unreceptive to the notion of
paying finder's fees, so even brokers are of limited assistance in expand-
ing mortgage portfolios, especially where the bank does not enjoy a choice
location. The mere availability of a 4 per cent rate on prime loans does
not insure a prompt response among the home buying community unless it is
accompanied by an effective merchandising policy.
The mortgage officers of a nearby savings bank faced the same problem
at the end of the war, but have worked toward its solution in a more positive
manner. In 1946 its mortgage portfolio, amounting to less than one-fourth
of total assets, consisted largely of loans on local run-down properties,
many being written on the traditional straight-term basis. To w.rork its
way out of this trap, the bank refused all but the most promising requests
for local loans and vigorously invaded new territories. It not only
honored broker fees, but also financed operative builders on a wide scale,
1
frequently taking advantage of the FHA-insurance program. Furthermore,
A rather unique approach in this area. See Part VI..
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after such purchases were authorized in 19h9, this institution has invested
rather heavily in insured loans in other sections of the country. To better
accommodate new and existing customers, an attractive branch office was
established at a convenient dovmtown location. As a result of this multi-
pronged attack, mortgage holdings have more then doubled, while loans on
local properties have actually diminished somewhat. At the present time
more than 56 per cent of its resources are invested in mortgage loans,
over half of which are FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed.1
While the above mentioned institutions have shunned away from lending
in such districts as Roxbury, Charlestown, etc., others have found this
to be good business provided certain precautions are takan. These latter
lencers gradually acquire a certain degree of expertness in appraising risk
elements involved in lending in lower-income districts, and can accordingly
gain from this specialization. Indeed, certain Boston institutions, inclu-
ding some of the largest cooperative banks, have consistently loaned on
properties located in relatively undesirable sections, and give every indi-
cation of continuing this practice. Among the larger savings banks, however,
only two Boston institutions appear to lend heavily in such communities, and
2then only if loan-value ratios are unusually conservative. When only low-
percentage loans are written, jUnifor financing±iscpractically inevitab.len many
3
cases, constituting a possible source of strength for the lender but certainly
A neighboring Roxbury savings bank, somewhat larger in terms of total re-
sources; has been less active in building up its mortgage portfolio. Be-
tween 1927 and 1951, its total assets nearly doubled while mortgare hold-ings were halved. Furthermore, despite the relatively low volume of new
loans made, it has consistently made more mortgages on Roxbury properties
than has the above more aggressive institution.
2This impression has been gathered from interviews as well as data on mort-
gage recordings compiled by Metropolitan Lortgage Bureau.
3As explained by a local savings bank executive, the existence of a junior
lien does not impair the security of the first mortgage as mich today as
when straight-term loans predominated. Under present conditions, the first
mortgagee receives regular amortization inflows and delinquency is effec-
tively minimized by the close watch maintained by the third party who has
only a secondary lien on the property.
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a costly burden for the borrower.
Cooperative banks which willingly operate in lower- income sections
have no difficulty in charging a minimum of 5 per cent on all new mortgage
loans, except where a VA-guarantee is involved. This substantial mergin
over prevailing rates on prime loans is taken as more than sufficient to
cover the added risk and administrative expense involved. The Boston bank
which consistently makes more loans in Roxbury than any other cooperative
bank has effectively compensated for any inherent high-risk elements through
proper servicing. The old multi-family flats in the Roxbury community are
regarded as stable in value and a steady revenue producer for the property
owner.1 In order to minimize mortgage delinquency on such multi-femily
loans, the bank stresses upon the borrower that monthly mortgage payments
must be taken out of rental income before anything else. Furthermore, any
indication of non-compliance must be promptly investigated and remedied,
and the property itself must be inspected periodically. The treasurer of
this cooperative bank reports that its specializing in loans frequently
unacceptable to other institutions has actually paid off well. Not only
does the bank enjoy a margin in gross interest yields of up to 1 per cent,
but as a result of efficient, sound operations its delinquency ratio has
2
consistently rem-a'ried below the state average.
It is noteworthy that rarely is an institution a dominant lender in
both A and D community groups. Twocf the largest cooperative banks and one
federal in Boston are consistently the major mortgage lenders in Roxbury,
but are almost totally absent from recordings in Belmont and Newton. Loan
1The net vacancy ratio in Boston proper (including Roxbury) as of April
1950, was only 0.9 per cent, against a ratio of l.C per cent for the entire
Metropolitan Area. Corresponding ratios for Medford, Somerville, Newton,
and Quincy were 0.h, 0.7, 1.1, and 2.0 per-cent, respectively. Preliminary
Reports of the 1950 Census, Series HC-7, No. 21.
2Minority groups are frequently included among the mortgagors in the lower-
income sections of Boston. Although there appears to be little indication
of outright discrimination, some interviewed officers feel that these bor-
rowers must be carefully watched so that they do not commit themselves too
heavily in other installment obligations.
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ambunts are ordinarily considerably lower on Roxbury properties, but loan-
value ratios and overall risk are not correspondingly reduced. The relative
concentration of their lending in lower districts is reflected in the differ-
ential in average interest rates charged by these institutions as opposed
to most savings banks. Among the large Boston cooperative banks visited,
only one makes uninsured loans at rates below 5 per cent, and this parti-
cular bank finds the h per cent market more receptive in B and C coxmmruni-
ties than in such A residential areas as Newton and Belmont. These scat-
tered bits of data thus point to a positive correlation between interest
rates and the relative risks and costs involved in making the loan.
INDIVIDUALS AS LENDERS IN CERTATIN COLOTITIES
As discussed earlier, individuals as a source of mortgage credit have
been gradually supplanted by specialized institutions of various sorts. The
latter, by pooling together the savings of thousands of individual deposi-
tors, are better equipped to achieve and maintain well-diversified mortgage
portfolios. The individual lender has not dropped out of the picture in all
communities. to the same extent, however. As suggested in the preceding dis-
cussion, most local institutional lenders prefer to operate in such commu-
nities as A, B, or C above, and frequently shun away from loans in D commu-
nities. As a consequence, prospective or existing home ovners in Roxbury,
for instance, may be able to secure. only part, if any, of a loan request
through conventional channels. In this event, they are obliged to look
elsewhere for mortgage credit, either for a primary loan or for supplementary
funds. As stated earlier, the latter may involve either a second mortgage
from an outside party or a purchase-money mortgage taken back by the seller.
The singularly significant role played by individual investors in extending
mortgage credit in Roxbury is indicated in Table XV.
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It may truly be questioned, however, whether private lenders perform
a real service to the prospective or existing property owner if the loan re-
quest has already been flatly rejected by conventional thrift institutions.
Perhaps he is best advised to refrain from borrowing altogether, as the
attendant risks are dangerously severe for both parties concerned. To
compensate for the risk involved, such individual lenders, frequently
organized as realty companies, generally write the loan contract on a costly
discount basis. Nominal rates are perhaps little above those charged by
federals and cooperative banks operating in the same community, but effec-
tive rates are substantially higher because the discount is taken on the full
1
loan amount before monthly principal payments are begun. Mortgage record-
ings reported in the Banker and Tradesman frequently include the contract
interest rate as well as loan amount, especially where an individual is the
lender. In the quarters where rates for both individuals and institutions
are reported, the former are consistently higher but generally by a margin
of less than 1 per cent. Undoubtedly if complete data were available re-
garding repayment terms, renewal fees, etc., the margin between their corres-
2
ponding effective rates would be substantially wider.
As indicated in Table XV, individuals continue to be a primary source
of mortgage credit in the old Roxbury section of Boston. Except in commu-
nities such as this, however, the proportion of total mortgage recorcings
made by individuals has fallen significantly over the past quarter century.
In the relatively stable community of Dorchester, this ratio dropped from
60.4 per cent in 1927 to 19.8 per cent in 195L. In areas such as Newton and
1This scheme is -similar to that used by the private construction lender
described earlier. p.314,15.
2Loan terms are apparently relatively short under these discount-type
mortgages.
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TABLE XV. PROPORTTON OF TOTAL MORTGAGE RECORDINGS MADE 1f DMIVITDUAL LENDERS
IN FOUR COWNITIEAS, AS REPORTED tuRING TIE FIRST WHEEK OF EACH
QUARTER IN'SELECTEDYEARS, 1927 - 1951
Community
Year Winchester Newton Dorchester Roxbury
Total Individuals Total Individuals Total Individuals Total Individuals
No. Total No. Total No. Total No. Total
1927 17 35.3% 188 41.5% 305 60.4% 163 70.6%
1936 28 28.6 143 36,4 145 42.0 55 45.5
1940 11 22.2 117 28.0 104 29.8 48 62.5
1945- 19 10.5 117 16.2 90 28.9 42 56.6
1946 30 0.0 161 10.6 189 21.2 64 39.1
1947 32 6.2 143 14.0 216 24.1 95 41.0
1948 25 0.0 150 17.2 216 19.0 111 47.8
1949 19 10.5 80 15.0 168 21.4 84 40.5
1950 28 0.0 195 7.7 193 18.1 103 39.8
1951 51 3.9 233 15.0 201 19.8 75 50.7
Source: Computed from recordings reported in Banker and Tradesmanusing
the first issue of January, April, July, and October for each year
concerned.
Winchester, where new construction and overall housing activity have been
more extensive, ratios fell from 41.5 and 35.3 per cent to 15.0 and 3.9 per
cent,respectively, over the same interval. In Roxbury, however, individuals
have consistently accounted for roughly one-half of all mortgage recordings,
the ratio being 50.7 per cent in 1951, a postwar high. The relative growth
patterns of these four communities are indicated by the underlying trends
in the total number of recordings reported. For the A communities, the
1951 total was substantially above the 1927 level, while the opposite situa-
tion prevailed in the C and D communities, where the 1927 volume has not
been appr.oached in the postwar period.
It should be repeated that the data in Table XV refer to the total num-
ber of recordings, and not dollar volume. Since individuals frequently make
small second mortgages, the corresponding ratios based on dollar volume would
reveal a far less significant role played by such lenders. In any event,
however, Roxbury home owners are strongly dependent upon non-portfolio lenders
1.
See Table XIV.
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for mortgage funds to a far greater extent than are those in more progressive
districts.
It is perhaps noteworthy that the ratio of individual to total recordings
has risen rather sharply between 1950 and 1951 among all four communities.
This shift may merely reflect a spurious movement resulting from the small
sample considered. On the other hand, the restrictive provisions of Regu-
lation X and of the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program, as well as a ten-
dency to discount current inflated prices for appraisal purposes, may have
produced a more conservative mortgage lending policy on the part of some
thrift institutions. If maximum loan-value ratios are lowered on first
mortgages, home owners may resort to outside sources for first and particii-
larly second mortgage credit.
ADDED'COMMENTS ON LARGEST MOR1' GAGE LMNDER.S
The preceding analyses of interest rates and mortgage lending prac-
tices have made frequent reference to the largest institutions, especially
where their behavior differs from that of the others. The present section
will summarize some of these observations by charting the relative growth
patterns of the five largest savings and cooperative banks against those of
all such institutions in this vicinity. The three largest federals are
similarly analyzed, while the small degree of concentration in mortgage
lending among local commercial banks has already been discussed. For this
summary analysis, total assets ill be used as the staidard for detennining
the "Big Five." The same individual banks vould be similarly classified if
mortgage holdings were the standard, except in the case of one large savings
bank which had an unusually small portfolio in the early postwar period.
lp. 28%.
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Savings Banks
Among all savings banks in the Boston vicinity, the Big Five have
consistently included the same institutions, although their relative ranking
has shifted slightly. The two largest banks have exchanged positions, vhile
the next three, currently grouped closely together at -r asset level more
than $100 million below the leaders, have frequently changed their respec-
tive ranking. Total resources as well as mortgage holdings of each of the
Big Five stood at a higher level in 1951 than in the previous boom year,
1927. Over the same 24-year interval, however, total assets have risen less
rapidly for these five than for all savings banks in the area, while the
opposite is true of mortgage portfolios. (See Table XVI.)
The relative growth patterns of the Big Five compared with all banks
have differed considerably over the past quarter century. Until recently,
the Big Five relative to all banks have figured pore prominently as a de-
positary than as a source of mortgage funds. During the prosperous 1920s,
TABLE XVI. COMPARISON OF MORTGAGE ACTIVITY OF THE FIVE LARGEST SAVINGS BANKS
WITH TAT OF ALL SAVINGS BAIKS IN THE BOSTON AREA 1927 - 1951
(Dollar Amounts in illion)
Five Banks with Largest All Banks Ratio of Five Largest
Dollar Issets to~All Tanks
Year Assets Mortgages Mortgages New Mortgages Assets Mortgages New
Assets Loans Assets Loans
1927 $373.0 $162.7 43.6% $23.4 52.2% 41.3% 34.6% 29.9%
1936 48o.4 170.8 35.5 7.2 41.7 41.5 35.4 31.6
1940 480.6 148.7 30.9 12.7 36.9 40.2 33.7 38.7
1946 589.0 127.7 21.7 30.9 23.5 36.4 33.5 33.7
1947 611.9 135.0 22.1 34.2 24.3 36.6 33.2 34.3
1948 627.8 150.4 23.9 33.9 26.4 36.8 33.h 33.h
1949 636.9 17C.5 26.8 40.5 28.9 36.8 34.2 36.3
1950 654.6 234.2 35.8 93.6 34.9 36.6 37.6 h5.0
1951 668.9 298.5 44.6 96..8 41.6 36.5 39.2 42.4
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
this difference was most pronounced, 0s in 1927 the Big Five held 41.3 per
cent of total assets but only 34.6 per cent of aggregate mortgage holdings.
Furthermore, they were less active in enlarging their portfolios, as new
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loans represented a low 29.9 per cent of the aggregate volume. During the
subsequent depression and wartime periods, mortgage holdings of all banks
declined steadily, with mortgage-assets ratios falling to all-time low
levels. In both savings and mortgage markets, the Big Five were relatively
more significant in 1936 than in 1927, but over the succeeding decade the
1
remaining banks showed important relative gains.
During the postwar years, the large Boston savings banks have assumed
a leading role in the gigantic mortgage expansion. In fiscal year 195C,,
the Big Five made new loans in a dollar amount nearly equal to that of the
remaining 51 banks in the area. In addition, the mortgage-assets ratio
reached an all-time high for the Big Five in 1951, while that of all banks
was yet slightly below the 1927 level. .In 1950 the share of total mortgAges
held by these five banks exceeded their share of aggregate asset holdings for
the first time. Indeed, between 1949 and 1951, their share of total mort-
gage holdings increased from 34.2 to 39.2 per cent while their share of
total assets actually dropped from 36.8 to 36.5 per cent. The rapid in-
crease in mortgage portfolios since 1949 is die in large part to extensive
2
purchases of insured mortgages on properties in other sections of the country.
Nevertheless, most savings banks, especially including the Big Five, have
aggressively sought new loans in the local mortgage market through the vari-
ous methods described earlier.
In view of previous analyses of lending practices, it is not surprising
that the Big Five tend to charge relatively low rates of interest on t heir
mortgage loans. In 1951 the weighted average rate on all mortgages held
1 The decline among the Big Five was most pronounced in the savings market,
as their share of total savings capital fell from hl.5 to 36.4 per cent
between 1936 and 1946, while their share of mortgage holdings dropped
slightly from 35.4 to 33.5 per cent.
2See Part VII.
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by these institutions was 4.07 per cent, while the unweighted average rate
1
for all 56 savings banks was 4.27 per cent. Furthermore, only two of the
remaining 51 banks showed an average rate below this -4.07 per cent figure.
As stated earlier, large Boston banks have generally been more receptive to
making loans on large income properties than have smaller suburban insti-
tutions. Moreover, although nearly all lenders have become increasingly
interested in smaller residential loans, the average new loan made by the
Big Five continues to be slightly larger than the average for all 56 savings
banks. Between 1927 and 1951, the average outstanding balance for the former
declined from $20.2 to $9.2 thousand, and for the latter, from $7.9 to
$7.3 thousand. The only savings bank currently earning an average- rate of
less than14 per cent on its mortgage loans is a member of the Big Five.
As might be expected, this bank has consistently held the portfolio with
the highest average loan balance over the past quarter century, amounting to
$14.7 thousand in 1951.
Another f actor accounting for their relatively low interest rates con-
cerns the geographic area served by the lending operations of the large Boston
savings banks. As analyzed in the preceding section, these institutions have
been particularly active in financing construction operations of specula-
tive builders. Furthermore, they have widely publicized the availability of
4 per cent credit on choice loans, and have offered a 1 per centfinder's fee
to brokers bringing in such business. By offering such attractive mortgage
programs, these savings banks not only hoped to re-enter the market they
had so recently abandoned, but they also sought to enrich their portfolios
with prime mortgages. Many banks have refused to write any loans whatever
on properties in Roxbury and other lower-income communities.
Not all savings banks in the Boston area have enjoyed a continuing
growth in mortgage holdings. Indeed, fully one-fourth of the 56 institutions
The unweighted average for the Big Five was 4.09 per c ent.
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had not approached their 1927 level by 1950. Since that time, however,
many of these relatively less active banks have expanded their portfolios
through making extensive mortgage purchases in the secondary market. Among
the institutions which have failed to keep pace with the average, most have
either traditionally concentrated on large income-property loans or have
operated in communities with relatively little new construction or transfer
activity. In the former case, the institutions concerned have perhaps found
a less promising demand for.income-property loans or else have adopted a
policy of seeking smaller home loans. Average interest rates among such
institutions are ordinarily quite low, but they have not succeeded in gain-
ing a firm foothold in the postwar home mortgage market.
Many savings banks which are either unfavorably located or else con-
centrate mortgage lending in relatively undesirable sections have not shared
to any great extent in the postwar mortgag7e boom. To menbers of the Big
Five, both having offices in the hub district, have tended to specialize
in lending on older 2- to h-family properties in established sections which
have become progressively less desirable in recent years. Average inter-
est rates on their real estate loans have consistently exceeded those for
all of the Big Five, with the average rate for one such bank being 4.28
per cent in 1951. Furthermore, total mortgage portfolios of these two
Boston savings banks increased only 15 per cent between 1927 and 1951, whiile
those of the remaining three banks rose 137 per cent. As indicated earlier,
institutions frequently find it extremely difficult to withdraw from lend-
ing in less desirable communities once they are firmly embedded therein.
Some banks located in such communities perhaps prefer to remain in the imme-
diate mortgage market and, as sound mortga':e demands dwindle and new con-
struction vanishes, they experience a gradual decline in total mortgage
holdings. These institutions, as well as others located at a considerable
distance from communities with brisk housing activity, maintain portfolios
in part by retaining existing mortgages after the property changes ownership
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and the new buyer seeks added mortgage credit. Indeed, unless such banks
engage in extensive construction lending or else secure firm contacts with
active real estate agents, they face a difficult task in placing mortgages
in choice residential suburban communities. Inasmuch as savings capital
continues to mount despite a dearth of local mortgage demands, such insti-
tutions may now partially expand portfolios through secondary market pur-
chases if they are unable or unprepared to seek conventional loans outside'
their immediate community.
Gross operating income as a percentage of total assets tends to vary
inversely with the size of savings bank concerned. As of October 31, 191,
"total ordinary income" represented 3.230 per cent of total assets among all
188 banks in assachusetts, while the corresponding ratio for the l banks
with assets of $50 million or more was 3.199 per cent. The smallest banks
(up to $2 million) had the highest income-assets ratio, and the largest of
the 8 size groups ranked seventh. This observation is not at all surprising
in view of the smaller average interest return on mortgage loans held by
the largest savings banks. At the same time, however, total expense ratios
fall continuously as larger banks are concerned and costs accordingly ab-
sorb a diminishing share of the above mentioned "total operating income."
As indicated earlier, savings banks undoubtedly, enjoy certain economies in
large-scale operations, as evidenced by the steadily declining proportion
of total assets represented by salaries, the largest single expenditure item.
Dividend payments accounted for 2.01 per cent of total assets among the
2
largest 14 savings banks, but only 1.93 per cent among all 188 institutions.
1From an analysis prepared..by the Savings Banks Association of assachusetts.
2The relatively higher dividend disbursement amongf the largest banks does
not necessarily indicate a corresponding differential in dividend rates.
Actually, the margin is narrowed by virtue of the relatively higher pro-
portion of deposits to assets among these banks (88.1 vs. 87.6 per cent).
The residual component of gross income is allocated primarily to surplus,
representing 0,689 per cent of total assets. among the 14 largest and 0.768
per cent among all banks in 1951. Book surplus also represents a relatively
smaller proportion of total savings capital among the largest banks in the
Commonwealth. In 191 guaranty fund and profit and loss reserves aggregated
12.CO1 per cent of total deposit liabilities among all banks, and 11.793
per cent -among the 14 largest. Indeed, this ratio exceeded 12 per cent
amonc the banks in all but two of the C asset-size categories. Consequently,
future net profits vwill be subject to the federal corporate income tax for
many if not most savings banks in the Commonwealth.
Cooperative Banks.
In contrast to savings bank experience, the largest cooperative banks
have played a relatively minor role in the postwar mortgage expansion.
Indeed, while mortgage portfolios of all cooperative banks in the Boston
area increased 7.5 per cent between 1927 and 1951, holdings of the Big Five
actually dropped 10.3 per cent. (See Table XVII.) The increase in aggre-
gate portfolios is far more significant if due allowance is made for the
banks which converted into federal associations during the prewer period.
Combined portfolios of local cooperative banks and federals in 1951 were
73 per cent larger than the 1927 level.
The Big Five cooperative banks have held a steadily declining share of
aggregate assets and mortgage portfolios among all local banks over the
past quarter century. This decline in mortgage holdings has become increas-
1 The Congress in 1951 amended existing tax laws to apply to mutual thrift
institutions as soon as reserves represent 12 per cent of total deposit
liability. As of this writing, it is still too early to comment on the
impact of this provision on local bank operations. As a matter of fact,
regulations surrounding the levy are not completed end there is some
doubt as to its effect on earmarked loss reserves. Some banks may seek
to avoid this tax payment through expanding advertising budgets, raising
dividend rates, reducing interest rates, etc. Others may continue as at
present, paying the required tax and adding the remainder to reserves,
thereby further fortifying themselves against contingent losses.
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ingly pronounced in the postwar period, in direct contrast to the continuing
relative growth of large savings banks. Mortgage-assets ratios for all
cooperative banks have e xceeded those for the Big Five by a progressively
wider margin, and since 1946 the share of aggregate mortgage portfolios
held by the latter has fallen from 30.2 to 26.1 per cent.
TABLE XVII. 'COMPARISON OF M1ORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS OF THE FIVE LARGEST TiITH
THOSE OF ALL COOPERATIVE BANKS IN THE BOSTON AREA, 1927 - 1951
(Dollar Amounts in Millions)
Five Banks with Largest Ratio of Five Largest
Dollar Assets All Banks to all Banks
Year Assets ,Mortgages Mortgages ortgeges Assets Mortgages
Assets Assets
1927 $85.4 $79.5 93.2% 93.6% 31.14% 31.2%
1936 74.5 51.8 69.7 72.8 28.3 27.1
1940 76.4 52.5 68.6 75.2 33.0 30.2
1946 84.8 61.6 72.8 74.4 30.8 30.2
1947 89.6 62.4 69.6 74.4 30.7 28.8
1948 90.4 65.8 72.9 77.5 29.7 27.9
1950 93.5 67.8 72.5 77.7 31.4 26.8
1951 96.5 71.3 74.0 79.7 28.1 26.1
Source: Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
The individual institutions included in the five largest coopera-
tive banks have displayed widely differing growzth patterns. Although four
banks have figured in this group in each reported year, their relative
ranking has varied somewhat. Institutions in Boston proper have consis-
tently occupied the first and second positions by a wide margin, vhile
the remaining three posts have been held by banks in Boston, Lynn, Malden,
Quincy, and Watertown at various times. Of the four banks included each
year, all but one held smaller mortgage portfolios in 1951 than in 1927,
the combined decline of these three banks being 23.0 per cent. In con-
trast to this unimpressive record, mortgage holdings of the remaining two
banks in the Big Five of 1951 were 35.14 per cent above their corresponding
1927 level.
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Some of the primary factors accounting for this rather curious
development have been discussed in detail earlier in Part V. Geographic
lending areas have perhaps been far more restricted among cooperative
banks than among local savings banks. Whereas the latter have aggres-
sively expanded mortgage portfolios through various means, including
1
purchases in the secondary market, cocperative banks appear to be less
mobile in selecting lending areas. As indicated earlier, many leading
mortgage lenders in Boston became active in districts such as Roxbury
when they were yet highly desirable residential communities. However,
as properties depreciated and neighborhoods blighted, some institutions
effectively withdrew and entered newer more progressive sections of the
metropolitan area. Others, however, have continued to operate in these
increasingly less desirable neighborhoods, and consequently have not
shared in the postwar mortgage boom. The three relatively inactive coop-
erative banks mentioned above continue to dominate lending operations in
such districts and have rarely placed many loans in areas of extensive
2home building activity. One of these banks has quite consistently made
more loans in the Roxbury section than any other thrift institution.
The fact that some of the largest cooperative banks continue to
lend in lower-income districts does not necessarily signify uneconomic
mortgage operations. Their static condition may merely reflect the
virtual absence of new construction as well as the relatively low level
of sound mortgage requests in such areas. Nevertheless, they ordinarily
lIt will be remembered that cooperative banks have not been authorized
to make out-of-state mortgage investment whatever.
2
One of these banks, however, is the only cooperative bank visited which
has financed speculative building to 2ny great extent. Hence, this
bank has at various times operated in more progressive communities, but
a significant proportion of their 5 per cent loans are still made in
the districts described in this paragraph. This latter observation is
confirmed by data from the Metropolitan Mortgage Bureau.
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realize a slightly higher interest return on their real estate loans,
and are able to minimize mortgage default through proper risk analysis
and servicing technique. In 1951 average rates on their respective
portfolios ranged from 4.61 to 4.82 per cent, while corresponding rates
for the Big Five and for all 76 institutions were 4.58 and 4.59 per cent,
respectively. If it were not for the substantial volume of 4 per cent VA
home loans within their respective portfolios, average interest rates
would be considerably higher, as the three banks concerned apparently
charge a minimum of 5 per cent on all conventional loans. Furthermore,
reserve funds aggregated nearly 10 per cent of total assets for the three
relatively static banks, as opposed to a state average of 9 per cent and
2
an average of 7.3 per cent for the largest bank in the area. The loss
experience of individual banks has not been examined in any detail, so
little can be said regarding the adequacy of their respective surplus
reserves. Thus far in the postwar period, however, mortgage delinquency
has not been a s erious problem among any institutions visited.
This discussion of relative growth patterns suggests an issue which
is somewhat more philosophical in nature, namely, what are thrift insti-
tutions seeking to maximize? If they are supposed to achieve as rapid a
growth as possible, many large cooperative banks, and savings banks as
well, have. failed in their mission. According to this standard, local
federals have been most successful, as their combined mortgage portfolios
have increased more than fivefold since their respective conversion dates.
Others perhaps regard continual growth as a healthy and even enviable con-
dition, but place other objectives as supreme to growth per se. Indeed,
lSee pp. 345-346.
2These data refer to their respective operating positions in April 195.
3See Chapter 15.
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they may seek to maximize dividend returns provided depositors ' funds are
properly protected through prudent investment and adequate loss reserves.
Still others may strive to facilitate home purchase by reducing interest
rates as low as practicable, so long as dividend returns are sufficient to
maintain savings capital in tact.
Undoubtedly many institutions pursue the relatively easy course of en-
tertaining mortgage applications whenever tendered, but rarely go outside
their own community to attract business. Banks belonging to this category
encounter little difficulty in maintaining a sound, well-diversified port-
folio if they are located in most suburban residential communities. Such
cooperative banks rarely lend to speculative builders, but do finance con-
tract home building on a wide scale through making long-term loans to new
home buyers. Other mortgage loans on new or older properties are acquired
through local real estate agents, shareholders, or personal contact. These
institutions are conveniently located for mortgage operations, and can or-
dinarily be quite selective in granting loan requests. Certain suburban
banks have consistently charged lower rates on real estate loans than have the
largest Boston cooperative banks. One bank in an exclusive community west
of Boston charges a flat rate of 4 per cent on all new loans, whether they
be VA-guaranteed or not. Another realizes an average return of 4.04 per cent
on its mortgage holdings, far below the 4.47 per cent earned by the largest
cooperative bank in the area. The latter bank charges a minimum of 14 per
cent on uninsured loans, and has enjoyed a continuous growth in mortgage
holdings in the postwar period. Within the relatively exclusive A and B
communities referred to earlier, however, this institution has generally
been less active than smaller local banks which may or may not charge a
lower interest rate.
If a bank is less favorably located, mortgage investment poses serious
problems. As stated earlier, cooperative banks rarely honor broker commis-
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sions, and are.prevented by statute or custom from financing speculative
builders on an extensive basis. In addition, several Boston banks, large
and small alike, are still housed in upper stories of large office buildings,
hardly a convenient location for expansion purposes. Other cooperative banks,
and particularly federals, which have moved into more adequate business qi.ar-
ters have realized an immediate improvement in operating conditions. The
failure of certain institutions to make such a move perhaps reflects a
basic indifference toward savings and lending operations in general. Some
such institutions record a progressively smaller mortgage portfolio at each
reporting date, as old loans are paid off aid new ones are rarely made to
replenish the stock. Undoubtedly these portfolios would decline even more
rapidly if it were not for a considerable volume of refinance activity where-
by mortgaged property is sold before maturity with the new buyer seeking
a rewriting of the contract. Among the less progressive institutions,
share-accumulation loans and traditional serial share capital are still re-
latively significant. Indeed,' one small Boston bank held only cooperative
form mortgages in its portfolio as late as 1950, all being carried at a
51 per cent nominal rate of interest.
In summary, proper mortgage investment constitutes an increasingly
complex problem for many small cooperative banks in the Boston area. Un-
less they are fortunate enough to enjoy a favorable location or else pos-
sess other unique advantages, they find it extremely difficult to con-
tinually make sound new loans on desirable properties. Within Boston
alone there are 14 cooperative banks each with total resources under $3
million. One of these institutions has a portfolio of 9C loans and total
1As indicated earlier, these smaller banks are rarely members of the
Home Loan Bank System.
361
assets of $290 thousand. Then so few loans are handled, with an average
balance of less than $2,700, the continuing existence of such an institution
is somewhat surprising, as economy operations are difficult if not impossible
to realize.
Federal Savings and Loan Associations.
Data on mortgage operations of local federal savings and loan associations
are scattered and incomplete, so little can be said in regard to speci-
fic lending practices. As indicated earlier, growth patterns of the 15
local associations have been most spectacular since the depression years,
and by 1951 only two federals had assets of less than $5 million. While
share capital has risen rapidly, mortgage portfolios have risen even more
sharply, with the resalt that all associations have frequently resorted to
seeking advances from the Home Loan Bank for supplemental funds. As of
December31, 1951, mortgage portfolios exceeded share capital among 10 local
federals, including the three largest members. All but the smallest feder-
als have achieved a significant proportion of their postwar mortgage expan-
sion through financing new construction, whether it be on an operative or
contract basis. During the 12-month period ending February 1951, new home
construction accounted for a larger proportion of all loans made by the
three largest federals than did the purchase of older properties.
The three largest members accounted for 43.5 per cent of aggregate
mortgage portfolios held by all 15 local federals in December 1951. Mort-
gage-asset ratios were roughly 83 per cent among both groups of federals,
being slightly above the corresponding ratios for cooperative banks. Al-
though the three largest have borrowed somewhat more heavily than the re-
maining federals, 1 their current mortgage lending operations appear to
somewhat below the average rate for all associations. During the year
1As of December 1951, Home Loan Bank advances represented 12.3 per cent of
total share capital among the Big Three, and 10.0 per cent for all 15
associations.
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ending February 1951, new loans among the former accounted for 38.6 per cent
of aggregate recordings, thus slightly less than their corresponding share of
aggregate portfolios. Federals have aggressively expanded mortgage port-
folios in varying degrees since the immediate post-depression period. In
recent years, however, the rejuvenated interest in mortgare lending by
savings banks has perhaps been more spectacnlar. Thring the fiscal year
1950, new mortgage loans made by the 56 local savings benks represented
33.4 per cent of the year-ending ortfolio, while the corresponding ratio
among the 15 federals was a lesser 30.4 per cent.
1 The latter referring to the 12-month period through February 1951.
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PART VI. CHAPTER 13. UTILIZATION OF FHA AND VA HOivE LCAN PROGRAS IN EOSTON AREA
Across the nation the home loan programs of the Federal Housing Admin-
istration and Veterans Administration have played a prominent role in the
postwar housing boom. The former agency has insured institutions ag-ainst
loss in mortgage lending since 1934, while the latter was initially esta-
blished in.19hh to assist war veterans in purchasing their own homes.
NATIONWIDE DATA
Since the late 1930s, these federal programs have been involved in
approximately one-fourth of all mortgage loans made on 1- to 4-family
properties. Their importance is far more pronounced in terms of new
construction alone, however, as both FHA and VA programs have provided a
real stimulus for new home building since the depression period. During
the war years, the emergency Title VI provisions were used in most private
housing starts, as conventional civilian activity practically c -me to a
standstill. In the postwar years, the FHA and VA programs have assisted in
nearly half of all private nonfarm starts across the nation. (See Table I.)
Slightly more than half of the loans guaranteed by the VA and slightly
less than half of those insured by the FHA have been for existing homes.
Since the end of the war, however, the proportion of loans for new homes
has risen steadily, representing two-thirds of total recordings in both
programs during 1950.
FHA Program
By the end of December 1950, the FHA had insured over 14 million
property improvement and home mortgage loans, totaling over $19 billion. 1
1 Annual Report, HHIFA, 1950, pp. 242, 314.
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TAELE I. PROPORTION OF kORTGAGE LCANS ON 1- TO 4-FAMILY I1ELINGS AND
OF PRIVATE NONFARM STARTS UTTIZING FHA AND VA PIROGRA1B, 1936-1951
Total Mortgage Percentage Percentage Total BLS Percentage Percentage
Year Loans Made on Using FHA Using VA Private~ Using FHA Using VA
1- to T-Family Insurance Guarantee Starts Insurance Guarantee
Homes (000) (Coo)
1936 2, 232 13.8% 304 16%
1938 2,399 20.1 399 28
1940 3,287 23.2 530 32
1912 3, 201 30.4 301 51
1943 3,252 23.5 184 79
1944 3,857 18.3 139 67
1945 4,721 10.8 1.5% 208 20 3%
1946 9,470 4.5 11.5 662 10 13
1947 10,657 8.4 14.6 846 27 25
1948 10,834 19.5 8.6 914 32 11
1949 10,820 20.5 6.7 989 36 11
1950 14,800 16.9 11.2 1,353 3$ 1$
1951 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,023 26 15
Source: Housing Statistics, Housing and Home Firnnce Agency.
n.a. - not available.
Unsecured property improvement loans written under Title I accounted for
four-fifths of the number but less than one-fourth of the total dollar volume
of insured loan recordings. Such loans have ordinarily been used in con-
nection with the modernization and improvement of single-family homes, with
the average loan proceeds being $406 during the 16-year period through 1950.
Among the home mortgages insured by the FHA, three-fourths have been pro-
cessed under the permanent Section 203 program, while most of the remaining
loans were written during the war and early postwar period under Section 603.
As explained in Chapter 8, loan insurance may be terminated in a number
of ways. By the end of 1950, over 1.1 million out of the 2.6 million home
mortgages insured by the FHA had been terminated, with prepayment in full
accounting for over four-fifths of these cases. Most of the remaining
terminations resulted from the placement of a new insured mortgage on the
property, superseding the old contract. During the 16-year period through
1950, mortgage default and foreclosure occurred in 0.62 per cent of all
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insured home loans writtenwith title to the property being acquired by
1
the FHA in three-fourths of the cases. Foreclosure has been far more
prevalent among loans written under provisions of the emergency Section 6C3
than under the more permanent Section 203. Through 195C, Section 603 loans
accounted for two-thirds of all foreclosures despite the fact that their
cumulative total represented only one-fourth of all insured home loans
written up to that time. . A cumulative total of 4,333 small homes insured
under Section 203 had been acquired by the utual Mortgage Insurance Fund
by 1950, for which -debentures and cash adjustments had been issued in an
amount of $20.h million. Of these home properties, h, 172 had already been
sold at prices which left a net charge of $2.! million against the Fund,
or an average of approximately 3585 per case. Certificates of claim is-
sued to the mortgagee holding the defaulted loan were paid off either in
full or in some part thereof in nearly 40 per cent of all property acqui-
sitions. In addition, mortgagors shared in any subsequent excess proceeds
in 15 per cent of the cases, receiving en average refund of $264. 2
Total losses sustained by the Liutual Lortgage Insurance Fund during the
first 16 years of operation were $2.h million, representing 0.02 per cent
of the aggregate principal amounts insured. 3 While this represents an
impressive record of achievement, it must be recalled that the FHA has been
operating during a period of rising real estate prices and incomes. The
real test as to the adequacy of loss reserves, of course, must await a
general recessionary period, when mortgage delinquency and default become more
widespread. Serious administrative problems would undoubtedly arise if the
lIt will be recalled that the mortgagee may elect to retain the foreclosed
property himself and thereby terminate the -FHA insurance.
2Annual Report, Hh{T'A, 1950, pp. 2h3-h, 351-3.
3Ibid., p. 346.
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F-A were compelled to acquire and handle hundreds of thousands of fore-
closed properties, in which event it would function much as another HOLC.
At any rate, however, mortgage lending institutions are well protected
against loss even if the Fund cannot cope with the task, for F{HA debentures
are unconditionally guaranteed as to principal a.nd interest by the United
States government.
VA Program
Through providing an outright guaranty of up to 6C per cent of an
approved home loan, the VA program has aided more than 2 million returning
war veterans in purchasing new and older properties. Through November 1951,
home loans with an aggreg-ate principal volume of nearly 16 billion had beEn
closed, with the guaranteed portion accounting for slightly over half this
total. Out of the 2.54 million loans closed, 84 per cent have involved first
mortgages, with most of the remainder being of the combination FIA-VA variety.
The VA program differs from that of the FHA in that neither mortgagor
nor mortgagee pays any insurance premium whatever, and all loss liability
must be assumed by the VA itself. The VA gueranty is automatically termi-
nated when the loan matures or is prepaid in full. On the other hand,
lenders frequently relinquish the guaranty if the veteran requests a larger
loan .or term extension which would be quite acceptable on a conventional
basis. Local mortgagees'report that seeking the necessary VA approval on
such refinance operations entails considerable red tape and is hardly worth
the added security gained. 7hcn the VA guaranty is dropped, the home owner
receives a prompt approval of his request, but frequently is obliged to pay
a higher interest rate than the maximum h per cent on VA loans. Mortgage
default constitutes the remaining major cause for termination of a VA loan
guarantee.
1 Most lenders shift all application fees charged in connection with VA loans
to the borrower, generally amounting to about 420.
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Through November 1951, over 312 thousand VA-guaranteed loans had been
retired in full, representing 11 per cent of all loans closed up to that
time. The total number of reported defaults has been nearly as --reat, al-
though most have been subsequently cured or otherwise withdrawn. By late
1951, claims had been paid on 23 thousand guaranteed loans, with the net
amount after refunds aggregating j23.million. The loss experience on VA
hoime loans, while quite satisfactory, has been far less favorable than that
on FHA-insured Section 203 loans. Foreclosure has been necessary in..83
per cent of all home loans closed under the VA program, compared with a C.32
per cent ratio among insurcd loans. Moreover, net loss sustained as a per-
centage of original principal amounts guaranteed or insured has shovm an
2
even greater contrast between the two programs. This rather sharp differ-
ence in mortgage default and loss perhaps reflects the more liberal appraisal
standards of the VA, which approves most loans acceptable to the mortgagee
so long as the purchase price does not exceed the VA appraised value. The
FHA, on the other hand, has provided a more rounded program, designing and
supervising new housing developments as well as underwriting individual
mortgage loans.
Participating Lending Institutions
The offer of mortgage insurance or guarantee has appealed to many mort-
gage lending institutions across the country. As mentioned earlier, spon-
sors of the FHA program had hoped that the uniform standards and procedures
1Finance, Veterans Administration, November 1951. This latter amount is
subject to further downward revision from "liquidation of tangible security."
2Net loss on VA loans has represented 0.14 per cent of original principal,
but 0.27 per cent of the guaranteed portion; on insured Section 203 loans,
the corresponding ratio was .02 per cent through 195C.
The implications of this distinction will be brought out more clearly
throughout this and the succeeding chapter.
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prescribed would attract certain large institutional lenders back into the
market, especially life insurance companies and commercial banks. By
certifying the quality of mortgage credit, the FIHA, and recently the VA
as well, has induced these institutions to lend on properties located a
considerable distance from their respective offices. iAs seen in Table II,
life insurance companies in 1950 were more than twice as important as holders
of FHA-insured home loans than as holders of the ag:gregate mortgage debt on
1- to h-family properties. In 19h9 FHA mortgages comprised 29.6 per cent
and VA loans 10.5 per cent of the aggregate nonfarm mortgage debt held by
all life insurance companies in the nation. 1
Commercial banks have also invested heavily in insured mortgages, and
in 1950 held 30 per cent of all home mortgages insured by the FHA, compared
with a 20 per cent share of the total 1- to h-family mortgage debt. During
the immediate postwar period, they were extremely active in the VA program,
accounting for nearly 40 per cent of all VA loans closed through 19h7. This
share has fallen sharply since that time, although guaranteed loans continue
to occupy a more prominent position among ccmmercial bank home mortgage
portfolios than do.FHA-insured loans. In 1950 the former constituted 30.2 per
cent and the latter 27.2 per cent of aggregate commercial bank mortgage
2holdings on 1- to h-family properties.
Especially since their respective lending areas have been enlarged,
savings banks have become increasingly significant as investors in FHA and
VA mortgages. Accordingly, by 1950 these institutions were relatively far
more important as holders of insured and guarenteed loans than as holders
1Life Insurance Factbook, Institute of Life Insurance, 1951, p. 72.
2 This refers to all FDIC-insured commercial banks in the country. Operating
Insured Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, FDIC, June 30, 1950, p. 8.
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of the aggregate home mortgage debt.
The aforementioned institutions, life insurance companies, commercial
banks, and savings banks, frequently buy insured or guaranteed mortgages
in the secondary market, and are accordingly less important as mortgage
originators than as holders of the outstanding debt. By the same token,
mortgage companies play a prominent role as originators of both FIA and VA
2loans, but are relatively unimportant as permanent mortFagees.
Savings and loan associations have never figured prominently in the
FHA insurance program, either as mortgage originators or as permanent mort-
gagees. The relatively low yield of h - per cent on such loans, coupled
with other equally important factors, has resulted in a minimum of enthusiasm
3for the whole program. These associations have been far more active in
extending VA-guaranteed home loans despite the still lower interest return
of 4 per cent. Since the early postwar period, the share of total VA
loan recordings accounted for by both savings and loan associations and
commercial banks has fallen steadily. During the first two years of the
VA guaranty program, each of these lender types accounted for nearly hO
per cent of total recordings, but by 1950 their combined share had dropped
to 43.3 per cent. This significant continuing trend is perhaps due both
to the increasing interest in VA loans among other institution, especially
in the secondary market, as well as to the general tightening in interest
rates. Rising dividend rates and yields on alternative investments, inclu-
ding prime conventional mortgage loans, have made the fixed h per cent
See Table II.
2These agencies initiated 27.6 per cent of all FHA home loans during 1950,
but held only 4.1 per cent of the total insured debt.
3See pp. 391 below.
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TABLE II. PARTIIPATION OF VARIOLS LE-hDINIG INS TITUTIONS I T THE OVERALL
HCE LORTGAGE LARKET, FHA, AND VA HOLE LOAN PRO RALS, IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1950
Percentage Distribution
ortgage Total Savings Insurance Ccamercial Mutual Lbrtgage Indi- Other
Item (Millions) & Loan Compardes Banks Savings G-mpanies viduals bFtgae
Ass 'ns.
1-4 Family q646,941 29.3 17.9 20.2 8.2 X X 24.4
Debt Held
Dollar Amount 16,179 31.3 10.0 20.8 6.6 x 14.2 17.1
of Recording
of $20,000
or less
FHA Mortgages 338 10.8 20.8 29.6 7.6 27.6 x 3.6
Originated
FHA Mortgages 1,473 8.4 41.9 30.0 11.8 4.1 x 7.9
Held
VA Mortgages 3,073 21.9 8.0 21.4 9.1 39.1 x 0.
Originated
Source: Statistical Summary, Home Loan Bank Board; Annual Report, HHFA;
Housing Statistics, HHFA.
x - included with "other mortgagees"
return on VA-guaranteed loans progressively less attractive, especially
among savings and loan associations. Unlike insurance companies and sav-
ings banks, savings and loan associations have seldom purchased insured
mortgages in the secondary market to any appreciable extent. They have
generally been constrained by custom or statutory regulation from operating
beyond their immediate lending area.
Considering the country as a whole, the FHA and VA home loan programs
have been a boon for the urban real estate interests. In the first place,
home builders have found a vastly expanded market for their product, both
in the prewar and postwar periods. Individuals who were otherwise destined
to be tenants became active bidders for new and existing homes, providing
a vital demand factor in the unprecedented, postwar housing boom. Secondly,
mortgage lending institutions have become increasingly interested in mort-
gage investment, whether the properties be located near or far. Indeed a
leading savings bank president has characterized Title II loans as "the
answer to a mutual savings banker's prayer." Especially when an FIA firm
commitment has been obtained, commercial banks in particular have played
a vital role in financing site development operations of speculative builders
throughout the country. Even in cases where conventional thrift institutions
have been unable or unwilling to take over the permanent mortgage, the mort-
gage company or builder concerned has often been able to rely upon the FIA
for relief. Up to 1950, this latter eventuality became so widespread via
the advance commitment procedure that the FNIJA functioned as a virtual first
2
mortgagee.
FHA OPERATIONS IN THE EOSTON AREA
In sharp contrast to its widespread utilization throughout the nation,
the FHA home loan program has been received with limited enthusiasm in the
Boston area. A similar indifference to making FHA-insured loans appears to
be prevalent throughout much of New England, as data on Massachusetts and
adjacent states reflect the same relationships as those for the Boston area
alone.
Whereas FHA insurance is currently employed in roughly 1 out of every
6 home mortgages recorded throughout the nation, the corresponding utiliza-
tion ratio for the Eoston area is hardly 1 out of a 1CC.3  The significant
difference in utilization ratios is due in part to the varying rates of new
construction activity locally and elsewhere. As pointed out earlier, the
availability of loan insurance has been a boon to home construction across
the nation, with the result that new properties were involved in nearly
]Speech of Levi Smith at 1951 Maine Savings Bank Convention, repr:Inted in
Savings Bank Journal, October 1951, pp. 64-65.
2The role of the FHA in the secondary mortgage market will be considered
in the succeeding Chapter 14.
3Interview with Boston FHA officials.
4For other perhaps more significant reasons see below.
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65 per cent of all insured loans ritten in 195C. In the local area, on the
other hand, new home building has proceeded at a less rapid pace, and was
accordingly found in only 42 per cent of the modest 2,178 insured loans made
in the Commonwealth in 1950.
From its inception the FHA home loan program has played a minor role in
the local mortgage market. Indeed, during the entire period 1934-1950, fewer
than 16 thousand home mortgages on Massachusetts properties had been insured
by the FHA, slightly more than four-fifths of which were written under Sec-
tion 203. While the Commonwealth houses approximately 3 per cent of the
nationt s population, its local properties have been represented in but 0.6
per cent of all FHA mortgages. Actually Lassachusetts ranks last among the
48 states in terms of dollars of insured home loans made per capita. Al-
though 1949 represents the peak year for insured lending in the Boston Metro-
politan Area in terms of absolute dollar volume, the FHA plan was relatively
2
more significant during the prewar and early war years. When the program
was launched, insurance against mortgage loss appealed to many depression-
striken lenders, and accordingly nearly a thousand insured home loans were
recorded in 1936.. New construction activity was practically at a standstill,
so existing properties accounted for a large majority of all insured loans
until the late 193Cs. Perhaps the FHA amendments of 1938 granting special
treatment for new, owner-occupied homes influenced in part the abrupt upward
shift in the ratio of "new to all homes" in that year. 3
As mentioned above, civilien home construction was sharply curtailed
during the war years, with the criticEl housing needs of war workers receiving
the bulk of this diminished volume. In the Boston area, Title VI was idely
1Annual Report, HHFA, 195c, p. 241. As :indicated in Table XII, Chapter 11,
the FHA program was utilized in 12'per cent of all new single-family pur-
chases in the Boston etropolitan Area during late 1950 and early 1951.
The combination 1A-VA loan was found in 3 per cent of the cases.
2See Table III.
3See Table III.
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used during this period, and in 1942 a peak of 1219 insured loans were made
on local 1- to h-fenily properties. Eligibility standards on Section 603
loans were significantly relaxed and other concessions were made on such
mortgages to make them singularly attractive to local mortgage lending
institutions.
TABLE III. YEARLY VCLUIE OF FHA-INSURlD .in. Y0iIGAGE1S* lADE ON 1- TO h-
FAMILY U~ELLINGS LOCATED I TIE EOS TON IlT0iCFCLITAN DISTRICT,
SELECTED YEARiS, 1935-195o
Number of Number Amount Ratio of New
Year Mortgages of Units to all Homes
1935 565 n.a. $3,072 13.555
1936 970 5,211 34.6
1937 572 2,979 24.2
1938 628 3,374 66.5
1939 hhc 2,2h9 61.8
1940 747 3,516 69.h
1941 565 2,429 n.a.
19h2 1219 5,680
19h5x 63 272
1946" 22 23 98
1947 60 82 501
198 h8 466 3,402
1949 917 985 6,968
1950 667 727 5,o95
Source: Federal Housing Administration, Division of Research and Statistics
Refers to net firm commitments under Sections 203 and 6C3.
x Includes only July through December data for Section 203.
xIncludes only July through December data for Section 6C3.
n.a. - not available.
In the postwar era, insured lending has continued at a modest pace
while the local market has witnessed a housing boom of unprecedented pro-
portions. Indeed, the number of loans made under Sections 203 and 603
was smaller in 1949 than in 1936, the latter year hardly being one of
brisk housing activity. Though data are not available on a local basis,
it is likely that existing construction has accounted for a majority of the
postwar volume of insured loans, in contrast to the predominant role of new
1See Chapter 8.
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construction during the prewar years. The reasons for this rather unusual
observation ill be advanced shortly. Single-family dwellings hate pre-
dominated postwar insured lending under Sections 203 end 603 in the local
area. During the 5-year period through 1950, the ratio of "units" to
"number" of mortgages was roughly 1.1, indicating that single-families
2
have accounted for over 90 per cent of all home mortgages insured.
Title I Activity in the Boston Area
Insured lending under Title I of the FHA program has received a much
wider acceptance in the local area than has either Title II or VI. In
Massachusetts, 26 thousand Title I loans were made during 1950, nearly
all of which concerned the repair, alteration, and improvement of existing
properties. New low-cost homes have been eligible for long-term insured
loans under this title also, but the bulk of this activity has been con-
3
fined to the states of California, New York, and Texas. While Massachu-
setts ranked 35th in terms of insured mortgages written on local home
properties during the 16-year period through 1950, it was 10th among the
48.states in terms of Title I operations. By 1950, over 325 thousand home
improvement loans had been made in Massachusetts, over 20 times the cumula-
tive total of insured home loans written. Despite the fact that the average
amount was $404 on Title I loans against 35.7 thousand on Sections 203 and
603 loans, the former has actually been more important in terms of total
dollar volume. Local Title I loans had aggregated $132 million through 1950,
while insured home mortgages had reached only $87 million.h
1See "FHA as an Aid in New Construction" below.
2This corresponds rather closely with the structural breakdown of new
housing in the Boston area, (see Chapter 3), but places a greater em-
phasis upon single-families in relation to the distribution of existing
properties.
3Accounting for over one-half of all such new home loans. Annual Report,
HHFA, 1950, p. 315.
4Ibid., pp. 242, 314.
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Generally written for terms of less than 3 years, Title I home
improvement loans have appealed to commercial banks in particular as a
profitable and safe investment outlet. W.hen due allowance is made for the
discount procedure -prescribed, the effective yield on such insured loans
is well over 9 per cent. Throughout the nation, national banks accounted for
nearly half of all Title I loans made between 1934 end 195C. State banks,
industrial banks, and savings banks accounted for another 28 per cent of
this cumulative total, with finance companies dominating the remaining
portion. Ordinary thrift institutions, including savings banks as well,
have concentrated their lending operations on long-term mortgages, and have
not been equally active in making unsecured home improvement loans. Local
thrift institutions are authorized to make these latter loans whether they
be insured or not, but such activity is supplementary to their other mort-
gage operations.
Local Thrift Institutions in Insured Home Mortgage Lending
Very little data are available regarding the geographic area covered
by the insured loans held by local thrift institutions. It is known, how-
ever, that loan insurance has rarely been sought in connection with the
purchase of local home properties. As a result, loans on properties located
outside the immediate vicinity as well as in other regions throughout the
country dominate insured portfolios of local lenders. Largely because of
the increasing significance of purchases in the secondary market, the geo-
graphic distribution of' insured mortgage holdings may bear little or no re-
lation to the location of secured properties. 2
The relative importance of insured, guaranteed, and conventional loans
among residential mortgage holdincs of the major lender types in the Boston
area is indicated in Table IV.
Ibid., p. 316.
2
See pp. 376-377 below.-
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TABLE IV. RESIDENTIAL LMORTGAGE HOLDINGS OF MAJOR LENDER TYPES IN ESSEX,
MIDDLESEX, NORFOLK, AND SUFFOLK COUNTIES, MAY 31, 1951
(Dollar Amounts in illions)
Lender Type FHA- VA-
Insured Guaranteed Conventional Total
Commercial Banks $ 22.3 $ 24.5 $ 68.7 $ 115.5
Savings Banks 77.6 199.5 412.0 689.1
Savings and Loan 5.9 156.3 316.8 479.0
Associations
Insurance Companies 116.6 55.6 199.7 371.9
All Others o.h 1.3 19.1 20.8
Total $222.8 $437.2 $1016.3 $1676.3
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
* Does not include trust departments.
As of May 31, 1951, insurance companies held slightly over half (52.4 per
cent) of all FHA-insured loans held by mortgage lenders in the local four-
county area. At the same time insured mortgages accounted for 31.4 per cent
of the residential mortgage debt and 16.8 per cent of the aggregate mortgage
debt held by these companies. That these loans are primarily secured by
distant properties is suggested by the fact that loans on Massachusetts
properties accounted for 0.17 per cent of all FHA-insured loans owned by
2
all U. S. life insurance companies in 1949. Furthermore, the FHA plan was
used in 3.3 per cent of all nonfarm loans on Massachusetts properties, while
the corresponding ratio for the country as a whole was 29.6 per cent.
Next in importance as holders of FHA-insured loans are the local.-savings
banks, vhich held 34.8 per cent of the outstanding insured mortgage debt in
the four counties in 1951. This volume also represents 11.2 per cent of the
residential mortgage debt held by the savings banks included in this group.
The exact proportion of these holdings related to local properties is not
known, but it is probably less than 20 per cent of the total. In 1951 only
1Undoubtedly large multi-family properties are far more important among
insured holdings of insurance companies than of other local thrift insti-
tutions. In the case of one local company visited, Section 608 loans were
over h times as large in dollar volume as all insured home loans combined.
Hence, these data above perhaps exaggerate the importance of insurance
companies in the FHA home mortgage program.
2Life Insurance Factbook, 1951, p. 72.
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14 savings banks in the immediate Boston vicinity held any FHA-insured loans
whatever on instate properties, with the volume of such loans representing
1
2.3 per cent of aggregate mortgage holdings of all 56 banks. Furthermore,
out of these 14 savings banks, local insured loans represented over 14 per
cent of aggregate portfolios in only three cases, with the ratio being 18
2
per cent in the case of one of the Big Five. Leny of these insured loans
were written under the emergency Title VI program during the war and early
postwar years, with the result that outstanding balances are declining
steadily. Indeed, only one local bank, a Q25 million institution,. appears
to be consistently active in originating and holding insured loans on Massa-
chusetts properties.3 Some of the larger savings banks have never originated
local insured loans on a large scale, but have frequently made block pur-
chases in the local secondary market. Although this activity hcz not been
extensive in the Boston area, the FNLA and lenders seeking added liquidity
have a various times sold such loans on the open market.
Life insurance companies and savings banks held over 87 per cent of the
FHA-insured mortgage debt held by all local mortgage lenders in 1951, with
an additional 10 per cent being held by commercial banks. Insured loans,
as mentioned earlier, hold an especial appeal for commercial banks and in-
surance companies, as the quality of the mortgage is essentially underwritten
by the government. Accordingly, insured loans represented 19.3 per cent of
aggregate mortgage holdings of local commercial banks in 1951, a proportion
lEven where in-state properties are involved, a significant proportion is
located outside the immediate area.
2 1nsured holdings on in-state properties exceeded $1CC thousend in only 9
savings banks and were less than 610 thousand in L cases.
3 The latter bank has used the FHA program to great advantage in connection
with financing site developments.
1 n the 3'years for ihich these data are available, 1942, 1947 and 195C,
savings banks accounted for 43 per c ent of all purchases of insured loans
from FNMA on Massachusetts home properties; next in importance, in order,
were insurance companies, savings and loan associations, and national banks.
FHA, Division of Research and Statistics.
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exceeded only by insurance companies. Once again, these extensive insured
mortgage holdings are concentrated primarily on properties located outside
Massachusetts. Whereas FHA-insured loans accounted for 27.2 per cent of
aggregate mortgage holdings of all insured commercial banks in the country
in 1950, the corresponding ratio for Massachusetts 1- to h-family properties
was 6.1 per cent.
Last to be considered here as permanent FHA mortgagees are savings and
loan associations. These associations, both state- and federally-chartered,
held 2.6 per cent of the total insured mortgage debt held by all local len-
ders in 1951. At the same tine, insured loans comprised only 1.2 per cent
of aggregate residential mortgage holdings of all local savings and loan
associations. In contrast to other major FRA-mortgagees, however, lending
operations of savings and loan associations are largely confined to proper-
ties located near the lending institutions. Hence, if only in-state proper-
ties are considered, insured loan holdings are but slightly less significant
among local savings and loan associations than among savings and commercial
banks.
Among the 15 federals organized within the Boston vicinity, seven held
some FHA-insured loans in their respective portfolios in 1950. These loans
represented 3.6 per cent of aggregate mortgage holdings for the entire group,
and exceeded 7 per cent in the case of three local associations. A large
proportion of these insured loans were undoubtedly placed on the books be-
fore the postwar period, with the-result that the outstanding balance is
steadily eeclining. At least four federals, however, did add to their
respective insured loan balances during 1950, either through origination or
through the purchase of existing mortgages from other associations seeking
added liquidity.
1Operating Insured Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, op. cit. p. 8.
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Cooperative banks have perhaps participated in the FHA home loan
program less than any other major institutional group in this area. In 1951
only 14 of the 76 cooperative banks i'n the Boston vicinity held any insured
loans whatever, with their modest value of $1.4 million representing C.5 per
cent of aggregate mortgage holdings. These ratios were considerably smaller
during the early postwar years, as insured loans constituted a trifling C.17
per cent of aggregate mortgage holdings as late as 19h8. The sharp increase
in insured loan holdings from $394 thousand to l, 254 thousand during the
ensuing 2 years reflects an unusually large volume of new lending on the
part of three local banks. One of these three banks had never made any FHA-
insured loans before, and insured holdings of the other two increased tenfold
during this brief interval. This sudden interest in the FHA program perhaps
reflects a desire on the part of a few banks to minimize overall risks of
lending during inflationary periods by seeking the protection of FHA loan
insurance.
It is interesting to note that insured lending by cooperative banks has
been concentrated in two quite dissimilar situations. The more recent case
was mentioned above and the earlier occurred during the middle and late
1930s. After the depression had inflicted severe losses upon local mortgage
lenders, many institutions were reluctant to re-enter the mortgage market
for several years. Savings banks, for example, largely withdrew from active
mortgage lending, preferring to place savings inflows and other funds in
government bonds rather than in "riskyt mortgage channels. Cooperative banks
and particularly federals were far more anxious to enlarge mortgage holdings
during the prewar recovery. At this time, insurance against loss appealed
to certain of these lenders as the inherent risks in maetgage lending were
still fresh in. their minds. By 19h, 18 cooperative banks in the Boston
vicinity had made scme insured loans on local properties, but their combined
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volume represented only 0.h per cent of aggregate mortgage cldings.
Following this half-hearted interest, however, cooperative banks vrthdrew
almost completely from insured lending, and existing balances fell steadily
to 1948.
As indicated in the preceding chapter, federals end cooperative banks
were geniinely interested in lending on neW construction during the prewar
recovery. Savings banks, on the other hand, were less anxious to finance
and supervise such activity, and ordinarily preferred to concentrate on older
properties. This sharp difference in lending policy is reflected in data
presented in Table V.
-TABLE V. TYPE OF INSTITUTION ORIGINATING FHA-INSURED HOL OR GAiGES IN OSTON
TiOPOLITAN DISTRICT, 19h0
Per Cent Distribution of Amount of Loan
Type of Institution New Homes Existing Homes All Momes
National banks 14.4 9.7 12.7
State banks 3.3 10.2 5.7
Savings and loan 52.9 h.4 35.7
associations
Nortgage companies 3.6 .4- 2.5
Insurance companies 11.4 5.h 9.3
Savings banks 14.4 68.6 33.6
All others - -1.3 .5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Federal Housing Administration, Division of Research and Statistics.
FHA an An Aid in New Construction
While most local mortgage lenders have chosen to refrain altogether
from insured lending, some have expressed a genuine interest in the FHA
program. Although most insured loans made locally involve older properties,
the interest among certain lenders revolves primarily about new construction,
where the FHA provides valuable assistance in planning and supervising site
developments. This assistance is particularly appreciated when the proposed
construction involves special risk factors with which the lending institution
is either unfamiliar or unwilling to assume without FHA protection. For
example, FHA insurance is frequently sought whenever local lenders finance
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speculative builders in communities located outside their ordinary lending
area. The lender may be unaware of peculiar risk characteristics involved
in such operations and is virtually prevented from making continuing investi-
gations during the production period.
Along a somewhat different vein, local mortgage lenders have financed
prefabricated housing projects to a considerable extent under the guidance
and protection of the FHA. While they may be sympathetic to the notion of
prefabrication, most lenders are frankly skeptical of the long-run durability
and acceptability of such housing under existing technology. Rather than
dehy builders and prospective home owners the opportunity to deal with such
housing, several, lenders have willingly financed their erection provided
loan insurance is forthcoming. It should be mentioned that the local FHA
underwriters have generally been most cooperative with prefabricated home
dealers, so long as the manufacturer and erection crews are of reputable
quality.
When the promoter of a new housing development submits his site plans
to the FHA for processing and approval, the financing institution is safe-
guarded afainst an unsound investment. Before preliminary approval is
granted, the proposed development must pass a series of rigid qualifying
standards. The underriting staff examines each individual home in regard
to its structural soundness, livability, placement on the lot, adaptability
to the terrain, etc. Furthermore, the home must blend in harmony with the
neighborhood into vvoich it is placed, writh reference not only to architec-
tural or aesthetic qualities but also to the general 'market value of sur-
rounding properties. The FHA seeks to plan well-balanced site developments,
1 The Cape Cod area is a case in point. See pp. 385-386 below.
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so that the individual properties concerned will continue to repres'ent accept-
able security for mortgage purposes for many years hence.
After the planning stage is completed and preliminary approval granted,
the FHA makes a series of thorough inspections during the ensuing construction
period. Some lenders regard such examinations as sufficient in themselves,
and rely largely upon FHA judgment as a satisfactory criterion of accepta-
bility in passing on loan applications. Others, however, feel morally obli-
gated, both on behalf of their orn depositors as well as the FHA itself,
to maintain the same close check on all construction activity which they are
financing. Even though the FHA substantially insures them ageinst loss,
these lenders regard it their responsibility to minimize mortgage delin-
quency and foreclosure at every possible juncture. Furthermore, in the
event of default and acquisition by the FHA, mortgagees are reimbursed for
foreclosure costs only so far as subsequent revenues from disposition of
the property warrant.
The FHA plan is particularly attractive in new construction activity
when firm commitments are issued by the insuring office. Under this arrange-
ment, the builder may qualify as a bona fide mortgagor in case the property
is not sold upon its completion. 'Where the alternative conditional commit-
ment is issued, the FHA agrees to insure the mortgagee against loss only
after an acceptable buyer is found. Although the former arrangement is
preferred by the mortgagee, the FHA has granted firm commitments only where
marketability appears practically assured. In the Cape Cod region, for
example, the local office agreed to issue such commitments only so long as
demand for new housing was especially active.
In spite of these decided advantages, some local mortgage lenders
genuinely interested in insured lending have encountered difficulty in using
FHA facilities in securing loans on new properties. In the first place, many
speculative builders are reluctant to operate under the guidance and control
of the FHA. This attitude is in direct contrast to that in other sections
of the country where FHA approval of a biilder Is operations is regarded as
a treasured seal of approval. In this area, however, many builders prefer
not t6 have their site plans scrutinized and modified by an outside federal
agency. Furthermore, they do not appreciate the possible duplication in com-
pliance inspections vhen both lender and FHA take an active interest in the
new construction. Undoubtedly if F.HA approval were more highly regarded in
this vicinity, the possibility of uneconomic "jerry building" might be
effectively minimized, and even selling prices more moderately set in cer-
2
tain cases. Under present conditions certain lending institutions may be
induced to finance speculative builders but lack the staff necessary to main-
tain a proper check on construction progress, let alone critically analyze
the initial site plan. Before the FHA approves a proposed site development,
the promoter or builder must submit detailed plot plans, surveyor's maps,
etc., whereas some lenders are apparently ready to act upon the perusal of
a simple house plan. Certain FHA provisions, such as requiring a minimuM
lot frontage exceeding local building code specifications, may perhaps
seem superfluous and an unnecessary addition to total costs of construction.
On the other hand, the FlA seeks to protect the long-run interests of owner,
lender, and community at large, and accordingly regards these standards as
an essential phase of their underwriting operations.
In the event the builder refuses to submit to FHA construction rules
ad supervision, he generally encounters little difficulty in securing con-
ventional financing. Provided his reputation as a businessman and builder
lit should be mentioned that an FHA official referred to a local builder
who "really learned how to be successful" while operating under the guid-
ance of the FHA during the prewar years. In -recent times, however, while
he continues to apply these valuable aids, he no longer feels the need for
dealing with FHA, as liberal financing can readily be secured without it.
2See "Capital Surplus Area" below.
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is satisfactory, he has been able to bypass the few lenders favoring FHA
and deal with other institutions. If certain features of the proposed devel-
opment, such as builder reputation, construction design or technique, price
class, etc., appear to entail undesirable risk elements, the thrift institu-
tion may refer the builder to specialized construction lenders for short-term
credit.1 After construction is satisfactorily completed, however, most in-
stitutions are once again anxious to secure the permanent financing, even
offering a 1 per cent finderts fee for it in many cases. Hence, even though
the new property may incorporate certain undesirable risk elements apparent
at the time of construction, mortfgage lenders are still willing to accept it
as security for a liberal long-term mortgage. Certainly such risk is mini-
mized if the home buyer meets the necessary credit standards. The fact re-
mains,- however, that rejection of a proposed construction project by the FHA
or by conventional lenders themselves on the basis of unsound security does
not imply an abandonment of the project. Indeed, it maybe carried out in
the same minute detail regardless of such rejection.
Even if neither lender nor builder is opposed to the idea of FHA insur-
ance, conventional financing may still be dictated, on grounds that the home
buyer would refuse an insured loan anyway. This latter supposition does not
imply any a priori mortgagor antipathy toward loan insurance. It merely im-
plies that he may be able to secure a permanent loan at rates below the
prevailing FHA maximum, either through a conventional or a VA-guaranteed
home loan.2 In the past this eventuality has been a little concern, as
lenders -who were interested in the FHA program primarily during the construc-
tion period would readily drop the FHA commitment as soon as a buyer accep-
table for either conventional or VA financing was found. This activity has
lSee "Construction Loans", Chapter 12, for a discussion of these lenders.
2See "Reasons for Low Level of FHA Operations in the Boston Area, ". below.
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been effectively reduced by a recent FHA ruling whereby the builder is
required to deposit $5 pdr unit as an initial application fee, $25 of -which
is refunded only if the permanent mortgagor retains loan insurance. While
a $25 loss is not damaging in itself, the builder may not be enthusiastic
about.FHA operations when this contingent loss is added to the other detail
involved in dealing with the agency. In order to maintain builder interest
in the FHA, at least one local savings bank offers the former a 1 per cent
finder T s fee if the permanent uninsured loan is retained with the s ame bank.
This particular institution offers the home buyer a choice of FHA, VA, or
conventional financing, provided he meets the corresponding eligibility re-
quirements. A typical percentage breakdown among these 3 types has been
55-50-15 in new site developments.
Local lenders interested in the FHA program have found the Cape Cod
area singularly attractive for making long-term insured mortgages. The Cape
is located far enough away from the Eoston vicinity so that loan insurance
has an especial appeal for some lenders who prefer conventional financing
locally.2 Builders in that area apparently regard the FHA insured loan
program as valuable if not essential in maintaining a continuing volume of
construction activity. Furthermore, the prevailing interest rate on con-
ventional loans of 5 per cent renders the insured loan an attractive pro-
position for the home buyer as well, as the gross rate maximum on the latter
is 4 3/h per cent.
VA Home Loan Program in the Boston Area
In contrast to the FHA home loan program, the loan guaranty program- of
the Veterans Administration has been widely received in the Boston area.
Whereas Massachusetts ranks 35th among the 48 states in terms of insured
1 The reasons for this relativelv high proportion of insured loans are
given immediately below and on pp. 38C-381.
2or reasons given above, p. 381.
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lending, it is sixth in writing VA-guaranteed loans. Through November 1951,
nearly 114 thousand home loans had been approved for insurance, with a prin-
cipal amount of $793 million and a guaranteed portion of '367 million.
With the sole exception of life insurance companies, the dollar volume of VA-
guaranteed loan holdings have exceeded that of FHA-insured loans among all
major lending institutions in the area. Although the VA program has not
been analyzed in detail in this study, its influence on the local mortgage
market is most significant and hence merits brief reference here. Accord-
ing to sample findings of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the VA-gueranteed
loan has been used in slightly more than one-half of all new home purchases
in the ietropolitan Boston Area in recent years. Some mortgage officers
indicate that "patriotism" has prompted them to engage in this low-profit
business, but competition among rival lenders has certainly been at least
equally important in forcing its almost universal acceptance.
The VA program has enjoyed wide appeal among local savings banks and
savings and loan associations. The Federal Reserve has found such loans
to constitute nearly one-third of aggregate mortgage holdings of these in-
2
stitutions in the local four-county area. An unknowm proportion of guar-
anteed loans held by savings banks represents mortgages purchased in the
secondary market, but the extent of this activity is somewhat less than in
the dase of FHA-insured loans , All but one small savings bank held VA-
guaranteed loans on local properties in 1951, comprising in the aggregate
22.0 per cent of total mortgage holdings. Local federals and cooperative
banks, many of which charge 5 per c'ent on conventional loans, have generally
approved most h per cent VA loan requests without hesitation. In 1951 guar-
anteed loans represented 28.8 and 30.6 per cent of aggregate mortgage hold-
ings of local federals and cooperative banks, respectively. Only three of
the smallest cooperative banks in the Boston area have failed to write any
1Finance, VA, Novanber 1951, p. 68.
2See Table IV.
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VA loans, largely because of the substandard 4 per cent return. It is very
likely, however, that the non-participation of these institutions reflects
an overall indifference toward mortgage lending, for cooperative-form mort-
gages continue to dominate their respective .ortfolios.
Commercial banks have resembled savings banks in their policy toward
holding insured and guaranteed loans. That is, among all assachusetts
commercial banks, VA-guaranteed loans represented 28 per cent and FHA-
insured loans 6.1 per cent of aggregate home mortgage holdings on in-state
properties in 1950. In terms of aggregate mortgage holdings, however, the
corresponding ratios were 21.2 and 19.3 per cent, respectively, one year
later. This sharp contrast between the ratios on local as opposed to total
mortgage holdings reflects the disproportionate interest in higher yielding
FHA-insured loans among local banks when dealing in the secondary mortgage
market. At the same time commercial banks, just as savings banks, are gen-
erally disinterested in making insured loans on local properties.2 As a
result of secondary market operations, guaranteed m-d insured loan holdings
of local banks as a share of aggregate holdings differed but slightly from
the corresponding ratios for all banks in the nation.
Insurance companies have traditionally been less bound by law and custom
to confine most mortgage operations to a restricted area, and have hence been
more conscious of net yields on alternative investments throughout the nation.
A local insurance company executive indicates that this firm's mortgage port-
folio is dominated by conventional loans made in progressive communities,
1 The former ratios apply to 1-to h-family loans held by all IDIC-insured
banks in Massachusetts. Operating Banks, op. cit. p. 8; the latter, to
aggregate residential mortgage holdings of loc7(four-county) banks as
reported by the Federel Reserve.
2Local FHA officials indicate that three of the largest commercial banks in
Boston proper occasionally finance speculative site developments under FHA
guidance but refer the permanent financing to savings banks, where a finder 's
fee is paid and, incidentally, the insurance provision is generally dropped.
The latter being 3C.2 and 27.2 per cent for VA and FHA loans, respectively,
in mid-1950. FDIC, op. cit., p. 8.
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where a minimum gross yield of 5 per cent is realized. The somewhat more
favorable yield on FHA-insured relative to VA-guaranteed loans accounts in
part for the more prominent role played by the former among mortgage port-
folios of local companies. The availability of FHA insurance on large income-
property loans, such as under Section 6C8, also contributes to the lesser
relative importance of VA.home loans among local companies. Among the six
life insurance companies in Suffolk County, VA loans represented 14.9 per
1
cent of aggregate residential mortgage portfolios in 1951.
The VA home loan program has been a primary force underlying the demand
for new housing in the postwar period. By underwriting liberal credit ex-
tension, it has provided veterans an opportunity to purchase new and existing
homes with little -or no equity savings. Indeed, if mortgage lenders were to
relax down payment requirements from 20-40 per cent to 0-10 per cent, the
resultant impact upon the demand for home purchase would ordinarily be sub-
stantial. Similarly, a-liberalization of other provisions of the home mort-
gage contract might be expected to exert a direct influence on the housing
market concerned. As in any reasonably free market, a marked increase in
demand for a product might provoke an immediate price advance. In addition,
new and existing producers would be induced to step up output and expand
plant capacity, especially if the demand increase appeared permanent.. If,
however, the economy were already operating in a virtually full employment
situation, the outward shift in demand would be largely expended in price
adjustments. .This latter condition has been characteristic throughout much
of the postwar period, despite the record levels of new home production
attained. The continued upward pressure upon housing prices and new con-
struction at least during the early postwar years was due in no smal part to
Table XII. Among all companies in the country VA loans in 1949 accounted
for 10.5 per cent of the total nonfarm mortgage debt held, but only 2.5 per
- cent of the debt on Massachusetts properties taken alone. Life Insurance
Factbook, 1951, p. 72.
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the liberal VA home loan program. The returning veteian wvas most interested
in purchasing a house adequate to meet his pressing needs and was perhaps
less concerned with price itself than 7i th the equity down payment and monthly
carrying charges required to service the mortgage.
In a buyer's market more liberal credit facilities might induce poten-
tial home purchasers to acquire more. adequate housing accommodations without
any increase whatever in total monthly debt service. In a seller's market,
however, when choice is restricted and sales terms virtually set by the
seller, more liberal c redit availability is likely to be absorbed in sub-
stantial price advances. In late December 1965, the Servicemen's Readjustment
Act was amended so as to increase the maximum guarantee from $2,000 to 'd,000.
This relaxation in effect reduced the equity down payment required for home
purchase, as the lender would presumably feel justified in making a larger
loan for a given property purchase. Partly because of this liberalization,
the average amount on partially guaranteed loans made in 1946 increased by
31 per cent over the previous year. That the guaranty program heavily in-
fluenced this movement is evidenced by the considerably smaller dollar ad-
vance in new loans not involving the VA provisions. Between 1945 and 1946
average loan amounts on both FHA-insured loans and on all non-guaranteed
mortgages increased only 10 per cent. 1
Data are not available to formulate a similar set of relationships for
the local housing market, but it is possible to compare average prices paid
for new and existing homes in late 1945 and early 1946. In order to consider
communities where the veteran was quite likely to seek his own home, five
cities of brisk construction activity were selected. All home purchases are
recorded with the local county registry of deeds, and the purchase price is
roughly indicated by the stamps required in recording the title transfer,
1 E. M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets, and Their Financing Needs, op. cit.,
Chapter IV.
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All of these recordings are quoted in the weekly Banker and Tradesman,
generally entailing a lag of 3-h weeks between the point of sale and its
subsequent reporting. As indicated in Chart I, the liberalization in the
VA home loan program in December 1945, did not prompt an immediate increase
in averag,;e purchase price. Nevertheless, beginning in March a decidedly
higher level is in evidence and, if due allowance is made for the lag in
reporting home purchases, the above amendment may have exerted a direct
upward influence on prices. Obviously it is impo'ssible to isolate the pre-
cise effect of this amendment, but it has undoubtedly contributed to the
pei-sistent rising trend in current home prices during the early postwar
years.
CHART I. AVERAGE PRICE PAID FOR HOMES PURCHASED R FIVE COILUNITIES
I! LATE 1945 AND EARLY 1946
*H H
0
Source: Computed from data reported by Banker and Tradesman.
* Includes homes with purchase price of $20,000 or less within the
following communities: Arlington, Belmont, Lexington, Newton, and
Winchester.
Reasons for Low Level of FHA Operations in the Boston Area
The preceding sections have indicated the striking difference in the
relative utilization of the F-IA and VA home loan programs in the local area.
Before summarizing the reasons underlying this curious local development,
the characteristic reluctance of savings and loan associations to the FHA
plan throughout the nation will be briefly considered. As shown in Table
II, these associations hold nearly a third of the aggregate 1- to 4-family
mortgage debt, but less than a tenth of the insured home mortgage debt.
Opposition of Savings and Loan Interests. From the outset, savings and loan
interests looked upon the FHA as a dangerous threat to their very existence
as dominant mortgage lenders, fearing that large pommercial banks and life
insurance companies would be attracted into the nationwide market with
added vigor. Mortgage insurance would appeal to institutional investors
with vast stores of idle funds, but such was hardly characteristic of the
depression-ridden .associations during the mid-1930s. The latter were not
at all anxious for large outside investors to enter their traditional lend-
ing areas by writing insured mortgages at interest rates substantially below
existing levels. Rejecting federal mortgage insurance as most unsatisfactory,
savings and loan associations regarded an accelerated inflow of share capital
as the only sound means of stimulating a recovery in new home construction.
Accordingly, their own interests were best served through promoting the
various federal measurE centered in the Home Loan Bank, such as share in-
surance, IIOLC activities, chartering of federals, etc. 1
Savings and loan associations have traditionally made mortgages on a
local basis, and htve been little concerned with the marketability of the
paper, at least until the postw-ar period. Especially when they are able
to tap the central reserve facilities of the Home Loan Bank System, the
typical association can generally meet most liquidity requirements with
conventional amortized portfolios. For other institutions, however, which
either write mortgages for resale to others or else require marketability
1 These programs are all described in Part TV.
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in their own portfolios, loan insurance is of inestimable importance.
At any rate, savings and loan associations have regarded the FHA program
as an unnecessary and unsound competitor of their own time-tested methods
of mortgage finance. Instead of working hand in hand, savings and loan in-
terests have frequently been prompted to make such statements as: "Wie have
had no trouble meeting FHA competition. . t2 As stated earlier, some
local associations made a limited number of insured loans during the early
years of the program when mortgage risk and loss were still paramount in
the minds of their investment committees.
Administrative Detail. A variety of additional reasons may be advanced to
account for the disinterest of local thrift institutions in insured lending.
The most common reason given by interviewed lenders concerns the costly and
time-consuming detail required in dealing with the FHA. They point to the
typical bureaucratic bungling and unnecessary red tape associated with all
applications for loan insurance. The FHA requires detailed plot and house
plans and other items vhich are admittedly desirable but do entail addi-
tional effort on the part of all parties concerned. Furthermore, a typical
application may require at least a 30-day delay before a final decision is
handed down as to its acceptability. Rules and regulations, as well as the
numerous forms involved, change frequently and many lenders prefer not to
keep up with it. This latter factor suggests the desirability of a lender's
either offering no FHA-insured loans whFtever or else engaging in the activity
on an extensive scale. Indeed, the few interviewed lenders who do continue
to write insured mortgages prefer a steady volume of such business so that
mortgage personnel may keep abreast of current procedures.
In the following chapter, the participation of these various lender trpes
in the secondary market will be reviewed.
2Statement of Morton Bcdfish, TTNEC Hearings, Part II, p. 5099.
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Several of the visited bank executives refuse to make insured loans
because of a decided antipathy toward any extension of federal influence into
hitherto private fields. Their attitude is equally adamant toward other
permanent federal efforts in home finance, such as the chartering of federal
savings and loan associations as well as the spreading of share and deposit
insurance. The Home Loan Bank System and the VA home loan program represent
notable exceptions to this characteristic attitude. An officer of the local
Home Loan Bank attributes its successful reception to a policy of maximum
cooperation but minimum interference with the mortgage operations of member
institutions. Some reasons for the success of the bureaucratic VA program
will be discussed shortly.
Undoubtedly the local FHA officials are partly at fault for the lack
of interest in insured lending in the local market. Nearly every lender
visited referred to the decidedly uncooperative attitude which pervaded the
local underwriting office when the program was launched. In contrast to
the Home Loan Bank leaders, these FIA officials were "nothing but a bunch
of unsuccessful architects and brokers." M1any lenders were moderately in-
terested in the idea of loan insurance in the late 193Cs and accordingly
submitted several applications to the newly-created agency. In nearly every
case, however, their respective requests were rejected, either because the
desired loan amount was too high or else because the multitudinous forms were
not completed in every detail. Some local bank executives even went to
Washington on various occasions in order to improve this situation, but to
little avail. Frequently new personnel were sent to the Boston office, but
the same uncooperative attitude allegedly persisted well into the early
postwar period. As a consequence, many lenders were unimpressed with the
FHA program from the outset, and have never bothered to utilize its provi-
sions again. One mortgage officer regards the whole scheme as unnecessary
1Pp. 395-397.
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duplication of effort already performed by properly managed lending
institutions, and accordingly does not feel justified in paying an insurance.
premium to support it.
There is undoubtedly some justification for these claims that personali-
ties have retarded the development of local insured lending. Even some
local FHA personnel now admit that the crusading officials in the prewar
period.were quite uncompromising in coping with the equally determined
Boston mortgage bankers. The present staff appears to be well aware of
this serious problem, and seeks a means of convincing more lending insti-
tutions of the virtues of insured lending. They have frequently called on
various lenders in order to promote a more genuine feeling of cooperation in
promoting their common goals in the mortgage market. They have also sought
to answer charges' of unnecessary red tape by offering to.assist bank per-
sonnel at any time in completing the necessary forms and other procedures.
This new attitude has induced some lenders to submit a few mortgage applica-
tions for loan insurance, but a vast majority continue to utilize the FlA
provisions only in distant lending if at all.
A local FHA official believes that savings banks were disinterested
in the loan insurance program during the prewar period because of a possible
threat to their continuing dominance in the local mortgage market. These
institutions were realizing a steady flow of income from long-standing
mortgag:es on 2- to h-family properties. Such loans were written on a 3-
year demand basis, and represented a highly desirable investment so long as
the rented portions were continually occupied. Indeed, many banks pre-
ferred to reap such interest returns for-an indefinite term and even dis-
couraged substantial principal repayment by convincing the mortgagor of
the "superiority" of a larger savings account. The FHA threatened to upset
this easy investment program by promoting the increasingly popular direct-
reduction type mortgag;e. This new plan would appeal to tenants who were
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now afforded an opportunity to purchase their owm homes through making monthly
rent-like payments, thereby jeopardizing the soundness of existing mortgages
on multi-family flats. Furthermore, existing mortgagors perhaps also learned
of the advanta.7es of direct-reduction loans, and sought a rewriting of their
own unamortized mortgages. This latter would involve additional costs of
loan servicing and other modifications, changes which most savings banks
were reluctant to make at that time.
FHA Foregone in Favor of VA. Perhaps a primary though infrequently mentioned
factor accounting for the low level of insured lending in the Boston area
concerns the widespread acceptance of the VA home loan program. The ex-
treme contrast in the relative utilization of these federal programs is aptly
manifest by the confusion in evidence as to the points of difference between
them. All parties interviewed appeared to be well versed on the guaranty
features of the VA scheme, but at least one bank officer had Elways believed
the FHA plan was similarly organized and was unaware of the mutuality of the
insurance fund. Many lenders who are opposed in principle to the inter-
ventionary efforts of the FHA regard the veterans guaranty program as pro-
viding an expedient solution to the critical housing shortage. The former
program has set forth lofty, long-run goals in connection with its loan
insurance feature, whereas the latter seeks merely to alleviate an emergency
situation.
Since the VA program is of a temporary nature with strong "patriotic"
overtones, some lenders feel justified in supporting its operations without
contradicting their standing objection to ,the spread of federal influence
into this area. If. on the other hand, the VA program had not been established
at all, it is conceivable that local mortgagees would have displayed a more
sympathetic attitude toward insured lending. They might have found loan
insurance decidedly advantageous in fortifying themselves against loss on
1 Several thought the maximum interest rate on insured loans was still 5 per
cent, and many thought this gross rate was minimum as well.
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on mortgages written in inflationary periods. By utilizing the VA program,
mortgage lenders acquire portfolios which not only are partially protected
against loss but also reflect a certain degree of marketability, both being
advantages which might othervrise accrue to insured mortgage portfolios.
Furthermore, VA approval has been practically automatic in most cases while
the FHA has tended to be relatively conservative in its appraisal standards.
it might be argued, however, that a more widespread application of the latter
policy might have effected a reduction in overall risk inherent in many local
mortgage portfolios. A sudden economic reversal would undoubtedly inflict
severe losses on those institutions whose mortgage portfolios consist largely
of unseasoned, conventional, 80 per cent loans based on highly inflated
valuations.
In performing its elaborate risk analysis, the FHA requires detailed
information about the various factors affecting the degree of risk inherent
in the mortgage under consideration. As stated in Chapter 8, these risk
factors are arranged and rated in four categories: borrower, property,
location, and mortgage pattern. If the resultant rating fails to meet up
to minimum standards, the application is either rejected altogether or ap-
proved contingent upon the improvement in some of the inferior risk ele-
ments.
The Veterans Administration, on the other hand, delegates most risk
rating operations to the lending institution, and duplicates a minimum of
such effort. In contrast to the FHA vfhich insures mortgagees up to the
full amount of the home loan, the VA guaranty is limited to a certain portion
of the loan balance. Since its proportionate liability remains unchanged
throughout the loan term, the lending institution must bear the primary risk
lSee p. 402.
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in making guaranteed loans. and hence must exercise care in selecting accep-
table applicants. Furthermore, guaranteed loans generally involve longer
terms and larger debt-value ratios than conventional mortgage loans, thereby
1
suggesting a somewhat greater.degree of total risk in the former. In prac-
tice, a loan application is referred to the VA for partial guarantee only
after conditional approval has been granted by the lending institution.
Thereafter the VA certifies as to the eligibility of the veteran and makes
an appraisal of the property so as to protect him from paying an unwarranted
price. This latter function, comprising the primary risk rating operation
of the, VA, has been liberally interpreted by the local office and has rarely
2
resulted in a refusal to issue the requested guaranty. As soon as these de-
tails are completed, a- procedure which has apparently involved a minimum of
delay in the local area, the mortgagee has little occasion to deal with the
VA again unless the veteran either becomes delinquent in his payments or
else requests an amendment to the mortgage. Hence, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that most local lenders regard the simplicity associated with VA
lending as preferable to the complicated rules and regulations surrounding
FHA lending. Indeed, in the latter case, the lending institution must main-
tain a continuing correspondence with the insuring agency, through collecting
monthly mortgage insurance premiums from the mortgagor and subsequently remit-
ting the proceeds on an annual basis Lo the FHA Lutual Fund. Summarizing,
lending under the FHA, as compared with the VA, loan program not only demands
1
In the event of subsequent default, the VA may choose either to take over
the property itself and repay the mortgagee in full for the loan balance
and foreclosure costs; or else merely pay off the guaranteed portion to
the latter and take no further part in the disposition of the foreclosed
property. It is against this latter eventuality that the lender assumes
a certain degree of risk in guaranteed lending. The extent of the subse-
quent loss, however, is seldom substantial, especially since the maximum
guaranty was raised to $7,500 or 60 per cent of loan amount in 1950.
2
one spedulative builder, however, indicates that the VA would approve his
low-cost homes for loan guaranty only if he agreed to remove certain extras
ordinarily found only in more expensive homes, such as electric disposal
units, large refrigerators, automatic dishwashers, etc.
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a greater amount of time and administrative detail in securing initial
approval, but it also entails continuing effort throughout the entire loan
term.
The interest yield on VA-guaranteed loans is considerably below that
realized on most conventional loans made by thrift institutions throughout
the country. This allegedly "substandard" yield, as well as the h4 per c ent
maximum net return on insured loans, has been repeatedly attacked by housing
interests in other sections of the country as inequitable and injurious to
the whole industry. Thus far at least, these rate maxima have not been
increased, and there appears little likelihood that they ill be in the
near future. In the oston market, however, the 4 per cent rate on VA loans
has seldom, if ever, impeded their general acceptance among local thrift
institutions. Cooperative banks and federal s avings and loan associations,
many of which write nearly all conventional loens on a 5 per cent basis,
regard VA home loans as a safe investment offering a higher yield than
government bonds. In addition, the typical veteran is perhaps more aware
of alternative rates of interest than most home buyers in the past. He is
frequently reminded of the 4 per cent mortgage credit to which he is entitled,
and keeps this fact in mind whenever financing a home purchase. This aware-
ness is especially true when a new home is acquired, for most promoters of
housing developments advertise the liberal credit available to eligible vet-
erans. As a result, all local thrift institutions are virtually forced to
offer 4 per cent VA-guaranteed loans in order to maintain their respective
positions in the mortgage market. If one bank refused to make 4 per cent
loans to qualified veterans, such business would be lost to rival institu-
tions and the former would be hard pressed to attract a sufficient volume of
See, for example, "Mortgage Crisis,tt Magazine of Building, August 1951,
pp. 121-12h.
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conventional mortgage applications to keep its funds fully employed.
Local institutions which write choice mortgages at a h per cent rate
frequently offer veterans the choice of either VA or conventional loan plans,
provided the respective eligibility standards are met. If the veteran is
really afforded either plan, he may choose the latter, preferring to save his
GI entitlement for a later date when it would offer more decided advantages.
As indicated earlier, however, most lenders are obliged by statute or lending
policy to be more conservative in regard to maximum loan terms and debt-value
ratios in making conventional mortgages. Furthermore, they may insist on a
more conservative ratio between monthly debt service and expected incomes
before approving a .conventional h per cent loan request. Imposing a more
rigid risk rating on such loans appears most likely in areas of relative
capital surplus where interest rates on VA-guaranteed loens are not below
the prevailing rate structure. In other areas, where yields on conventional
mortgages are at least 1 percentage point higher, lenders are perhaps reluc-
tant to write guaranteed loans except where the veteran applicant makes an
especially good showing. This factor perhaps explains in part the relatively
higher loss experience o.n guaranteed loans in the Boston area. Indeed,
through November 1951, claims had been paid on 910 guaranteed home loans
initially closed in the Boston regional office, representing the highest
number among all 68 offices in the nation. In relative terms, however,
the Boston area has not fared so badly, for these claims accounted for
but 0.8 per cent of all home loans closed, ranking eleventh among the
2
68 VA regions.
1One cooperative banker indicates that the wider profit margin on 5 per cent
conventional loans has made it possible to offer "less profitable" h per cent
VA loans without limit.
2 in terms of total number of loans closed, the Boston office ranked sixth.
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Capial Surplus Area. Throughout the nation, the FHA home loan program
has perhaps exerted some downward influence on mortgage interest rates. Even
today, the prevailing rate on prime home mortgages in most regions is 5 per
cent or higher, while the maximum rate on insured loans is h} per cent plus
the mortgage insurance premium. Hence, the nominal yield on insured loans
is substantially below that on conventional mortgages, unless due allowance
is made fot the difference in risk borne by the lender. In the Boston area,
on the other hand, the FHA program has not operated as a price leader in
the same fashion. Especially in the postwar period, the relative surplus
of mortgage credit has resulted in a.mortgag-e price structure which appears
at least as liberal as that generally associated with insured lending. In
other areas where demands for mortgage credit are inadequately met by exist-
ing mortgage-lenders, the availability of loan insurance has provided an in-
centive for other institutions, notably outside insurance companies, to
enter such markets. In the Boston area, however, existing thrift institu-
tions have not only supplied local mortgage demanders with ample credit but
2
have also sought additional mortgage investment in other areas. The
characteristic abundance of long-term mortgage funds has undoubtedly influ-
enced the success of the insured loan program in the local area.
This condition technically existed during the prewar period as well,
but at that time many thrift institutions were far more anxious to accumulate
government bond portfolios than to engage in new mortgage investment. Savings
banks were singularly reluctant to adopt the direct-reduction mortgage con-
tract and continued to write most new loans on the old-fashioned straight-term
'Whether or not this differential in risk warrants such a spread in gross yield
obviously depends upon the many variables influencing mortgage risk. Mrany
lending interests apparently regard this spread as too great, and accordingly
propose an upward revision in FHA maximum rates as the most natural solution.
See p. 398 above.
2See the succeeding chapter on the secondary market.
4ol
basis, if at all. Indeed, even where most risks of loss in mortgage lending
could be shifted on to the FHA, they preferred to invest in low-yielding
government securities.
Large life insurance companies and commercial banks, taking an imme-
diate interest in insured lending across the nation perhaps failed to enter
the local area for two primary reasons. In the first place, the recovery
in new home construction was s omewhat retarded. in the local area relative to
newer, rapidly expanding regions. Since insurance companies at least are
primarily interested in making insured loans on new properties, either on
isolated lots or in large site developments, mortgage investment opportunities
in the local area were relatively unattractive. Secondly, these institutions
have striven to place their mortgage credit in areas where existing credit
facilities are inadequate to meet current demands. Hence they have been
relatively inactive in local mortgage activity, except in cases where large
income-property transactions are concerned.1
During the postwar period, the capital surplus characteristics of the
local mortgage market have become increasingly pronounced. At the end of the
war, savings banks sought to rebuild their badly depleted mortgage portfolios
after nearly 15 years of inactivity. The potential mortgage investment aris-
ing from liquidation of government portfolios as well as new savings inflows
assumed tremendous-proportions. It is true that the local postwar housing
boom, while less intense than that in other areas, has perhaps surpassed
the expectations of even the more optimistic observers. Nevertheless,
"unbalanced supply-demand" relationships have compelled mortgage lenders
to make substantial concessions, both of a price andmn-price character, in
2
order to share in the ensuing mortgage business.
1 Although data are not available for all insurance companies, it appears
if Section 608 loans still dominate insured holdings on local properties.
2See Chapter, 12 above.
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In view of this competitive struggle for new loans, the availability
of FHA loan insurance has hardly been required as a further inducementfor
mortgage investment. Indeed, there is reason to believe that local lending
institutions have written conventional mortgages on a more liberal basis
Than if FHA insurance were utilized more widely. It is true' that FHA regu-
lations generally provide unusually favorable treatment for buyers of lower-
cost housing, especially in regard to allowable term and debt-value maximums.
Up to the present emergency at least, certain 90 per cent, 25-year-loans were
eligible for FHA insurance while most local thrift institutions in conven-
tional lending have been restricted to making 80 per cent, 20-year loans.
In practice, however, such liberal insured loans have been seldom made, 1
and the local underwriting staff has tended to be relatively conservative
in approving requests for loan insurance, particularly with respect to
maximum loan amount.
Both local underwriting officials and interviewed lenders who have
occasionally submitted applications for loan insurance indicate that the
FHA estimate of appraised value is "often at least 10 per cent below current
market price." FHA officials defend their conservative approach as being
consistent with the long-run economic soundness of the entire mutual insur-
ance fund. Only if loan amounts bear a reasonable ratio to true "worth,"
not merely a transitory inflated figure can the FHA hope to function as a
self-sufficient agency over the business cycle. While this conservatism is
undoubtedly manifest in regard to old and new properties alike, local offi-
cials have referred to several site developments where an FHA commitment was
denied because the requested loan amount, as indicated by the proposed sel-
ling price of the homes, was out of line with the long-run "value" of the
underlying security. Re jection by the FHA -homever does not imply a re-
vision in such development plans, as the builder or promoter is generally
1 See data on average purchase prices, p. 404.
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ale to secure financing through conventional methods with little difficulty.
Competition for new mortgages loans, especially on new properties, has made
1
FHA approval or rejection of limited consequence in this area.
There is little evidence available on the respective contract provisions
contained in local insured and conventional loans. The Bureau of Labor Stati--
tics, however, has compiled some data in connection with its sample surveys
of local home building activity, the results of which tend to bear out the
hypothesis advanced above. Only in regard to repayment periods do insured
loans app ear to be more liberal than corresponding conventional mortgages,
while in terms of loan-value ratios or interest rates the opposite tendency
prevails. As indicated in Table XII of Chapter 12, the average repayment
period on insured loans was 20.3 years in late 1950, compared with 18.1 years
2
on conventional mortgages. At the same time, average loan-value ratios on
the alternate mortgage types were 55.1 and 58.6 per cent, respectively. Aver-
age interest rates on insured and conventional loans were 4.1 and 4.2 per
cent, respectively, the former being reported as net of the mortgage insur-
ance premium. 3  These latter two mortgage price components will- be briefly
considered in order.
The rather surprising difference in loan-value ratios may perhaps re-
flect an unreliably small sample, as only 230 insured loans were included
in the survey. On the other hand, a similar survey' conducted one year
earlier found an even greater variation in average ratios, namely, 48.3 and
57.6 per cent among insured and conventional mortgages, respectively. It
is quite likely, however, that the unusually conservative loan-value ratios
1 For farther reference to the FHA's role in site developments, see pp. 380--386
above.
2See footnote, p. 406.
VA-guaranteed loans were more liberal on all counts, as average loan-value
ratios were 82.8 per cent; repayment terms, 24.9 years; and interest rates,
)*.O per cent.
VUnpublished data of Bureau of Labor Statistics. The average-ratio on VA
loans was 88.1 per cent.
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on insured loans are due" in part to the relatively high average purchase
price on the properties concerned. As indicated earlier, despite the fav-
orable treatment afforded insured loans on low-cost, homes, lenders have rarely
utilized the FHA program for such purposes. Indeed, tfie average purchase
price on new homes using FHA financing was significantly higher in both ELS
surveys than where either conventional or VA methods were employed. In the
1950 survey, for example, these average prices were $18.2, $13.7, and $11.7
thousand, respectively. Inasmuch as mortgage lenders generally insist on
larger down payments when more expensive properties are purchased, the rela-
tively higher loan-value ratios on insured loans are perhaps to be expected.
Moreover, under credit regulations existing at that time for either FHA or
conventional financing, a new home buyer was required to make a minimum
down payment of nearly 40 per cent on an $18 thousand property. At any rate,
even though the wide variation in home price class precludes a valid com-
parison of contract provisions under alternate financing plans, it seems
clear that the FHA has neither promoted to any significant extent low-cost
housing nor been instrumental in liberalizing loan-value ratios in the
Boston area.
In regard to the third major price component, average interest rates
appear to be significantly higher on insured than on conventional mortgages,
at least when the mortgage insurance premium is included in the former.
Certainly this inclusion is a necessary one, for only by considering the
actual borrowing rate on either type of loan can comparability be attained.
Indeed, an average rate differential of 0.4 per cent has a profound influ-
2
ence ortotal debt service, especially when repayment extends over 20 year2s
Although the FA does not specify the interest rate to be charged on insured
l..e., the difference between 4.2 per cent on a conventional and 4.1 +- 0.5
per cent on insured loans.
2 See Chapter 2 for the influence of varying interest rates. on monthly debt
service.
loans, most lenders apparently charge the maximum of 4 1. per cent, espec-
ially when existing properties are mortgaged. Where new construction is con-
cerned, however, some of the larger savings banks have cut the "net" rate
on insured loans to 4 per cent, to be on a par with the contract rate on
1
conventional loans. As analyzed in Part V, many local mortgage lenders,
notably large Boston savings banks, have reduced interest rates on choice
loans to 4 per cent in order to expand and maintain portfolios at the de-
sired level. Some have also granted 80 per cent, 20-year mortgages on the
same basis, though most appear to adjust interest rates in accordance with
other contract provisions. At any rate, competition among dominant lending
institutions has resulted in a mortgage price structure -which appears fully
as liberal, if not more liberal, than that generally associated with insured
loans.
Even if a lender were moderately interested in insured lending and set
the net rate at a par with conventional loans at 4 per cent, a negligible
volume would be recorded unless the home buyer would stand to gain from the
FHA loan. In other words, unless the buyer were offered a larger loan or
longer term under the FHA plan, he would undoubtedly choose a conventional
mortgage and thereby avoid paying the 0.5 per cent mortgage insurance pre-
mium. A lender located outside the immediate area has promoted FHA-insured
loans at the above maximum rate by offering a 20-year term, as opposed to a
16-year limit on conventional loans at 41 per cent. Among the large Boston
savings banks, however, such a policy would be of limited utility, for com.
In a letter from the Washington FHA office, Mr. Allan hornton, director of
Research and Statistics, reveals that fewer than 3 per cent of all FHA-
insured loans are made at less than the above maximum rate, and that the
bulk of the latter occurs in the Northeast. The local FHA officials report
that one mortgagee had written an insured loan at 3 3/4 per cent net, al-
though this concerned rental housing. (Section 608)
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petition has virtually compelled the offering of a 4 per cent, 20-year loan
plan to most deserving, applicants. Of course, if the requested loan amount
appears unusually high, such a liberal conventional mortgage would not be
forthcoming, but neither would FA approval be granted under such circumstances.
Rather than write new insured loans, some Boston banks have allegedly expanded
conventional portfolios through refinancing insured loans held by other lenders
by offering a 4 per cent rate.
The question may be raised as to why those institutions which make con-
ventional loans at h per cent do not set net rates on insured loans at an
even lower level. If FHA loan insurance effectively relieves the mortgagee
of most lending risk, he may feel justified in reducing the compensation
required to cover the'residual risk which is not shifted. If, however,
overall risk is considered to be greater on insured, than on conventional
4 per cent loans, the lending institution may feel justified in charging at
least 4j per cent gross on the former. Interviewed mortgage officers indi-
cate an indifference between choice conventional mortgages at 4 per cent
and insured loans at 4 per cent net, believing the savings in risk to be
largely offset by the extra administrative detail involved.2
The Interest Rate Paradox. It may seem paradoxical that despite the inherent
capital-surplus characteristics of the local market, many lenders refrain
from making insured mortgages on grounds that the current rate maximum of
These references to the existence of effective competitive elements in the
Boston mortgage market do not imply the existence of perfect competition.
Among the imperfect elements, as indicated earlier, the buyer of a new home
rarely has a free choice in regard to mortgagee selection, and ordinarily
must accept the loan offering of the bank financing the operative builder,
or else seek a different property.
2 If such lenders actually believed FHA loans at 32 per cent net were equivalent
or even preferable to conventionel loans at 4 per cent, a heavy inflow of new
insured loans might seriously 1ip.ai' the flow of undistributed earnings into
surplus. Especially with dividend rates of 2} or 3 per cent, most of the
margin would be absorbed by operating expenses. Of course, this is precisely
what would be expected, as only limited loss reserves would be required if
insured loans predominated. Under this academic possibility, the lending
institution would revise its surplus policy, and its overall investment struc-
ture would not be unlike that of the early 1940s when government bonds domi-
nated he portfolios of local savingw banks.
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4 per cent provides an unjustifiably low net yield. As stated earlier,
many local thrift institutions have continued' to- attract a steadyr volume
of new loans at 5 per cent, involving new as well as existing construction.
In additionito their intense antipathy toward federal intervention in gen-
eral, these lenders ordinarily feel it altogether unnecessary to sacrifice
up to 3/4 of 1 per cent in gross yield merely to secure FHA insurance pro-
tection. Most mortgage officers questioned on this matter believe that
their conventional mortgages are so carefully selected that the necessary
risk compensation is really a "minor item" anyway. Others apparently are
not fully aware of the degree to which most risks of mortgage lbss can be
shifted to the FHA through adopting loan insurance. At the same time, home
purchasers are .convinced as to the virtues of keeping their mortgage dealings
"within the local community," as well as the negligible savings in mortgage
2
costs between a 4 3/4 per cent insured and a 5 per cent conventional loan.
It should be mentioned, however, that the non-participation of these
lenders in the FHA program may not be as inconsistent with the capital-
surplus hypothesis as might appear at first glance. It is entirely possible
that many such 5 per cent mortgages would be unacceptable to the FHA. even
if loan insurance were sought. Indeed, as indicated earlier, allowable loan-
value maximums tend to be relatively high anong loans written by local fed-
erals and cooperative banks on a conventional basis. Furthermore, these
institutions willingly write liberal mortgages in communities where other
lenders and the FHA are reluctant to operate under any conditions. In
The rather substantial volume of new construction lending by institutions
charging 4j - 5 per cent is reflected in data on average interest rates
referred to above.
22Lenders seldom mention the very real likelihood of the mortgagors' receiving
participation dividends from the mutual insurance fund as a decided advan-
tage of the FHA plan. Indeed, as stated earlier, several interviewed len-
ders appear to be totally unaware of the mutuality of the Fund.
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summary, despite 'the fact that auch non-participating-lenders regard neces-
sary risk compensation as a "minor item," there is reason to believe that a
significant risk differential accounts in part for the continuing spread
between interest rates on certain conventional loans and the FHA maximum
1
Local FRA Loss Experience. The fact that the FRA. tends to be relatively
conservative in approving loan requests does not necessarily imply that only
choice loans are included in local insured portfolios. On the contrary,
there is some evidence' to indicate that insured loans on local properties
have entailed significantly higher risk than -orresponding loans in other
parts parts of the country. Through 1950, titles to 173 Massachusetts home
properties had been transferred to-the FHA pursuant to default on loans
insured under Section 203. -Stated differently in relative terms, title
acquisitioA had resulted from 1.40 per cent of all Section 203 loans written
during the 16-year period. This relatively unfavorable mortgage experience
was second only to New Hanpshire, while the national average acquisition
2
rate was a slight 0.32 per cent.
'Since Massachusetts has also. been a state in which VA mortgage loss
has been relatively heavy, one'might conclude that local mortgage lending
involves an abnormally high degree of risk. As explained earlier, however,
the heavy loss experience on VA' loans may be due in part to a tendency on
the part of local.lenders to refer relatively high-risk loans to the VA for
1 The various economic factors influencing interest rate differentials are
more fully analyzed in Chapter 12. While permissible loan-value maximums
are lower, the FHA tends to favor longer loan terms than most cooperative
banks. Unless certain aspects of the transaction point to the contrary,
20-year loans are generally quite acceptable to'the FHA, whereas cooperative
banks had previously concentrated on "long--termn share-accumulation mort-
gages with average terms of 12-14 years, and have only gradually offered
longer terms on new direct-reduction loans* As indicated earlier, however,
most lenders interviewed regard 20 years as a reasonable loan term, espec-
ially on new construction.
2Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 246. The corresponding ratios for Section 603
cases were .01 and 1.60 per cent for Massachusetts and U.S., respectively.
It should be mentioned that these ratios refer to acquisitions by the FHA
only, and not total foreclosures * Data are not available on the cases where
the mortgagee himself chose to retain title to the property.
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guaranty. In a similar vein, the striking difference in acquisition ratios
among insured portfolios is perhaps a manifestation of the relative utiliza-
tion of the FHA loan program locally and elsewhere. In most sections of the
country, FHA insurance is sought on the most desirable home loans, espec-
ially in connection with new housing developments. Most life insurance
companies, commercial banks, and savings banks regard loan insurance as an
1
essential ingredient for long-distant mortgage lending. In the Boston
area, however, local lenders can readily meet all mortgage demands without
resort to capital importing, with the result that the most desirable loans
are generally written without the inclusion of FHA insurance. Even though
some lenders prefer to finance operative builders under the guidance and
supervision of the FHA, the permanent mortgage is frequently written on a
2
conventional or VA-guaranty basis anyway. As stated above, some lenders are
willing to lend on prefabricated homes only where loan insurance or guaranty
is included, while others are reluctant to deal in such properties under
any circumstances. Even when existing properties are concerned, local
lenders frankly admit that they refer mortgage requests to the FHA only
if certain undesirable risk elements are involved. They prefer to avoid
the administrative detail entailed in making an FHA application if the
request meets all standards for conventional loans. Indeed, many inter-
viewed lenders feel that they are "justified" in imposing the extra } of 1
per cent FHA insurance premium on the borrower only when absolutely neces-
sary. Furthermore, if a property is still mortgaged at the time when FHA
1 See the succeeding chapter.
2Unless the lender is able to retain the FHA insurance on a portion of the
loans, by means mentioned above. The ability to dictate mortgage terms,
of course, depends upon the extent to which the buyer is attached to the
institution financing construction.
410
loan insurance is sought, approval cannot be granted unless the existing
holder has refused to rewrite the mortgage with contract provisions as
favorable as those contained in the proposed FHA loan*
In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that insured
lending has entailed a relatively high degree of risk on the local level.
In contrast to the situation across the country, existing properties have
figured more prominently in local insured lending than has new construction.
Other things being equal, relatively newer properties are regarded as choice
risk elements for mortgage security purposes by most lenders interviewed.
Furthermore, in the case of existing properties, the FHA does not attract
a random sample of all mortgage recordings and, despite its rigid risk
rating technique, a relatively lower grade of loans are perhaps to be
expected. Undoubtedly existing portfolios of local mortgage lenders con-
tain many conventional mortgages with risk elements at least as undesirable
as those inherent in insured loans. In a well-rounded portfolio, however,
the existence of corresponding prime loans counterbalances the influence
of such less desirable loans, and makes possible a moderately favorable
risk rating for the entire portfolio.
PART VII. CHAPTER 14. SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
The stimulation and encouragement of a truly effective secondary
mortgage market has always been a vital adjunct of the FHA loan insurance program.
Framers of the program foresaw the development of such a system as indispen-
sable in attaining a satisfactory degree of flexibility and stability in home
mortgage lending across the country. The need for a secondary market has
undoubtedly been recognized for decades, but agitation toward its realiza-
tion has stepped up considerably since FHA-insured loans have become widely
accepted and respected.
NEED FOR SECONDARY MARKET
The importance of a secondary mortgage market is readily understood
if one considers the unequal stages of economic development characterizing
the various regions of the country. - Numerous economic indicators presage
a continuing growth in the South, Southwest, and Far West at a more rapid
pace than in the relatively mature regions, notably the Northeast. The
general westward movement of population represents a permanent shift away
from eastern congested centers, with the Boston area witnessing a negligible
1
growth during the past three decades. Population movements have followed
rather closely trends in industrial location, as important industrial cen-
ters are developing in newer areas that had been predominantly agricultural.
In view of these and other factors, it 'is not surprising that per capita
as well as total income payments are rising much less rapidly in the rela-
tively mature Northeast than in other areas.2 Furthermore, these economic
variables tend to have a direct bearing on the regional distribution of
1See Chapter 3.
2Ibid.
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urban residential construction. Where growth is more rapid, incomes and
population pressures stimulate a continuing demand for new construction
and for home mortgage credit. If this demand appears permanent and rea-
sonably stable, lending institutions may find mortgage investment in such
areas highly attractive, for both mortgagor and underlying property dis-
play desirable risk elements.
Whereas the demand for home construction and financing has mounted
rapidly in newer sections, principal sources of mortgage credit are con-
centrated in established urban centers. Comparison of the geographical
distribution of savings with that of construction provides a rough index
of relative supply and demand conditions existing in the various mortgage
markets concerned. In Table I, aggregate time and savings deposits in
commercial and mutual savings banks are compared with total construction
for the various Federal Reserve Districts in 1948. Unfortunately comparable
data on share capital among savings and loan associations are not available
for this geographical distribution, nor is there any breakdown as to resi-
dential and other construction. Nevertheless, these data serve to indicate
the sharp contrast in construction-savings ratios among Federal Reserve
Districts, especially between the Northeast and Southwest. In the Dallas
district, there was $1,20 in construction contract awards for every dollar
of savings, while the corresponding ratio in the three northeastern Dis-
tricts was but $0.09. These data do not include the San Francisco District,
a region of intense construction and general economic activity. Although
only 7 per cent of the total population are housed in the state, California
has consistently built 15 - 20 per cent of all new residential units in the
United States during recent years. Over a sixth of all FHA-insured loans
made on single-family units have concerned California properties, 1=volving
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TABLE I. RATIO OF CONSTRUCTION 10 SAVINGS IN FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS,
1948
(Billions of Dollars)
Districts Savings Construction Ratio
Boston, New York, Philadelphia $ 25.1 $ 2.25 $0.09
Richmond, Atlanta 2.8 1.80 .64
Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis 9.9 2.75 .28
Minneapolis 1.1 .29 .27
Kansas City .7 .38 .56
Dallas .6 .89 1.20
Total $ 40.1 $ 8.17 $0.20
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin and National Association of Mutual Savings
Banks, presented in a privately circulated brochure by the Worces-
ter County Institution for Savings, completed in September 1948.
z Construction - F. W. Dodge data on construction contracts awarded in
37 states east of Rockies for 12 months through March 1948.
* Time deposits of member banks as of late March, and savings deposits
of mutual savings banks as of January 1, 1948.
over 400 thousand individual loans with an aggregate principal value of
$21 billion.
As a result of this geographic unbalance between demand and supply,
certain areas are blessed with an abundance of home mortgage credit zhile
others suffer from a chronic shortage. The development of an effective
secondary market offers an economic and sound method of alleviating this
situation. By providing a means whereby credit may flow freely throughout
the economy, a secondary market facility would effect a more equitable dis-.
tribution -of mortgage funds and thereby afford all communities an opportunity
for expansion and development. Home buyers in capital-importing areas would
enjoy the benefits of more liberal credit availability, while institutional
investors in exporting areas would acquire sounder, better diversified mort-
gage portfolios. Before these objectives could be realized, however, sev-
eral fundamental barriers would have to be eliminated or largely overcome.
'Speech by W. A. Marcus before Convention of Mortgage Bankers Association
of America, San Francisco, September 4, 1951, reprinted in Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, September 20, 1951, pp. 1070-71.
Concerted efforts have already been directed toward this end, but much
remains to be done. These barriers, conveniently classified into techno-
logical and statutory impediments, will now be summarized in order.
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPEDIMENTS
The key to the development of a secondary market lies in the creation
of a standardized and readily salable mortgage instrument. Although the
characteristics of the institutions operating in the market are of vital
importance, the character of the paper itself is even more crucial. Stated
differently, if the security is such that it commands universal acceptance,
the institutional problem will largely take care of itself.
Among the various instruments used in financial exchange, the tradi-
tional mortgage contract is perhaps least satisfactory, at least as far as
marketability is concerned. As indicated earlier, poor marketability is
perhaps both a cause and a consequence of the localization characteristic
.of conventional mortgage lending. Since mortgage lenders in general have
not adopted a uniform set of quality standards for selecting individual
loans,. a conglomerate of uncoordinated, isolated mortgage markets has been
an inevitable development. Mortgage terms have been set in accordance with
local lending practices, reflecting no necessary relation to those currently
offered in other areas. Appraisal standards and risk analysis techniques
have been so diverse that lenders traditionally insist on a first hand
knowledge of the loan security before making an investment.
1 0n the other hand, mortgage banking on the Continent has long been well
organized and concentrated in a limited number of specialized institutions.
Consequently, a high degree of qualitative control over this type of credit
has developed, and yields on mortgage bonds have continuously corresponded
closely with that on long-term government paper. This situation contrasts
sharply with that existing in this country, at least until recent years,
where a great many, non-specialized institutions are engaged in mortgage
lending, with the result that "standards of qualitative control might
easily deteriorate." M. Palyi, Principles of Mortgage Banking Regulation
Europe, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 191, pp. 11-.
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Mortgage investment policies of life insurance companies have long
represented a notable exception to the extreme localization so character-
istic of conventional mortgage lending.' Their mortgage portfolios are built
up and serviced primarily by company personnel in branch offices and loan
correspondents who operate as intermediaries between borrower and dis-
tant lender over the loan term. Although occasional loans are bought
outright from independent agents or brokers, most conventional loans are
made -directly through affiliated personnel who maintain a continuing
rel at ionship with the company. Such operations, while greatly facili-
tating a more equitable distribution of funds for home finance, hardly
evidence an effective secondary market, however, as mortgage paper is
seldom freely traded 'among various mortgage investors. In 'other words,
insurance companies have typically invested long-term funds for optimum
profitability regardless of property location, but they are reluctant to
purchase conventional mortgages without being familiar with the details
of the individual case.
The fact that insurance companies have succeeded in making distant
mortgages on a conventional basis at all is an achievement in itself.
Perhaps an extension and elaboration of the techniques employed by these
companies in evaluating and approving mortgage loan requests may provide
a key for the development of a conventional secondary mortgage market.
While the risk rating procedure prescribed for loan correspondents in
considering eligible mortgage applications is admittedly crude and some-.
what arbitrary, it at least provides a widely recognized yardstick under-
standable to all parties concerned. This method contrasts sharply with
the risk analysis employed by all but the most progressive local mortgage
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lenders. Rarely have local mortgagees placed much weight or confidence in
the numerical risk rating methods as promoted by the American Bankers Asso-
1
ciation in making conventional loans. Perhaps existing methods, based on
the informed judgment of experienced specialists, are adequate in evaluating
mortgage risk so long as a lending institution is satisfied in confining
mortgage operations to the immediate community. Only if it seeks either
to place surplus funds in outside markets or else to interest outside in-
vestors in its own mortgage paper might the institution become vitally
concerned about systematic risk analysis.
Under existing "technology," expense constitutes a primary stumbling
block to the development of a standardized mortgage instrument on a conven-.
tional basis. If all loans were to be drawn up according to a risk rating
schedule accepted and respected by private mortgage investors in general, the
"ost- ri lao*ould be almost prohibitive. Before universal acceptabi-
lity were attained, all investors concerned would have to agree on the
precise items to be covered in the risk analysis, as well as the weighting
system used in arriving at a final rating. In order to make such a pro-
cedure applicable to lenders throughout the nation, due allowance would
have to be made for factors peculiar to certain areas. At any rate, the
resultant risk analysis network, provided agreement has been reached, might
entail such an elaborate procedure that the services of added mortgage
specialists would be required by the institutions concerned. Furthermore,
even though the method of risk rating were most satisfactory, mortgage
investors would be reluctant to place unlimited confidence in the judgment
of the mortgage originating institution. In other words, even if Banker B
1These recommendations are similar to those prescribed in the FHA Under-
writers Manual, and may be found in Home Mortgage Lending, American Bankers
Association, 1938. Both volumes reflect the substantial contribution of
Professor E. M. Fisher in their formulation.
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in 11allas were using the same criteria in evaluating a given loan application
as all other lenders in the country, Banker A in Boston might hesitate to
invest his depositors' funds in such an investment without additional assur-
ance as to its soundness. A credit rating agency, analogous to Dan and Brad-
street in commercial credits, would temper such skepticism to a considerable
degree, provided the agency were widely recognized and properly set up to
perform the task required. Perhaps even the creation of private credit
agency would not allay all doubts, however, and the inclusion of some form
of guarantee or insurance might be needed. This latter scheme was adopted
and widely respected in some areas during the 1920s, when title guaranty
companies found a flourishing business in selling guaranteed mortgages.
As indicated earlier, the subsequent depression experience of these as
well as other mortgage bond companies was most unsatisfactory, and the
development of a private secondary market was promptly checked, for the
time being at least.
Remedial Action
The FHA loan insurance program, coupled with the FNMA, incorporates
certain features designed to remove or effectively counterbalance these
impediments. Indeed, a primary purpose of the. FHA in-analyzing, rating,
and insuring mortgage loans has been the establishment of quality standards
to widen the mortgage market. When a mortgage originating institution
submits a loan request to the FHA for insurance, the resultant risk analysis
is performed in accordance with prescribed standardized criteria. This
risk rating, as described in Chapter 8, incorporates all the' primary vari-
ables influencing mortgage risk and follows a relatively objective weighting
system 6niversally applied by all underwriting offices. 2 In addition to the
1Chapter 8.
21t will be recalled that all eligible insured loans are classified into
three quality groups.
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assurance that risk elements are properly evaluated, lenders are protected
against most risks of loss through the inclusion of loan insurance. In
other words, overall risk of default is not only initially minimized through
scientific risk analysis, but in the event of default the mortgagee is in-
sured against all loss except for part or all of the attendant costs of-
foreclosure.
Among the immediate objectives in offering mortgage insurance, framers
of the FHA program hoped that a wide rangekof institutions would become
actively interested in mortgage lending. Furthermore, as stated earlier,
they firmly believed that the universal acceptance of insured loans, coupled
with federal encouragement of national mortgage associations,would set the
stage for an effective secondary mortgage facility on a private basis. It
was soon apparent, however, that private capital was not interested in
establishing any such associations, so the federal government was obliged
to take the lead in creating two agencies within the RFC, the RFC Mortgage
Company and the F1M.A.
The FHA-insured loan, and later on the VA-guaranteed loan as well,
has largely overcome many of the technological impediments generally
associated with conventional mortgage lending. Holders of such loans reap
the benefits of a widely recognized trade mark, for the product must meet
certain quality standards and, if it fails to do so, there is virtually
a "money-back guarantee." Banker A in Boston is less reluctant to purchase
a mortgage written by Banker B in Dallas if the loan is underwritten in full
or in part thereof by the FHA or VA. Not only does the federal agency con-
cerned offer to indemnify the mortgagee against loss of principal, but the
expanding private secondary market also gives promise of providing a ready
1 he former was terminated in 1947 and the latter was transferred t o the
HHFA in 1950.
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resale for the paper if immediate liquidity is sought before maturity.
Indeed, since the relatively uniform risk characteristics of insured loans
have enjoyed widespred recognition, a limited private secondary market
has emerged without federal encouragement. Many institutions have actually
preferred to purchase mortgages from other lenders rather than originate
1
them directly. The development of an effective private secondary market,
however, has depended and still depends upon the relaxation or elimination
of various legal barriers.
STATUTOU IMPEDIMENTS
In this section the primary legal barriers retarding the free inter-
regional flow-of mortgage credit will be reviewed. The first of these,
already touched on in Part IV, relates to -the dissimilarity among the
states in regard to foreclosure and title laws. Although a lending in-
stitution may be effectively insured against principal loss in a particular
mortgage investment, it must still stand to bear part or all of the costs
2
associated with a contingent foreclosure. Moreover, even if the institu-
tion is fully reimbursed for foreclosure expense, a lengthy redemption
period may be required before the mortgage may be foreclosed. As indicated
earlier, this redemption period has ranged up to 2 years in the case of
Alabama, with laws varying among the states as to whether or not the FHA
may acquire the title during the interim. In any case, however, mortgagee
loss is minimized, for the debentures issued by the FHA are effective as
of the date when foreclosure proceedings are instituted, not when completed.3
1
See below.
2It will be remembered that FHA issues certificates of claim which are to
cover foreclosure costs only if the subsequent property sale by the FHA
warrants; the VA pays a cash settlement to the lender to cover what it
regards as a reasonable sum for foreclosure.
3 As stated above, VA claims are payable in c ash.
h20
Another legal barrier concerns the various qualification requirements
which must be met before service contracts and foreclosure proceedings may
be enforced. Once again state laws vary widely. Some require no qualifi-
cation standards so long as the permanent mortgagee does not deal directly
with the mortgagor, while others may require detailed application forms
as well as various entrance fees, franchise and property taxes, etc.1
The above barriers all relate to restrictions imposed upon mortgage
investors within the state into which mortgage funds are to be imported.
Even more restrictive have been the various statutory limitations placed
upon those lending institutions which seek to export mortgage funds. Such
regulations generally favor investment within the individual state of 'in-
corporation, with the result that institutional investors are virtually
2
precluded from placing funds on the basis of maximizing net yields alone.
As indicated in Chapter 5, all state-chartered thrift institutions in
Massachusetts, except life insurance companies, are largely confined to
mortgage lending within the Commonwealth or adjacent s tates. National
banks may invest anywhere in the country without regard to state lines,
while federals may operate within 50 miles of their main office as well as'
in any region permissible for cooperative banks. Federals are given greater
leeway when the mortgage loans are insured or guaranteed, as FHA loans may
be made anywhere within a 100-mile radius of the main office, and VA loans
may be made without geographic restriction. With special permission, in-
sured loans may be made beyond the above limit, within the 15 per cent of
assets category, and authorization to further liberalize this clause is
1Special Report by Worcester County Institution for Savings, op. cit.
pp. 36-38.
2Some implications of these geographic restrictions are discussed in T. c.
Ballaine, "New England Mutual Savings Bank Laws and Interstate Barriers
to the Flow of Capital," American Economic Review, March 1945, pp. 155-9.
1
now pending approval.
Cooperative banks are permitted to operate in the secondary market only
in a most indirect manner. While they are not prevented from trading in
mortgage paper, these state-chartered institutions are able to hold mort-
gages only where the pledged properties are located within their ordinary
lending area. If they are members of the Home Loan Bank, cooperative banks,
just as all federals, may indirectly provide mortgage credit for distant
lenders through holding time deposits in the District Bank. Thus if a mem-
ber bank is unable to keep its share capital optimally employed in local
mortgages, it may choose to deposit a substantial amount in the Home Loan
Bank, which in turn may advance credit to other member banks seeking added
funds to make more loans. This procedure obviously is a poor substitute
for outright purchases in the secondary market, one primary reason being
the significant differential in net yields on time deposits as opposed to
mortgage loans. Moreover, effecting a free inter-regional flow of mortgage
funds via the Home Loan Bank System is hardly more favorable for the borrow-
ing than for the depositing member institution.2
Traditional restrictions on lending areas of local s avings banks have
constituted a major stumbling block to the development of a secondary
market. Soon after the introduction and widespread adoption of FHA-insured
loans, some of the more progressive savings bankers foresaw the very real
possibility that investment in such standardized instruments would solve
many of their pressing investment problems. Even during the prewar period,
at least one executive began pressing for permissive legislation to invest
in insured loans beyond conventional lending areas. His recommendations
were largely disregarded both by state legislative interests as well as by
1 Interview with R. P. Harold, President of Worcester Federal Savings. The
15 per cent category is described in Chapter 5.
2See "Summary and Prospects" below.
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other members of the local savings bank fraternity. Most opposition
centered about the notion that the savings of local depositors should be
used to promote home ownership in the Commonwealth alone, and should not
be exported into distant areas. Most official objection took the form of
lacking confidence in the overall soundness of insured loans. For example,
the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks in 1942 rejected the idea of an im-
mediate removal of geographical limitations as follows:
. . * . The time may come when such an investment has sufficiently
seasoned and the administrative policies and machinery surrounding
it have become sufficiently stabilized to justify some such
relaxation of t e usual safeguards; but it does not seem to have
arrived as yet.
In the postwar period agitation for such a relaxation was renewed with
added vigor, as most savings banks possessed vast sums of savings capital
well-suited for mortgage investment. Savings continued to flow into these
institutions during the prewar and war years, while mortgage portfolios
dwindled steadily. By the end of the war, mortgage-assets ratios had
reached historic low levels and new lending operations had been largely
taken over by rival savings and loan interest.
The methods pursued by local savings banks in expanding mortgage
portfolios have already been spelled out in some detail. 3 In addition to
making liberal mortgages on a conventional basis, they have participated.
to a considerable extent in the VA home loan program. For reasons advanced
in Chapter 13, the FHA program failed to make a much better showing among
local savings banks during the postwar than during the prewar years. Never-
theless, even though the insurance feature was regarded as superfluous in
1The same reasoning in the past had once prohibited any investment in
private securities of any corporation organized outside the Commonwealth.
2Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, 1942.
3Chapter 12.
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making local mortgage loans, the more progressive leaders have become
increasingly aware of its importance in long-distant lending. Indeed, it
soon became clear to most large savings bankers that the limited demand for
mortgage credit locally was sorely inadequate to absorb the abundance of
capital available for such investment. The case for relaxing geographic
barriers on insured and guaranteed loans was implemented by the circulation
of special report prepared by the Worcester County Institution for Savings.1
Shortly thereafter a team of leading savings bank executives made an inspec-
tion tour of areas of concentrated home building operations in the South-
west and West. As a result of these visits, local lenders became familiar
with the general economic characteristics of the regions as well as the
probable soundness of the properties as loan collateral. Moreover, they
became acquainted with leading mortgage servicers operating in these
markets, and learned of the various procedures involved in purchasing and
handling loans on distant properties.
As soon-as these local bank executives became well aware of the vir-
tues of extensive operations in a nationwide secondary market, a united
block presented a proposal to the state legislature. Although the sub-
sequent authorization was less extensive than that proposed by some, their
efforts bore fruit in enabling legislation effective mid-year 1949.2 As a
result, Massachusetts savings banks are now permitted to invest up to 10
per cent of their deposits in either FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loans
regardless of property location, provided the total holdings of each type
do not exceed 50 per cent of aggregate holdings on in-state properties.
SECONDARY MARKET PURCHASES OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS
Inasmuch as most secondary market activity among local thrift institu-
1
"FHA Insured Mortgages for the Savings Banks of Massachusetts," completed
September 24, 1948.
2Acts of 1949, Chapter 374, approved June 2, 1949.
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tions has revolved about out-of-state purchases by savings banks, much
of the following material refers primarily to these operations. Secon-
dary market operations of life insurance companies and national banks have
not been carefully investigated in this study both because of a lack of
relevant data as well as the relative insignificance of these institutions
in the local permanent mortgage market. Among the other thrift institutions,
cooperative banks are forbidden by statute from distant lending and local
federals have not felt obliged to participate in such operations on a
large scale. Indeed, the latter associations have kept share capital
fully -employed in meeting local mortgage demands, and have frequently
sought substantial advances from the Home Loan Bank to supplement this
capital.2 A large federal outside the immediate Boston area, however, is
completing arrangements for purchasing VA loans from reputable FSLIC-
insured associations in the South and Southeast.
Since mid-1949 when authorization was initially granted, several
local savings banks have been singularly active in the nationwide mort-
gage market. As of October 31, 1951, all but three of the institutions
with total mortgage portfolios of $15 million or more held some out-of-state
insured or guaranteed mortgages. The largest bank in the area held a much
larger investment in out-of-state FHA-insured loans than the combined in-
state insured holdings of all 56 banks. For the 14 banks which have engaged
1 Savings banks have also dominated insured loan purchases on local proper-
ties. During the 3 years for which these data are available (1942, 1947,
1950), the number and dollar amounts were distributed among major lender
types as follows: Number Amount in Thousands
National Banks 117
State Bank 70 350
Mortgage Company 3 12
Insurance Company 187 1,196
Savings and Loan Associations 128 624
Savings Bank 389 2,007
Federal Agency 8 48
Others 1 5
Total 9 ,7176
Source: Federal Housing Authority, Division of Reeearch and Statistics.
2Some have also sold mortgages at various times for liquidity purposes. See
p. 42.
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in such secondary market operations, combined holdings of out-of-state
insured and guaranteed loans had reached $96.8 million by October 1951,
representing 22.2 per cent of their respective aggregate mortgage holdings.
At the same time, these holdings accounted for 13.1 per cent of the total
mortgage debt held by all 56 banks.1 In the case of three banks, out-of-
state mortgages account for over one-fourth of their respective total port-
folios with the ratio being as high as one-third in one instance.2
Out-of-state mortgage loans are acquired in a variety of ways. Al-
though this is not the place to describe these procedures in detail, a few
principal methods will be mentioned. Perhaps most such loans are acquired
through a brokerage house or some other intermediary, agencies which may
or may not engage in servicing functions. Several large organizations have
their headquarters in New York City, frequently handling the financing
phase of a site development all the way from construction to placing the
permanent mortgage. Construction financing is generally supplied by short-
term lenders, notably national banks, provided the operations are performed
under FHA guidance and frequently provided a commitment for the permanent
financing has already been secured.3 Many of the largest national banks in
the country have found this business highly attractive. Frequently involv-
ing "warehousing operations," a line of credit is issued to a reputable
mortgage originating company for use in financing the development for a 6-
month period. The yield on these loans is favorable and with FBHA backing
1Only 7 banks held insured loans both on local and distant properties.
These data are compiled from special reports submitted by all savings
banks to the Massachusetts Savings Banks Association.
2Savings banks are now seeking authorization to raise the maximum holdings
of out-of-state FHA and VA loans to 20 per cent of deposits for each type.
3 Indeed, FHA loan insurance is an essential feature of any proposed mort-
gage transaction in capital-short areas, in direct contrast to the situa-
tion prevailing in the local money market center.
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the risk involved is minimized. Even if the mortgage company fails to
contact a suitable permanent mortgagee and the construction lender is
compelled to retain the mortgage, relief may still be sought from FNMA if
desired.1
While some savings banks deal exclusively with specialized brokers,
others acquire most distant mortgages through a local cooperative buying
group organized for this purpose. This latter group operates as a broker
itself and deals directly with the builder or promoter concerned with the
particular housing development. Certain members of this group make periodic
visits of regions in which they are interested, investigating not only the
areas in which developments are concentrated but also the quality of the
servicing agent retained by them. Inasmuch as the servicer alone main-
tains a continuing direct contact with the mortgagor, utmost care and scru-
tiny must be exercised in making this selection. The buying group re-
ceives applications for advance commitments in large blocks and, in turn,
refers them to member banks for selection and acceptance. As indicated
above, local banks are concerned solely with the permanent financing and
generally will issue a commitment only if adequate construction credit has
2
already been arranged. Individual member banks receive detailed informa-
tion surrounding each mortgage application, including such items as borrower
credit rating, house construction, neighborhood location, FHA rating, etc.
If a given insured mortgage application is acceptable to a member bank,
the commitment is forwarded to the builder representative and the servicer
agrees to perform his specified functions at a fee of - of 1 per cent of the
unpaid loan balance. The price which the local institution is required to
1warehouse operations are described by J. J. Scully of the Chase National
Bank in the Boston Sunday Herald, Real Estate Section, June 1, 1952.
2As stated earlier, each type of financing institution, short-term and long-
term, frequently requires a commitment on the part of the other before
granting final approval to a particular home mortgage application.
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pay for the mortgage depends upon current competitive c onditions prevailing
in the market. Inasmuch as contract interest rate maximums on such loans
are fixed by the VA and FHA, adjustments in net yields are accomplished
through a variable market price on the paper itself. Since most out-of-
state mortgages have been acquired pursuant to commitments issued prior
to Spring 1951, purchase prices have generally been above par. Paying
premiums did not in itself deter most banks from making such purchases,
however, as net yields were still quite favorable, especially when ac-
quired through disposing of government bonds which were also selling at a
1
premium. It was during these times that local lenders were anxious to
purchase sound mortgages from the FNMA, as selling prices on its holdings
were generally quite favorable. 2
Since the bond market break in early 1951, however, most insured
and guaranteed loans have been selling at discounts of 1 - 3 points.
The discount may even be more substantial if the property is not in a
choice location or if the mortgage company is encountering special pro-
blems in securing adequate financing. The continuing existence of sub-
stantial discounts does not necessarily spell severe operating losses on
the part of the servicer, however, for he is generally reimbursed in full
by the builder who, in turn, makes a corresponding adjustment in home
selling prices. Furthermore, the servicing agent does not ordinarily
depend upon broker commissions as a primary source of income but is far
1 Some interviewed lenders, however, refer to other members of the mortgage
fraternity who are opposed in principle to buying mortgages either at a
premium or at a discount; the former because they refuse to pay more than
what the paper is "worth", and the latter because they fear the paper is
substandard.
2 See below for a discussion of FNMA operations.
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more concerned with retaining the servicing option.1 Since insured loans
are now selling at a discount, mortgage lending institutions are able to
realize net yields in excess of those indicated on the contract itself. At
the present time, market selling prices are such that net yields after
servicing are approximately 3.75 per cent on either FHA or VA home loans if
2
carried to maturity. Some bankers have estimated that the additional ser-
vicing required on such loans at their own office entails an extra 0.15 per
cent of the loan balance, roughly equivalent to a third of that for conven-
tional portfolio loans held by a moderate-sized institution.
Although lending institutions take every possible precaution in se-
lecting suitable servicing agents, a certain degree of risk remains in the
event the latter are unable to fulfill their stated obligations. It is
possible, though perhaps not likely, that the payment of } of 1 per cent
of outstanding loan balances is adequate to provide profitable operations
only so long as a sizeable volume of loans are serviced each month. If
new lending were to be drastically curtailed, outstanding balances on
existingniortgages would decline rapidly, and revenues drop off sharply.
If the servicer were forced to discontinue operations, the lending insti-
tution holding the permanent mortgage would perhaps choose one of these
alternatives: search for a new servicer, attempt to sell the paper, or
else continue servicing the loan from its home office. Even though the
mortgages concerned are either insured or guaranteed, administrative pro-
blems would be doubly serious if servicer bankruptcy were accompanied by
lOne of the lenders interviewed spoke of a servicer who charged a 1-2 point
premium for all loans but agreed to perform all servicing for an unusually
low 1/8 of 1 per cent fee. This lender shuns away from such schemes, be-
lieving the agent to be after short-run gains but unable to effectively
service the loans throughout the term for such a small fee.
2It will be recalled that nominal gross yields are 41 and 4 per cent, res-
pectively, on these two mortgage types. FHA debentures continue to offer
a nominal 2] per cent yield, a factor which allegedly reduces the desira-
bility of insured loans in face of a general tightening of bond rates. Al-
though debentures are marketable and fully guaranteed by the government,
a mortgagee seeking immediate liquidity from a foreclosed loan would ab-
sorb a capital loss in their sale. Incontrast, settlement of VA claims
(Footnote continued)
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waves of mortgage delinquency and foreclosure throughout the region.
In order to effectively hedge against this latter eventuality, at least
one local savings bank refuses to invest in mortgages beyond the New Eng-
land area. The mortgage officer of one such bank indicates that all sec-
ondary market transactions are handled through a large broker-servicer
located in Portland, Maine. In the event this agent is forced into bank-
ruptcy, the mortgagee is in a position to continue servicing himself with
a minimum of confusion and effort, as all properties are located within a
one day's driving distance from the home office.2
All but one savings bank out of the Big Five have participated rather
extensively in the secondary mortgage market. The executive officer of the
remaining institution expresses an interest in the secondary market and be-
lieves current out-of-state lending regulations are most desirable. His
institution has also shown a real interest in the FHA program, as its in-
sured holdings on local properties exceed that of any other lender in the
area. Perhaps in part because of distant lending activities of others,
however, this Boston bank has been able to approach its legal mortgage-
deposits limit through making loans on local properties alone. Only if
1 Indeed, widespread foreclosures would be hazardous even where the servicing
agent were reasonably competent, for the latter may be unable to exercise
the same discretion in handling such matters as would a local mortgagee.
2Many life insurance companies were compelled to set up their own servicing
systems after encountering difficulty with the correspondent system during
the early depression years. The latter were unable to fulfill their ini.
tial servicing contracts, owing in large part to methods of receiving com-
pensation therefor. Rather than charge a percentage fee periodically
throughout the loan term, they were paid a fee only at the time of. loan
origination. Saulnier, Urbai Mortgage Lending By Life Insurance Companies,
op. cit., pp. 31-32.
are always paid in cash.
3These estimates were made by the president of a progressive $25 million
savings bank.
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demand slackens considerably will this bank seek any out-of-state loans
whatever, particularly so long as relative yields on local and distant
mortgages remain unchanged.
An important factor which has induced the above and other institu-
tions to refrain from distant lending altogether and has also limited such
activity of participating banks concerns the - of 1 per cent state excise
tax. As stated earlier, average deposits are the basis for this tax, but
investments in Massachusetts securities or real estate loans, federal se-
curities, and certain other outlets constitute allowable deductions. Since
non-taxable assets exceeded average deposits among most local savings banks
in mid-1949, a certain amount of out-of-state mortgage investment was possi-
ble without incurring tax liability. After a certain point has been
reached, however, any added investment in such loans subjects the bank to
substantial cuts in net yields after tax. Under present conditions, the
net yield might be trimmed to as low as 3 per cent, little above the
government bond rate and equivalent to that on choice eligible corporate
1
securities. Accordingly, many banks have made purchases in the secondary
market only up to the point where any added loans would entail this tax
liability. Hence, the prospects for continuing purchases are not very
promising under existing circumstances, as most lenders consider a net
yield of 32 per cent as inadequate to warrant added mortgage investment.
Quite understandably, savings bank interests regard this discriminatory
levy as detrimental to the best interests of their depositors, for it has
effectively precluded an optimum mortgage investment program. To remedy
this situation, a substitute measure has been proposed whereby tax liability
is a function of dividend payments. This latter levy would supposedly pro-
duce larger tax revenues for the Commonwealth, but would remove the undesirable
Residual administrative costs appear to be roughly the same among these
alternate investments.
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discriminatory features of the existing structure.
Summarizing, local savings banks have realized several distinct ad-
2
vantages from their recent operations in the nationwide secondary market.
In the first place, a greater availability of insured loans has afforded
participating institutions an opportunity to increase income without en-
dangering surplus. During the postwar period, a means of increasing re-
venues was not only desirable, but was virtually essential for the con-
tinuing growth of local savings banks. Indeed, costs were mounting steadily
and dividend rates were still far below those on savings and loan shares,
largely because the latter were invested primarily in high-yielding mort-
gage loans. Insured mortgages appeared well-suited to qualify under both
investment criteria of profitability and safety. Especially as long as the
excise tax could be effectively avoided, these low-risk mortgages offered
considerably higher net yields than could be obtained on government bond
holdings. At the same time, overall risk in this marginal investment would
be effectively minimized through gaining the loan insurance protection of
the FHA or VA.3
A second major benefit accruing to secondary market purchases concerns
further implications of the safety criteria in mortgage investment. The
opening of this additional source of investment has undoubtedly lessened
the temptation for certain banks to expand mortgage portfolios through
accepting undesirable risk elements or engaging in daher dangerous practices.
The competitive tactics employed by local savings banks in the postwar
period have already been outlined, including liberal construction loans
1Interview with C. L. Goss.
2Most of these benefits were discussed in an interview with Mr. C. L. Goss,
President, Worc ester County Institution for Savings, who has undoubtedly
been the primary driving force behind current secondary market authoriza-
tion.
3See below.
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with tying agreements for permanent mortgaging, price cutting, etc. Since
1949, these institutions have had the option of securing distant mortgages
with a minimum of administrative effort, if securing additional local busi-.
ness became unusually difficult. Unsound -loan requests could be refused on
the local level, as the funds could be profitably invested elsewhere. Price-
cutting has apparently subsided in recent years and some lenders outside
Boston proper have found a more ready demand for h and 5 per cent mort-
gages than previously. This latter factor reflects in large part a gen-
eral tightening in bond rates, but it may also result from the opening
up of mortgage investment opportunities in other markets.
Even if only high quality conventional loans are selected, a lending
institution may achieve an even higher quality mortgage portfolio by in-
creasing its investment in FHA and VA loans. The more funds that a bank
invests in the latter, the smaller is the probability of its holding
frozen assets in a subsequent depression. If such an economic reversal
should occur in the near future, the dangers of holding frozen assets
would be especially critical in the case of many local thrift institutions
with conventional mortgage portfolios overburdened with unseasoned, high-
percentage loans based on the current inflated price level. In order to
hedge against this eventuality, 'a few savings banks have expanded holdings
of insured and guaranteed mortgages both on local and distant properties so
that their combined volume comprises over one-half of aggregate mortgage
holdings.
Thirdly, the quality of mortgage portfolios is materially improved by
virtue of the diversification accruing to out-of-state mortgage investment.
Although savings banks have long been permitted to invest in securities of
other states, mortgage investments until 1949 were restricted to Massachu-
setts properties alone. Until this barrier was removed, all such investment
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was subjected to the many risks inherent to this local economy. Under
current regulations, the undesirable effects of this concentration mr be
minimized, as mortgages may be placed on properties in regions whose economic
fortunes hinge on vastly different forces. The effects of prosperity and
depression vary widely across the country and the probability of mortgage
delinquency and loss is lessened through proper geographic diversification.
Lastly, local savings banks have acquired the art of trading in mort-
gages on a big scale, and have also strengthened the secondary market in
so doing. Mortgage officers have become familiar with the details of this
operation and have attained a certain skill in selecting sound mortgage
investments without a personal knowledge of either borrower or pledged
property. Out-of-state mortgages are generally purchased in large block
amounts, and are regarded not wholly unlike certain bond investments. The
usefulness, or more correctly the indispensability, of FHA risk rating in
making such selection has perhaps served to emphasize the primary risk ele-
ments in any mortgage transaction, whether it be distant or local, insured
or conventional. Lenders note the care with which the FHA examines not
only the construction itself, but also its relation to the neighborhood
as well as the continuing ability of the borrower to bear the prescribed
debt service. The more progressive lenders have alreatr incorporated
a certain degree of systematic risk analysis in conventional niortgage
screening but an appreciation of its indispensability in distant insured
lending may well induce a more universal adoption of such methods in all
lending.
The private secondary market has been materially strengthened through
the increasing participation of savings banks and other lending institu-.
tions in its operations. Indeed, at certain times in the postwar period,
this private network has been so active that FNMA operations were confined
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primarily to mortgage sales, with a negligible demand for purchases. If
trading in mortgages continues to expand in volume, the point may be reached
whereby the secondary market would approach a conventional securities ex-
change. In such an event, the -holder of an eligible mortgage could find a
ready and reasonably stable market for the paper whenever additional li-
quidity were sought. Obviously the current secondary market is far from
this advanced stage and even the FNMA stands willing to purchase certain
mortgage loans only from the original mortgagee, and only within a res-
tricted period following its origination. Nevertheless, mortgage lending
is no longer strictly a local operation, and methods of facilitating a
free inter-regional flow of mortgage credit are steadily improving. 1
FNMA EFFORTS IN THE NATIONWIDE SECOND1ARf MARK
As indicated earlier, two essential elements in the development of a
secondary market have been the creation of a standardized mortgage instru-
ment and an institution designed to facilitate its exchange. The private
mortgage interests throughout the country were, among other things,too
disorganized and localized to provide these elements without fairly direct
federal stimulation. The FHA-insured, and later on VA-garanteed, mort-
gage loans have served as the eligible paper, and the FNMA and RFC Mortgage
Company have stood ready to support their prices in the open market. Pro-
viding this necessary support has required extensive purchases in some
periods, but a negligible volume in others.
Nationwide Activity
In the prewar period, the FNMvhA stimulated an interest in newly-authorized
high-percentage, long-term mortgages by purchasing $246.6 million in Title II
loans. During the subsequent war years, credit demands for new home construe-
1 See "Summary and Prospects" below.
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tion were sharply curtailed and the volume of mortgage sales far exceeded
that of acquisitions. By 1945 sales, repayments, and other credits had
reduced the outstanding FNMA portfolio to a $7.4 million level.1
During the early postwar years, the FNMA gradually enlarged its holdings
of insured mortgages, but the extent of such operations was limited until
mid-1948. As stated earlier, the RFC Mortgage Company alone was authorized
to trade in VA loans, having made cumulative purchases of $140.8 million
before its liquidation in June 1947. From this date until July 1948, when
FNMA authorization was extended to include VA loans, government bond rates
tightened somewhat, certain lenders shunned away from making 4 per cent VA
loans, and the market for this paper fell sharply. It was at this time
that the inferior trade mark on guaranteed loans, relative to that on Sec-
tion 203 insured loans, was first brought to the forefront. Undoubtedly
the "substandard" interest was the primary cause of this inferior market-
ability, but also risk characteristics were less uniformly and systemati-
cally analyzed in VA loans. Perhaps similar comments would apply to the
4 per cent Section 603 loans under the emergency FHA program. Postwar
purchases of Section 603 loans have nearly equalled in volume the cumula-
tive purchases of Section 203 during the entire 12-year period through 1950.3
Following its expanded authorization in mid-1948, the FNMA proceeded to
purchase VA-guaranteed as well as FHA-insured loans. Although the former
accounted for but 11 per cent of total purchases in the latter half of 1948,
this proportion rose sharply to 80 per cent one year later. During this
1Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 71.
2 From May 1947 to January 1948, the average yield on taxable long-term
Treasury bonds rose from 2.19 to 2.45 per cent. Business Statistics
Supplement to Survey of Current Business, Department of Commerce,
July 191 'F~ 96.
3 The precise values were $374.6 and $339.3 million, respectively, Annual
Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 77. FHA Section 203 mortgages were still qite
marketable in large part because the 4, per cent maximum rate was in ef-
fect until early 1950.
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latter period, the FNMA disposed of $19.8 million of its mortgage holdings,
only $0.4 of which were VA loans. These data serve to indicate the rela-
tively inferior marketability of 4 per cent VA loans even when the govern-.
1
ment bond rate was falling once again. Nevertheless, now that VA loans
once again became more marketable either through the FNMA or the private
secondary market, veterans began to experience less difficulty in securing
h per cent credit and VA applications rose from 330 thousand to 623 thousand
between 1948 and 1950. A substantial portion of FNMA purchases of VA loans
daring these years, however, were acquired directly from mortgage companies
whose primary function is to originate and sell portgages to private inves-
tors. The frequency of such acquisitions increased abruptly in late 1949
when certain restrictions were removed. Until October of that year, ori-
ginal mortgage lenders could sell to FNMA no more than 50 per cent of all
loans insured or guaranteed since April 1948. The removal of this limita-
tion made it possible for lenders to sell all such loans made, thereby
providing an assured market for their paper in the event private buyers
could be found only at a discount. As a result, mortgage companies ac-
counted for nearly 40 per cent of VA purchases by the FNMA in late 1949,
2
in contrast to a 14 per cent share one year earlier.
The virtually guaranteed par market provided by the FNMA, coupled with
a generous advance commitment procedure, played a prominent role in the
postwar home building boom. The latter procedure made it possible for the
mortgage company or other institution receiving the commitment to secure
the necessary construction financing with ease, since the commitment
assured a market for the permanent mortgage on the completed house. 3  While
such operations undoubtedly facilitated an expanded volume of new home
1 Yields on government bonds had fallen back to 2.19 per cent by I)ecember
1949. Business Statistics, op. cit., p. 96.
2Annual Report, HHFA, 1949, p. 24.
3 Through issuing such commitments, the FNMA agreed to purchase specific
mortgages at par plus accrued interest at any time within 1 year provided
all other requirements are met.
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construction and purchase, the federal government had in effect become a
primary source of mortgage credit, thereby aggravating inflationary pressuress
already mounting. Whenever access to the secondary market facility is given
to all types of mortgage originators, government credit may virtually rele-.
gate credit facilities of conventional thrift institutions to a subor-
dinate role. Investment programs of the latter, frequently termed port-
folio lenders, are controlled primarily by the flow of savings and repay-
ments and the demand for various types of investments. Since their opera,-
tions are tied in with the general capital market, the interest rates which
they charge roughly reflect supply and demand conditions existing in that
market. The operations of other types of mortgage originators, such as
mortgage companies, are controlled neither by these general market forces
nor by monetary authorities. To take an extreme case, suppose that no
loans whatever are made by portfolio lenders and that a government facility
provides unrestrained and indiscriminate purchasing authority. Under these
circumstances, the secondary market facility would actually function as
a primary lender, with mortgage originators operating as feeders and ser-.
vicing agents so long as the compensation for such activity proved to be
adequate.
Through such a perversion of secondary market functions, interest
rates may be permanently maintained at a level at which the private credit
market cannot equate supply and demand. If it appears in the public inter-.
est to supplement or supplant private credit in certain capital-short areas,
a more logical procedure might entail direct government aid in providing
credit or in improving existing private credit facilities. Indeed, when
indiscriminate use of a government facility is permitted, there is a real
danger of unsound mortgage lending. So long as the Association continues
to assure a market at par without recourse and without examination of indi-
438
vidual loans, mortgage originators may exercise less discretion in selec-.
ting loans for resale than for permanent portfolio holding. Undoubtedly
this danger is minimized when the loans have undergone a sdreening pro-
cess based on uniform standards, but the reliability of this hedge is
decidedly less certain in the case of VA than FHA loans. In any event,
mortgage originators would logically sell off prime loans to private port-
folio lenders so long as a premium were offered, and channel the remaining
less desirable loans to the facility.
The disasterous consequences of an unrestrained government facility
in an inflationary economy were clearly demonstrated by early 1950, and
remedial measures were promptly instituted. During the first 3 months of
1950 alone, commitment contracts amounting to $963 million were made, re-
presenting FHA and VA mortgages of $42.3 million and $920.7 million, res-
pectively. At the end of March 1950, advance commitments aggregating $1,456
million were outstanding, all but $485 million of which were fulfilled .or
otherwide cancelled by the end of the year.2 Largely pursuant to these
contracts, the dollar volume of the 1950 purchases was 55 per cent greater
than those in 1949 and equal to 90 per cent of all purchases from the in-
ception of FNMA in 1938 through 1949.
Inasmuch as the federal government was attempting to- combat inflation
through fiscal measures, and later on through ionetary policy as well, an
unrestrained FNMA would tend to nullify these objectives. Hence, the
Housing Act of 19503 provided for the cessation of the advance commitment
procedure, after which eligible mortgages could be purchased by FNMA only
1 The writer is indebted to Prof. Leo Grebler, Columbia University, for
much of this material on the analysis of the FNMA.
2Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 74.
3April 20, 1950, Effective May 10.
when guaranteed or insured at the time of the contract. Under current regu-
lations, over-the-counter mortgages may not be presented to the Association
for purchase earlier than 2 months or later than 12 months after the date ot
insurance or guaranty. In addition to this restriction, as 1I'ell as others
1
regarding the price class or construction standards of the property, a
lender may not dispose of over one-half of its otherwise eligible insured
loans to the FNMA. These regulations effectively reduce the dangerous
feeder operations of non-portfolio mortgage companies, who no longer can
rely on the government to provide a ready market for their paper. They
now must have adequate resources to hold eligible loans at least 2 months,
2
and they must look to the private market for most permanent mortgage credit.
Through curtailing the quantity of FNMA support for private home fi-
nancing and through stimula'ting sales out of its portfolio, the federal
government has paved the way for a larger participation of private capi-
tal in the secondary market. It was during this period that Massachusetts
savings banks and other large institutional; investors became active buyers
in the expanding secondary market. During 1950 alone, the dollar volume of
FNMA sales) was more than double its total mortgage sales during the l2-year
period through 1949 • Private investors became interested in VA-guaranteed
as well as FHA-insured loans, so that during the later months of 1950 dollar
sales of the former actually exceeded the latter. Perhaps this increasing
concentration on VA loans was due in part to the relative aVailability of
the two mortgage types, for only one-sixth of VA mortgages purchased by
FNMA had been sold by the end of 1950, while the"corresponding proportion
lSee "Federal National Mortgage Association," Chapter 8.
2J,pparently the 50 per cent rule does not 'apply to VA loans, at least as of
late 1950. Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 72.
, 3Involving 69,996 mortgages with total unpaid balance of $469 million.
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for insured mortgages was three-fifths.
Although average bond yields were rising slowly throughout 1950, the
FNMA found a ready market for both insured and guaranteed mortgages, even
commanding a premium of } of 2} per cent. During 1951, however, it has
already been mentioned that the market for this paper fell rather abruptly
as a result of a substantial tightening in the overall capital market.
FNMA had already withdrawn much of its support from the private mortgage
market and the Federal Reserve largely abandoned its government bond support
program, with the result that interest rates advanced and low-yielding FHA
and VA mortgages could be sold only at a discount. Some large insurance
companies found themselves overburdened with advance commitments to pur-
chase VA or FHA mortgages at or above par, and could fulfill these agree-
ments only through disposing of government portfolios at a discount. Rele-
vant data are not at hand, but from interviews made it appears that, after
these commitments were completed, mortgage funds have flowed more freely
once again. Indeed, as far as Massachusetts savings banks are concerned,
the factor retarding a continuing interest in making purchases of insured or
guaranteed mortgages is not the substandard nominal yield, but rather the
discriminatory state excise tax on out-of-state mortgage investment. A
would be expected, mortgage sales from FNM4A holdings fell to $111 million
1Annual Report, HHFA, 1950, p. 77. These ratios may be somewhat misleading,
as it must be remembered that FNMA authority to purchase VA loans was
granted only in 1948, while FHA loans had been bought and sold since 1938.
Another factor accounting for the increased interest in VA loans concerns
the more widespread impression that VA rates would not be raised in the
near future; in the past, such speculation undoubtedly deterred many inves-
tors from buying h per cent VA loans (especially during late 1947 and early
1948).
2The long-term treasury bond rate rose from 2.20 to 2.39 per cent from
January to December.
3 Between February and May 1951, average yields on Treasury bonds rose from
2.4o to 2.63 per cent, and yields had reached 2.74 per cent by January 1952.
4Page 430 above.
in 1951 from the 1950 high of $469 million. VA-guaranteed loans have gradu-
ally occupied a major role in such sales operations, comprising three-fourths
of the 1951 volume, but less than one-half during 1950. At the same time,
however, VA loans also continue to dominate FNMA purchases, accounting for
1
nine-tenths of the $677 volume million purchased in 1951.
Local FNMA Activity
The Boston area has rarely depended upon outside sources, either private
or governmental, in order to meet its mortgage credit requirements. On the
contrary, it evidences a relative surplus of mortgage funds, and of necessity
has exported funds to those areas where opportunities for profitable invest-
ment are more abundant. As indicated earlier, portfolio lenders dominate
the local mortgage market, and mortgage companies have never flourished
to the same extent as in other areas where existing credit facilities are
unable to provide the required long-term financing. In mid-1951, the
dollar volume of mortgages being serviced for others by lenders or other
agents in the local four-county area amounted to only $92 million, repre-
senting h per cent of total mortgages held for their own account. Undoubtedly,
a large share of these servicing operations arisesfrom loans on isolated
single-family and multi-family properties arranged through loan corres-
pondents for outside insurance companies. These agencies frequently oper-
ate as real estate agents or brokers, channeling choice loans to affiliate
insurance companies while retaining servicing, and referring other mort-
2
gage business to local lending institutions on a fee basis. In contrast
to the local area, loans serviced for others among mortgage lenders and
agencies in the Dallas Federal Reserve District were equivalent to 1 times
Housing Statistics, HHFA, January 1952. As of December 31, 1951, approxi-
ately two-thirds of the $2,750 million gross authorization consisted of
mortgage holdings, of which 89 per cent were VA-guaranteed loans.
2Mortgage brokers and real estate agents accounted for over 80 per cent
of such servicing operations. These agents may service a few mortgages
for individual investors who had purchased the instrument from them but
are not equipped for proper servicing.
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the total dollar amount held on their own account.
In view of these supply-demand relationships, it is not surprising
that the FNMA has purchased a limited amount of mortgages on local proper-
ties. On Dlecember 31, 1951, the Association owned no mortgages in the entire
Commonwealth, and during the past several years such purchases have been
2
rare. Obviously the volume of insured mortgage purchases has been prac-
tically nil, inasmuch as the FHA program has never flourished in this
area. In addition, even though the VA-guaranteed loan has enjoyed a wide
acceptance, lending institutions have rarely looked to the FNMA for relief
if immediate liquidity were required. A small federal in the local market
has frequently sold insured or guaranteed mortgages to other associations
in order to maintain a steady volume of new lending or to satisfy pressing
withdrawal demands. Another large federal has virtually functioned as a
miniature FNMA, by purchasing mortgages from certain loaned-up institutions
and selling to others with an excess of idle share capital. Among those
"loaned up," a large Boston federal has frequently solved serious liquidity
problems, generally arising out of withdrawal demands, by converting VA-
guaranteed mortgages into cash. The continuing effectiveness of this hedge,
however, depends upon an ample stock of eligible mortgage paper, as well as
3
a ready and reasonably stable market.
As mentioned in the previous discussion, local savings banks have
figured prominently in the development of a private secondary market.
Authorization for out-of-state mortgage investment coincided with the
1
"Real Estate Loans of Registrants under Regulation X," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, June 1952, p. 627. Across the nation, total loans serviced for
others amounted to one-fourth of total portfolio holdings.
2Letter from J. S. Baughman, President of FNMA, February 5, 1952. From the
data referred to in footnote on p. 424, the negligible amount of local
FNMA purchases are clearly indicated; in 1942 insured loans on 8 Massachu-
setts properties were thus acquired, but nonewhatever in either 1947 or
1950 (Sections 203 and 603).
3The association could have perhaps called in the Home Loan Bank for addi-
tional advances, but this facility had already been used quite extensively.
443
launching of the new FNMA policy regarding the sale of its portfolio
holdings. Accordingly, as the government proceeded to withdraw from its
extensive support program, local savings banks stepped in and purchased
nearly $30 million in FNMA mortgages by mid-1951. During the 2-year inter-
val through June 1951, these purchases aggregated $200 thousand or more in
the c.ase of 9 local banks, and approached $16 million in one case. Of these
aggregate purchases, FHA-insured loans represented 58.4 per cent of the
dollar volume and 51.9 per cent of the number of individual mortgages.
(See Table II.) Next to savings banks, which accounted for two-thirds of
TABLE II. PURCHASES OF FHA-INSURED AND VA-GUARANTEED MORTGAGES FROM
FNMA Bt LENDING INSTITUTIONS* IN THE BOSTON AREA, AUGUST 5, 1949-
JUNE 30, 1951
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands)
eype of Number of FHA Loans VA Loans Total
nsiTuition Ins titulions NumbeFAmount NumWer~ioiunt Number Amount
Savings Banks 9 2,315 $16,544 2,153 $11,793 4,468 $28,337
Commercial Bank 1 160 1,269 671 3,901 831 5,170
Life Insurance Co. 2 126 820 1,020 7,565 1,1146 8,385
All 12 2,601 $18,633 3,844 $23,259 6,4145 $41,892
Source: Data supplied by J. S. Baughman, President of FNMA.
* Includes only those institutions making aggregate purchases of $200
thousand or more.
all mortgage purchases from FNMA, were two local life insurance companies.
Curiously, VA loans accounted for over 90 per cent of total purchases by
the larger of these companies, in direct contrast to the corresponding
ratios for other institutions. This may reflect a preference for VA loans
as a matter of policy, but it may merely result from the acquisition of
mortgages on a particular site development in which VA financing was used
almost exclusively. Just as in other secondary market trading, the in-
vesting institution generally purchases mortgages from the FNMA in large
block amounts. The single commercial bank included in Table II has been
active both in financing construction operations as well as in purchasing
permanent mortgages on distant properties. In dollar volume, its pur-
chases from FNMA constituted 12.3 per cent of the total and ranked third
among all institutions.
SUMARY AND PROSPECTS
In summary, it appears as if the private secondary mortgage market
has developed to a considerable extent during the postwar period. This
development has been decidedly hastened and strengthened by the entrance
of Massachusetts and New York savings banks into this nationwide market.
It is to be expected that as private lending institutions come to recog-
nize and respect the relatively uniform security characteristics of insured
and guaranteed mortgages, the government facility may occupy a progressively
less prominent role in the market. Aside from the specific benefits ac-
cruing to the individual lending institutions themselves, extensive pur-
chases of distant mortgages have effectively channeled long-term credit
into areas where it is most needed. In the continuous theoretical case,
assuming a perfect capital market, lenders would continue to purchase mort-
gages in the secondary market until at the margin net yields on all port-
folio investments were equalized. In a free market, a mass transferral of
funds from government bonds into out-of-state insured mortgages would tend
to reduce current prices of the former and raise those of the latter, thereby
bringing net yields more closely in balance.
In the local capital-surplus area, participating institutions in the
secondary market have relied almost entirely upon the retirement and sale
of government bond holdings in making distant mortgage purchases, and have
not perceptibly modified credit standards in making local conventional loans.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that in the absence of the recent sav-
ings bank authorization, the pressures of mounting expenses and inadequate
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revenues from predominately government bond portfolios would have prompted
some institutions to further relax eligibility requirements in order to
expand mortgage holdings. While such an eventuality merely reflects a
highly competitive situation, it might result in an impairment of the
soundness of mortgage portfolios if undesirable risk elements are blandly
accepted without due compensation therefor. As pointed out above, the
opportunity to invest elsewhere has facilitated a more equitable distri-
bution of long-term funds, benefiting both borrowers in import areas as
well as depositors in the exporting thrift institutions.
It is not at all unlikely that the development of an effective secon.
dary market has obviated a further extension of federal intervention into
the mortgage field. If large institutional investors from the Northeast
had been unwilling to invest vast sums of long-term credit in capital-
deficient regions of the country, the government might have felt obliged
to make direct loans in order to relieve the situation. This latter pro-
cedure was virtually followed between 1948 and 1950 when the FNMA offered
to purchase unlimited amounts of insured or guaranteed loans from non-
portfolio mortgage companies. Especially where advance commitments were
involved, construction financing was easily secured and the mortgage ori-
ginator was not compelled to seek private investors to take over the per-
menent mortgage. Since these practices were effectively minimized in 1950,
the market for eligible mortgages has fallen significantly but only in
accordance with the overall bond market, despite the less active partici-
pation of the government facility.
Although the FNMA functions less as primary source of funds now than
previously, a new challenge to the private secondary market lies in direct
loan program of the VA. Under the Housing Act of 1950, the Veterans Mdmin-
istration was granted authority to make direct loans to veterans in areas
where 4 per cent VA mortgages are unobtainable through the usual lending
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agencies. In other words, if institutional investors possessing investible
long-term funds are unwilling or perhaps unable to satisfy credit require-
ments of veterans in capital-short areas, the federal government is now
authorized to offer direct relief. Although the extent of this direct
lending activity has been slight compared with aggregate VA guaranty opera-
tions, its mere existence represents a challenge, if not a threat, to
private mortgage investment.
Although the secondary mortgage market is increasingly dominated by
private institutional investors, the federal government continues to be the
key factor in its operations. First of all, FNMA has not withdrawn com-
pletely from the market, but has merely curtailed certain highly infla-
tionary aspects of its operations, and continues to make substantial purchases
on an over-the-counter basis. Since its purchases are somewhat limited, both
as to amount and type of insured loan accepted, the private market for this
paper has slipped below par. Nevertheless, the fact that FNMA is still
potentially if not actually a supporter of the insured mortgage market has
retained the interest of private investors in buying and holding such pa-
per. It seems most unfortunate that private interests have never estab-
lished a private national mortgage associations to possibly supplant the
1
existing FNMA. This serves as an instance where- federal authorities were
not only willing to charter private associations but were even offering
financial inducements for so doing. Curiously, private interests, abhorring
1 The American Bankers Association and other trade associations have discussed
such proposals at various times, but there is little evidence of any con-
certed efforts toward positive action.In 1951 a special panel of builders,
promoters, and lenders recommended that the ownership of FNMA be transferred
to approved mortgagees under a plan which would require all to own stock,
similar to member bank investment in the Federal Reserve and the analogous
Home Loan Bank System. Thence, the new FNMA could sell short- and long-term
debentures to the public and not depend upon the Treasury for funds. See
"Mortgage Crisis," Magazine of Building, August 1951, p. 123.
the spread of federal intervention, failed to seize this opportunity for
strengthening private control over the market and virtually prompted the
establishment of FNMA by default.
Even if FNMA were completely abandoned, the government would still
be compelled to supply an essential ingredient in secondary trading, namely,
the standardized credit instrument. As discussed earlier in this chapter,
it appears highly improbable that a free nationwide exchange would evolve
about a privately-underwritten mortgage contract for a great many years,
if ever. Only if certain basic weaknesses in the conventional mortgage
contract were removed or largely overcome would mortgage paper move freely
in financial trading. If such were accomplished, however, a private secon-
dary market would perhaps be a natural and inevitable development without
any federal prompting.
At least three primary changes would be required before a truly effec-
tive private secondary market could be attained.2 The first of these
changes has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, namely, the
incorporation of uniform foreclosure and title laws and procedures across
the country.3 Closely allied to these barriers to free interstate mortgage
investment are the various statutory regulations placed upon lending areas
of state-chartered thrift institutions. Partial relaxation of such restric-
tions among savings banks in Massachusetts and New York represents a notable
achievement in this regard. Even among local savings banks, however, con-
tinuing interest in out-of-state mortgage investment is contingent upon the
removal of the discriminatory excise tax on most forms of non-state invest-
1
Under these circumstances, government supervision might be required only
where public distribution of the mortgage debt is involved, in order to
prevent a repetition of the mortgage bond disaster. See Chapter 8.
2 These proposals are mentioned by M. L. Colean, "What Makes a Secondary
Mortgage Market Tick?" Savings and Loan Annuals, 1948, pp. 152-153.
3p, 419.
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ment.
As a second prerequisite of a more effective secondary market, a
uniform method of appraisal and risk rating must be instituted, to be
universally accepted and practiced by all lending agencies. Disregarding
the possible violation of anti-trust laws, the establishment of such stan-
dards would be most costly and time-consuming, as existing methods of risk
rating are generally haphazard and applicable only to a restricted lending
area. Among the various methods available, perhaps agreement could best
be reached by using the FHA appraisal system as a model. Hence, it appears
as it a more widespread utilization of FHA-insured lending offers more
immediate promise for a more effective secondary market than would an ex-
tension of Home Loan Bank facilities.1 FHA insurance is a necessary trade
mark which must be associated with a mortgage instrument before it is
freely traded. A similar public acceptance accrues to VA-guaranteed loans
as well, but the VA program is of a temporary nature and consequently
2
will gradually wane in significance in future years. By promoting FHA-
insured lending on a much more extensive scale, all mortgage lenders would
become familiar with the elaborate risk rating system employed in screen-
ing applications. Gradually thereafter it would be hoped that the under-
standing and recognition of such scientific risk analysis would facilitate
the adoption on an uninsured basis of an acceptable standardized mortgage
instrument for secondary trading.
The Home Loan Bank, on the other hand, seeks not to interfere directly
with lending practices and specific mortgage contracts written, but rather
to standardize and coordinate the overall operations of member institutions.
1For a penetrating analysis of the FHA and FHLB objectives, activities, and
rivalry, see D. M. French, "The Contest for a National System of Home
Mortgage Finance," The American Political Science Review, February 1941,
pp. 53-69.
Unless, of course, the VA program is extended or otherwise modified so as
to cause its significance to continue.
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Only after this latter objective were realized to a high degree would any
secondary trading of conventional mortgages take place on a nationwide basis.
Such a development seems most remote at best, as it is difficult to conceive
of a local savings and loan association purchasing mortgage loans written
by even reputable lenders on distant properties unless the former were
familiar with the details of the case and unless some concrete assurance
of its soundness were provided. Perhaps this development is not seriously
considered by the Home Loan Bank, except on a most hypothetical level.
As a substitute solution to long distance mortgage lending, the Home
loan Bank System does attempt to promote inter-regional capital flows through
making short- and long-term advances to member associations. In order to
raise the necessary funds, the Banks accept time deposits and certificates
from members with an abundance of idle share capital and also issue deben-.
tures for sale. As stated earlier, this method of channeling mortgage
credit is inferior to the system whereby FHA, VA, or some other standardized
mortgage loans are to be freely traded. Under the former scheme, the mem-
ber institution enlarging its time deposits maintains a high degree of
liquidity but makes a substantial sacrifice in yield relative to mortgage
investment. At the same time, the association seeking Bank advances is
afforded the opportunity to make additional mortgage loans, but is unable
to reduce overall portfolio risk to the same extent as under the alternate
system. The member may put up its mortgage holdings as security for ad-
vances, but it cannot sell them outright to the Bank. Indeed, mortgage
originating institutions would be far more willing to dispose of existing
holdings in order to make new loans if these holdings could be sold without
recourse. Under existing circumstances, the inclusion of a FHA or VA con-
tract is required before the buying institution is willing to assume the
1 See Chapter 7
1
mortgage without recourse.
A third requirement of a truly effective secondary market specifies
that interest rates be permitted to move freely with interest rates in
general. Under the present FHA and VA programs, the establishment of in-
terest rates, loan terms, and other dimensions of mortgage price is directly
influenced by social and poIitical as well as economic considerations. '!his
is not the place to analyze the philosophy underlying such activities, but
federal attempts at providing unsua1ly liberal credit availability for cer-
tain income groups have heavily influenced the type, tenure, and price class
of new home construction. Unless the government or private secondary faci-
Ii ty seeks to promote certain non-economic objectives, it seems essential
that interest rates be fre~ to fluctuate as changing market conditions dic-
tate. If the facility attempts to maintain interest rates at an artifi-
cially low level, its mortgage portfolio would expand steadily up to the
limt of its authorization and inflationary pressures already mounting
would continue unchec ked. Such conditions prevailed during much of the
postwar period until FNMA. purchasing operations were decidedly curtailed
in 1950. Since that time, however, net yields on insured mortgages have
moved quite closely with general interest rates, although FNMA purchases
during 1951 exceeded s ales by a 6 to 1 ratio.2 If the faeili ty were ab-
solutely free from federal interest rate tampering, the total volume of
mortgages held would be relatively unchanged over long periods of time,
l'Ihe Boston Home Loan Bank has recently introduced a service of assisting
local members in trading mortgages among themselves. It does not func-
tion as a true broker, but merely brings the two parties together on an
informal basis.
2Just as the FNMA tends to abet the inflationary spiral during boom periods,
so also would it tend to accelerate a possible deflationary movement.
Dllring a downswing, the fixed interest returns on FHA. and VA loans would
appear more favorable and private investors "ftOuld become active buyers of
FNlfA holdings. Therefore, the tacil!ty would absorb current savings wi.th-
out a corresponding increase in real investment.
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as purchases from mortgage lenders in capital-short areas would tend to
be counterbalanced by sales to those in surplus markets.
In conclusion, the realization of a truly stable secondary mortgage
market is not yet clearly in view, although prospects are not altogether
unfavorable. It will certainly be a long time before private individuals
will feel free to purchase mortgage loans in the same manner as corporate
or government securities. Rather than expect the ultimate in secondary
trading, it would be a great achievement if appraisal standards and statu-
tory regulations were sufficiently modified so that institutional investors
would freely trade in mortgage paper. The road ahead is long and diffi-
cult, but there are indications that the private secondary market, espec-
ially when insured mortgages are concerned, will become progressively
stronger and more effective.
PART VIII. CHAPTER 15. SUIMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study will be concluded with a brief analysis of two timely issues,
some background material for which have been presented in the body of this
study. Firstly, the soundness of existing mortgage portfolios will be analyzed
with reference both to the adequacy of the interest rate structure as well
as the relation between surplus reserves and potential mortgage loss. Se-
condly, the influence of certain federal programs upon the competitive struc-
ture of the local mortgage market will be reviewed.
SOUNDNESS OF MORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS
Among the three types of institutions chosen for detailed study,
mortgages have always constituted a primary investment outlet for savings
capital. Among local cooperative banks and federal savings and loan asso-
ciations, real estate loans have consistently comprised over 70 per cent
of total resources, with the ratio exceeding 90 per cent in some cases.
Even savings banks, whose investment opportunities provide for a far more
widely diversified portfolio, have also regarded mortgage loans as their
major non-government investment. As indicated earlier in the study, lend-
ing operations of all institutions tend to vary directly with local real
estate activity, although the extent of these fluctuations is not uniform
among the various types. For example, local savings and loan associations
found a sharply curtailed demand for new home loans during the depression
years, but nevertheless assisted many existing home owners through rewriting
old-fashioned mortgage contracts and offered prospective home buyers liberal
long-term credit availability. Savings banks, on the other hand, largely
because of unsystematic mortgage loss policy, virtually withdrew from the
market precisely at a time when risk on new loans was at a minimum. As a
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consequence, mortgage-assets ratios among local savings banks had fallen
from a 52.2 per cent level in 1927 to 23.5 per cent by 1946. Corresponding
ratios among federals and cooperative banks in the latter year were 71.0
and 74.5 per cent, respectively.
Despite an unusually severe depression loss experience, mortgage loans
continue to represent a highly profitable investment. Indeed, gross losses
on mortgage holdings of all Mass achusetts savings banks during the years
1931-1945 amounted to only 1.16 per cent of the average outstanding port.
folio of unforeclosed mortgages. After deducting this amount as well as an
estimated 0.4 per cent per year for acquisition and servicing expense from
the average interest rate of 4.96 per cent, net yields realized on mortgage
portfolios during this 15-year period were 3.4 per cent per year. Hence,
even when evaluating mortgage experience at a time when delinquencies and
foreclosures were at a maximum, net yields were larger than could be ob-
tained in any year except 1933 on government bonds with maturities exceed-
ing 12 years. If the period under consideration were extended back into
the earlier prosperity years, mortgage yields were even more favorable, for
over the 39-year period, 1907-1945, aggregate losses represented only 0.6
per cent per year of the average volume of mortgages outstanding. Comparable
data are not available in regard to mortgage yields among local savings and
loan associations, but Professor Lintner estimates that their loss experience
corresponded quite closely with that on unamortized, 60 per cent residential
2
mortgages held by Massachusetts savings banks.
To summarize, not only does the spread between interest rates on mort-
gages and on other investments such as government bonds include a differential
11intner, op. cit., pp. 305-6.
2Lintner, 'Our Tremendous Mortgage Debt," Harvard Business Review, January
1949, p. 1C4.
risk premium, but this premium appears to have exceeded the actual loss
sustained by all major lender groups over the past half-century. The fact
that the losses which did develop were not smoothly and effectively handled
has been due in large part to the failure of lenders to set aside special
loss reserves effectively available for this purpose.1 Nevertheless, -while
a proper handling and use of reserves would have effected a more satisfactory
method of dealing with mortgage losses as they appeared, an improvement in
other phases of mortgage lending policy would undoubtedly have been even
more beneficial. Indeed, the fact that such heavy mortgage losses had
been sustained in the first place was due in large part to inadequate
methods of loan selection and servicing as well as an inferior contract
form (i.e., straight-term, non-amortized, etc.).
The postwar expansion in mortgage holdings has surpassed all pre-
vious peaks among many local lending institutions, and mortgage-assets
ratios have also advanced significantly. Aggregate portfolios of both local
savings banks and federals doubled in dollar volume during the first 5 post-
war years, while cooperative banks registered a less spectacular 33 per cent
advance. Furthermore, new loans written by savings banks over this period
were 2.2 times the outstanding balance in 1946. Inasmuch as unseasoned,
high percentage loans. based on highly inflated valuations dominate mort-
gage portfolios, some parties have expressed concern over the possible un-
soundness of the existing mortgage structure. This concern is not wholly
unfounded in view of the fact that much of the recent depression loss ex-
perience can be traced directly back to unsound mortgage investment policy
during the late 1920s.
Since maximum mortgage yields are necessarily limited by contract
interest rates, net yields on existing portfolios will undoubtedly be less
lLintner, Mutual Savings Banks, op. cit., Chapter XII.
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than in previous years, even assuming a most favorable experience during
the downswing of the cycle. Contract rates of interest on new mortgage
loans have followed rather closely the overall decline in interest yields
over the past two decades. Although average rates tend to be more flexible
on new than on aggregate mortgage holdings, the decline among the latter
has been equally significant. Between 1927 and 1951, average interest rates
on aggregate mortgage holdings of local savings banks fell from 5.99 to h.27
per cent, and of local cooperative banks from 6.20 to 4.59 per cent. Over
this 25-year span, interest rates on mortgage loans have consistently ex-
ceeded those on long-term government bonds by 1L to 2 per cent, although
this margin has narrowed recently in the case of institutions making h per
cent mortgages.2 The spread between average dividend rates and mortgage
rates has declined steadily since the prewar years, but is significantly
above the 1927 level among both savings and cooperative banks.3
Cost Components
As indicated in Part III, interest returns on mortgage loans are
expected to adequately cover three primary cost components, namely, divi-
dend returns, administrative costs, and risk compensation.4
These components will be briefly summarized with reference to the
existing rate structure. As shown in Tables IX and X, dividend rates
among both types of institutions fell steadily from the late 1920s well
1 Tables IX and X, Chapter 11.
2The long-term government rate on taxable bonds was 2.74 per cent in
January 1952.
3Tables IX and X, Chapter 11.
It should be repeated, howeirer, that earnings on invested surplus have
generally provided local institutions with substantial revenues; in the
past such revenues plus fines, etc., frequently covered total administra-
tive costs among local cooperative banks. On the other hand, the narrow
spread between interest and dividend rates during the late 1920s undoub-
tedly was inadequate to properly compensate for the heavy risk inherent
in the new mortgages being written at that time.
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into the postwar period. Since 1949 there haa been a slight upward tendency
in dividend returns once again, except in the case of cooperative bank
serial shares. In recent years savings banks and cooperative banks have
paid roughly the same return on ordinary savings accounts , with federals
generally offering a slightly higher yield. At the same time, however,
aggregate capital costs have been the highest among cooperative banks, for
paid-up and serial shares continue to domi.nate their capital structure on
which a premium return of up to a full 1 per cent has ordinarily been paid.
Hence, taken as a whole, savings banks have consistently attracted savings
capital by offering the smallest relative dividend return among local thrift
inatitutions, with the notable exception of commercial banks which have
1largely refrained from. active mortgage lending on other counts.
Little data are available as to the administrative expense involved in
procuring and maintaining mortgage port'foliQs. As indicated earlier in
the study, there appear to be some signific ant economies accruing to large-
scale mortgage operations , although unit costs vary widely among local thrift
~
institutions, both as to type as well ,as size." Among local savings banks
making choice new. loans at 4 per cent, including priinarily the lar gest
Boston institutions, an allowance of 0.5 per cent per year appears to be
2
adequate to cover all acquisition and servicing costs. Average costs ap-
pear to be considerably higher among cooperative banks than among savings
bankS, in part because of size differentials, but undoubtedly becc.use of
other factors as well. Expressed in terms of average operating expense per
$1,000 of assets, the respective cost ratios were $8.68 for cooperative banks
1See Cha.pter 10.
20ne progressive banker estimates such costs have risen in recent years
but still approximate 0.45 per cent per year on local mortgages, where all
servicing is performed by the bank i teel! • See below for yields on out-
of-sta,te investments.
1
and $4.92 for savings banks in 1950. A large part of the existing differ-
ential in average' expense ratios even among cooperative banks and savings
banks of similar asset size is due to the far more prominent position of
mortgages in the asset structure of the former associations. Indeed, it
is very possible that if the two institutions were comparable both with
respect to asset size as well as mortgage-assets ratio, the cost differen-
tial existing between local savings and cooperative banks would largely
2
disappear. In addition, some local savings banks continue to hold a
substantial volume of large income-property loans as well as unamortized
term loans, generally regarded as less expensive to service than small,
monthly payment type mortgages. Though comparable data are not available,
there is good reason to believe that operating costs among federals are
significantly higher than among either type of state-chartered institution.
Federals in particular maintain far more extensive advertising budgets than
any other type of mortgage lender, although some of the larger savings banks
have stepped up such activities in recent years. Most interviewed mortgage
officers from local savings and loan associations are quite uncertain about
precise servicing costs, but a margin of at least 2 per cent is frequently
3
mentioned as a minimum coverage for both risk and administrative expense.
Very little can be said with assurance regarding the risk component
implicit in the mortgage interest rates currently charged by local lending
institutions. Indeed, the extent of subsequent losses on any mortgage port-
folio depends upon a great many variables, some internal and some external
1Annual Report, Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks.
2
Unfortunately there is no simple method of testing this hypothesis, as
mortgage-assets ratios among cooperative banks consistently exceed those
cC savings banks by a significant margin.
31f the interest rate structure of local 'cooperative banks and federals
were analyzed in detail, one would probably discover that most of this 2
per cent margin should be alhcated to loss reserves, as loans made by these
associations tend to involve a higher risk assumption than corresponding
savings bank loans. (See below.)
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to the lending firm. Included among the primary internal variables are
the quality of loans in present and prospective portfolios, the adequacy
of servicing functions, and the ability to effectively handle mortgage
delinquency and default once such a contingency arises. A reasonably
complete understanding of past mortgage lending experience provides an
invaluable guide for future mortgage policy, but the element of uncertainty
can never be eliminated. Indeed, perhaps the most determining of all
factors concerns the extent of the economic reversal hypothesized, inasmuch
as delinquency and foreclosures tend to be cumulative and most damaging
during such periods.
Even assuming a subsequent loss experience as severe as that sustained
during the years 1931-1945, choice conventional loans written by savings
banks at 4 per cent appear to provide a satisfactory net yield. Thus,
after deducting 0.5 per cent per year for acquisition and servicing costs
and raiunuualy generous loss allowance of 1.2 per cent per year, net yields
on uninsured loans are but slightly below current long-term government yields.
As pointed out above, a more valid estimate of potential mort-age loss should
be based on previous lending experience over a longer period. Hence, if the
39-year interval, 1907-1945, were taken as a guide for mortgage risk, the
net yield on 4 per cent mortgages would be 2.9 per cent, slightly above
current government bond yields. Breaking down current rates in a different
manner, if the above cost rate of 0.5 per cent per year as well as the
current 2.3 per cent dividend rate on savings deposits were deducted from
the h per cent mortgage contract rate, an estimated 1.2 per cent per year
would still be available for reserve allocation.2
1This comparison overstates the attractiveness of government bonds, for
the bank must exert a certain amount of administrative detail in managing
these portfolios.
2 Inasmuch as dividend rates and administrative costs have drifted upward
since 1949, the margin for reserve allocation was even larger in earlier
years.
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Inasmuch as the mortgage loss experience of local savings and loan
associations has not been the subject of an intensive analysis, very little
can be said in regard to inherent risk in their respective portfolios.
Perhaps the minimum interest rate to be charged by local cooperative banks
and federals is somewhat higher than by savings banks on account of all
three cost components mentioned above. As reviewed earlier, these smaller
institutions have consistently faced a higher relative cost structure, and
have generally paid more generous dividend returns on savings capital.
With respect to risk implicit in mortgage transactions, several reasons
were advanced in Fart V to indicate that local savings and loan associa-
tions have on the whole been willing to write relatively high-risk mort-
gages. Whether this risk.be manifest in an unusually high loan-value ratio,
property location in an unstable or decadent neighborhood, antiquated con-
struction, or inferior borrower credit rating, many local associations have
continued to charge a full }L to 1 per cent premium above the rate realized
on prime savings bank mortgages. -Certainly one cannot ascribe a minimum
rate differential to properly compensate for the added risk inherent in
certain loans, but a differential of up to a full 1 per cent may be consis-
tent with a reasonable degree of competition.2
Favorable Risk Factors
Even if a forthcoming depression should prove to be as severe as the
last, some factors point to a more favorable mortgage loss experience while
others foretell the opposite situation. Only by weighing the relative in-
fluence of these opposing factors can any tentative conclusion be reached.
The latter factors relate primarily to the unseasoned, high percentage loans
which predominate most local mortgage portfolios. Inasmuch as such loans
have been based upon a highly inflated price structure, a sudden reversal
in economic activity might easily wipe out the accumulated thin equities,
1
As pointed out in Chapter 12, high-risk loans also tend to entail added
servicing costs, as such loans require close check to minimize delinquency
and accelerated property depreciation.
2See concluding summary on competitive structure.
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thereby resulting in substantial losses to the lending institution.
Among the favorable factors, the first relates to the increasing
significance of small home loans among mortgage portfolios of local savings
banks. Losses taken on residential loans made by all Massachusetts banks
between 1918 and 1931 were no more than half as large as those incurred
on aggregate portfolios. Indeed, all subsequent losses could have been
easily covered through reserves accumulated at the rate of 0.48 per cent
per year on outstanding balances.1 Furthermore, even on single-family
loans made during the years 1927-1929, subsequent losses amountedto only
0.6 per cent per year of the average life of the original loans.2 Inasmuch
as loans on 1- to 4-family properties have always dominated mortgage hold-
ings of local savings and loan association,s, the increasing prominence of
small home loans is less pronounced. On the other hand, loans on single-
family dwellings are undoubtedly more common today, especially among asso-
ciations financing new construction on a large scale.
Another favorable factor concerns the significant role played by
insured and guaranteed loans in the mortgage portfolios of local thrift
institutions. Although the FHA program has not been well received by local
federals and cooperative banks, VA loans have been generously written
throughout the postwar period, so that by 1951 insured and guaranteed loans
represented nearly a third of aggregate holdings of both lender types. The
participation of savings banks in these two federal programs has followed
much the same pattern so far as local properties are concerned, for in 1951
in-state FHA and VA loans accounted for 2.3 and 22.0 per cent, respectively,
of aggregate holdings. Since mid-1949, however, mortgage portfolios of local
savings banks have undergone substantial revision, largely resulting from
1Lintner, "Our Tremendous Mortgage ebt," op. cit., p. 96. The properties
included in aggregate portfolios ranged all the way from single-family
home to a fair grounds.
2Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks, op. cit., p. 312.
their authorization to make a limited investment in out-of-state mortgages.
By October 1951, nearly $100 million had been placed in these channels,
thereby increasing the proportion of aggregate mortgage holdings represented
by insured and guaranteed loans to 37.4 per cent. Largely because of this
extensive participation in the FHA and VA programs by savings banks, the
dollar volume of conventional mortgage holdings was actually larger in both
1927 and 1936 than in the peak postwar year 1951.
As indicated earlier, FHA and VA loans are not entirely free of risk,
although the probability of gross mortgage loss is effectively minimized.
FHA-insured loans are covered in full by the insurance feature and, in the
event of default, the mortgagee may choose whether to retain title to the
property or seek FHA debentures and a certificate of claim. The VA provides
only a partial guarantee against loss and reserves the right to determine
whether mortgagee or guarantor acquires the property title in the event of
foreclosure. On the other hand, the VA guarantee of up to 60 per cent of
the loan balance is sufficient to offset most contingent depression losses.
In addition to providing safety, federally-3ecured loans are undoubtedly
more marketable than any other type of mortgage contract, thereby injecting
a vital element of liquidity into mortgage portfolios. When distant FHA
or VA mortgages are purchased in the secondary market, the investing insti-
tution engages an outside agent to handle all servicing functions, ordinarily
entailing a fee of 0.5 per cent per year of the loan balance. Accordingly,
current nominal yields are seldom in excess of 3.75 per cent, but net yields
on such investments are still quite attractive. It should be emphasized
that these data on FHA and VA loans refer to overall mortgage holdings, and
1 Unless the savings bank is subject to the 2 of 1 per cent state excise tax
on its added out-of-state investments. See Chapter 14.
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of course indicate nothing about the individual portfolios concerned. Indeed,
whereas some local institutions have over one-half of their aggregate holdings
protected by either federal agency, others continue to concentrate on con-
ventional loans for the most part.
In addition to their substantial holdings of FHA and VA loans, local
lenders have perhaps improved the overall quality of their conventional
portfolios through various means. In regard to proper loan selection,
many local lenders appear to employ somewhat more thorough and systematic
risk rating techniques. Rather than rely upon a conservative debt-value
ratio as the primary criterion of soundness, lenders are placing an in-
creasing emphasis upon the credit rating of the borrower and his ability
to carry the attendant debt service. Furthermore, the long-term adequacy
of the pledged property is considered in the light of the economic charac-
teristics of the surrounding neighborhood and its secular development. As
indicated earlier, the risk analysis employed in all uninsured lending is
still far from this desired level, but there is definitely a tendency away
2
from the dangerous "curb appraisal" methods of the 1920s.
Perhaps the increasing concern over proper risk selection and loan
servicing is due in large part to the prominence of high-percentage, long-
term loans in mortgage portfolios. Indeed, only by careful loan selection
and servicing can these otherwise high-risk elements be effectively over-
come. At the same time, however, borrowers are le'ss frequently obliged to
seek second and third mortgage loans for supplementary financing. Even
though aggregate borrowings are roughly the same, mortgagors secure all
the necessary credit from one source on a relatively low cost, convenient
basis. Lender and borrower alike benefit from making debt repayment on a
lSee Lintner, "Our Tremendous Mortgage Debt," op. cit.,pp. 102-106.
2Certainly it is to be hoped that the lessons learned from the past disaster-
ous loss experience may .be used to advantage in minimizing mortgage delin-
quency through proper loan selection and servicing, and in effectively han-
dling defaulted mortgages once they occur.
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monthly direct-reduction basis, with principal, interest, and real estate
taxes all included together. Although amortization itself is no panacea
for mortgage loss, a systematic retirement of the outstanding obligation
safeguards the lender from heavy principal loss if a forthcoming depression
were to occur but a few years after such loans were written.1
Furthermore, the likelihood of mortgagor delinquency is perhaps signi-
ficantly lessened whenever debt service can be conveniently handled on a
monthly income basis. Not only as a matter of convenience, but borrower
motivation is properly stimulated by virtue of the fact that a progressively
larger equity in the property is lost if foreclosure becomes necessary during
the repayment period. Indeed, the fact that the recent depression loss ex-
perience of cooperative banks was no more favorable than that of residen-
tial holdings of savings banks can hardly be regarded as an indictment
against amortized loan contracts. On the contrary, the loss experience of
cooperative banks would have perhaps been far more disasterous if it were
not for regular principal repayment, especially if these institutions tended
to make relatively high-risk mortgages in the 1920s just as in the postwar
2
period.
Loss Reserves
An analysis of the current rate structure is essential in providing
an insight into the adequacy of these rates to properly compensate for the
various cost elements implicit in new mortgages being written. When con-
sidering the overall soundness of existing mortgage portfolios, however,
one generally refers to the adequecy of reserve accumulation to cover the
1 See Table II Part IV for a schedule showing the remaining debt balance on a
25-year loan after repayment has proceeded a varying number of years. Pro-
fessor Lintner observes that, if bank appraisals in 1929 had been 5 per cent
below current prices, an 80 per cent, 15-year loan would have had an out-
standing balance lower than current market valuation (based on new construc-
tion costs) in every depression year. Ibid., p. 104.
2For the relative loss experience, see Ibid., p. 104n.
potential losses arising out of these holdings. Since the depression years,
the surplus position of local thrift institutions has improved steadily, so
that by 1951 these reserves were at an all-time high relative to total re-
sources. Between 1930 and 1951, for example, book surplus as a percentage
of total assets increased from 7.76 to 10.55 per cent among all savings
banks in Massachusetts, and from 3.34 to 9.12 per cent among cooperative
banks. In 1951 surplus reserves in the 15 local federals represented 6.86
per cent of total assets, also presumably at or near an all-time high.
As a result of their favorable surplus position, local thrift institu-
tions could perhaps sustain relative mortgage losses in terms of total assets
fully as severe as during the last depression without seriously disrupting
normal bank operations. Gross losses on mortgage portfolios of Massachu-
setts savings banks amounted to $207.8 million during the last depression,
a sum equivalent to 9.0 per cent of total assets and 1.C5 times combined
book surplus in 1930. Even if the same share of total assets in 1951 were
to result in mortgage loss, this latter sum would represent but 0.85 times
1
present surplus. To be more realistic, the adequacy of present surplus
should be based upon the relation of total loss on past mortgage portfolios
to surplus existing at that time. Once again current prospects are favorable,
for even if 16.4 per cent of total mortgage portfolios held in 1951 resulted
in total loss, the dollar loss would represent but 0.61 times present surplus.2
Analogous observations may be made regarding potential loss on coopera-
tive bank portfolios. As indicated earlier, cooperative banks fared somewhat
better than savings banks in terms of relative loss on aggregate mortgage
1
When losses on securities are included as well, aggregate loss figures
relative to book surplus are correspondingly greater. See Lintner, Mutual
Savings Banks, op. cit.,p. 266. Also see footnote 1 on p. 465.
2 The 16.4 per cent value refers to the ratio between subsequent losses in
the years 1931-45 to mortgage portfolios in 1930.
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portfolios, largely because of the heavy non-residential holdings of the
latter. Among all cooperative banks in the Commonwealth, gross losses
during the years 1931-1945 amounted to 0.63 per cent per year of the
annual outstanding volume, in the aggregate equivalent to 1.88 times
1
their significantly smaller book surplus of 1931. By 1951, combined
surplus of the remaining state-chartered banks had more than tripled,
while mortgage portfolios has actually declined somewhat. Hence, if
subsequent losses were to amount to 7.14 per cent of existing mortgage
holdings, the total sum would constitute but 0.56 times the present
book surplus.
Two additional comments should be made relative to the adequacy of
existing bank reserves. In the first place, the mere existence of a sub-
stantial reserve accumulation does not in itself assure a satisfactory
mortgage-loss policy. Indeed, before mortgage delinquency and default
can be systematically handled, these retained earnings should be pro-
perly recognized and treated as bona fide loss reserves. In order to
minimize the characteristic reluctance among local banks to write down
book surplus as a matter of principle, the establishment of special mort-
2
gage valuations reserves has been proposed. In the second place, deposi-
tors in all local thrift institutions are largely protected against loss
through a network of central banks and deposit insurance funds. State-
chartered institutions belong to their own respective organizations, whereby
lIt must be remembered that private securities were much more prominent in
savings banks ' portfolios and actually accounted for nearly two-fifths of
total depression losses; hence,-it is to be expected that surplus bear a
higher ratio to mortgage portfolios among savings banks. It should be
mentioned, however, that potential losses arising out of bond portfolios are
undoubtedly far less severe today than 20 years ago. In 1930 private se-
curities accounted for 24.4 per cent and government securities 11.1 per cent,
respectively, of total assets for all savings banks in the Commonwealth.
In 1951, on the other hand, the relative importance of these investmenta
was reversed, with private and government securities constituting 10.8 and
46.8 per cent, respectively, of combined assets. In view of the predominance
of low-risk federal securities, the relation between non-mortgage portfolios
and existing surplus appears highly favorable.
2See Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks, op. cit., Chapter XII.
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state authorities may take over and operate insecure affiliated banks and
also tap the resources of the limited insurance funds if necessary. Feder-
als, and member state-chartered banks as well, may utilize the central re-
serve facilities of the Home Loan Bank, and the former have the added share
insurance protection of the FSLIC. Undoubtedly a repetition of the debacle
of the early 1930s would inflict a severe strain upon these state and federal
agencies, but their existence should go. far in -easing the burden among mem-
ber institutions, no small part of which revolves about a continued public
confidence in the safety of their deposited funds.
In summary, a final judgment as to the adequacy of the existing rate
structure and book surplus can be ascertained only at some future date when
mortgage delinquency and default perhaps mount once again. Certainly the
actual loss experience depends to such a great extent upon the severity of
the forthcoming downswing hypothesized that even an informed guess is of
limited value. Undoubtedly the fact that savings banks as a whole refrained
from active mortgage lending at a time when overall risks were at a minimum
and have surged back into dominance during inflationary periods has in-
fluenced the potential loss in such portfolios. Savings and loan associa-
tions are less guilty of this charge, as lending operations have been a
bit more stable over the cycle. It remains to be seen, however, whether or
not improved techniques of mortgage selection and servicing, full amortiza-
tion contracts, and other favorable factors will be sufficient to offset
the various opposing factors. On the whole, it seems highly probable that,
providing a future depression is no more severe than the last, local savings
banks and savings and loan associations are.fairly well fortified against
loss. Not only are the major cost components well compensated by the exist-
ing interest rate structure but book surplus also appears to be in a far
healthier position today than 20 years ago.
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Inasmuch as current revenues from mortgage loans as well as other
investments have enabled local thrift institutions to expand book surplus
to unprecedented levels, the present upward drift in dividend returns
among the stronger banks appears well justified. Indeed, since they
are truly mutual institutions, both savings banks and savings and loan
associations are obliged to distribute those earnings which are not re-
quired for loss reserves or other specific purposes. Now that their re-
tained earnings are subject to the federal corporate profits tax after re-
serves approach a certain level, local institutions may be more inclined to
either reduce mortgage inter.est rates or increase dividend rates in the near
2
future. In view of the overall tightening in interest rates throughout the
country, the latter eventuality seems a bit more likely. As indicated ear-
lier, lenders are perhaps more selective in extending liberal credit today
than in the early postwar years, but there has been no perceptible advance
in average contract rates.
IMPACT OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION UPON THE COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE OF THE LOCAL.WMRKET
The issue of raising dividend payments or reducing interest rates on
some or all mortgage loans once again raises the philosophical question as
to what thrift institutions seek to maximize, a question which defies a
simple explanation. Both rates are tied in with the general capital funds
market in some fashion, but the degree of isolation between these markets
varies widely through time as well as among areas at any given time. For
instance, the level of dividend rates is roughly related to current yields
1 Cf. the narrowing spread between mortgage interest rates and dividend
returns, Tables IX, X, Chapter 11.
On the other hand, they may prefer to utilize otherwise taxable revenues
in enlarging salary or advertising budgets. The former may involve a
permanent increase, while advertising may be expanded only until the levy
is eliminated or reduced.
468
on savings bonds, insurance policies, and other public investments, as
well as the necessary compensation for parting with cash liquidity. Such
a functional relationship is a tenuous one at best, for many systematic
thrift programs are of a long-term nature, whether they involve insurance
premiums, payroll savings, or savings and loan serial shares, and the indi-
viduals concerned are not at liberty to shift from one plan to another with-
out a substantial sacrifice in yield.1 On most conventional thrift accounts,
however, the savings institution may adopt a fairly flexible dividend poli-
cy, adjusting current rates to corespond with changing market conditions.
Changing mortgage rates, on the other hand, is not so simple when an in-
stitution is holding a substantial portfolio of long-term loans. Conse-
quently, many are reluctant to reduce existing rates below a level which
appears permanent, lest they risk a substantial loss in long-run income
2
maximization in the event of subsequent rate advances. Aside from the
problem of anticipated rate changes, mortgage lending policies are dependent
upon the relative attractiveness of alternate investment outlets, notably
government bonds and choice private corporate securities. Once again,
however, thrift institutions both because of custom and statutory regula-
tions ascribe a widely varying role to mortgage investment in their res-
pective portfolios.
Savings banks, as indicated earlier, were initially established to
provide a depositary for community savings, and all investment decisions,
pertaining. to mortgage lending as well as other forms of investment, have
been regarded as subordinate to the accomplishment of this goal. In other
le.g., special club accounts promote regular savings but offer no special
premium for it; indeed, frequently no. dividends whatever are paid on these
small accounts on grounds that they are unusually expensive to service.
2Methods of hedging against this eventuality are reviewed in Part V.
words, savings banks are afforded an opportunity to invest in various
private and governmental securities as well as out-of-state mortgages
whenever local mortgage demands appear relatively less attractive. In a
sense, life insurance companies pursue the same objectives, that of maximi-
zing investment income consistent with safety, but in this case the supply
cost of investible funds is somewhat more rigid by virtue of long-term pre-
mium and adjustment schedules on policies outstanding. Moreover, these
companies are perhaps less bound than most thrift institutions to maintain
a steady mortgage investment in their local communities, and are afforded
considerable latitude in placing funds in various mortgage markets through-
out the nation or in any of a great many other investment outlets. Savings
and loan associations, at the opposite extreme, regard the promotion-of home
ownership and community thrift as coordinate objectives, and on a policy
level at least are supposed to ascribe equal significance to their realiza-
1
tion. Provided competitive conditions permit, insurance companies and
savings banks may feel obliged to increase dividend returns as soon as
adequate loss reserves have been established. At the same time, savings
and loan associations perhaps feel an equal responsibility to lower mort-
gage rates, thereby effectively reducing overall- costs of home purchase
and widening opportunities for individual home ownership.
In practice, however, there may be little or no difference in the
operations of these various lender types, as the existence of all types
in the same market area permits but a relatively narrow range for arbitrary
policy-making. Furthermore, one should not gain the impression that raising
dividend rates and lowering mortgage interest rates necessarily constitute
the accomplishment of contradictory objectives. On the contrary, the reali-
zation of these goals may come hand in hand, and the latter is frequently
1 The varying degrees of attachment to mortgage lending as a primary invest-
ment outlet have been amply demonstrated by the impact of the upward drift
in bond rates, especially since early 1951, upon a continuing interest in
VA and FHA mortgages among insurance companies and conventional thrift
institutions. See Chapter 14.
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a prerequisite for the former. Whenever demand for mortgage credit appears
relatively elastic, either to the firm or to the system of firms, individual
lenders may find a rate reduction to be an effective means of stimulating
a heavier inflow of mortgage applications and hence of augmenting revenues.
For example, at the close of the Second World War, local savings banks re-
garded a significant reduction in current interest rates as essential in
reversing the steady downward movement in operating income and dividend returns.
Over the past two decades the interest rate structure has declined to
what might appear to be a permanently lower plateau. The significant de-
clines in both mortgage rates and dividend returns reflect in large part
the overall movements in this structure and are not the result of forces
operating within the mortgage sector alone. While one cannot delineate
the specific role played by any given institutional factor in influencing
this movement, the significance of federal intervention in both local and
nationwide mortgage markets should not be overlooked. Perhaps no one would
deny the dominant influence exerted by the federal government in establishing
and maintaining an easy-money policy well into the postwar period. Similarly,
federal activities and agencies have had a profound influence upon specific
mortgage contracts written as well as lending practices and policies fol-
lowed in the Boston market area. This is not the place to appraise the
overall desirability of federal intervention into hitherto private sectors,
but brief reference should be drawn to its impact upon the competitive
structure of the local mortgage market.
Disregarding the philosophical considerations underlying these efforts,
it can be shown that federal activities have afforded positive benefits to
home buyer and depositor alike, with the lending institution sharing in
1See below.
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the gain of both. Certainly many of these benefits would have arisen as
a natural outgrowth of existing conditions, but federal efforts have tended
to accelerate their development. Inasmuch as these gains are mutually
shared by the three parties concerned, they will be considered jointly in
the discussion that follows.
Prewar Competitive Structure
A perusal of limited data has confirmed the impression shared by
numerous interviewed parties that local savings banks as a whole had long
enjoyed a commanding influence over mortgage lending operations, perhaps
as late as the onset of the recent major depression. These institutions
had been firmly entrenched in their respective communities for over a
century in many cases, and prospective mortgagors as well as depositors
looked to them as the primary source for such services. Cooperative banks
and savings departments of local trust companies grew rapidly during the
booming 1920s, but hardly constituted much of a threat to the continuing
dominance of savings banks. The latter rarely found it necessary to engage
in outright price cutting or extensive advertising campaigns, as the de-
sired mortgage level could be maintained without resort to such tactics.
Indeed, once such a level had been established, the bank could maintain
the same mortgages within its portfolio for an indefinite period. As pointed
out earlier, their unamortized mortgage portfolios were simple to service,
provided generous interest yields, and rendered mortgage investment policy
a routine matter. Moreover, such loans were reasonably secure, especially
when the pledged property provided steacy rental income for the mortgagor
and was adequately maintained. As a result of these "favorable" factors,
the lending institution seldom felt inclined to seek substantial principal
repayment until liquidity needs would warrant.
1During this period, cooperative banks functioned primarily as small
community institutions, facilitating local home purchases through providing
long-term credit for existing shareholders. Being of modest means, such
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individuals required high-percentage loans, but the absolute dollar amount
was relatively low. For the best mutual interests.of borrower and lender,
repayment was set up on a level monthly payment basis under the traditional
share-accumulation plan. Quite naturally, such loans were relatively
expensive to service, both because of the type of mortgage contract as
well as the small loan amounts concerned. At the same time, cooperative
banks were compelled to continually seek new mortgages in order to keep
funds fully employed, inasmuch as existing loans were automatic ally retired
in full as soon as the sinking fund reached a certain level. Indeed, a
local cooperative bank executive frankly admits that his bank got merely
"the drippings" from mortgage business which would otherwise be refused
by savings banks.
This easy life among savings banks was abruptly checked following the
downswing of the early 1930s. While public confidence in the soundness of
these institutions was amply demonstrated by the heavy inflow of panic
savings from rival depositaries, savings banks were entering a period in
which their previous dominance was seriously challenged on several counts.
First of all, the creation and adoption of various federal and state de-
posit and share insurance funds gradually restored public trust in any
approved thrift institution. Thereafter the community of savers began to
select a depositary on the basis of more than safety alone, notably inclu-
ding dividend returns and convenience. Thus, while the widespread adoption
of deposit and share insurance did not in itself impair the position of
local savings banks, their competitive advantage of assuring absolute
safekeeping was gradually waning in significance.
lSee Chapter 5.
2See Chapter 5.
A far more serious challenge to the dominance of savings banks resulted
from the re-chartering of several local cooperative banks into federal sav-
ings and loan associations. This authcrization, in addition to the crea-
tion of FSLIC referred to above, provided member associations a new lease
on life whereby they might enter the loc al savings and mortgage markets
with added vigor. A deficiency of share capital posed no particular pro-
blem for most federals, as they could readily secure substantial advances
from the newly-created Federal Home Loan Bank to make new mortgage loans.
Thus, protected by federal share insurance and afforded liberal credit
availability from the central bank, local federals were properly equipped
to embark on a spectacular expansionary program during the prewar period.
Savings banks, on the other hand, were so busily engaged in handling delin-
quent and defaulted loans that new mortgage applications were entertained
only where an exceptionally good showing was made. Being preoccupied with
clearing up the unfavorable consequences of earlier unsound lending prac-
tices, these institutions were, either unaware of, or indifferent toward the
rapid rise of newly-chartered federals. The latter not only welcomed loan
applications but enthusiastically promoted individual home ownership through
advertising and publicity campaigns of unprecedented proportions.
A vital key to the success of local federals, and of the more progres-
sive cooperative banks as well, concerned the offering of high-percentage,
direct-reduction loan contracts. Whereas savings and loan associations had
always recognized the merits of fully amortized loans in their share-
accumulation schemes, it took more overt federal intervention before genuine
direct-reduction contracts would be universally adopted. Not only were
federals required to write new home mortgages on this new monthly payment
basis, but the FHA and HOLC also had similar provisions. Whereas FHA-
insured loans were made rarely in the Boston area, 1 the HOLC proved to be
1See Part VI.
most helpful in disposing of frozen mortgage holdings among all types of
local thrift institutions. At any rate, federals offered the type of mort-
gage program which the home buying community preferred, while savings banks
persisted in writing loans on a straight-term basis, if at all. Although
both factors are signific ant, it is hardly stretching the point to state
that federals achieved dominance in the prewar mortgage market as much
through default as through their own aggressive efforts. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that federals expanded portfolios without making any substantial
concessions in the form of lower interest rates. Advertising and other
forms of non-price competition, coupled with a significant liberalization
of such quasi-price components as loan-value ratios and loan terms, were
used as primary tools in realizing this growth.
Postwar Structure
The competitive struggle for new loans in the postwar period has al-
ready been analyzed in some detail,1 so only brief reference will be made
here. Savings banks had finally completed their extended depression fore-
closure program and once again sought to rebuild sorely depleted mort-
gage portfolios. Their re-entrance into the local market was not automatic,
however, as federals and other rival lenders had retained many of the solid
ties established during the prewar era. The inherent surplus capital char-
acteristics of this market became increasingly pronounced and savings banks
were virtually compelled to make substantial concessions in order to recoup
some of their loss in relative position. Loan contracts which appeared to
be fully as liberal as those written by most federals were offered by these
banks and interest rates were reduced to h per cent in many cases.2 Al-
though they were opposed to the principle of honoring brokerage fees, most
1Chapters 10-12.
2 This similarity in contract provisions does not necessarily imply similar
risk characteristics. See Chapter 12.
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Despite these favorable signs, the awareness of specific contract
provisions is far from perfect among the home buying community. Lending
practices and mortgage terms still display a wide variation within each
lender type as well as among the principal types, a variation which c annot
be wholly explained on economic grounds. There is reason to believe that
cooperative banks and federals tend to accept a relatively high degree of
risk in making 5 per cent loans on a conventional basis, while those large
savings banks which offer 4 per cent credit strive to be highly selective in
placing their funds.1 As shown in the first section of this Part, a gross
rate of 4 per cent on the latter appears to be adequate to cover the major
implicit cost elements associated with mortgage lending. Whether or not
this rate approximates that equilibrium rate which would exist under a
theoretical perfectly competitive situation cannot be judged at this
point. In face of rising net yields on government bonds and prime corpor-
ate securities, a 4 per cent ratd hardly appears unjustifiably high.
It is doubtful, however, whether the } - 1 per cent premium charged by
suburban savings banks and most savings and loan associations is always
the minimum compensation required for the additional risk involved. Exten-
sive adv-rtising, coupled with effective salesmanship, has greatly assisted
local federals in maintaining a steady inflow of mortgage applications.
Furthermore, the universal adoption of direct-reduction mortgage contracts
has undoubtedly led 'inany buyers to be more concerned about monthly payment
than other important price elements, notably interest rates and length of
repayment term. Cooperative banks continue to enjoy the utmost allegiance.
of their shareholders in regard to making home mortgages. Some bank offi-
cers frankly admit that rival s avings banks in the immediate community would
offer essentially the same liberal credit at a significantly lower rate.
1See Chapter 12.
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Home buyers are ignorant of alternate sources of credit, and prefer to deal
with small community institutions with which they are familiar. Indeed,
one savings bank officer reports that occasionally home owners are surprised
to learn of the convenient mortgage plans available at savings banks. In
large part because of ineffective merchandising efforts among the latter,
many mortgagors continue to regard savings and loan associations as the only
place where monthly payment mortgages are available.
In a similar vein, the mortgage interest rate structure continues to
besignificantly lower among the large Boston savings banks than among smaller
suburban institutions. As explained in Chapter 12, the former often regard
} of 1 per cent as the minimum compensation to counter-balance the relative
locational advantage enjoyed by banks in suburban residential communities.
Thus, even though the five largest banks account for over two-fifths of
total mortgage recordings among all savings banks in the Boston area, few
genuine monopolistic privileges accrue to this dominance. Rather than
operate as a collective unit, these dominant firms have vigorously competed
with one another in aecuring new loans for postwar portfolio expansion.
Certainly individual home buyers rarely shop around among city and suburban
institutions for the "best deal"t in mortgage credit, preferring to accept
the offer of nearby banks as most satisfactory. Accordingly, the large
Boston banks can keep their savings capital optimally employed only if
home buyers in outlying sections are attracted to them in great numbers.
It is here that builders and brokers perform an essential service, but the
latter atleast are frequently extremely sensitive of relative contract pro-
visions offered by rival lending institutions. Through these operations,
a certain degree of uniformity in long-term credit availability has been
achieved within the center of the local market area, although this tendency
becomes less pronounced as one extends outward into suburban districts.
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Confirmed supporters of state-chartered thrift institutions have always
decried the indiscriminate spread of federal influence into their own qphere
of operations. Steeped in traditional New England conservatism, these par-
ties absolutely refuse to deal with any bureaucratic federal administration
unless dictated by necessity, It is interesting to note, however, that the
nature of their attacks upon the existence and growth of federal savings
and loan associations have been modified in recent years. During the late
1930s, most objections to the activities of local federals revolved about
specific lending practices, particularly with respect to the aggressive
promotional tactics employed and the liberal high-percentage, long-term
contracts written. In the postwar period, however, rival institutions have
found some merit in certain of these practices and now appear to decry the
existence of federals on a more philosophical level. Several interviewed
parties have referred to two separate features of the operations of federals
that contradict the "very heart of true time-tested mutual banking."
The first of these objections concerns the creation of branch banks
in communities not adjacent to the home office of the parent bank. Whereas
state-chartered institutions may seek permission to set up branch offices
only within the county of incorporation, two federals in Worcester and
Pittsfield have established such offices in "distant" Springfield. Whereas
the federals involved point to the crying need for more adequate credit faci-
lities in the Springfield area, state banking interests have taken legal
action against this extension of federal influence on grounds that conver-
sion should not exempt an association from long-standing regulations, and
also that the area concerned is overbanked already. The second objection
centers about the liberal borrowing facilities of federals from the Home
Loan Bank and other sources. Whereas state-chartered banks are dependent
upon the inflow of community savings to provide investible funds, federals
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are limited only by their extended line of credit. As a result, the
latter have borrowed extensively to meet the credit demands of home buyers
in mortgage markets already blessed with an abundance of long-term capital.
In a similar vein, savings bank interests in particular have attacked the
policy among local federals of permitting dangerously high mortgage-assets
ratios without setting up adequate loss reserves. A leading savings bank
executive summarizes this position as follows:
. . . . We believe that savings banks are ready to meet all fair
competition from soundly operated savings institutions, but some
of our competitors appear to be acting on the theory that federal
insurance is a substitute for reserves. The public is led to be-
lieve that these institutions will pay on demand, yet they invest
all but a small per cent of their funds in long-term mortgages and
then borrow against their liquidity funds to make more investments
in mortgages.
From an academic point of view, it has perhaps been contrary to the
principle of optimum resource allocation in many cases for federals to
seek Home Loan Bank advances merely to make additional mortgage loans.
State-chartered institutions, especially savings banks, had vast sums of
long-term capital ideally suited for sound mortgage investment. Lack of
perfect knowledge among the various parties concerned, coupled with a
singularly ineffective merchandising program on the part of many savings
banks, has resulted in an inordinate proportion of new mortgage businees
being directed to local federals. The former continued to hold substantial
portfolios of low-yielding government bonds unless positive measures were
taken toward expanding their mortgage lending activity.
When analyzing the competitive elements in- the local market, there is
a very real danger of overstating the influence of federal intervention,
1 Cf. surplus positions of various lender types, p. 46 above.
2Address by T. W. Symons at Massachusetts Savings Banks Association Annual
Convention, 1951, Reprinted in U. S. Investor, September 29, 1951, pp. 52-54.
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for the lessons learned from the recent depression loss experience as well
as the natural development of lending practice would have achieved similar
results. There is no doubt, however, that the spectacular growth of feder-
als had a very direct bearing upon the difficult competitive struggle that
local savings banks faced in re-entering the postwar market. Their quasi-
monopolistic position had been lost and the surplus nature of their investible
capital became increasingly apparent. This is not to say that savings bank
resources performed a subordinate role in financing the unprecedented housing
boom in the postwar era, but merely that alternate sources of credit were
mounting in significance. Savings bank leaders soon realized that local
mortgage demands were insufficient to absorb the vast sums of investible
funds without endangering the soundness of the entire mortgage structure.
Hence, just as federals had assisted in rendering local mortgage lending in-
creasingly competitive, so also did the FHA and VA provide a mortgage in-
strument to alleviate any undesirable consequences of this development.
As analyzed in Part VII, all savings banks were authorized in 1949 to make
a limited investment in insured and guaranteed mortgages regardless of
geographic location. By virtue of this authorization, dependent almost
entirely upon the uniform quality characteristics of the mortgage contract,
savings banks are now afforded an opportunity to attain a degree of liqui-
dity and diversification in their portfolios never before possible. At the
same time, secondary market purchases of local s avings banks are improving
the overall competitive structure of the nationwide mortgage network by
facilitating a flow of funds into optimal mortgage investment channels.
The rapid growth of federals has undoubtedly caused all local state-
chartered .institutions to re-examine their own policies and practices, with
an eye toward maintaining their relative positions in the savings and mort-.
gage markets. In the case of cooperative banks, however, the impact of
federal chartering has been even more direct, for the continued existence
of the system of state-chartered associations is at stake. The immediate
appeal of federal share insurance coupled with liberal borrowing and lend-
ing opportunities prompted a large number of local banks to relinquish their
state charters during the prewar period. As indicated earlier, conversion
was readily accomplished during these years, but since 1938 ardent coopera-
tive bank supporters have been quite successful in blocking further deser-
tions from the state ranks. Indeed, beginning in 1943 conversion was abso-
lutely forbidden by statute as an emergency measure, with the prohibition
being successively extended through most of 1950. Under current regula-
tions, an association is technically eligible to convert from state to
federal charter, and vice versa, whenever a two-thirds vote of all quali-
fied shareholders is secured. In view of the disinterest among a great
many small shareholders in the typical bank, conversion is difficult to
accomplish today, even where most active parties favor the move. Hence,
only one cooperative bank in the Boston vicinity has acquired a federal
charter since the prohibitive clause was removed.
It is entirely possible that the system of cooperative banks has ac-
tually strengthened its overall position in the market and that the incen-
tives for conversion are perhaps less pressing today than during the post-
depression years. Many of the weaker banks were either forced into liqui-
dation during the depression years or merged with nearby stronger institu-
tions without loss to the individual shareholders. During the postwar
years, the surplus position of local cooperative.banks has attained a more
wholesome ratio to outstanding mortgage portfolios than ever before in
their 75-year history. As far as home mortgages are concerned, lending
lIn Part III operating positions of converting banks were compared with those
which did not convert. In many cases the former appeared relatively weak,
and consistently relied upon borrowed funds more extensively. Others, how-
ever, were among the stronger banks and regarded the acquisition of a federal
charter as an effective method of facilitating a rapid and sound growth.
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opportunities now available to these state-chartered institutions are nearly
as liberal as those of federals, with respect both to loan amount and repay-
ment term. Furthermore, local cooperative banks have substantial holdings
of VA-guaranteed loans, which provide a certain degree of liquidity as
well as invaluable protection against substantial mortgage loss in a sub-
sequent downswing. Finally, most of the larger banks are members of the
Home Loan Bank System, and as such may tap these central reserves in the
event of emergency liquidity needs. In view of these other elements of
strength, most local cooperative banks apparently regard their own small
Central Bank and Share Insurande Fund as wholly adequate to meet any con-
tingency.
Perhaps the best interests of borrower and lender alike are promoted
through a continued co-existence of state- and federally-chartered savings
and loan associations. By preserving such a dual system of banking, each
type of association acts as an effective check upon the operations of the
other, and the community of savers and borrowers stand to benefit from this
wholesome rivalry. Provided conversion from one type charter to the other
can be accomplished with. a minimum of arbitrary detail and red tape, each
group will strive to meet the changing needs of their patrons. Under exist-
ing conditions, however, there is the real possibility that the impediments
retarding the chartering of more federals reflect a latent desire to pre-
serve the system of cooperative banks regardless of the relative merits of
each type. Undoubtedly ardent cooperative bank advocates would regard the
loss of several additional strong banks to the group of- federals as detri-
mental to the continuing soundness of the remaining institutions. At the
same time, some of the small non-member cooperative banks would perhaps
encounter difficulty in securing membership in the Home Loan Bank System
as well as share insurance coverage by the FSLIC. Thus, aside from the
possible social or political benefits accruing to their continued existence,
the present concerted efforts toward preserving the cooperative bank net-
work in tact has the effect of preserving individual competitors instead of
competition. Even though overall bank efficiency may not be in direct
proportion to firm size for an indefinite range, the long-run efficacy of
a thrift institution with total resources of less than $3C0 thousand is
open to serious question.2
Emergence of Specialized Mortgage Lenders
Up to the recent depression at least, the functions of the various
types of financial institutions were sharply defined with a minimum of
overlapping. Since this period, however, a combination of federal inter-
ventionary and private efforts have gradually narrowed these gaps, end in
many cases the savings and lending activities of local thrift institutions
are scarcely distinguishable. Cooperative banks have abandoned their in-
sistence upon systematic thrift, whereby non-complience necessarily resulted
in fines, and have offered ordinary savings shares in increasing volume.
Moreover, shareholders may frequently invest in such savings shares without
any significant sacrifice in dividend yields. Savings banks, on the other
hand, have invested far more heavily in residential loans during the postwar
period than previously. They have also written nearly all new mortgage con-
tracts on a long-term, direct-reduction basis, in direct contrast to the
situation prevailing in the 1920s. Just as savings banks have drawn nearer
to savings and loan associations in regard to making home loans, federals at
1 This opinion was mentioned by executives of local federals and cooperative
banks alike; the latter officials, however, tended to favor the gradual
abandonment of the State Share Insurance Fund, a view not shared by most
cooperative bankers. Local Home Loan Bank officials, on the other hand,
did'not refer whatever to the possible inability of certain small banks
to qualify for.membership.
Especially in areas which are already well supplied with alternate credit
sources.
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least have extended their lending operations to include a limited volume of
large income-property loans, a sphere previously reserved for savings banks
and others. It should be remarked, however, that most federals continue to
concentrate almost entirely on small residential mortgages, and even the
1
largest associations have shown little interest in non-residential properties.
Now that the traditional lines of demarcation separating the various
lender types have become less distinct, some interviewed persons express
the belief that a single-type institution is an inevitable consequence. Such
a view is frequently shared by savings and loan interests, who quite expec-
tedly regard an extension of their own methods of operation as the optimum
arrangement. As analyzed in Part VII, ardent supporters of Home Loan Bank
activities regard the evolution of a uniform type of lending institution as
the natural means of attaining a truly effective secondary market.
Despite the increasing evidence of uniformity in regard to lending prac-
tices, the emergence of a system of truly specialized mortgage lending in-
stitutions appears highly remote indeed. So long as vast sums of long-term
capital are held by such institutional investors as life insurance companies,
the mortgage market will be heavily influenced by the operations of these
"fair weather" lenders. Constituting an effective competitive fringe, in-
surance companies, as well as commercial and savings banks to an increasing
extent, will continue to enter and withdraw from active participation in
various mortgage and securities markets more or less in accordance with
relative net yields. Especially with the increasing recognition of the
uniform quality characteristics of FHA-insured mortgages, the continuing
existence of lender types dependent in varying degrees upon mortgage lending
1 The latter are included in the 15 per cent of assets category referred to
in Chapter 5. A large federal outside the Boston vicinity has often pur-
chased home mortgages on a large-scale block basis, frequently involving
VA-guaranteed loans on distant properties.
as an investment outlet may provide a most satisfactory arrangement. Indeed,
if private interests maintain an active participation in the secondary market
and if perchance a private FNMA were established, the nationwide mortgage
market would be materially strengthened and stabilized. By trading freely
in insured paper, a more equitable distribution of the available long-term
credit would result and lending institutions in surplus areas could maintain
reasonably well-diversified and profitable mortgage portfolios at all times.
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